Peo v. Nevares

24CA1645 Peo v Nevares 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1645
Conejos County District Court No. 17CR4
Honorable Michael A. Gonzales, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Santos G. Nevares a/k/a Santos G. Nevarez,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Phoebe W. Dee, Alternate Defense Counsel, Basalt, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Santos G. Nevares a/k/a Nevarez1 appeals the

district court’s order denying his petition for postconviction relief

pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2017, officers responded to an incident in Conejos

County and discovered four individuals with gunshot wounds. The

prosecution later charged Nevares with over thirty counts, including

first degree murder for three deceased victims and attempted first

degree murder for the surviving victim. The prosecution indicated

that it was considering seeking the death penalty.2 Plea

negotiations ensued, and on June 27, 2018, the prosecution agreed

not to pursue the death penalty if Nevares pleaded guilty to two

counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree

murder.

1 Nevares has also used the surname Nevarez. See People v.
Nevarez, (Colo. App. No. 20CA0786, Oct. 6, 2022) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). For purposes of this appeal, we use
Nevares, which is the spelling that appears on the caption pages of
the parties’ briefs.
2 The events leading to the charges in this case occurred before

Colorado abolished the death penalty in 2020. Ch. 61, secs. 1, 10,
§§ 16-11-901, 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 204,
209–10.

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¶3 On June 29, before counsel could present Nevares with the

plea offer, he suffered an emergency medical condition requiring

multiple hospitalizations and resulting in a serious infection.

Nevares’ counsel could not visit him until July 24 but visited him at

least six times between July 24 and August 14.

¶4 On August 15, Nevares signed the plea agreement. At a plea

hearing on August 17, pursuant to Crim. P. 11, the district court

read through the agreement and confirmed that Nevares

understood it. Nevares also confirmed that he (1) was mentally and

physically healthy and thinking clearly; (2) understood his right to

plead not guilty and to not follow counsel’s advice to plead guilty;

(3) made the plea agreement willingly and voluntarily; and (4) was

not pleading guilty due to any “threat, coercion, undue influence, or

force or promises of any kind.” Nevares twice confirmed that he did

not need more time to consider the plea. After the advisement,

Nevares verbally pleaded guilty, and the court accepted his pleas.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced Nevares to two

life sentences without parole and one forty-eight-year sentence.

¶5 In April 2019, Nevares filed a pro se petition for postconviction

relief pursuant to Rule 35(c). Alternate defense counsel later

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supplemented the petition. Together, the petitions alleged that (1)

Nevares’ guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent;

and (2) he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel.

Specifically, he alleged that counsel coerced his plea by telling him

death by lethal injection would be excruciatingly painful and by

promising that he would receive certain privileges and benefits

while serving a life sentence that he would not receive on death row.

He asserted that he accepted the plea primarily due to fear of this

painful death. And he alleged that he was particularly susceptible

to counsel’s pressure given his fragile physical condition. Finally,

as relevant here, he argued that his counsel performed deficiently

by pressuring him to accept the plea and by making

misrepresentations about the privileges he would receive while

serving a life sentence in prison.

¶6 The district court denied Nevares’ Rule 35(c) petition without a

hearing, and he appealed. People v. Nevarez, (Colo. App. No.

20CA0786, Oct. 6, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

A division of this court reversed, holding that Nevares was entitled

to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 20. After a February 14,

2024, evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied Nevares’

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request for postconviction relief. Nevares now appeals, arguing that

the district court erred by concluding that the evidence presented at

the hearing did not warrant postconviction relief.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

¶7 In a Rule 35(c) proceeding, a presumption of validity attaches

to a judgment of conviction. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 25.

We review the denial of a Rule 35(c) petition following a hearing for

an abuse of discretion. People v. Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 28.

A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it misunderstands or

misapplies the law. Id.

¶8 Whether a guilty plea was valid is a mixed question of law and

fact. Corson, ¶ 25. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims also

present mixed questions of law and fact. Id. For both, we defer to a

district court’s factual findings when they enjoy record support, but

we review its legal conclusions de novo. Id. And “[b]ecause the

[district] court is in the best position to determine the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, we defer to its

finding[s].” People v. Pendleton, 2015 COA 154, ¶ 13.

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B. Nevares’ Plea Was Valid

1. Applicable Law

¶9 A guilty plea “is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant

circumstances and likely consequences.’” Medina v. People, 2023

CO 46, ¶ 17 (quoting Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183

(2005)). This determination “depends on the circumstances of each

case.” Id. at ¶ 39. To assess a guilty plea’s validity, we consider

“whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id.

at ¶ 23 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).

¶ 10 A guilty plea is invalid if obtained by “actual or threatened

physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the

defendant.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). A

plea is also invalid if it is “the product of such factors as

misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others.”

Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011)

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)). “But

pressure alone does not invalidate a guilty plea.” People v. Lopez,

2025 COA 73, ¶ 30. And a guilty plea “is not invalid merely

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because [it’s] entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”

Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. Rather, a “plea is involuntary if [the

defendant] was ‘so gripped by fear . . . or hope of leniency that he

did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the

advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading

guilty.’” People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816-17 (Colo. 1999)

(alteration in original) (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 750).

2. Analysis

¶ 11 The first part of our analysis overlaps slightly with the

question of whether Nevares’ counsel was ineffective. See People v.

Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987) (When a defendant is

represented, the voluntariness of his plea “depends in part upon

whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” (quoting McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). Nevares argues that his

plea was involuntary in part due to his counsel’s representations

about (1) the excruciating nature of death by lethal injection and

(2) the privileges he would receive while serving a life sentence in

prison.

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¶ 12 We agree with the district court that Nevares did not establish

that his counsel’s conduct rendered his plea invalid. In its detailed

order denying Nevares’ petition, the court noted that it did not find

Nevares credible. It described his testimony as “self-serving” and

“internally inconsistent and/or contradicted by the record.”

Because these findings enjoy record support, we owe them

deference. See Pendleton, ¶ 13.

¶ 13 We begin with Nevares’ contention that he only accepted the

plea because his lead attorney, Joseph Archambault, “warned him

of a painful, tortu[r]ous death by lethal injection.” Nevares testified

that the subject “came up one time,” and Archambault said it would

be “excruciating” and “like no pain []ever.”3 But Nevares testified

that he did not believe Archambault’s description of death by lethal

injection and said it only scared him “a little.” When asked if he felt

pressured by this description, Nevares responded, “No, not really.

At the end of the day, it was more . . . family.” Nevares also testified

that several family members encouraged him to plead guilty, which

3 Archambault testified that he did not remember telling Nevares

that death by lethal injection would be excruciating but agreed that
he likely said something about the death penalty being “a really bad
thing.”

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influenced his decision. Later, in response to a question about

whether he had been worried about the death penalty, he said, “I

don’t know” and then said he had not been. When asked why his

Rule 35(c) petition said he was terrified if that was not true, Nevares

said, “I’m telling you that’s not true because it was pride.” Shortly

thereafter, he reversed course and said he became scared after

Archambault told him how painful it was to die by lethal injection.

He also repeatedly suggested that certain statements in his pro se

petition were not his own and came from a “jailhouse lawyer” who

assisted him.

¶ 14 We conclude that Nevares’ testimony undermines his

argument that he pleaded guilty due to a fear of death by lethal

injection. While at times inconsistent, his testimony

overwhelmingly suggested that such fear did not motivate his

decision. In short, the evidence supported the inference that he

was not “so gripped by fear of the death penalty . . . that he did not

or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the

advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading

guilty.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.

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¶ 15 Next, Nevares asserts that his plea was the product of his

counsel’s misrepresentations about certain privileges that he would

receive while serving a life sentence. He testified that Archambault

said the privileges on death row were extremely limited, but he

could get visits, use the phone, walk outside, attend classes, and

get a job while serving a life sentence. Nevares never directly

testified about how the alleged promises influenced his plea. And

defense counsel’s notes from August 8, 2018, said that

Archambault “offered to talk to [Nevares] more about conditions [in

prison] as [he] had offered before,” but Nevares declined and

indicated that he already knew about the conditions.

¶ 16 Archambault testified that he typically discussed conditions in

the Department of Corrections (DOC) with clients. However, he

explained that he had never promised a client that they would be

eligible for certain privileges because “[t]he nature of DOC is that

they change their policies kind of every single day. And you can’t

guarantee what will happen . . . .” Finally, Daniel Edwards, an

expert in capital murder prosecution and defense testified about the

differences between death row and serving a life sentence: “[I]f

you’re on death row, you’re in your cell [twenty-three] hours a day

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and let out one hour [a] day. And you have other very limited

privileges.”

¶ 17 The district court’s conclusions that Archambault’s testimony

was credible and that he made “no such promises” are supported by

the record. See Pendleton, ¶ 13. While Archambault likely

discussed confinement conditions with Nevares, he clarified that he

made no explicit promises. And even if Archambault told Nevares

he would have fewer privileges on death row than while serving a

life sentence, Edwards’ testimony suggests that this was not a

misrepresentation. Moreover, Nevares failed to present evidence

that the alleged promises influenced his plea to an extent that

would render it involuntary. See Medina, ¶ 23.

¶ 18 Nevares also contends that his plea was involuntary because

he was still suffering from his illness, and his weak condition

affected his decision to plead guilty. The district court rejected this

argument, and we agree. Nevares testified that he was in the

intensive care unit “most of July of 2018” and was still in extremely

poor physical condition when he returned to jail. He testified that

he had lost a lot of weight, which his defense team also noted at the

time. But Archambault’s notes from August 6, 2018, stated that

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Nevares looked healthier and had said that “he was feeling much

better” and “was in less pain.” And although Nevares testified that,

after returning from the hospital, he wanted more time to consider

the plea and was drained physically and emotionally, he admitted

that he was “in much less pain” when he accepted the plea. He

remembered telling Archambault he felt better and was healing but

testified that he lied out of pride.

¶ 19 On appeal, Nevares repeatedly argues that the district court

placed too much weight on evidence that he was feeling better. But

he had an opportunity at the postconviction hearing to explain not

only that he remained unwell but also how this affected his plea.

Instead, he testified about his physical condition without explaining

its influence on his decision-making. He asks us to infer from the

nature of his condition that his plea was invalid, but he presented

little evidence about how his physical ailments affected his mental

acuity and decision-making.

¶ 20 Additionally, during the Rule 11 advisement, Nevares said that

he was healthy and thinking clearly, that his plea was not a result

of coercion or “promises of any kind,” and that he did not need

more time to consider his decision. Such statements do not

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automatically bar a later challenge to a plea’s validity, but they

“carry a strong presumption of verity.” Lopez, ¶ 31 (quoting

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74); see also Medina, ¶ 19 (“Compliance

with Crim. P. 11 ‘normally will satisfy constitutional due process

concerns.’” (citation omitted)). Given the district court’s credibility

determinations to which we defer, the evidence presented at the

postconviction hearing — about Nevares’ illness and his other

allegations — was insufficient to overcome this presumption.

¶ 21 Nevares clearly struggled with what must have been a difficult

decision — accept the plea and spend the rest of his life in custody

or risk a death sentence. He testified that he was initially adamant

about going to trial and not pleading guilty. But he acknowledged

that he told Archambault he changed his mind on a sometimes

daily basis. And defense counsel’s contemporaneous notes from

that period reflect the internal turmoil this decision caused Nevares.

Ultimately, that the choice to plead guilty was difficult does not

mean it was coerced or otherwise invalid. See Bordenkircher v.

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“While confronting a defendant

with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a

‘discouraging effect on [his] assertion of his trial rights, the

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imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable’ — and

permissible — ‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates

and encourages the negotiation of pleas.’” (citation omitted)).

¶ 22 Nevares also had multiple discussions with his defense team

and his family before accepting the plea, and he received a proper

Rule 11 advisement. In sum, the record evidence supports the

district court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to

prove that Nevares’ plea was not “a voluntary and intelligent choice

among the alternative courses of action.” Medina, ¶ 23 (quoting

Alford, 400 U.S. at 31).

C. Nevares’ Counsel Was Constitutionally Effective

1. Applicable Law

¶ 23 For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a defendant must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness”; and (2) “there is ‘a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.’” Corson, ¶ 34 (quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984)). In the

guilty plea context, the first prong is the same, but the second

prong requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

13
errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty.” Id. at ¶ 35

(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2. Analysis

¶ 24 On appeal, Nevares reasserts his contention that — but for

counsel’s inappropriate pressure to accept the plea — he would not

have pleaded guilty. We disagree. We have already concluded that

any such alleged pressure did not invalidate his plea. Additionally,

the defense team’s notes indicated that Nevares’ counsel repeatedly

emphasized that the decision to plead guilty was Nevares’ and his

alone to make. Archambault, who had been a public defender for

fourteen years, testified that this was his standard practice. He

also testified that, pursuant to American Bar Association (ABA)

guidelines, he was obligated to do everything possible to avoid a

client receiving the death penalty, including pursuing a plea to life

without parole. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and

Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 10.9.1

cmt. (rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1040

(2003); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 (2004).

¶ 25 Finally, Edwards, the expert witness, testified that Nevares

received effective representation. He explained that ABA guidelines

14
require discussing lethal injection with a client, including that it

could be extremely painful. And he testified that defense counsel

should explain the different privileges and living conditions of

different levels of confinement.

¶ 26 We are also not persuaded by Nevares’ contention that “the

lack of contemporaneous notes from defense counsel” from the day

he signed the plea agreement supports a conclusion that counsel

pressured him to accept the plea. We employ a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance. People v. Wardell, 2020

COA 47, ¶ 29. The defendant must overcome this presumption by

establishing that counsel’s errors were “so flagrant that they more

likely resulted from neglect or ignorance.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690). The mere absence of notes from the day Nevares

signed the plea is insufficient to overcome this presumption.

¶ 27 All told, Nevares failed to establish that his counsel’s

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

Corson, ¶ 34 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). So the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his petition for

postconviction relief. Huggins, ¶ 28.

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III. Disposition

¶ 28 The district court’s order denying relief under Rule 35(c) is

affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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