Peo in Interest of GM

25CA1132 Peo in Interest of GM 02-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1132
Weld County District Court No. 21JV290
Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of G.M., a Child,

and Concerning J.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026

No Appearance for Petitioner

Sandra K. Owens, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 J.M. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) for G.M. (the child). Father argues that the

court erred by adopting a three-step parenting time plan for E.S.

(mother) that allows mother to progress to the next step after ninety

days of demonstrated sobriety in each step. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect alleging concerns about, among

other things, mother’s substance use and mental health and

parents’ verbal abuse. The court adjudicated the child dependent

or neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents.

¶3 About three years after the petition was filed, father was

convicted of multiple felony criminal charges and incarcerated.

Father remained incarcerated throughout the remainder of the

proceeding.

¶4 The court placed the child with J.T., a family friend, and

designated J.T. a special respondent.

¶5 With the Department and father’s support, the guardian ad

litem (GAL) later moved for an APR to J.T. Mother also filed a

motion for an APR to J.T.

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¶6 Before the hearing on the APR motions, the parties mostly

agreed to a proposed APR. They specifically agreed that J.T. would

be the primary residential custodian, and that mother and J.T.

would share decision-making authority “with regard to major

decisions.” And all agreed that mother and father should receive

parenting time. With respect to mother specifically, the parties

agreed to a step-up parenting plan (containing three steps) that

required mother to demonstrate sobriety for an identified period

before advancing to the next step. But the parties disagreed on the

required period of demonstrated sobriety before mother could

progress to the next step. Mother, the GAL, and the Department

proposed ninety days; father proposed 182 days.

¶7 The court held a hearing on the narrow issue of whether

mother could advance to the next step after ninety days of

demonstrated sobriety. At the time of the APR hearing, mother had

been sober for several months and was engaging in supervised

weekly visits with the child. After considering the evidence, the

court found that a ninety-day step-up period was in the child’s best

interests.

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II. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

¶8 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by allowing mother to advance in her step-up plan after only ninety

days of demonstrated sobriety.1 We disagree.

¶9 The Children’s Code governs allocations of parental

responsibilities. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18; see

§ 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025. The overriding purpose of the Children’s

Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing

procedures through which the child’s best interests can be served.

J.G., ¶ 19. A court therefore must allocate parental responsibilities

in accordance with the child’s best interests. People in Interest of

L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 10 The allocation of parental responsibilities is within the juvenile

court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

1 Because father is challenging the length of time mother must

demonstrate sobriety in each step of the step-up plan, we reject the
GAL’s assertion that this issue “is factually moot” because only the
first ninety-day period of mother’s step-up plan is at issue.

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misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022

CO 55, ¶ 14. The credibility of the witnesses, the probative effect

and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to

be drawn therefrom are within the court’s discretion. People in

Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 11 The court carefully considered father’s concerns about

mother’s sobriety as it related to the child’s best interests. The

court found that the proposed ninety-day increments were in the

child’s best interests and balanced the child’s need “to see that he

has increasing time with his mom as she stabilizes in the

community.” Recognizing father’s “legitimate” concerns about

mother’s sobriety struggles, the court added additional protections

by requiring mother to provide J.T. with documentation of her

sobriety and her progress in substance use treatment and by

allowing mother to advance a step only upon ninety days of

continued clean drug testing. If mother missed scheduled family

time “without a valid reason,” or “ha[d] a positive or missed”

urinalysis, the “phase shall start over.”

¶ 12 The court’s ruling is supported by the record. While father

testified about mother’s past substance use struggles, the

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caseworker testified that mother had been sober and successfully

engaging in treatment for about four months, and that her

parenting time had been going well during those four months. The

caseworker testified that mother had “figured out . . . a system that

works for her with [her mental health] medications.” The

caseworker also opined that, as of the date of the hearing, mother

was compliant with her treatment plan. And the caseworker

confirmed that the proposed ninety-day period was based on the

child’s “attachment to his mom and preference for seeing her.”

¶ 13 Even so, crediting his own testimony, father maintains that a

longer period in each step was warranted. But it was for the

juvenile court to consider and weigh the evidence and resolve any

evidentiary conflicts. See id. at 250 (“[I]t is important to defer to the

[juvenile] court, particularly when it hears contradictory testimony

on material issues . . . .”). To the extent father asks us to reweigh

the evidence and reach a different conclusion than the juvenile

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court, we won’t do that. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 29.2

¶ 14 Because the court considered the evidence and applied the

correct legal standard, we conclude that it did not abuse its

discretion by declining father’s proposed 182-day step-up period for

mother.

III. Disposition

¶ 15 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

2 Beyond his own testimony, father also relies on evidence that was

not introduced at the APR hearing. But we do not consider
evidence that “was not presented to the trial court.” In re Edilson,
637 P.2d 362, 364 (Colo. 1981).

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