Peo v. Hale

23CA1088 Peo v Hale 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1088
Adams County District Court No. 22CR339
Honorable Jeffrey Smith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Colby J. Hale,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lipinsky and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Colby J. Hale, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Colby J. Hale — who identifies as Colby Hale-El —

appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding

him guilty of second degree assault, driving while ability impaired

(DWAI), and careless driving. (We will refer to him as Hale-El,

though for records consistency we will retain in the caption the

name under which he was charged and convicted and under which

he is listed in the Department of Corrections; we mean no

disrespect by doing so.) Hale-El contends that the trial court erred

by allowing the prosecution to present inadmissible evidence and by

violating his right to be present at trial. We disagree and, therefore,

affirm.

I. Evidentiary Issue

¶2 Hale-El first argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the

prosecution to admit a recording from a police body camera that

depicted his conduct and demeanor at a hospital hours after the

incident (body camera recording). We perceive no reversible error.

A. Background

¶3 Around 3:30 a.m. one day in January 2022, firefighters

responded to a report of a vehicle that was stopped in the grassy

median of the roadway. The firefighters described the vehicle’s

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driver — identified as Hale-El — as agitated, aggressive,

uncooperative, and verbally abusive. They took measures to

prevent Hale-El from leaving the median and walking across the

highway through traffic.

¶4 At some point, Hale-El tripped, and a firefighter reached out to

stop him from falling. Hale-El struck the firefighter in the face. The

other firefighters briefly subdued Hale-El until he could be turned

over to police custody. Hale-El was taken to a hospital to be

evaluated before being transported to jail.

¶5 The prosecution charged Hale-El with second degree assault

on a firefighter, driving under the influence (DUI), and careless

driving.1 Before trial, the prosecution moved to introduce evidence

“relating to [Hale-El’s] conduct while being treated by the

paramedics, being transported to the hospital, while at the hospital,

and while being transported from the hospital to the jail on the date

of the offense.” This evidence included the body camera recording.

The prosecutor argued that such evidence was intrinsic to the

1 The prosecution also charged Hale-El with violating the

compulsory insurance statute but dismissed that charge before
trial.

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crimes charged because it was probative of Hale-El’s mental state

for the assault charge and his intoxication for the DUI charge. The

prosecutor asserted that he was also prepared to establish the

evidence’s admissibility as extrinsic evidence.

¶6 At a motions hearing, Hale-El objected to the admission of the

body camera recording, arguing essentially that it did not show

what the People contended, it was not true, and that he should

have been given a field sobriety test instead of transported to the

hospital; he did not base his objection on the rules of evidence. The

court granted the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence,

finding that it was intrinsic and relevant, and that its probative

value outweighed any undue prejudice.

¶7 At trial, the prosecution presented the body camera recording

to the jury. During closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the

direct evidence that proved Hale-El’s mental state for the assault

charge and his intoxication. The prosecutor then argued that the

body camera recording could be considered as circumstantial

evidence of Hale-El’s intoxication and his intent when he struck the

firefighter. The jury convicted Hale-El of second degree assault. It

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acquitted him of DUI but found him guilty of the lesser offense of

DWAI, as well as careless driving.

B. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶8 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” CRE 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except

as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, or rule. CRE 402;

Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 25. Among other things, relevant

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury.” CRE 403.

¶9 Additionally, “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that

on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the

character.” CRE 404(b)(1). The application of CRE 404(b) depends,

in part, on whether the proffered evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic to

the charged crimes. Rojas, ¶¶ 42, 44, 52.

¶ 10 Evidence of a person’s acts “that directly prove the charged

offense or . . . that occur contemporaneously with the charged

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offense and facilitate the commission of it” is intrinsic to the

charged offenses and exempt from the requirements of CRE 404(b).

Rojas, ¶ 52. Otherwise, such evidence is extrinsic and is admissible

only as provided by CRE 404(b) and the four-part test set forth in

People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990). Rojas, ¶¶ 27, 52.

¶ 11 “Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence based on its relevance, its probative value,

and its prejudicial impact.” People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20.

Thus, we review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Rojas, ¶ 16. A court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Elmarr, ¶ 20.

¶ 12 We review for plain error when a defendant did not object to

the admission of evidence at trial. People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32,

¶ 28. Plain error is error that is both “obvious and substantial.”

Hoggard v. People, 2020 CO 54, ¶ 13. An error is substantial and

warrants reversal under plain error review “if an appellate court,

after reviewing the trial record in its entirety, can say with fair

assurance that the error ‘so undermined the fundamental fairness

of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

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judgment of conviction.’” People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 43

(quoting Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo. 1987)).

C. Analysis

¶ 13 Hale-El argues that the trial court erred by finding that the

body camera recording was intrinsic and not subject to CRE 404(b).

Alternatively, he argues that even if the evidence was intrinsic, it

was inadmissible under CRE 401 and CRE 403. We need not

decide whether admitting the body camera recording was error,

because even if it were, we conclude that it does not require

reversal. See Martinez v. People, 2017 CO 36, ¶ 25.

¶ 14 First, we are not convinced that any error in admitting the

recording was obvious. “An error is obvious if it is ‘so clear-cut’ that

‘a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.’”

People v. Ramcharan, 2024 COA 110, ¶ 63 (quoting Crabtree, ¶ 42).

The prosecution’s position that the evidence was intrinsic or, in the

alternative, was admissible as extrinsic evidence had at least

arguable merit such that it cannot be said the evidence should

clearly have been precluded. See People v. Robinson, 2022 COA

124, ¶¶ 30, 33 (holding that the challenged testimony “was not

obviously improper because it arguably fell within an exception to”

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the rule that precluded such testimony). Notably, Hale-El only

argues that the court did not make the admissibility findings for

extrinsic evidence pursuant to Spoto and CRE 404(b). He does not

state why the recording would not have been admissible had the

court done so.

¶ 15 Second, the strength of the following unobjected-to testimony

belies the conclusion that the admission of the body camera

recording undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial or cast

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. See

Martinez, ¶ 38 (“[T]he strength of the prosecution’s case against [the

defendant] mitigate[d] any doubt about the reliability of the jury’s

verdicts as a result of” the asserted unpreserved court error).

¶ 16 Regarding Hale-El’s mental state, the victim testified that

Hale-El told him “to get the fuck out of there” when the victim

attempted to check Hale-El for injuries after the car accident. After

exiting the vehicle, Hale-El “slam[med] his driver’s door, began to

curse at [the firefighters], [and] began to tell [them they were]

racist.” The victim stated that, when the firefighters tried to prevent

Hale-El from leaving the median and walking into traffic, he told

them “don’t fucking touch me. Please get the fuck out of here.”

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Importantly, the victim testified that, when he attempted to catch

Hale-El after he tripped, Hale-El “turned around . . . and said,

‘Don’t you fucking touch me’” and “[t]hen he basically swung and

hit me in the left side of the head.”

¶ 17 Another firefighter testified that, when Hale-El was told he

could not walk into traffic, Hale-El “didn’t like that answer; so he

. . . str[uck] [the victim] in the head, knocking his helmet to the

side.” A police deputy testified that, when taking Hale-El into

custody, he was belligerent, yelling, cursing, and uncooperative.

And a state trooper stated that, while transporting Hale-El to the

hospital and while at the hospital, Hale-El was uncooperative,

agitated, and belligerent; yelled, cursed, and kicked the gurney; and

tried to assault the medical staff.

¶ 18 This overwhelming evidence of Hale-El’s mental state during

and shortly after his interaction with the first responders more than

justifies an inference as to his intent when he hit the victim. See

People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1154 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[A]

defendant’s mental state may be inferred from [their] conduct and

other evidence, including the circumstances surrounding the

commission of the crime.”).

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¶ 19 Regarding Hale-El’s intoxication, the victim testified that

Hale-El appeared to have an “unsteady gait” and that his speech

appeared to be slurred. The deputy recalled the smell of alcohol

coming from Hale-El. And the trooper testified that Hale-El was in

the back of a sheriff’s deputy’s vehicle when the trooper arrived on

the scene and that, when the vehicle’s door was opened, he detected

the “strong odor of unknown alcoholic beverage coming from

inside.”

¶ 20 This evidence was more than sufficient to warrant the jury’s

finding that Hale-El was intoxicated. See People v. Mersman, 148

P.3d 199, 201-02 (Colo. App. 2006) (indicia of intoxication observed

at the time the police contacted the defendant was sufficient to

support his DUI conviction).

¶ 21 Moreover, before deliberations, the jurors were instructed that

they must (1) follow the rules of law; (2) apply the rules to reach

their verdict; and (3) “not be influenced by sympathy, bias or

prejudice in reaching [their] decision.” Absent any contrary

indication in the record — and we discern none — we presume the

jurors followed these instructions. See People v. Carter, 2015 COA

24M-2, ¶ 59.

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¶ 22 Finally, we are persuaded that the jury’s acquittal on the

greater DUI charge and conviction on the lesser offense of DWAI

demonstrate that, notwithstanding the assertedly improper

admission of the body camera recording, the jury properly weighed

and evaluated the admissible evidence and the charges. See People

v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M, ¶ 40 (“[E]ven if we assume that the

jurors heard [the purportedly inadmissible evidence], any error was

harmless; the jury’s split verdict indicates that the audio did not

substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the

trial.”). Indeed, during closing argument, the prosecutor

admonished the jury not to consider DWAI unless it “first concluded

that [Hale-El] is not guilty of DUI.”

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that any error in the

admission of the body camera recording did not substantially

influence the verdict or impair the fairness of the trial. See People

v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Colo. 1989).

II. Right to Be Present

¶ 24 Hale-El next argues that the trial court violated his right to be

present during his jury trial when it impermissibly removed him

from the courtroom on the second day of trial. We disagree.

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A. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶ 25 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees defendants the right to be present during every stage of

a trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); People v.

Janis, 2018 CO 89, ¶ 16. This right, however, is not absolute.

Janis, ¶ 17. As relevant here,

a defendant can lose his right to be present at
trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
courtroom.

Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see also Janis, ¶ 17 (“A defendant may waive

her right to be present . . . through her conduct.”); People v. Cohn,

160 P.3d 336, 341 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[A] defendant may forfeit the

right to be present by persisting in disruptive conduct after being

warned by the court that further similar conduct will result in

removal.”). “Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be

reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself

consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept

of courts and judicial proceedings.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.

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¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court has identified “three

constitutionally permissible ways” for a trial court to handle an

“obstreperous defendant” — namely, “(1) bind and gag him, thereby

keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of

the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.” Id.

at 343-44. Whether to remove a disruptive defendant from trial is

within the court’s discretion. Id. at 343; Cohn, 160 P.3d at 341.

¶ 27 Moreover, in Colorado, Crim. P. 43(a) provides, in part, that

“[t]he defendant shall be present . . . at every stage of the trial.” See

Janis, ¶ 16 n.2. However, similar to the language in Allen, Crim. P.

43(b)(2) provides that

[t]he trial court in its discretion may complete
the trial, and the defendant shall be
considered to have waived his right to be
present, whenever a defendant, initially
present[,] . . . [a]fter being warned by the court
that disruptive conduct will cause him to be
removed from the courtroom, persists in
conduct which is such as to justify his being
excluded from the courtroom.

¶ 28 We review de novo whether a court violated a defendant’s

constitutional or Rule 43 right to be present. Janis, ¶ 14; People v.

Hernandez, 2019 COA 111, ¶ 12.

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B. Relevant Facts

¶ 29 Hale-El represented himself at trial, with the assistance of

advisory counsel. Throughout the first day of trial, Hale-El

interrupted the court proceedings, repeatedly challenged the court’s

jurisdiction, and used profane language numerous times both in

front of and outside the presence of the jury. The court informed

Hale-El multiple times that, if he continued to interrupt the

proceedings, he would be held in contempt or removed from the

courtroom. At one point, while raising yet another challenge to the

court’s jurisdiction, Hale-El said, “I don’t care. I’m speaking my

mind. You don’t like it, kick me out. I don’t care. I care about the

jurisdiction. You don’t have any, period.”

¶ 30 On the morning of the second day of trial, Hale-El told the

court that an officer had purportedly assaulted him while

transporting him to the courtroom. The court advised Hale-El to

report the incident and then commenced that day’s proceedings.

¶ 31 While discussing preliminary matters before bringing in the

jury, Hale-El interrupted the proceeding multiple times. The court

advised Hale-El that, if he continued to disrupt the proceeding and

failed to follow the court’s orders, he would be held in contempt and

13
would be watching the trial outside the courtroom and without the

ability to cross-examine the witnesses. Hale-El replied, “I think I

got what I need. I really don’t care anymore. I don’t.”

¶ 32 During the preliminary discussions, the prosecutor addressed

discovery issues that Hale-El had previously raised and sought to

provide him with physical copies of the documents. Hale-El threw

the documents on the floor. The court advised Hale-El that it would

“not tolerate outbursts today.”

¶ 33 When Hale-El persisted in interrupting the discussions, the

court ordered him to stop and placed him on notice that he would

be held in contempt. After additional disruptions, the court found

Hale-El in contempt because he “violated [the court’s] orders . . .

because [he] continue[d] to interrupt.” The court warned him that

the next sanction would be to remove him from the courtroom.

Hale-El responded, “I might as fucking well. Shit, you are not even

letting me make any God damn evidence in here, not let me say

shit. I might as fucking well.” After more profanity-laced

interruptions, the court ordered Hale-El removed from the

courtroom:

THE COURT: Mr. Hale-El, we’re done. Stop it.

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THE DEFENDANT: Are we done?

THE COURT: I find you in contempt.

THE DEFENDANT: We should be fucking done.
You are not letting me talk.

THE COURT: You’re out of here.

THE DEFENDANT: -- introduce evidence.

THE COURT: You’re out of here.

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t give a fuck.

THE COURT: The Court -- I’m going to make
this record before you leave. Hold him --

THE [DEFENDANT]: Fuck you.

THE COURT: Get him set up where he can
watch. Keep him in here right now if you don’t
mind.

The Court is going to make the following
record. The Court has already found Mr.
Hale-El in contempt for refusing to follow these
Court’s orders concerning his decorum in the
courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: You don’t even decorum.
You don’t have jurisdiction.

THE COURT: He has been advised numerous
times by --

THE DEFENDANT: You cannot adjudicate.
You can’t adjudicate me. There is no decorum.

THE COURT: The record speaks for itself on --

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THE DEFENDANT: You don’t have jurisdiction,
period.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Hale-El’s contemptuous --

THE DEFENDANT: You don’t have jurisdiction.

THE COURT: -- conduct.

THE DEFENDANT: Prove it.

THE COURT: The Court finds --

THE DEFENDANT: You have to prove
jurisdiction. You cannot proceed in any legal
matter --

THE COURT: All right. He is out of here.

THE DEFENDANT: -- unless you have
jurisdiction.

THE COURT: I’ll be down there with a laptop.

¶ 34 After Hale-El was removed from the courtroom, the court

made an additional record:

Mr. Hale-El has now been excused from the
courtroom.

I will finish making my record.

The record in this case over the last year
speaks for itself concerning Mr. Hale-El’s
continued interruptions in court. He was
advised this morning as he was numerous
times in the last week about how this trial was
going to be conducted.

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The Court finds that contempt sanctions
would not cure his conduct and his disruptive
behavior in this case. Therefore, the Court is
having him removed. He will be placed in a
room downstairs below us, a jury room. The
Court is making available to him the ability to
view this trial by WebEx.

I will have a deputy down there so that if Mr.
Hale-El decides that he wants to continue to
participate in this trial, he can let the deputy
know. They’ll let me know. I will then pause
us wherever we are during the case to allow
Mr. Hale-El to be brought back into this
courtroom.

¶ 35 Advisory counsel made an additional record that she

“imagine[d] that th[e] [purported assault by the officer] was

incredibly stressful for Mr. Hale-El, and it may be in part why he is

not able to maintain court decorum this morning.” The court

acknowledged the reported assault but found that “he has been

explained the rules many times over, and he knows how he can get

back into this courtroom if he wants to.”

¶ 36 Courthouse deputies later made a record that, during the

remainder of the second day of trial, they periodically asked Hale-El

if he wanted to virtually watch the proceeding or return to the

courtroom. Hale-El declined each offer. The court advised the

deputies to continue to ask Hale-El if he wanted to participate

17
because “[a]nytime he wants to come back, he is welcome back in

the courtroom if he’ll follow the Court’s rules.”

¶ 37 At the end of the second day of trial, the court issued a written

order requiring Hale-El to be present in the courtroom for the next

trial day and rescinding the order authorizing the use of force to

secure his presence. Hale-El refused transport to the courtroom for

the third trial day, however.

C. Analysis

¶ 38 Based on this record, we conclude that, through his conduct,

Hale-El lost or validly waived his right to be present. See Crim. P.

43(b)(2); Janis, ¶ 17; see also Allen, 397 U.S. at 339-40, 343, 345-

46 (The defendant lost his constitutional right to be present when

he “argue[d] with the judge in a most abusive and disrespectful

manner”; “he tore the file which his attorney had and threw the

papers on the floor”; “[h]e continued to talk back to the judge” and

make “more abusive remarks” despite being warned that he would

be removed from the courtroom; and he “responded to one of the

judge’s questions with vile and abusive language.”).

¶ 39 The record makes clear that Hale-El’s conduct was disruptive

to the courtroom proceedings and disrespectful to the court. See

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Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (“It is essential to the proper administration

of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the

hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant

disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper

conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.”). And when the

court’s warnings and contempt citation failed to secure Hale-El’s

willingness to conduct himself appropriately, the court permissibly

removed him from the courtroom. See id. at 345-47.

¶ 40 In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. To the

contrary, the court’s approach to Hale-El’s incorrigible behavior was

exemplary. The court exercised admirable patience and did

everything in its power to allow Hale-El to bring his behavior into

line and avoid removal from the courtroom, as well as to return to it

later. Hale-El’s absence from the proceedings resulted solely from

his steadfast refusal to behave appropriately. His claim that he

somehow did not waive or otherwise lose his right to be present is

meritless.

III. Disposition

¶ 41 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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