Parental Resp Conc LAL

25CA0645 Parental Resp Conc LAL 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0645
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV30202
Honorable Christine A. Washburn, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning L.A.L. and E.E.L., Children,

and Concerning Clifford A. Bloch and Natalie Bloch,

Appellees,

and

David Samuel Lechner,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Springer & Steinberg, P.C., Amy M. Springer, Michael P. Zwiebel, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellees

Robinson & Henry, P.C, Zach Williams, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 David Samuel Lechner (father) appeals the district court’s

order requiring him to pay retroactive child support for L.A.L. and

E.E.L. (the children). We affirm the order.

I. Background

¶2 Father and mother were involved in divorce proceedings when,

before the permanent orders hearing, father shot and killed mother.

Mother’s parents (grandparents) took custody of the children

immediately after the incident.

¶3 Grandparents later moved for a child support order, including

a request for retroactive support to the time of mother’s death in

March 2023, pursuant to section 19-6-104, C.R.S. 2025. The court

held an evidentiary hearing at which father represented himself.

Father and grandfather testified, and the parties submitted written

closing arguments. After the hearing, but before the court issued a

written order, a jury convicted father of first degree murder, and he

was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

¶4 The court then issued a written order requiring father to pay

retroactive child support in a lump sum payment of $560,000. The

court noted this amount was a deviation from the child support

guidelines but found the presumptive amount inequitable, unjust,

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or inappropriate based on the fact that father was responsible for

mother’s death, that father was in prison for life and thus had very

few upcoming living expenses, and that father had sufficient

financial resources to pay the amount awarded.

¶5 Father appeals.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion

because the issue of a parent’s financial resources is factual in

nature. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo. App.

2011). Abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s child

support determination is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. In re Marriage of Atencio, 47 P.3d 718, 720 (Colo. App.

2002). When a district court’s order is supported by competent

evidence, it should not be disturbed on review. In re Marriage of

Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989).

III. Relevant Law

¶7 For child support purposes, “income” means the actual gross

income of a parent from any source. § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2025; Davis, 252 P.3d at 534; see also § 19-6-106, C.R.S. 2025

(section 14-10-115 applies to child support actions brought

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pursuant to title 19). The statute defines income broadly to include

sources beyond those specifically listed. See In re A.M.D., 78 P.3d

741, 743-44 (Colo. 2003). And a source of income not listed in the

statute may be included in a parent’s gross income for child

support purposes if it is available to the parent to pay their

expenses or increase their standard of living. See id. at 746.

¶8 Using the parent’s income and other factors, the court

calculates an amount using the guideline and schedule under

section 14-10-115(7), which establishes a rebuttable presumption

of the amount of child support a parent owes. § 14-10-115(8)(e);

see In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1214 (Colo. App. 2011).

A court may deviate from the guidelines and schedule if applying

them would be “inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate,” but such

deviation must be accompanied by findings “specifying the reasons

for deviation.” § 14-10-115(8)(e).

IV. Income Determination

¶9 Father argues the district court erred when it determined his

income for the purposes of calculating his child support obligation.

He also claims that the court improperly imputed him income

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despite his incarceration without possibility of parole. We are not

persuaded.

A. Father Did Not Preserve His Argument that the Funds Were
Unavailable

¶ 10 Father first claims that the court inappropriately considered

funds disbursed from his investment accounts and proceeds from

the sale of the marital home as “income” because “such funds are

not available [for his] discretionary use.” But father did not present

this argument to the district court. On appeal, he asserts that he

preserved the “sum and substance” of his argument by generally

asking the court to decline to award child support in his closing

argument, and that this court must liberally interpret his pleadings

because he was pro se. We disagree.

¶ 11 To preserve an issue for appeal, the party must bring the issue

to the district court’s attention, giving the court an opportunity to

rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570

(Colo. App. 2010). And although we liberally construe a pro se

party’s arguments, we cannot invent arguments father has not

made. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34; Minshall v. Johnston,

2018 COA 44, ¶ 21. Father urges us to consider his argument

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because he was pro se at the hearing but provides no authority

indicating that an appellate court may disregard the principle of

preservation simply because a party acted pro se at the district

court level. See Anderson v. Shorter Arms Investors, LLC, 2023 COA

71, ¶ 25 (noting that liberal construction of pro se pleadings does

not include considering arguments that are not preserved).

Moreover, “[a] pro se litigant who chooses to rely upon his own

understanding of legal principles and procedures is required to

follow the same procedural rules as those who are qualified to

practice law and must be prepared to accept the consequences of

his mistakes and errors.” Rosenberg v. Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26

(Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 12 In support of his argument that he preserved the issue of

whether the funds were “available for discretionary use,” father,

who is now represented by counsel, cites an unpublished case, In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.L., (Colo. App. No. 23CA1269,

Aug. 29, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). Of course,

unpublished opinions announced by this court “have no value as

precedent.” Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40 (quoting

Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992,

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999 (Colo. 2003)). And it is this court’s policy that parties are

generally forbidden from citing unpublished opinions. See Colorado

Court of Appeals, Citation Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of

Unpublished Opinions (2025), https://perma.cc/M9HG-J295

(stating that citation of unpublished opinions is prohibited absent

certain exceptions that do not apply here).

¶ 13 In any event, father testified at the hearing that he did not

want his money to go to support his children because he needed the

money to hire a criminal defense team, to pay his “other bills and

loans,” and to pay for “commissary, sweats, food, all the kind of

stuff that you do in prison.” Accordingly, father’s own testimony

indicated that he believed the funds were available for his

discretionary use.

B. The Court Did Not Impute Income to Father Going Forward

¶ 14 Father next argues that the court erred when it imputed

income to him in contravention of section 14-10-115(5)(b)(I)(C),

which provides that “a determination of potential income must not

be made for an incarcerated parent sentenced to one hundred

eighty days or more.” But father does not point us to, nor can we

locate in the record, the district court’s purported mistake. To be

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sure, the court found that the guideline amount of child support for

the year 2025 was ten dollars per month. But this was not an

income determination as father appears to claim. Rather, it is the

guideline amount of child support for parents making under $650

per year. See § 14-10-115(7)(b). Moreover, the court did not order

any child support going forward, so it is unclear how any purported

error affected father.

¶ 15 In sum, the district court did not err when it calculated

father’s income for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025.

V. The Children’s 529 Accounts

¶ 16 Father also asserts that the district court erred when it

ordered that he execute necessary paperwork to transfer the

children’s 529 accounts to grandparents to be distributed for the

benefit of their post-secondary education.1 We disagree.

¶ 17 The court heard very little about the 529 accounts. At the

hearing, father referenced them only once when he asked

1 Named for a section of the Internal Revenue Code, 529 plans are

tax-deferred savings plans designed to help pay for college
expenses. L.A.L’s account totaled $76,783.02 and E.E.L.’s account
totaled $53,625.81.

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grandfather about the existence of the accounts, and grandfather

explained that he had no knowledge of them. Father again

referenced the accounts in his written closing argument when he

contended that the children were well cared for without any

contributions from him. As support for this assertion, father

included a list of accounts belonging to the children including the

529 accounts.

¶ 18 As we understand father’s argument on appeal, he claims the

court’s order required him to contribute to the cost of the children’s

post-secondary education, and the court was prohibited from doing

so under section 14-10-115(15). We agree that a court has no

authority to order a parent to contribute to their children’s post-

secondary education absent an agreement by the parties. See § 14-

10-115(13)(V)(b); In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 51 (Colo.

2005); see also § 14-10-115(15) (providing guidelines for post-

secondary education obligations established prior to July 1, 1997).

Thus, if the court had concluded that it was appropriate for father

to contribute to the costs of the children’s postsecondary education

pursuant to section 14-10-115(15)(c), its conclusion would have

been error.

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¶ 19 But the court’s order requiring father to execute documents

designating grandparents as the administrators of the children’s

already existing 529 plans did not order father to contribute to the

costs of the children’s post-secondary education pursuant to

section 14-10-115(15)(c). It required only that father execute the

necessary documents to transfer the already existing accounts. The

court’s order noted that “father did not appear to object” to

transferring the 529 accounts in his closing argument. And on

appeal, father concedes that he “did not necessarily object to

transferring the 529 accounts to [grandparents].”

¶ 20 Father contends, however, that he “did not agree to the

transfer of the accounts in the form of a stipulation or [s]eparation

[a]greement.” But the court’s order simply requires father to

execute necessary paperwork so that the already existing accounts

can be administered by grandparents, the children’s legal guardians

— a process to which the district court noted that father did not

object. Nor does father explain how he is prejudiced by the court’s

order requiring that he execute the required paperwork. See

C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must

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disregard any error defect in the proceeding which does not affect

the substantial rights of the parties.”).

¶ 21 Accordingly, the court did not err when it ordered father to

execute necessary paperwork to transfer the children’s 529

accounts to grandparents.

VI. Grandparents’ Request for Attorney Fees

¶ 22 Grandparents ask for their appellate attorney fees, arguing

that father’s appeal was frivolous. C.A.R. 39.1; § 13-17-102(2),

C.R.S. 2025. We deny this request.

¶ 23 Although father did not prevail in his appeal, it was not so

lacking in justification as to warrant an award of fees. See Glover v.

Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that awards of

appellate attorney fees for frivolous appeals should be reserved for

“clear and unequivocal” cases involving “egregious

conduct” (citation omitted)).

VII. Disposition

¶ 24 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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