Marriage of Stremler

25CA0457 Marriage of Stremler 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0457
Douglas County District Court No. 22DR643
Honorable Daniel Warhola, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jina Leigh Stremler,

Appellee,

and

Troy Dale Stremler,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Fourth Street Law, LLC, Caroline C. Cooley, Christopher J. Linas, Castle Rock,
Colorado, for Appellee

Anne Whalen Gill, L.L.C., Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Troy Dale

Stremler (husband) and Jina Leigh Stremler (wife), husband

appeals the permanent orders regarding property division, spousal

maintenance, and attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 1991 and have adult children. In 2022,

they sought to dissolve their marriage.

¶3 In October 2024, after an evidentiary hearing, the district

court entered a dissolution decree and permanent orders. The

court accepted the parties’ stipulation that the marital residence

was worth $950,000. After subtracting the mortgage and a home

equity line of credit, $482,130 in net marital equity remained. The

court directed the parties to list the residence for sale at $950,000

and awarded wife the net proceeds.

¶4 Next, the court rejected husband’s claim that the over

$550,000 the parties received from his father during the marriage

constituted a marital debt. As a result, the court excluded the

alleged loan from the property division. The court then allocated to

husband the entire marital interest in his company, Newdea, which

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was valued at $580,356. In the end, the court concluded that an

equitable property division required husband to receive $570,561

and wife to receive $524,249.

¶5 The district court also granted wife monthly spousal

maintenance of $3,412 for twelve years.

¶6 Finally, the district court ordered each party to pay their own

attorney fees.

¶7 Husband moved for post-trial relief. Because the marital

residence sold for $1 million, the district court amended the

judgment, ordering the parties to equally divide the additional

$50,000 in net proceeds. The court also supplemented its findings

regarding maintenance.

¶8 On appeal, husband contends that the district court erred by

(1) awarding the marital residence to wife instead of allowing him to

buy out her interest; (2) excluding from the marital estate the

claimed debt owed to his father; (3) granting wife maintenance; and

(4) denying his request for attorney fees. We address each alleged

error in turn.

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II. Property Division

A. Standard of Review

¶9 A district court has great latitude in making an equitable

property division based on the facts and circumstances of each

case, and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶

19. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In

re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28.

¶ 10 We accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly

erroneous, meaning they are not supported by the record. See In re

Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Dean, 2017

COA 51, ¶ 8.

¶ 11 We review de novo, however, whether the district court applied

the correct legal standard. Medeiros, ¶ 28.

B. Discussion

1. Marital Residence

¶ 12 Husband argues that the district court should have let him

keep the marital residence by buying out wife’s share. We conclude

that the issue is moot.

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¶ 13 Whether an issue is moot is a question of law that we review

de novo. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022

COA 105, ¶ 49.

¶ 14 An appellate court will not render an opinion on the merits of

an issue when subsequent events have rendered the issue moot. In

re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 7. An issue is moot when

the relief requested, if granted, would have no practical effect on an

existing controversy. See In re Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123,

¶ 21.

¶ 15 It is undisputed that the parties have already sold the marital

residence. Thus, an order compelling wife to convey her interest to

husband so he could keep the residence would have no practical

effect. See id. Because the sale extinguished the controversy, we

dismiss as moot this part of husband’s appeal. See id.; see also In

re Marriage of Walker, 264 P.3d 630, 631 (Colo. App. 2011) (part of

an appeal dismissed for mootness).

2. Alleged Marital Loan

¶ 16 Husband contends that the district court erred by excluding

from the marital estate an alleged debt owed to his father. We

disagree.

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¶ 17 When dividing the marital estate, the district court must

determine whether a particular debt exists and, if so, whether that

debt is marital. See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35

(Colo. 2001); In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1171-72

(Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 18 The classification of a transfer as a debt or a gift depends on

the resolution of factual disputes. See In re Marriage of Hoffman,

650 P.2d 1344, 1345-46 (Colo. App. 1982).

¶ 19 Husband testified, and his accompanying spreadsheet showed,

that he1 took loans from his parents during the marriage and that,

by the September 2024 permanent orders hearing, the loan balance

had reached roughly $565,000, with almost $300,000 in accrued

interest at a 4% rate. He also introduced a promissory note signed

on February 4, 2024, more than a year after wife initiated the

dissolution.

¶ 20 According to the note, he owed his father about $550,000 at

0% interest and agreed to repay it in monthly installments of

1 The record is unclear regarding how many loans wife was aware

of; however, the promissory note reflects husband’s name as the
only borrower.

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$2,500 once the dissolution case concluded. In explaining the

discrepancy between the interest rates on the spreadsheet (4%) and

the promissory note (0%), husband said it was his mistake because

he was not an attorney. Husband also admitted that he drafted the

note specifically for the dissolution case because he expected wife to

dispute the debt’s legitimacy.

¶ 21 Husband’s father testified that he could not remember who

drafted the promissory note, when it was created, or what it said.

When asked whether he reviewed the note, he answered, “I probably

read it, maybe not. I’m . . . not really into that, but I . . . definitely

agree with it.” Husband’s father pointed out that the loan carried a

4% interest rate, which conflicted with the note. And he testified

that the parties made just one $100 payment during the marriage.

¶ 22 In contrast, wife testified that husband’s parents gave the

parties financial help, but husband or his parents always told her

that it did not have to be repaid and instead would be taken out of

their future inheritance. She said that whenever she suggested

making repayments, husband made it seem like it “never needed to

[be] pa[id] back.” Moreover, she testified the alleged debt amount

was far larger than anything ever mentioned before.

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¶ 23 The court concluded that the promissory note shouldn’t be

included as a marital debt. It found that husband’s father’s

uncertain testimony about the promissory note, along with his

willingness to agree with it anyway, indicated that he was simply

trying to help his son and raised “skepticism” about the promissory

note’s validity. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49;

In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007). The

court further found that the promissory note and the spreadsheet

were inconsistent. And the court credited wife’s testimony about

the amount of the payments received from husband’s father. See

Thorburn, ¶ 49 (credibility determinations and the weight, probative

force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the district

court’s sole discretion); see also Amich, 192 P.3d at 424 (the court

can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if

uncontroverted).

¶ 24 Given the record support, we may not disturb the district

court’s finding that a valid marital debt did not exist. See Hoffman,

650 P.2d at 1345-46; Gibbs, ¶ 9.

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III. Maintenance

A. Standard of Review

¶ 25 We review a district court’s maintenance determination for an

abuse of discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 58. We defer to the court’s factual

findings if they have record support, but we review de novo whether

it correctly applied the law. Id.

B. Discussion

¶ 26 Husband says that the district court failed to consider all

relevant statutory factors in determining maintenance. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 27 Section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2025, specifies the process a

district court must follow when considering a maintenance request.

In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. The court must first

make findings concerning (1) the amount of each party’s gross

income; (2) the marital property apportioned to each party; (3) the

financial resources of each party; (4) the reasonable financial need

as established during the marriage; and (5) whether the

maintenance awarded would be deductible for federal income tax

purposes by the payor and taxable income to the recipient. § 14-

10-114(3)(a)(I); see Wright, ¶ 14.

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¶ 28 After making these initial findings, the district court must

determine the amount and term of maintenance, if any, that is fair

and equitable to the parties. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II). In doing so, the

court must weigh the statutory factors set forth in section 14-10-

114(3)(c). “[W]hile a district court has no obligation to make specific

factual findings on every factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it

must ‘make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate

court a clear understanding of the basis of its order.’” Wright, ¶ 20

(quoting Gibbs, ¶ 9).

¶ 29 Last, section 14-10-114(3)(d) also requires the district court to

find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property,

including marital property apportioned to him or her, to provide for

his or her reasonable needs and is unable to support himself or

herself through appropriate employment before awarding

maintenance.

¶ 30 Husband asserts that the district court failed to consider (1)

the volatility of his income; (2) that wife had the qualifications to be

hired as a director at a nonprofit, earning $7,500 per month; (3)

that wife was awarded over $500,000 in marital property; (4)

whether wife’s award of marital property could generate income;

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and (5) his age and “reasonable expectation to retire in a few years.”

He is mistaken.

¶ 31 When determining maintenance, the district court made the

following findings:

• The parties were married for thirty-three years and

enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle.

• Husband had been the breadwinner throughout the

marriage.

• Based on a three-year average, husband’s monthly

income was $16,656.

• And husband was likely to continue to be successful in

his career.

• Wife was in her fifties and had put her career on hold for

many years to raise the parties’ children, which the

parties agreed to early in the marriage.

• As a result of her prolonged absence from the workforce,

wife had minimal work experience, few financial

resources, and relied on husband’s income during the

marriage.

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• In early 2024, wife was employed as an assistant director

at a nonprofit, earning $5,416 per month but had quit at

the time of the permanent orders hearing.

• Wife was voluntarily unemployed and could earn $5,416

per month.

• Husband’s suggestion that wife could immediately work

at a director level for a nonprofit was unpersuasive

because she only recently became an assistant director

after many years as a homemaker and had been

employed for just the past couple of years.

• Regarding the property division, husband received

$570,561 and wife received $524,249.

• Husband was also allocated his ownership stake in

Newdea, contributing to his “significantly more financial

resources.” And wife’s testimony about husband

receiving a substantial inheritance from his parents was

relevant.

• Wife did not have potential income from her marital

property award.

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• Husband lived alone, had no dependents needing

financial support, and had the ability to meet his

reasonable needs while paying maintenance.

• Husband was sixty years old and cannot be expected to

work into his late sixties or early seventies to pay

maintenance but considering all relevant factors and

findings, the term should be twelve years.

• Maintenance payments were neither deductible for the

payor nor taxable to the recipient for federal income tax

purposes.

Contrary to husband’s argument, the court did consider his

fluctuating income over the last three years, his evidence about

wife’s qualifications and earning capacity, wife’s award of marital

property plus whether it could produce any income, and his age

and expected retirement.

¶ 32 Nor are we persuaded by husband’s assertion that the district

court did not make findings as to the “reasonable financial need as

established during the marriage.” See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D). The

court found that the parties built a comfortable standard of living

during the marriage. It explained that they lived in a 5,000 square

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foot, million-dollar home in an “affluent neighborhood.” The court

also found that wife relied on husband to meet her reasonable

financial needs throughout the marriage. We understand this to

mean that the reasonable need included the financial resources

necessary to live in a large property in an affluent neighborhood

and that wife was unable to meet that need without husband’s

assistance. Cf. In re Marriage of Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782, 789 (Colo.

2010) (“[T]he parties’ standard of living during marriage is in fact an

appropriate — and even a necessary — starting point for the

[district] court’s determination of a particular spouse’s reasonable

needs or whether a spouse would be able to support herself through

appropriate employment.”); In re Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244,

252 (Colo. 1992) (“A review of the financial information in the record

and the parties’ standard of living at the time of the decree supports

this finding [that wife lacks sufficient property to provide for her

reasonable needs] and provides no basis to overturn the district

court’s ruling.”). To the extent husband contends that the district

court was required to assign a precise figure to the reasonable

financial need, he does not cite (and we haven’t found) any

authority supporting that proposition. Because the district court

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made some findings regarding reasonable need and because we can

discern its reasoning from those findings, we decline to disturb its

maintenance award on this ground. See Gibbs, ¶ 9 (A court must

make “sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court

a clear understanding of the basis of its order.”).

¶ 33 Husband insists that the district court clearly erred by finding

that wife secured “her first job in twenty-five years” when she began

working at the nonprofit because her testimony indicated that she

had returned to part-time work in 2012. But when reading the

entire permanent orders in context, we interpret the court’s finding

to mean that wife obtained her first full-time job in a long time. In

any event, wife’s work history was only one factor among many that

the court considered in determining maintenance.

¶ 34 And to the extent that husband asks us to reweigh the

evidence or the statutory factors in his favor and substitute our

judgment for that of the district court, we decline the invitation.

See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing

for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the

record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not

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substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”); Thorburn, ¶

49.

IV. Attorney Fees

¶ 35 Last, husband contends that the district court erred by

denying his request for attorney fees under section 13-17-102,

C.R.S. 2025. We conclude that additional findings are necessary.

¶ 36 We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse

of discretion. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., 2020

COA 115, ¶ 32

¶ 37 A district court may assess reasonable attorney fees against a

party when it finds that the party brought an action that lacked

substantial justification. § 13-17-101.5(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 38 A civil action lacks substantial justification when it is

“substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially

vexatious.” § 13-17-102(6). A claim is frivolous if the proponent

has no rational argument to support it based on evidence or the

law. D.P.G., ¶ 33. A claim is groundless if it is unsupported by any

credible evidence. In re Marriage of Oberg, 900 P.2d 1267, 1272

(Colo. App. 1994). And a claim is substantially vexatious if it is

“brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass another.” In

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re Parental Responsibilities Concerning I.M., 2013 COA 107, ¶ 29.

“[V]exatiousness includes conduct that is arbitrary, abusive,

stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of the truth.” Id.

¶ 39 Here, husband asserted that wife should pay at least half of

the $91,437 in attorney fees he incurred as a result of wife’s

substantially frivolous, vexatious, and groundless litigation during

the dissolution proceedings. The district court summarily denied

the request, stating only that each party would be responsible for

their own attorney fees.2 True, a court denying a request for

attorney fees need not specifically set forth its analysis. See Munoz

v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 2011). But the court’s brief

and general finding doesn’t provide us with a basis on which to

conduct appellate review of husband’s assertion. See Weston v. T &

T, LLC, 271 P.3d 552, 561 (Colo. App. 2011) (district court must

make sufficient findings supporting its attorney fee decision to allow

2 Husband asked for attorney fees under both sections 13-17-202,

C.R.S. 2025, and 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025. The court declined to
award him any attorney fees. In its ruling, the court stated that
section 13-17-102 did not apply in dissolution cases. Read in
context, however, the court clearly misspoke and meant section 13-
17-202. Husband doesn’t challenge on appeal the propriety of the
court’s denial of fees under section 13-17-202.

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meaningful appellate review). We therefore reverse this portion of

the judgment and remand for better findings. See In re Marriage of

Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997) (reversing where the

[district] court’s findings “d[id] not permit meaningful appellate

review”).

V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 40 Given our disposition, we deny wife’s request for appellate

attorney fees under section 13-17-102 and C.A.R. 39.1.

¶ 41 Wife also asks for her attorney fees under section 14-10-119,

C.R.S. 2025. See In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136, 141

(Colo. 2006) (section 14-10-119 empowers the court to equitably

apportion costs and attorney fees between the parties based on

their relative ability to pay). As the district court is best situated to

determine the factual issues regarding the parties’ current financial

resources, we direct the court on remand to decide whether to

award wife her reasonable appellate attorney fees under section 14-

10-119. See In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30.

¶ 42 Wife seeks her appellate costs. Because we affirm in part and

reverse in part, we remand to the district court to determine

appellate costs. See C.A.R. 39(a)(4) (“[I]f a judgment is affirmed in

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part, reversed in part, modified, or vacated, costs are taxed only as

ordered by the [district] court.”).

VI. Disposition

¶ 43 The district court’s permanent orders are reversed as to the

denial of husband’s request for attorney fees under section 13-17-

102. The court on remand must make further findings explaining

the basis for its denial. The permanent orders are otherwise

affirmed.

¶ 44 The district court on remand should also consider wife’s

requests for appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119 and

costs under C.A.R. 39.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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