Marriage of Rich

25CA0498 Marriage of Rich 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0498
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23DR30642
Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Glen Michael Rich,

Appellee,

and

Katherine Mary Kappas,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Harrington Brewster Mahoney Smits, P.C., Joshua C. Sauer, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellee

Suazo Law LLC, Ian Z. Shea, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Katherine Mary Kappas (wife) appeals those portions of the

permanent orders concerning the marital property division and

maintenance on the dissolution of her marriage to Glen Michael

Rich (husband). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2024, the district court entered permanent orders

dissolving the parties’ marriage of approximately ten years. The

court divided the marital estate, which was valued at approximately

$5.6 million, roughly equally. Wife was allocated approximately $2

million in cash proceeds from the sale of the marital home, plus

bank, retirement, and investment accounts valued at over

$700,000. Husband was allocated approximately $160,000 in

marital debt, plus the parties’ second home in Florida, which had

$300,000 in equity. In addition, the court allocated husband the

entirety of the marital value of his ownership interests in his

businesses, Key Lime Air and CBG LLC (CBG), totaling $2,592,000.

¶3 The district court awarded wife $8,500 per month in

maintenance for four years and eleven months.

1
II. Marital Property Division

¶4 Wife contends that the district court erred when valuing

husband’s business interests and otherwise made insufficient

findings in support of its division of the marital estate. We disagree.

A. Valuation of Husband’s Business Interests

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 The court has latitude to equitably divide the marital estate

based on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we will not

disturb its decision absent a showing that the court abused its

discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. “A

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the

law.” In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16.

¶6 When dividing marital property, the court determines the

property’s approximate current value. In re Marriage of Wright,

2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. In doing so, the court may select the valuation

of one party over that of the other party or make its own valuation,

and its decision will be affirmed if the value is reasonable in light of

the evidence as a whole. Medeiros, ¶ 41; In re Marriage of Krejci,

2
2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (recognizing that a valuation will be upheld

“unless clearly erroneous”).

2. Additional Background

¶7 Husband came into the marriage with a twenty-four percent

interest in Key Lime Air, a small cargo and passenger airline, and a

thirty percent interest in CBG, which was formed solely to purchase

and lease aircraft to Key Lime Air. As of the permanent orders,

husband’s interest in Key Lime Air had increased to 33.33%, and

his interest in CBG remained unchanged.

¶8 The parties retained a joint expert to value husband’s business

interests as of the date of the marriage and the date of the decree,

with any increase in value representing marital property to be

divided by the district court. See § 14-10-113(4), C.R.S. 2025

(defining the increase in value of an asset acquired prior to the

marriage as marital property). The joint expert valued husband’s

business interests as of the date of the marriage and December 31,

2023, and presented two different valuation methods for the court’s

consideration.

¶9 On an investment value basis, the joint expert opined that the

value of husband’s interests in Key Lime Air and CBG had

3
increased during the marriage by $1,477,000 and $2,589,000,

respectively. Alternatively, after applying discounts of fifteen and

twenty-five percent for lack of control and marketability, the joint

expert opined that the value of husband’s interests in Key Lime Air

and CBG had increased by only $941,000 and $1,651,000 on a fair

market value basis.

¶ 10 Wife presented a rebuttal expert who opined that the joint

expert had failed to account for airlines typically selling at a

multiple of their net asset value. Wife’s expert adjusted the joint

expert’s figures and concluded that the marital values of Key Lime

Air and CBG were $2,370,987 and $4,921,688, respectively.

¶ 11 In the permanent orders, the district court found the

testimony of the joint expert to be “more helpful, more accurate,

and more credible.” The court found the joint expert’s use of

discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability based on

husband’s minority interest in the businesses to be “compelling and

convincing.” Conversely, the court was skeptical of the rebuttal

expert’s adjustments because the market value of invested capital

multiplier that he used was based on data from the sale of large,

national airlines.

4
3. Date of Valuation

¶ 12 Wife first argues that the district court erred by relying on the

joint expert’s valuation, which was valid as of December 31, 2023,

as opposed to the date of the October 4, 2024, permanent orders

hearing. Accordingly, wife asserts that the court ignored increases

in the assets of both businesses during 2024. We perceive no error.

¶ 13 Under section 14-10-113(5), marital “property shall be valued

as of the date of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on

disposition of property if such hearing precedes the date of the

decree.” However, when valuing marital assets, it is the parties’

duty to present the court with the requisite data to allow it to make

a sufficient valuation, and any failure by the parties in this regard

does not provide them with grounds for review. Krejci, ¶ 23; cf. In re

Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A] party

who fails to present sufficient evidence at trial should not be

allowed on appeal to challenge the inadequacy of the evidence.”).

¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, the joint expert

acknowledged that she had seen the businesses’ financial

statements for the first half of 2024. However, she opined that no

revisions to the December 2023 values were necessary because the

5
mid-year statements had not been reviewed by the companies’

accountants or been adjusted for items like depreciation. And while

she conceded that CBG had recently acquired additional airplanes,

she confirmed that the airplanes had been entirely financed.

¶ 15 The rebuttal expert criticized the joint expert’s December 2023

value as “stale.” However, the rebuttal expert had also valued the

businesses as of December 2023, although he offered to

“recalculate [the] results,” using the 2024 figures “if requested to do

so.” The rebuttal expert testified that the new airplanes would have

increased the present value of CBG by millions of dollars, although

he did not provide a clear dollar figure.

¶ 16 The district court agreed with the joint expert and did not find

the 2023 values to be “stale,” reasoning that the 2024 fiscal year

“ha[d] not concluded.”

¶ 17 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district

court erred. The only definitive values that the court received were

as of December 2023, and neither expert used the 2024 figures in

valuing the businesses. Accordingly, the failure by both parties to

introduce a more recent valuation does not provide grounds for

reversal. See Krejci, ¶ 23; Zappanti, 80 P.3d at 892.

6
¶ 18 Wife suggests that court should have nonetheless relied on the

rebuttal expert’s report, which indicated that, based on the June

2024 financial statements, the shareholders’ equity in CBG,

“without adjustments,” had increased by $3,300,000. But the

district court was free to credit the joint expert’s testimony that it

was not appropriate to rely on such unadjusted mid-year

information, which even the rebuttal expert had not used in his

calculations. See In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo.

App. 2003) (“[C]redibility determinations and the weight, probative

force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the sole

discretion of the trial court.”); In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267,

270 (Colo. App. 2010) (the district court’s resolution of conflicting

evidence is binding on review).

¶ 19 Lastly, we disagree with wife’s suggestion that the district

court was otherwise obligated to make its own valuation

adjustments based on the mid-year financial statements. See In re

Marriage of Eisenhuth, 976 P.2d 896, 901 (Colo. App. 1999)

(recognizing that while the district court is required to consider the

evidence presented to it, it does not act as a surrogate attorney).

7
4. Application of Discounts

¶ 20 Wife next argues that the district court erred when

determining the marital value of the businesses because it

erroneously applied marketability and lack of control discounts.

But, given the substantial discretion afforded to the district court

when valuing marital assets, we are not persuaded.

¶ 21 In In re Marriage of Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782, 787 (Colo. 2010),

the Colorado Supreme Court refused to impose per se legal tests

governing the valuation of marital property because district courts

are vested with significant discretion to divide marital estates

equitably. Specifically, Thornhill declined to adopt a blanket rule

prohibiting marketability discounts when valuing an ownership

interest in a closely held corporation. Id. at 785. Even though the

court had previously prohibited marketability discounts in the

context of a corporation buying out a dissenting minority

shareholder, see Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353

(Colo. 2003), Thornhill refused to extend that prohibition to

dissolution of marriage proceedings. Thornhill, 232 P.3d at 785.

¶ 22 The Thornhill court reasoned that section 14-10-113 did not

specifically require marital assets to be valued using any particular

8
method and that said section instead gave district courts “broad

discretion to divide marital property as they ‘deem[] just’ after

‘considering all relevant factors.’” Id. at 786 (quoting § 14-10-

113(1)). Accordingly, Thornhill left the application of a marketability

discount to the district court’s discretion because “the language of

the marriage dissolution statute suggests that a case-by-case

approach is most appropriate.” Id. at 787.

¶ 23 Here, while the joint expert valued the businesses both with

and without discounts for lack of control and marketability, the

district court found the use of discounts to be “compelling and

convincing” based on the joint expert’s report. In turn, that report

explained that a lack of control discount accounted for the fact that

husband, as a minority shareholder in both businesses, could not

unilaterally take actions such as appointing management,

determining compensation, declaring dividends, and setting

business policy. The report likewise explained that a lack of

marketability discount accounted for restrictions on an owner’s

ability to sell their ownership interest.

¶ 24 Wife argues that the district court’s valuation was

unsupported by the record because the joint expert did not

9
specifically advocate for either a discounted or undiscounted

valuation approach. She also asserts that the joint expert’s report

lacked detail as to the studies that the expert relied on when

determining appropriate discounts. But it is well-established that

an expert may base their opinion on information that has not been

admitted into evidence so long as said information is “of a type

reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming

opinions or inferences upon the subject.” CRE 703; see KN Energy,

Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769, 785 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 25 And here, because the district court was specifically

persuaded by the joint expert’s explanation of the discounts, we are

satisfied that the court appropriately weighed both valuation

options and acted within its substantial discretion when deciding to

apply the discounts. See Thornhill, 232 P.3d at 786; Medeiros, ¶ 41;

Krejci, ¶ 23. While wife cites the rebuttal expert’s testimony that

the discounts were inappropriate, the district court was free to

weigh such testimony as it saw fit. See Lewis, 66 P.3d at 207; see

also In re Marriage of Bookout, 833 P.2d 800, 804 (Colo. App. 1991)

(“The weight to be accorded to the valuation techniques of an expert

is for the [district] court’s determination . . . .”).

10
¶ 26 We are also unpersuaded that the district court erred by

applying a marketability discount to husband’s interest in CBG,

which had a pre-discounted value that was almost entirely based on

the appraised value of the company’s airplanes. Relying on foreign

authority limiting the application of marketability discounts, wife

argues that it is improper to apply such discounts to tangible assets

like airplanes. But we decline wife’s invitation to impose such a

prohibition here because Thornhill, 232 P.3d at 787, affords district

courts substantial discretion to value assets on a case-by-case

basis. And because we have already concluded that the application

of a marketability discount was supported by the record in the form

of the joint expert’s report, we otherwise perceive no abuse of the

court’s substantial discretion.

¶ 27 For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by wife’s assertion,

again based on foreign authority, that the district court could not

apply a marketability discount when there was no indication that

husband was contemplating selling his business interests. Indeed,

in Thornhill, id. at 786, the supreme court cited with approval

Fausch v. Fausch, 697 N.W.2d 748, 752–53 (S.D. 2005), which held

that “[w]hether or not it is fair or appropriate to apply a discount in

11
a divorce case where no immediate sale is contemplated is for the

trial court to determine based upon the evidence of the case.”

5. Business Intangibles

¶ 28 We lastly consider and reject wife’s contention that the district

court abused its discretion by failing to consider an increase in

value of the intangible assets of Key Lime Air, such as the airline’s

Federal Aviation Administration certifications.

¶ 29 The joint expert testified that she had considered

approximately $700,000 worth of intangible assets that were listed

as assets of Key Lime Air by the company’s independent

accountants and had relied on the book values as listed by the

accountants when determining that the intangible assets had not

changed in value. Conversely, the rebuttal expert opined that the

intangible assets had increased in value as reflected by the market

value of invested capital multiplier that he applied to the assets of

Key Lime Air and CBG when reaching his opinion of value.

¶ 30 But the district court found credible the joint expert’s

testimony that the value of the intangible assets had not changed

during the marriage and was skeptical of the multiplier used by the

12
rebuttal expert because it was based on sales of airlines that were

substantially larger than Key Lime Air.

¶ 31 Therefore, we again decline to second-guess the district court’s

credibility findings or otherwise reweigh the evidence to set aside

the court’s findings when, as here, the record supports them. See

Bookout, 833 P.2d at 804; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243

P.3d 244, 249-56 (Colo. 2010) (reversing when appellate court

“improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court

regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight, sufficiency,

and probative value of the evidence”).

B. General Sufficiency of Findings in Support of Marital Property
Division

¶ 32 We next reject wife’s assertion that the district court made

inadequate findings explaining how it arrived at the marital

property division.

¶ 33 While section 14-10-113(1) requires the court to consider

certain factors when dividing the marital property, such as the

contributions of each spouse, the value of the parties’ separate

property, and the spouses’ respective economic circumstances,

weighing the factors is within the district court’s discretion, and the

13
court need not make specific findings on each factor. In re Marriage

of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2009); In re Marriage of

Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (recognizing that the court must make

findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently explicit to give an

appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order).

¶ 34 Here, although the district court did not engage in a detailed

discussion of each statutory factor, we are satisfied that it

considered the pertinent factors when dividing the marital estate.

See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959. For instance, at other points in the

permanent orders, the court found that both parties had

contributed to the marriage, with wife supporting husband’s

businesses and contributing to the parties’ household. See § 14-

10-113(1)(a). The court also engaged in a detailed discussion of the

parties’ respective economic circumstances, including each party’s

present earning capacity. See § 14-10-113(1)(c).

¶ 35 While wife argues that the district court failed to consider her

deteriorating health when dividing the marital estate, the district

court did “not find her credible that she is unable to work due to

her medical conditions, medications, or age,” and, therefore, it is

apparent to us to the court did not find her health to be a relevant

14
economic circumstance when dividing the marital estate. See

Foster v. Phillips, 6 P.3d 791, 796 (Colo. App. 1999) (findings may

be implicit in a court’s ruling when the ruling, in the context of the

record, is sufficient to determine its basis). Lastly, we decline to

consider wife’s assertion, made for the first time in her reply brief,

that the court mischaracterized her partial, pre-decree use of the

proceeds from the marital home when allocating the marital

property. See In re Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 14 (issues

raised for the first time in reply brief will not be addressed).

III. Maintenance

¶ 36 Wife next asserts that the district court committed multiple

errors when awarding her $8,500 per month in maintenance. We

are not persuaded.

A. Standards of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 37 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount

and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that

discretion, its decision will not be reversed. See § 14-10-114(2),

(3)(e), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.

¶ 38 Under section 14-10-114(3), the district court must follow a

specific process when considering a maintenance request. In re

15
Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 28. “[T]he court must

first make written or oral findings on each party’s gross income, the

marital property apportioned to each party, each party’s financial

resources, the reasonable financial need as established during the

marriage, and the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” Herold,

¶ 25; see also § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I).

¶ 39 Next, the court must determine the amount and term of

maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering the

statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive statutory

factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c); Wright,

¶ 15. But when, as here, the parties’ combined annual adjusted

gross income exceeds $240,000, the advisory guideline amount for

maintenance under section 14-10-114(3)(b)(I) does not apply. See

§ 14-10-114(3.5). Instead, the court must determine maintenance

based on the statutory factors in section 14-10-114(3)(c). See § 14-

10-114(3.5). Then, only if the party seeking maintenance lacks

sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to them,

to provide for their reasonable needs and is unable to support

themself through appropriate employment, may the court award

maintenance. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

16
B. The Parties’ Respective Incomes

¶ 40 We first consider and reject wife’s contention that the district

court erred when determining the parties’ respective incomes.

¶ 41 As to wife, the district court found that she was not presently

working and imputed to her an income of $3,048 per month, which

represented a full-time income at Denver’s minimum wage of

$18.29 per hour. While wife argues that the district court erred

because certain health conditions prevented her from working and

because she had not historically earned such a wage, we perceive

no error.

¶ 42 If a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,

maintenance is based on a determination of that party’s potential

income. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV). Potential income is the amount a

party could earn from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s

demonstrated earning ability, In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA

83, ¶ 26, although potential income shall not be determined for a

physically or mentally incapacitated party, § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV).

¶ 43 Here, the district court considered wife’s past work history,

including her work as a pilot, real estate agent, and director of

apparel at Key Lime Air. And although the court found that wife

17
was “suffering from certain medical conditions,” it did “not find her

credible that she [was] unable to work due to her medical

conditions, medications, or age.”

¶ 44 While wife cites her lengthy testimony concerning her medical

conditions that prevent her from working, we decline to second-

guess the court’s credibility determinations or otherwise reweigh

the evidence in her favor. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-56; In re

Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (“The

[district] court can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s

testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of conflicting

evidence is binding on review.”). And we otherwise reject wife’s

argument that the level of income imputed by the district court was

inconsistent with her demonstrated earning ability given that the

court found that she could work full time and based her income on

the present minimum wage in the court’s jurisdiction.

¶ 45 As to husband, the district court found that his income was

$35,069 per month, based on his paystubs and 2023 W-2. Wife

asserts that the court erred because it declined to use husband’s

2023 K-1s for Key Lime Air and CBG, which reflected approximately

an additional $1.3 million in income. The court cited husband’s

18
testimony that he did not take home any of the income reflected on

the K-1s since the monies corresponded to a one-time insurance

payout for an airplane that had been totaled in an accident.

¶ 46 We agree with wife that the district court would have erred if it

had excluded husband’s K-1 income solely because he did not take

any distributions. Husband is the vice president of Key Lime Air,

and section 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(W) limits a party’s gross income from

a limited liability company or closely held corporation to “actual

cash distributions received” only if that party “is a passive investor,

has a minority interest in the company, and does not have any

managerial duties or input.”

¶ 47 However, because the district court also found, with record

support in the form of husband’s testimony, that the income on the

K-1s corresponded to a one-time insurance settlement for a

destroyed plane, we disagree that the district court erred by

excluding it. As explained by another division of this court in In re

Marriage of Laughlin, 932 P.2d 858, 861 (Colo. App. 1997),

settlement proceeds are generally not considered income to the

extent that the payments represent the return of lost principal to

the claimant. And here, we view the insurance proceeds as akin to

19
such a return of lost principal given husband’s testimony that the

payout was for the “total loss” of an airplane that was struck by

ground equipment. Cf. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(T) (including funds

payable from casualty insurance as gross income only “to the extent

that such insurance replaces wages or provides income in lieu of

wages”).

C. Wife’s Reasonable Financial Needs

¶ 48 Wife also contends that the district court abused its discretion

by failing to sufficiently consider and meet her reasonable financial

needs when awarding maintenance. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D).

¶ 49 While the district court observed that the parties lived a “high

lifestyle” during the marriage, it found wife’s reasonable financial

needs to be much less than the $44,000 per month listed on her

sworn financial statement. Despite the parties’ high standard of

living, the court found many of wife’s claimed expenses to be

“exorbitant,” with “[e]xamples . . . includ[ing] . . . the [second] home

that is being allocated to [husband], $7,000 in monthly travel

expenses, monthly pet care of $1,240, and $1,500 in monthly

sporting event costs.” The court also found that husband had been

allocated much of the debt listed by wife and accordingly concluded

20
that her “reasonable monthly financial need is closer to $16,000.00

per month.”

¶ 50 We perceive no error. The district court acted within its

discretion as fact finder when it discounted wife’s claimed $44,000

in monthly expenses as excessive, and we will not disturb that

credibility determination. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-56.

Moreover, while wife objects that the court did not explain, dollar

for dollar, how it calculated her $16,000 per month in reasonable

needs, there is no requirement in the statute that the court account

for each dollar of such need, only that it make findings regarding

reasonable financial need. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D). And because the

court identified examples of the expenses that it found to be

excessive or otherwise inapplicable, we can adequately discern from

its findings how it found wife’s claimed needs to be grossly

overstated. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056,

1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they

identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed persuasive and

determinative of the issues raised.”).

¶ 51 Wife also argues that even if her reasonable need was $16,000

per month, the $8,500 monthly maintenance award, plus her

21
$3,048 per month in imputed income, was insufficient to meet that

need. But when considering wife’s financial resources, the district

court also found that she could earn substantial interest on the

approximately $2.8 million in assets that she was receiving in the

marital property division, which primarily consisted of cash and

other investable assets. See §§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C) and 14-10-

114(3)(c)(I) (directing the court to consider “actual or potential

income from separate or marital property”). The court credited

husband’s testimony concerning the interest income that wife could

earn on her share of the property division and cited an exhibit

prepared by husband demonstrating the monthly interest that wife

could earn at various interest rates.

¶ 52 Wife claims that the district court failed to make specific

findings as to what amount of her assets could generate interest

and what her investment return would be. But we are satisfied that

the maintenance award reflects the court’s implicit determination

that wife’s reasonable needs could be met with the combined total

of the maintenance awarded, her imputed income, and the interest

earned on the significant assets allocated to her in the property

division. See Foster, 6 P.3d at 796; cf. In re Marriage of Page, 70

22
P.3d 579, 581, 584 (Colo. App. 2003) (applying a previous version of

the statute and upholding a maintenance award that was supported

by the evidence “based upon the totality of the circumstances”).

Moreover, because the district court specifically stated that it was

considering wife’s ability to earn “monthly interest” on the

substantial liquid assets awarded to her, we disagree with her that

the court somehow improperly considered unrealized capital gains

in its determination.

¶ 53 Lastly, we reject wife’s contention that the maintenance award

was inequitable because it left husband with significant disposable

income above and beyond his $14,000 per month in reasonable

needs. The purpose of the maintenance award is to help meet the

reasonable needs of the payee spouse as opposed to “ensur[ing] that

the spouses have an equal lifestyle forever.” In re Marriage of

Antuna, 8 P.3d 589, 595 (Colo. App. 2000).

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 54 Husband requests an award of his appellate attorney fees. We

deny his request because he has failed to state a legal and factual

basis in support of his request. See C.A.R. 39.1.

23
V. Disposition

¶ 55 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

24