Peo v. Shead

23CA0866 Peo v Shead 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0866
Douglas County District Court No. 22CR10
Honorable Patricia D. Herron, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ahmarion Kaliel Shead,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Shann Jeffery, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Ahmarion Kaliel Shead, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated

robbery involving a simulated deadly weapon, two counts of

menacing, and first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. We

reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2021, Noah Reed listed his van for sale on two

online marketplaces. He brought a friend along for a test drive with

a potential buyer, whom he and his friend later identified as Shead.

Reed and his friend testified that during the test drive, the potential

buyer stopped the van, pointed what appeared to be a gun at them,

and told them to get out of the car.

¶3 As relevant to this appeal, the prosecution charged Shead with

one count of aggravated robbery involving a simulated deadly

weapon, two counts of menacing, one count of first degree

aggravated motor vehicle theft, and one crime of violence sentence

enhancer.

¶4 Shead retained private counsel, William O’Donnell, who

attempted to arrange an interview with the assigned detective as

well as detectives in other counties where Shead had other open

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cases. The other detectives didn’t join, however, so the March 2022

interview included only Shead, O’Donnell, and the detective in this

case. During the videotaped interview, Shead confessed to

committing almost all the elements of the charged offenses.

¶5 Soon after the interview, O’Donnell stopped practicing criminal

law and withdrew from the case. The public defender’s office then

began representing Shead. In August 2022, the prosecution offered

Shead a plea deal, but Shead didn’t accept the offer. The case

proceeded to a jury trial.

¶6 During voir dire, multiple prospective jurors said they would

trust the testimony of law enforcement officers over testimony by

other witnesses. Two such prospective jurors, J.H. and K.B., ended

up sitting on the jury.

¶7 The jury found Shead guilty of the charges identified above.

The district court sentenced Shead to eighteen years in the custody

of the Department of Corrections.

¶8 On appeal, Shead contends that (1) the district court violated

his constitutional right to a fair trial because two jurors expressed

pro-law enforcement bias; (2) his videotaped confession was

inadmissible under CRE 410 because it occurred during plea

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negotiations; and (3) the district court plainly erred by admitting his

videotaped confession because his Miranda waiver wasn’t knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary.

¶9 We agree with Shead’s first contention as to one of the

challenged jurors, J.H., and therefore reverse Shead’s convictions.

Because it’s likely to arise on remand, we also address and reject

Shead’s second contention. But we decline to reach his third

contention for the first time on appeal.

II. Juror Bias

A. Additional Background

¶ 10 On his juror questionnaire, J.H. wrote “[d]epends” when asked

whether there was any reason why he couldn’t be a fair and

impartial juror. J.H. explained that he was “pro-law enforcement,

military, and for following established laws.” J.H. also wrote in his

questionnaire that his brother-in-law worked for a police

department.

¶ 11 Consistent with his questionnaire, J.H. expressed partiality for

law enforcement several times during voir dire, albeit with some

equivocation. In response to the prosecutor’s question about

putting aside preconceived notions, J.H. said that would be “a

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challenge” because he puts “a lot of faith” in institutions and law

enforcement officers. But J.H. added, “I think I could put that

behind me.”

¶ 12 J.H. also agreed with the prosecutor, at least initially, that law

enforcement officers sometimes make mistakes and that a juror

shouldn’t automatically believe an officer over other witnesses

simply because they are a member of law enforcement. In later

responses to defense counsel’s questions, however, J.H. said he

would give a law enforcement officer’s testimony more credibility

over another lay witness, even before hearing any testimony or

knowing anything about the officer’s training or experience. The

following exchange is illustrative:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Taking away those
hypotheticals just knowing what you know, do
you believe that you will give law enforcement
a leg up in their testimony just because they’re
law enforcement and not taking anything else
into account based on kind of your beliefs and
what you’ve said?

....

[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: . . . If you’re
talking somebody random that I don’t know
saying something different than testimony
from a uniformed police officer which does line
up with the rest of the facts, I’ll be honest I

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would probably give — because I do think we
put special trust in our uniformed officers.

I would have to give that more credibility than
somebody I have no idea because the only
difference I would have if that’s what you’re
saying is the fact that he has sworn an oath —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.

[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: — and this
person has no allegiance except for the
defendant.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me ask it this way.
Just without hearing the testimony, without
hearing training and experience, right, just the
fact that they’ve sworn that oath, just the fact
that they’re law enforcement, do they start
higher or maybe with more credibility than just
your average lay witness?

[PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.H.]: They do for me,
yes.

¶ 13 Defense counsel challenged J.H., among others, for cause

based on “law enforcement bias.” The district court then read the

pattern jury instruction on credibility, COLJI-Crim. E:05 (2024),

and asked each of the challenged prospective jurors whether the

instruction “change[d] anything” about how they would assess a law

enforcement officer’s credibility. J.H. responded that, while he

would consider the same credibility factors for all witnesses, law

enforcement officers have “inherent” credibility in his view based on

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the “special trust” that society places in them. J.H. added, “[J]ust

being a hundred percent honest with the [c]ourt, I would give law

enforcement a small leg up just by the nature of trust like we

discussed, but I agree that [in] each individual case we should look

at all those factors.”

¶ 14 The prosecutor tried to rehabilitate J.H., asking him directly

whether he would follow the court’s credibility instruction. J.H.

answered that, although he would look at “all factors for all

testimony,” he was nonetheless “more apt to put a little more trust

in an officer of the law than . . . a random person.” J.H. elaborated

that most people who go into law enforcement hold “lofty ideals that

inherently attract a degree of trust from me just because of the

sacrifice they make on a personal level.”

¶ 15 When the prosecutor tried again to rehabilitate J.H. by asking

through a leading question whether he would follow the court’s

credibility instruction, J.H. responded, “Absolutely.”

¶ 16 Finally, defense counsel asked J.H. whether a law enforcement

officer starts with a “leg up.” J.H. answered, “I would weigh

everything and when weighing everything, [law enforcement] will get

increased credibility as a baseline.”

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¶ 17 Defense counsel again challenged J.H. for cause, arguing that

J.H. said he would give law enforcement a “leg up out of the gate

without hearing anything.” The prosecution opposed the challenge,

saying no “leg up standard” exists and that J.H. acknowledged that

he would adhere to the court’s credibility instruction. The district

court agreed with the prosecution and denied the challenge for

cause but didn’t make any findings reconciling J.H.’s conflicting

statements.

¶ 18 Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges to strike

other prospective jurors who made statements favoring law

enforcement, but counsel exhausted her peremptory challenges

before she could strike J.H. As a result, J.H. served on the jury.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 19 Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

a criminal defendant the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.

U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; People v. Garcia,

2018 COA 180, ¶ 17. The right to challenge a juror for cause is an

integral part of a fair trial. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486

(Colo. 1999). “To ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial with an

impartial jury, a trial court must excuse biased or prejudiced

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persons from the jury.” People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo.

2001) (citing Nailor v. People, 612 P.2d 79, 80 (Colo. 1980)).

¶ 20 A trial court must sustain a challenge for cause, for example,

when “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evince[s] enmity

or bias toward the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S.

2025; see also Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X) (similar). When “a potential

juror’s statements compel the inference that [they] cannot decide

crucial issues fairly, a challenge for cause must be granted in the

absence of rehabilitative questioning or other counter-balancing

information.” People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App.

2007); accord People v. Prator, 833 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Colo. App.

1992) (trial court erred by denying challenge for cause to a

prospective juror who conveyed a “clear expression of bias in favor

of law enforcement witnesses”), aff’d, 856 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1993). A

declaration by the prospective juror that they will not follow the

court’s instructions isn’t a prerequisite for disqualification. People

v. Gulyas, 2022 COA 34, ¶ 26.

¶ 21 We review a trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Blassingame, 2021 COA 11, ¶ 9. “A

court abuses its discretion when it issues a ruling that is manifestly

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arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or

misapplies the law.” Id. In determining whether the trial court

abused its discretion, we examine the entire voir dire of the

prospective juror. Id. (citing People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 19, 22 (Colo.

App. 2004)). If a biased juror sits on the jury, structural error

occurs and we must reverse the defendant’s convictions. People v.

Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 2.

C. Analysis

¶ 22 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

denying Shead’s challenge for cause to J.H. During voir dire, J.H.

candidly admitted that he would give a law enforcement officer more

credibility than other witnesses, even before hearing any testimony,

simply because they are a member of law enforcement. Based on

J.H.’s statements, the court should have granted Shead’s challenge

for cause. See Gulyas, ¶ 24.

¶ 23 Although the court and the prosecution tried to rehabilitate

J.H. by asking whether he would follow the court’s credibility

instruction, their attempts proved unsuccessful. J.H. continued to

say that he would give law enforcement officers a “leg up,” view

them with “inherent” credibility, and place “more trust” in them

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compared to other witnesses. See Blassingame, ¶¶ 21-22. If

anything, J.H. upped the ante after his attempted rehabilitation by

saying he would extend law enforcement officers “increased

credibility as a baseline.” See id. at ¶¶ 22, 26 (concluding trial

court erred by denying challenge for cause, in part because the

prospective juror’s equivocal statements reappeared after the

prosecutor’s attempted rehabilitation).

¶ 24 In addition, J.H. didn’t need to “unequivocally” state his

partiality for one side to be deemed unfit to serve on the jury. Id. at

¶ 26. To the contrary, it’s enough that the prospective juror

provided “‘uncertain answers’ and was never sufficiently

rehabilitated.” Gulyas, ¶ 23 (quoting Blassingame, ¶ 27). Here,

J.H.’s repeated, unrehabilitated remarks that he would favor law

enforcement officers before hearing any testimony left little doubt

that he would struggle to decide crucial issues fairly. Blassingame,

¶ 28.

¶ 25 True, J.H. made some limited statements suggesting that he

would follow the court’s credibility instruction. But those remarks

were either equivocal, inconsistent with his statements favoring law

enforcement, or in response to the prosecutor’s leading questions.

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See id. at ¶ 22 n.2 (answers to leading questions during voir dire

are viewed with suspicion); People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432, 436

(Colo. App. 1999) (reversing convictions because “there was no

rehabilitation . . . containing unequivocal statements by the juror of

[their] commitment to fairness that might support the trial court’s

conclusion”). When defense counsel followed up with open-ended

questions, J.H. again emphasized that a law enforcement officer

would start with increased credibility as a “baseline.” See

Blassingame, ¶¶ 20, 26.

¶ 26 We recognize that the district court is generally best positioned

to decide whether a prospective juror can render a fair and

impartial verdict based on its unique ability to observe the potential

juror’s demeanor and credibility. Id. at ¶ 23. But here, the district

court made no findings or credibility determinations resolving J.H.’s

self-contradictory statements. See People v. Hancock, 220 P.3d

1015, 1019-20 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court erred by denying

challenge for cause, in part because the court didn’t “explain on the

record why prospective juror N.’s clear statements of doubt in her

willingness or ability to follow the law should be disregarded in

favor of an earlier general and seemingly inconsistent statement”),

11
overruled on other grounds by, People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18.

Absent such findings, J.H.’s final statement — that he would afford

law enforcement officers heightened credibility as a “baseline” —

leaves us with considerable uncertainty about whether he would

follow the court’s credibility instruction or decide crucial issues

impartially. Blassingame, ¶ 28; see also People v. Marciano, 2014

COA 92M-2, ¶ 17 (“While we defer to the trial court’s unique

perspective and ability to assess credibility and demeanor, absent

any findings regarding credibility or demeanor we are left with a

cold record devoid of any support for the trial court’s conclusions.”).

¶ 27 The People’s arguments to the contrary don’t convince us

otherwise. The People argue that Shead could have removed J.H.

with a peremptory challenge but “chose” otherwise. But Shead had

already exhausted his peremptory challenges on other prospective

jurors. And a defendant need not cure a trial court’s erroneous

denial of a challenge for cause by using a peremptory challenge to

strike the objectionable prospective juror to preserve a claim that a

biased juror deprived the defendant of their right to a fair trial. See

Garcia, ¶¶ 9-11.

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¶ 28 The People also rely on decisions in which reviewing courts

upheld denials of challenges for cause to prospective jurors who,

like J.H., gave self-contradictory answers during voir dire. We

conclude that the People’s cited cases are distinguishable because

either (1) the challenged prospective juror in those cases indicated

upon further questioning that they would follow the trial court’s

instructions and could be fair and impartial to both sides, see, e.g.,

People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶¶ 18, 22; People v. Vigil, 718

P.2d 496, 501 (Colo. 1986); or (2) the trial court made findings that

the challenged prospective juror could be fair (or, at a minimum,

didn’t harbor prejudice or bias) notwithstanding their inconsistent

statements, see, e.g., Garcia, ¶ 21; People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d

319, 322 (Colo. 1987). Neither occurred here.

¶ 29 Accordingly, because the district court abused its discretion by

denying Shead’s challenge for cause to J.H., we reverse Shead’s

convictions and remand the case for a new trial. Given our

disposition, we need not reach Shead’s argument that a second

juror, K.B., also expressed impermissible bias during voir dire.

13
III. Admissibility of Confession

¶ 30 Because it’s likely to arise on remand, we also address Shead’s

contention that the district court erred by admitting his videotaped

confession. According to Shead, the court violated CRE 410,

section 16-7-303, C.R.S. 2025, and Crim. P. 11(f)(6) because he

confessed to the charged offenses during plea negotiations. The

People counter that the district court properly admitted the

confession because the prosecutor didn’t consent to be bound by

the alleged plea discussions at Shead’s interview. We conclude the

district court acted within its discretion when admitting Shead’s

confession.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 31 CRE 410 limits evidence related to the plea bargaining

process:

[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn,
or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to
plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime
charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in any connection with any of the
foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in
any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding
against the person who made the plea or offer.

14
Section 16-7-303 and Crim. P. 11(f)(6) contain similar limitations,

rendering inadmissible “the fact that the defendant or his defense

counsel and the district attorney engaged in plea discussions or

made a plea agreement.”

¶ 32 But this principle doesn’t extend to all discussions between a

suspect and law enforcement agents. People v. Rollins, 759 P.2d

816, 818 (Colo. App. 1988). Rather, it “applies only to discussions

between defense counsel, or pro se litigants, and prosecuting

attorneys who have specific authority to bind the government to a

plea-agreement later consummated in court.” Id. While the

prosecuting attorney need not be present for statements to be

considered part of plea negotiations, their “knowledge and consent

to be bound by such discussions is an essential prerequisite.” Id.

¶ 33 As before, we review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility

of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Garcia, 169 P.3d

223, 226 (Colo. App. 2007).

B. Analysis

¶ 34 We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

decision admitting Shead’s confession. Based on testimony at a

pretrial motions hearing, the court found that the parties hadn’t yet

15
commenced plea negotiations when Shead’s interview with the

detective took place.

¶ 35 The prosecution presented ample evidence at the motions

hearing to support the court’s findings. The prosecutor testified

that (1) O’Donnell, not the prosecution, requested the interview;

(2) she didn’t authorize the interviewing detective to make any

promises or engage in plea discussions; (3) she hadn’t reviewed the

case to determine whether a plea bargain was appropriate, so plea

negotiations hadn’t yet commenced; (4) she didn’t agree to a “quid

pro quo or anything” in exchange for Shead sitting for the interview;

and (5) the interview played no role in the prosecution’s decision on

whether, or when, to extend a plea offer.

¶ 36 Based on this testimony and the court’s findings, the

prosecution didn’t “consent to be bound” by any interview

discussions. Rollins, 759 P.2d at 818.

¶ 37 Garcia, relied on by Shead, is distinguishable. 169 P.3d at

227. In that case, the defendant “was expected to take [a]

polygraph before engaging in (further) plea negotiations,” leading a

division of this court to conclude that the polygraph was “part of the

plea negotiations.” Id. By contrast, the prosecutor here testified

16
that the later plea offer wasn’t conditioned on Shead’s participation

in the interview.

¶ 38 To the extent Shead points to evidence in the record that he

believes shows the parties were in the midst of negotiating a plea,

we may not reweigh the evidence to reach a result contrary to the

one the district court reached. People v. Liebler, 2022 COA 21, ¶ 20

(appellate courts don’t reweigh evidence, assess credibility, or

resolve inconsistencies or contradictions in testimony).

¶ 39 Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion when

admitting Shead’s confession.

IV. Disposition

¶ 40 We reverse Shead’s convictions and remand the case for a new

trial.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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