Peo in Interest of AC

25CA1024 Peo in Interest of AC 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1024
Mesa County District Court No. 23JV53
Honorable JenniLynn E. Lawrence, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.C., a Child,

and Concerning V.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Donald L. Steerman, County Attorney, Meeker, Colorado, for Appellee

Cassandra L. Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, V.A. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her legal relationship with A.C.

(the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After receiving referrals regarding the child’s lack of

supervision, hazardous living conditions, and mother’s recent

arrest, the Mesa County Department of Human Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect alleging

concerns of domestic violence, incarceration, neglect, mental

health, and substance abuse.

¶3 The juvenile court subsequently adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother

that, among other things, required her to (1) engage in timely

communication with the Department; (2) attend family time; (3)

complete a capacity to parent evaluation and follow the reasonable

recommendations; (4) submit to random drug testing; (5) complete a

domestic violence victim assessment and follow all reasonable

recommendations; (6) maintain a safe and stable environment; (7)

comply with all terms and conditions of any criminal cases and/or

probation; and (8) attend family therapy as recommended.

1
¶4 Fourteen months later, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing,

the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion and terminated

mother’s legal relationship with the child.

II. Due Process

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court violated her due

process rights at the termination hearing when it denied her

request to appear by video and thus proscribed her presence to act

as an advisory witness and allow her to testify. She also claims the

court erred by denying her counsel’s request for a continuance after

the court required her in-person attendance at the hearing. Finally,

mother contends that the court erred by disallowing the testimony

of her rebuttal expert witness. We discern no reversible error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 We review procedural due process claims de novo. People in

Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26. We review the juvenile court’s

rulings on motions to continue for an abuse of discretion. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. Likewise, we review a court’s

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of

M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 52, overruled on other grounds by People in

2
Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. E.B., ¶ 14.

¶7 Because “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the care, custody, and management of their children,”

People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 17, termination of

the parent-child legal relationship must satisfy due process by

providing “fundamentally fair procedures,” People in Interest of J.G.,

2016 CO 39, ¶ 20 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-

54 (1982)). “Under this principle, a parent must be provided with

‘notice of the allegations in the termination motion, the opportunity

to be heard, the opportunity to have counsel if indigent, and the

opportunity to call witnesses and engage in cross examination.’”

E.B., ¶ 16 (quoting A.M., ¶ 18). A parent may not obtain relief on a

due process claim, however, absent a showing of harm or prejudice.

People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).

B. Additional Background

¶8 The juvenile court appointed counsel to represent mother at

the initial shelter hearing. Eleven months later, mother’s counsel

moved to withdraw. During the withdrawal hearing, mother chose

3
to proceed without counsel. Consequently, the court granted

counsel’s withdrawal motion and appointed advisory counsel for

mother. At the start of the termination hearing, based on mother’s

request, the court appointed mother’s advisory counsel to serve as

her counsel of record.

¶9 On the first day of the termination hearing, mother requested

a continuance, citing an “acute illness.” Mother provided a doctor’s

letter confirming her illness and estimating improvement within one

week. The court then limited that day of the hearing to evidence

regarding the Department’s motion to terminate the child’s father’s

legal rights, vacated the second day of the hearing, and ordered

mother to attend the third day of the hearing scheduled four days

later. Based on concerns that one day was insufficient to complete

the presentation of evidence related to mother, the juvenile court

set two additional hearing dates (day four and day five).

¶ 10 Mother appeared virtually for the third day of the hearing,

which the court found “appropriate given her recent diagnosis.”

But the court also made clear that mother was only allowed to

appear virtually because of her illness, reminded her that she had

outstanding warrants, and instructed her to resolve them. The

4
court did not convene over the weekend. On the fourth day of the

hearing, mother again appeared virtually. But because mother’s

illness had passed and she had no other reason to appear virtually,

and considering mother’s outstanding warrants, the court did not

allow her virtual appearance.

¶ 11 Given the court’s ruling, mother’s counsel requested a

continuance, citing the importance of having mother as an advisory

witness. Considering the child and his need for permanency, the

court denied the request. Mother did not appear in person during

the termination hearing. The court checked periodically throughout

the fourth day of the hearing to see if mother had turned herself in

so she could be brought to court for the hearing, but mother had

not done so.

¶ 12 Subsequently, mother’s counsel attempted to call an expert

witness — a psychologist who completed an evaluation of mother

four years prior — but the Department objected based on relevance

and lack of disclosure. Mother’s counsel responded that advanced

disclosure was not required because the witness was a rebuttal

expert. Finding the witness to be a direct expert for mother, the

5
juvenile court precluded the witness’s testimony because of

nondisclosure under the civil rules.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 Mother argues that the juvenile court’s orders precluding her

virtual appearance, her testimony, and the testimony of her expert

witness deprived her of a fundamentally fair proceeding, the

meaningful opportunity to be heard and participate in her own

defense, and her statutory right to call an expert of her choosing.

We disagree.

1. Virtual Appearance

¶ 14 We first reject mother’s assertion that the order requiring her

in-person appearance on the fourth day of the hearing violated her

due process rights.

¶ 15 Mother asserts that she “did not have sufficient notice that her

ability to participate in her termination hearing would be denied.”

Essentially, mother is asserting that she was unaware that she

would be required to appear in person for the fourth day of the

hearing. But the hearing notice, issued six weeks before the

hearing and served on mother and her advisory counsel, directed

the parties “to be and appear before [that] [c]ourt.” On the third day

6
of the hearing, the court reminded mother that she was only

allowed to appear virtually because of her illness. And when the

hearing commenced on the fourth day, mother’s counsel confirmed

that she had advised mother that the court requested her in-person

appearance that day.

¶ 16 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court “arbitrarily decided

that it would prevent [her] virtual participation on the third day of

the hearing and specifically during her presentation of evidence.”

But on the first and third days of the hearing, the court articulated

that it expected mother to resolve her outstanding warrants. And

mother’s counsel confirmed that she advised mother about the

court’s instructions before the court denied mother’s request to

appear virtually on the fourth day of the hearing. Thus, mother’s

claim of undue surprise is belied by the record.

¶ 17 To the extent mother asserts that the court erred by

disallowing her virtual appearance, she cites no authority in

support of her implied assertion that a court must allow a party to

participate virtually. Trial management decisions, such as whether

to allow virtual appearances, are left to the juvenile court’s broad

7
discretion. See Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181, ¶ 38; People in

Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 17.

¶ 18 The juvenile court found that mother’s decision to appear

virtually on the fourth day of the hearing was an “ongoing

manipulation of . . . the system and [the] [c]ourt.” The record

supports that finding. Mother did not provide any reason, other

than her illness, why she was unable to appear in person. And by

the estimations of mother’s doctor, her symptoms should have been

sufficiently improved by the fourth day of the hearing. The family

time supervisor testified that, between the first and third days of

the hearing, mother attended two in-person family time sessions

after having been cleared by her doctor. Mother’s only justification

for why she did not appear in person for the fourth day of the

hearing was a concern that, if arrested on her outstanding

warrants, she would not be released in time to attend the hearing.

¶ 19 The court explained that if mother had turned herself in as

ordered, it would have ensured that mother appeared in custody, as

it had done with father, who was in custody but appeared in court

despite serving prison time in Texas. And the court demonstrated

its commitment to ensure mother’s attendance at the termination

8
hearing in the event mother turned herself into law enforcement by

checking periodically with the facility during the remainder of the

termination hearing to determine whether mother was in custody

and needed to be transported to court. But mother did not heed

the court’s order or otherwise endeavor to appear in person at

court. See § 19-3-502(5.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (noting that a party to a

dependency and neglect proceeding “has the . . . responsibility to

attend and fully participate in all proceedings”). The court’s action

demonstrated that it was attempting to ensure mother complied

with the law, while also allowing mother to appear at the

termination hearing. Because the record supports the juvenile

court’s findings, and because its decision to disallow mother’s

virtual appearance was neither a misapplication of the law nor

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, we discern no abuse

of discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 20 Additionally, even assuming, without deciding, that the

juvenile court’s orders violated mother’s due process rights, she has

not shown that she was prejudiced as a result. See id. at ¶ 17

(providing that a parent must demonstrate actual prejudice to

prevail on a due process claim).

9
¶ 21 While mother does not directly cite any prejudicial impact from

the court’s orders, she implies that the order disallowing her virtual

appearance adversely impacted her case because her counsel was

relying on mother’s knowledge to examine and cross-examine

witnesses and on mother’s testimony to respond to the

Department’s allegations. But mother fails to explain what she

would have testified about, how that testimony would have changed

the outcome of the proceeding, or how her presence as an advisory

witness would have altered the examination and cross-examination

of witnesses. See id. at ¶ 22.

¶ 22 In sum, based on the record and lack of prejudice, we discern

no violation of mother’s due process rights.

2. Continuance

¶ 23 To the extent mother asserts that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by denying her request for a continuance following its

order that mother could not appear at the hearing virtually, we

disagree.

¶ 24 In denying mother’s request, the court focused on the child’s

“extreme distress” at the ongoing lack of permanency and found

that it was not in the child’s best interest to continue the hearing.

10
See § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2025 (requiring that, for cases regarding a

child under six years of age when the petition was filed, a court

must find that a child’s best interest will be served before granting a

continuance).

¶ 25 The record supports these findings. During the first day of the

hearing addressing mother’s case, the expert who completed a

parental capacity evaluation (PCE) testified that the child needed

stability. And the caseworker described the child’s anxieties and

opined that he needed stability and long-term permanency. At the

time of mother’s requested continuance, the case had been open for

almost two years, and the child had been out of the home for the

same amount of time.

¶ 26 Because the juvenile court properly weighed the reason

proffered for the continuance — mother’s counsel’s ability to

present her case — against the need for prompt resolution of the

proceeding and the child’s best interests, we perceive no abuse of

discretion. See People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 908 (Colo.

App. 2005) (“In ruling on the motion [to continue], the trial court

should balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration

11
of justice against the facts underlying the motion, while considering

the child’s need for permanency.”).

3. Rebuttal Expert Witness

¶ 27 Finally, it is not entirely clear from the record that the court

improperly classified mother’s expert as a direct expert, but even if

the court erred, the error is harmless.

¶ 28 The juvenile court found mother’s proffered witness to be a

defense witness, which required advanced disclosure pursuant to

the terms of the court’s pretrial order. And, considering the lack of

timely expert disclosure, the court found that allowing the expert to

testify would be too prejudicial to the other parties.

¶ 29 On the fourth day of the hearing, mother’s counsel filed her

witness disclosure, in which she listed the witness as an expert “in

clinical psychology, custody evaluations, parental competency

evaluations, and/or parent-child attachment” and stated that the

witness was expected to testify regarding her observations and

interactions with the parties and the children, evaluation of mother,

and any other information she reasonably relied upon. It was not

until the Department and guardian ad litem raised concerns about

the lack of a disclosed expert report that mother’s counsel indicated

12
her intention to call the witness for the purposes of rebuttal.

Specifically, mother’s counsel argued that the witness could “opine

about who is qualified to administer psychological testing, who is

qualified to interpret those things . . . , [and] what a correctly

completed [parent-child interactional assessment] looks like.”

Thus, mother’s counsel did not explain how, even if the witness was

allowed to testify on these points, her testimony would “rebut a

specific claim, theory, witness or other evidence” of the Department.

Warden v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, ¶ 22 (quoting People v.

Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 304 (Colo. 2003)).

¶ 30 Even assuming mother’s expert properly fell within the

expansive category of a rebuttal expert based on Warden, mother

has failed to establish any prejudice caused by the order

disallowing testimony from the witness. She asserts that “[c]alling

an expert to rebut the [D]epartment’s expert was crucial to her

defense.” But she did not provide any offer of proof or other record

indicating how her expert would have testified, so “we are unable to

discern that the termination proceedings would have been affected

13
in any appreciable way” by the expert’s testimony. E.B., ¶ 22 (citing

People in Interest of C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 358 (Colo. App. 1994)).1

III. Termination Criteria

¶ 31 Mother contends that the court improperly terminated her

parental rights because the Department failed to comply with the

Americans with Disabilities Act and, therefore, did not make

reasonable efforts or adopt an appropriate treatment plan. Mother

also contends that the court erred by finding that she was unfit and

unlikely to become fit within a reasonable period of time.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 32 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those findings. Id.

1 To the extent mother argues that she received ineffective

assistance of counsel, we decline to address it because the
argument is undeveloped. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d
530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate
argument presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or
supporting authorities).

14
¶ 33 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

¶ 34 Mother asserts that the juvenile court failed to consider her

known disabilities by making reasonable accommodations and,

therefore, erroneously concluded that her treatment plan was

appropriate and the Department made reasonable efforts. We

disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 35 The ADA requires the juvenile court and the Department to

account, and make reasonable accommodations, for a parent’s

disability when devising a treatment plan and providing

rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36,

¶ 34; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining “disability” under

the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

15
limits one or more major life activities”). But the ADA does not

restrict the juvenile court’s authority to terminate parental rights if

a parent, even due to a disability, is not able to meet a child’s

needs. People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 17. Rather, before

terminating parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the ADA

requires the juvenile court to consider whether reasonable

accommodations were provided when determining the

appropriateness of a parent’s treatment plan and whether the

department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent.

S.K., ¶ 34.

¶ 36 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.

Before the Department can be required to provide reasonable

accommodations under the ADA, the Department must be made

aware that the person is a qualified individual with a disability. Id.

at ¶ 22. Thus, while the Department must provide appropriate

screening and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible for

disclosing information regarding her disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And a

parent should also identify any modifications that she believes are

necessary to accommodate the disability. Id.

16
¶ 37 In considering whether reasonable accommodations can be

made for a parent’s disability, the juvenile court’s paramount

concern must always be the child’s health and safety. Id. at ¶ 36.

Thus, what qualifies as a reasonable accommodation will vary from

case to case based on the child’s needs, the nature of the parent’s

disability, and the Department’s available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.

2. Analysis

¶ 38 We disagree with mother’s assertion that the court erred by

finding her treatment plan appropriate because it “contained no

accommodations or modifications to ensure compliance with the

ADA.” At the dispositional hearing, mother informed the court that

she was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA

because she had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As a

result, mother requested three modifications to her treatment plan:

a life skills worker, a trauma-informed caseworker, and an

“advocate in the community.” The court granted her first request

and added a life skills worker to her treatment plan but denied her

other requests because it found those to already be available to her.

Mother did not move the court for additional changes or

modifications to her treatment plan. And she does not explain how

17
her treatment plan could have been amended to address her

disability and still render her a fit parent within a reasonable time.

See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14 (“In determining

whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the court must consider

whether the plan’s objectives adequately address the safety

concerns identified during the assessment of the family.”).

Therefore, we conclude that mother has failed to establish that her

treatment plan was inappropriate.

¶ 39 Mother also contends that the court erred by denying several

of her requests for ADA accommodations. But her initial notice of

ADA applicability and motion for ADA accommodations were filed

while she was represented by counsel but lacked her counsel’s

signature. Consequently, the court reserved ruling until mother’s

counsel filed a signed copy of the pleadings. See C.R.C.P. 11(a)

(“Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be

signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name.”)

(emphasis added). But mother’s counsel did not file any ADA notice

or request for accommodations. And even if the court had accepted

and considered mother’s initial filings, her notice only stated that

she had “profound psychological trauma and a diagnosis of PTSD

18
. . . [which] significantly impaired [her] ability to navigate legal

proceedings and engage effectively in court hearings.” See 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2025) (clarifying that “not every impairment

will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section”); see

also Hughes v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1239-40

(D. Colo. 2009) (noting that “a plaintiff must ultimately prove either

an actual or perceived substantial limitation in a major life activity

to prevail on a claim under the ADA”).

¶ 40 Indeed, it was not until the eve of the termination hearing that

mother provided more detailed information that her disability —

though still not specifically identified in the records she submitted

— substantially limited a major life activity, that is, her ability to

work. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2025); see also People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 16 (“For a parent to benefit from a

reasonable accommodation, the parent must raise the issue of the

ADA’s applicability in a timely manner.”).

¶ 41 But even assuming the updated disability disclosure mother

filed before the termination hearing was considered timely

submitted and, thus, the court erred by determining her claims of a

disability were “conclusory,” the court nevertheless considered the

19
specific accommodations she requested. See Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d

529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (holding that an error that did not

substantially influence the outcome of the case or impair the basic

fairness of the trial itself is harmless).

¶ 42 The court found mother’s request for “flexible” family time to

be unreasonable, expressing concern that it could cause anxiety for

the child. See S.K., ¶ 37 (“[T]he juvenile court’s assessment of what

constitutes a reasonable accommodation must take into account

the child’s best interests and need for permanency.”). The court

also found mother’s request for flexible court hearing times to be

unreasonable. Even so, the court gave mother breaks during

hearings to work with the clerks to file her exhibits, confer with her

advisory counsel, “get [her] thoughts gathered,” and otherwise

accommodate her disability.

¶ 43 The court found mother’s other requested accommodations to

be “unclear,” routinely available regardless of any disability, or

unrelated to her claim of disability. The record supports these

findings. Many of mother’s requested accommodations — including

deadline extensions, fair hearings, impartial court personnel,

treatment without bias or intimidation, opportunities to “contest

20
and strike any prejudicial fact alleged,” and freedom to make

complaints without retaliation — are available to all parties,

regardless of any disability. And mother did not explain why her

requests were necessary to accommodate her disability. For

example, mother based her request for clearly articulated

expectations from the Department on an alleged “lack of

transparency” and a desire for “clarity and fairness,” not on her

disability. But the reasonable accommodations required under the

ADA are limited to accommodations for a parent’s disability. See id.

at ¶ 34 (“[W]hen a parent involved in a dependency and neglect

proceeding has a disability under the ADA, the Department and the

juvenile court must account for and, if possible, make reasonable

accommodations for the parent’s disability when devising a

treatment plan and providing rehabilitative services to the parent.”)

(emphasis added).

¶ 44 Finally, we reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts

“without considering the implications of [her] disabilities and

necessary accommodations for rehabilitation.”

21
¶ 45 The court concluded that the Department’s reasonable efforts

were unable to rehabilitate mother. In support, the court found

that the caseworker “went above and beyond what she was required

to do to facilitate family time,” mother “barely” engaged with the life

skills worker, and, overall, mother’s lack of engagement impeded

her treatment plan progress.

¶ 46 Mother does not dispute these findings, instead arguing that

the court’s termination order erroneously focused on issues

stemming from her PTSD — including the “chaotic” nature of family

time, her communication style, and her “hyperfocus” on specific

providers — for which no accommodations were provided. But

mother does not explain which of her requested accommodations, if

provided, would have resolved these issues. As discussed above,

most of mother’s requested accommodations, aside from flexible

family time, focused on court procedures. And the Department

provided mother with a caseworker experienced with domestic

violence, a life skills worker, and referrals for family therapy,

domestic violence group therapy, and parent coaching. But mother

did not consistently engage with these provided services to work

toward rehabilitation and reunification with the child.

22
¶ 47 In sum, the record shows that the juvenile court considered

mother’s disability claims and granted her reasonable requests for

accommodation. And the Department engaged in reasonable efforts

and reasonably accommodated mother’s disability. But ultimately

mother’s lack of participation prevented her from successfully

completing her treatment plan. Thus, in relation to the ADA, we

discern no error in the court’s findings that mother’s treatment plan

was appropriate and that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child.

C. Fitness

¶ 48 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable period

of time. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 49 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give the child reasonable parental

care. Id. at ¶ 74. Reasonable parental care requires, at a

minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting

adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs

and conditions. Id.

23
¶ 50 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s

social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s

conduct or condition. S.K., ¶ 75. Where a parent has made little to

no progress on a treatment plan, the court need not give the parent

additional time to comply. S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶ 51 The determination of a reasonable period is fact-specific and

varies from case to case. D.Y., 176 P.3d at 876. However, a

reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be determined

by considering the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. As in this case, when a child is

under six years old at the time the petition is filed, the juvenile

court must also consider the expedited planning provisions, which

require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

24
2. Analysis

¶ 52 In finding mother unfit, the court considered evidence of her

partial treatment plan compliance but ultimately determined that

she could not become fit within a reasonable time based on her lack

of progress during the case, long-standing history of instability,

refusal to engage in services and make meaningful behavioral

changes, and previous involvement with the Department. The court

also considered the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs and found that it would not be in his best

interest to allow mother additional time to comply with her

treatment plan.

¶ 53 The record supports these findings even though, as mother

points out, she maintained communication with the Department,

consistently attended family time, completed a capacity to parent

evaluation and domestic violence assessment, engaged in individual

therapy, submitted clean drug tests, and maintained housing.

¶ 54 The caseworker testified that, despite mother’s partial

treatment plan progress, mother exhibited the same problems

addressed in the treatment plan without adequate improvement.

See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B) (instructing that a court “shall not find” a

25
parent in reasonable compliance with their treatment plan when

“[t]he parent exhibits the same problems addressed in the treatment

plan without adequate improvement”); see also People in Interest of

D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588 (Colo. App. 2003) (stating that, although

absolute compliance is not required, “partial compliance, or even

substantial compliance, may not result in a successful plan that

renders the parent fit”). The case had opened due to concerns

about mother’s substance use and ability to provide for the child’s

basic needs. The PCE evaluator testified that, during her

observations, mother ignored the child’s needs and did not take

accountability for her role in the case, admit any deficiencies in her

parenting, or acknowledge any barriers to the child’s return home.

Similarly, during the caseworker’s family time observations, she

noted “multiple times” when mother “completely ignored” the child,

including occasions when the child reported feeling hungry.

Considering mother’s regression in family time interactions,

inconsistent drug testing, five pending criminal cases with

outstanding warrants in each case that mother had not resolved,

lack of therapeutic progress, inability to put the child’s needs ahead

of her own, and lack of overall engagement and behavioral change,

26
the caseworker opined that mother was unfit and unlikely to

become fit within a reasonable period of time.

¶ 55 The caseworker also testified that the child had been in and

out of foster care for more than one-third of his life and described

him as a “very . . . anxious” child. She opined that he needed a

stable, predictable, mindful caregiver and that long-term

permanency for him was “overdue.” See S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 56 In short, the court’s findings and conclusions are supported

by the record. See People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 334-35

(Colo. App. 2006). And we cannot reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶

29.

IV. Alleged Judicial Bias

¶ 57 Mother contends that the juvenile court judge erred by not

disqualifying herself because of actual bias. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 58 We review a claim for disqualification based on actual bias de

novo. People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 27.

¶ 59 In Colorado, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires

disqualification of a judge when the judge’s involvement with a case

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might create the appearance of impropriety or when the judge has a

personal bias concerning a party or counsel. C.J.C. 2.11(A); see

also People in Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d 646, 650-51 (Colo. 2011)

(describing the two bases for disqualification as the “appearance of

impropriety” and “actual bias”).

¶ 60 To disqualify a judge for actual bias, a party must show that

the judge has “a substantial bent of mind,” People in Interest of A.P.,

2022 CO 24, ¶ 30 (citation omitted), that “in all probability will

prevent [the judge] from dealing fairly with a party,” A.G., 262 P.3d

at 650 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has

clarified that a judge’s “remarks during the course of a trial that are

critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or

their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also A.P., ¶ 30

(“Bare assertions and speculative statements are insufficient to

satisfy the burden of proof.”). Adverse legal rulings are also unlikely

to provide grounds for a bias claim. See A.P., ¶ 30.

¶ 61 Because disqualification based on actual bias is designed to

ensure that litigants receive a fair, impartial trial, they may not be

waived. A.G., 262 P.3d at 651. Thus, claims for disqualification

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based on actual bias may be considered on appeal even when they

were not raised in the district court. See Jennings, ¶ 21.

B. Analysis

¶ 62 The sole basis for mother’s claim of disqualification is that,

during a review hearing six months before the termination hearing,

the judge commented that the county attorney’s sister was “one of

[her] best friends.” Even if this relationship was sufficient to

disqualify the judge based on an appearance of impropriety, mother

never made such a request of the juvenile court. Therefore, on

appeal, she is limited to seeking review for disqualification for

actual bias. See A.G., 262 P.3d at 651; Jennings, ¶ 21.

¶ 63 Based on our review of the hearing transcript, we do not

discern, and mother does not identify, any “substantial bent of

mind” preventing the juvenile court judge from dealing fairly with

mother. A.P., ¶ 30 (citation omitted). And a judge’s connection to a

counsel’s family member, by itself, does not create actual bias. See

Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516, 517 (Colo. 2007) (“[T]he mere

existence of a trial court judge’s friendship with a member of a

prosecution team, by itself, does not create either actual bias or the

appearance of impropriety.”).

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¶ 64 For these reasons, we reject mother’s argument that the

juvenile court judge was “required” to disqualify herself from the

proceeding.

V. Conclusion

¶ 65 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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