Peo in Interest of KW

25CA1204 Peo in Interest of KW 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1204
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30749
Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.W., T.L.L.S.C., and A.J.R.S.C., Children,

and Concerning A.W., M.E.W., and I.C.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 22, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Harald Van Gaasbeek, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Fort Collins,
Colorado, for Appellant A.W.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant M.E.W.

Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant I.C.
¶1 A.W. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationships with K.W., T.L.L.S.C., and

A.J.R.S.C. (the children). In addition, M.E.W. (father M.E.W.)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationship with K.W. And I.C. (father I.C.) appeals the judgment

terminating his parent-child legal relationships with T.L.L.S.C. and

A.J.R.S.C. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2023, Denver Human Services (the Department)

received multiple referrals raising concerns about mother’s and

father I.C.’s substance abuse. Mother and father I.C. did not

engage with the Department and refused to complete urinalysis

testing “to confirm or negate the allegations of parental substance

use.” One month later, the Department received a referral raising

concerns that K.W. had been physically abused. Father M.E.W.

was incarcerated at the time.

¶3 The Department sought and was granted temporary legal

custody of the children for placement with maternal grandparents.

The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

Three months later, the Department moved T.L.L.S.C. and

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A.J.R.S.C. to a different kinship placement provider at maternal

grandparents’ request. Shortly thereafter, the Department removed

K.W. from maternal grandparents’ home due to concerns about

maternal grandmother’s sobriety. The juvenile court adjudicated

the children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans

for the parents. Among other provisions, mother’s and father I.C.’s

treatment plans required them to (1) complete substance abuse and

mental health evaluations and follow all treatment

recommendations; (2) submit to drug testing; (3) cooperate in family

therapy or attachment therapy with the children if recommended by

the children’s therapists; (4) learn and use healthy communication

with the children and discipline the children in an emotionally,

physically, and mentally safe manner; and (5) attend all scheduled

parenting time. Father M.E.W.’s treatment plan required him to

(1) participate in programs offered at the correctional facility while

in custody; (2) comply with all conditions of parole once released;

(3) refrain from criminal activity; (4) attend all scheduled parenting

time; and (5) learn K.W.’s specific developmental and mental health

needs by attending all school meetings; doctor appointments; and,

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if appropriate, therapy appointments when permitted by the

correctional facility or after his release.

¶4 The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) later moved to

terminate mother’s, father M.E.W.’s, and father I.C.’s parental

rights, and the Department joined and agreed to prosecute the

motion. The juvenile court conducted the contested termination

hearing over six days, spanning three months. Twenty months

after the Department filed the petition, the juvenile court granted it

and terminated the various parent-child legal relationships.

II. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶5 Mother and father M.E.W. contend that the juvenile court

erred by finding that they could not become fit within a reasonable

time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has

not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

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conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 A parent is unfit if the parent is unable or unwilling to give a

child reasonable parental care. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 23, 524 P.3d 1209, 1216. “Reasonable parental care

requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and

protection adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and

mental health needs.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 9, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204. A parent’s noncompliance with a

treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to

meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also be considered in

determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403,

408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶8 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates their parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). What constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a

treatment plan is necessarily fact specific and may vary from case

to case. Id. But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time; it must

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be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. S.Z.S., ¶ 25, 524 P.3d at 1216.

¶9 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change and whether the parent can become fit in a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider, among other

factors, whether any change in the parent’s behavior occurred

during the pendency of the proceeding, the parent’s social history,

and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or

condition. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). When a

parent has made little to no progress on a treatment plan, the court

need not give the parent additional time to comply. See People in

Interest of R.B.S., 717 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. App. 1986).

¶ 10 In addition, when, as in this case, a child is under six years

old at the time the petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the

juvenile court must consider the expedited permanency planning

(EPP) provisions, which require placement in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 A juvenile court’s termination of parental rights presents a

mixed question of law and fact because it involves application of the

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termination statute to evidentiary facts. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10, 486 P.3d

at 1204. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but

we review de novo the court’s legal conclusions based on those

facts. Id. at 1204-05.

¶ 12 The credibility of the witnesses, as well as the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are all subject to the

juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d

244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 13 The juvenile court concluded that the parents could not

become fit within a reasonable time. In its analysis, the court gave

primary consideration to the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs, including their significant trauma

history and need for permanency. The court noted that mother and

father M.E.W. had “lengthy” histories with child welfare

departments and, despite the services provided to them in this and

prior cases, they had not demonstrated the ability to be sober and

available parents to their children.

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¶ 14 The record supports the court’s findings. The court took

judicial notice of the prior dependency and neglect cases involving

mother and father M.E.W., which showed that K.W. and T.L.L.S.C.

had been removed from mother’s care on two prior occasions and

returned to her care only approximately seven months before the

Department filed the petition in this case. During her testimony,

mother acknowledged that she had been involved with child welfare

departments “[o]n and off” for the preceding twelve years and that a

department of human services either previously or currently had

custody of ten of her children. Father M.E.W. described his

relationship with K.W. as “limited” due to his incarceration history.

¶ 15 In addition, despite mother’s engagement in substance abuse

treatment, she tested positive for methamphetamine less than one

month before the termination hearing began. And less than two

months later, a shelter worker found methamphetamine in mother’s

possession. The caseworker continued to have concerns about

mother’s sobriety based on her inconsistent drug tests, recent

relapse, and criminal charge for possession of a controlled

substance. The caseworker opined that, even with more time,

mother was unlikely to resolve these concerns.

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¶ 16 Similarly, the caseworker testified that, despite the

Department’s efforts, father M.E.W. continued to have a limited

relationship with K.W. and struggled to engage in visits with K.W.

when he was not in custody. Although father M.E.W. was

incarcerated for the first ten months of the case, and the jail did not

cooperate with the Department’s attempts to arrange virtual visits,

after his release, he attended only one in-person visit with K.W.

during the four months before his rearrest and reincarceration.

Even though father M.E.W. attended virtual visits during his second

period of incarceration and received positive feedback from the

supervisor, at the time of termination, he had been out of custody

for about two months but had not responded to the caseworker’s

efforts to resume in-person parenting time. As a result, the

caseworker had reservations about father M.E.W.’s ability to reunify

with K.W. even with more time. Moreover, considering the length of

the case, placement changes, and the children’s significant needs,

the caseworker opined that the children could not wait any longer

for permanent placement. The caseworker explained that the

children needed permanency and a prompt resolution of the case.

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¶ 17 Nevertheless, mother and father M.E.W assert that the

juvenile court erred by finding that they were unlikely to become fit

within a reasonable time because their significant progress

warranted granting them additional time. For example, mother

notes that she completed substance use disorder treatment and

was in the process of obtaining housing, working on her sobriety,

and progressing in child-parent psychotherapy (CPP). Likewise,

father M.E.W. contends that he made “significant progress” in

building a bond with K.W.

¶ 18 In terminating mother’s and father M.E.W.’s parental rights,

the juvenile court acknowledged their periods of compliance with

their treatment plans. Specifically, the court found that mother

had engaged in services, obtained a housing voucher, parented

safely during supervised visits, and remained in good

communication with the professionals throughout the case. And

the court acknowledged father M.E.W.’s in-person visit with K.W.

and his engagement in virtual family time during his second

incarceration. Nonetheless, the court found, with record support,

that mother and father M.E.W. were unsuccessful in addressing the

key components of their respective treatment plans, they remained

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unable to meet the emotional and mental health needs of the

children, and their conduct or conditions were unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. Mother and father M.E.W. effectively ask

us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of

the juvenile court, which we cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29, 524 P.3d

at 1217.

¶ 19 Mother also asserts that the record did not support the court’s

findings that CPP would take at least a year and could be

unsuccessful, and that the court erred by relying on these

inaccurate findings in concluding that she could not become fit

within a reasonable time. We are not persuaded.

¶ 20 We acknowledge that mother began engaging in CPP during

the last two to three months of the case and that a parent may be

reunified with a child before full completion of the CPP process,

which takes an average of one year. Multiple therapists provided

CPP therapy to the children. K.W.’s CPP therapist explained that

the duration of the CPP process depended on multiple factors,

including the caregiver’s ability to understand and process the

child’s symptoms and trauma. All three children had “significant”

trauma and needed consistent, ongoing therapy, even after a

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potential return home. The CPP therapists expressed concern that

the children would be negatively affected if they returned home and

could not continue in therapy. And based on mother’s lack of

engagement for much of the case, the CPP therapist for T.L.L.S.C.

and A.J.R.S.C. expressed doubts about mother’s ability to meet the

children’s needs. K.W.’s CPP therapist opined that mother would

need to consistently attend weekly meetings for a year to progress

through CPP. The caseworker said she did not believe that waiting

even six more months to resolve permanency was in the children’s

best interests. Because the record supports the court’s findings

that mother and father M.E.W. could not become fit within a

reasonable time, we have no basis to disturb those findings. See id.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 21 Mother and father M.E.W. assert that the juvenile court erred

by finding there was no less drastic alternative to termination.

Specifically, they argue that an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandparents was a viable less

drastic alternative. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 22 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, the court

must give primary consideration to the children’s physical, mental,

and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 23 In deciding whether there is a less drastic alternative, the

juvenile court may consider various factors, including (1) whether a

less drastic alternative is available, People in Interest of D.P., 160

P.3d 351, 356 (Colo. App. 2007); (2) whether the children are

bonded to the parent, D.P., 181 P.3d at 408-09; (3) whether

permanent placement with a relative would provide adequate

permanence and stability for the children, People in Interest of

T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005); and (4) whether the

alternative placement option favors adoption rather than an APR,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011). It

is within the juvenile court’s discretion to determine how to weigh

the various factors, so long as the record supports the court’s

findings. A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250.

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¶ 24 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27, 480 P.3d 682,

688. Hence, if the court considers a less drastic alternative but

finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it

must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at

¶ 32, 480 P.3d at 689. Under those circumstances, we must affirm

the court’s decision if the record supports its findings. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80, 488 P.3d 1026, 1042.

B. Analysis

¶ 25 The juvenile court found that an APR to maternal

grandparents was not a viable less drastic alternative because they

had indicated they were unable to care for the children. The court

further concluded that an APR or guardianship, in general, would

not provide the children with sufficient permanency because it

could “perpetuate the children’s anxiety and trauma symptoms

indefinitely.”

¶ 26 The record supports these findings. The caseworker expressed

concern about maternal grandparents as a placement option

because of their prior inability to care for all the children

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simultaneously. And the caseworker noted recent concerns

regarding maternal grandmother’s sobriety. Furthermore, the CPP

therapist for T.L.L.S.C. and A.J.R.S.C. emphasized their need for

“consistent predictable” caregivers. And K.W.’s CPP therapist

described the intense nature of his separation anxiety. Considering

the children’s higher than average needs, past placement changes,

and K.W.’s and T.L.L.S.C.’s prior removals from mother’s care, the

caseworker opined that the children “desperately need[ed] [the]

permanency and . . . stability that adoption [could] offer.”

¶ 27 Nevertheless, mother and father M.E.W. argue that an APR to

maternal grandparents was in the children’s best interests because

they were an appropriate placement who would have allowed the

children to maintain their bonds with each other and their parents.

Although the Department placed one of the children’s older siblings,

C.F.W., in maternal grandparents’ care during the termination

hearing, the caseworker explained that C.F.W. was differently

situated than K.W., T.L.L.S.C., and A.J.R.S.C. because of her age,

behavior, numerous placement changes, and lack of a possible

permanent placement. For these reasons, the Department took “a

little bit of a risk” and placed C.F.W. with maternal grandparents in

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the hope of establishing much-needed stability for her. Because

K.W., T.L.L.S.C., and A.J.R.S.C. were in possible permanent

placements and maternal grandparents had previously expressed

an inability to care for the children and C.F.W., the caseworker said

she did not believe placement with maternal grandparents was in

the children’s best interests. See People in Interest of J.L.M., 143

P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[I]n deciding whether . . . less

drastic alternatives exist, a trial court may recognize differences

between the parents, as well as differences between the children,

and base its decision upon the best interests of the children.”).

¶ 28 And even though the court did not specifically consider the

impact that termination would have on the children’s relationships

with each other, it did acknowledge that the children would likely

suffer a loss as a result of the termination. But the court ultimately

concluded that any potential loss did not outweigh its other findings

and that termination was in the children’s best interests. We

cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of

the juvenile court. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29, 524 P.3d at 1217.

¶ 29 We are also unpersuaded by father M.E.W.’s argument that

the juvenile court erred by declining to enter an APR to the

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placement providers because nothing indicated they would refuse to

accept an APR. This fact, without more, did not render an APR a

viable less drastic alternative. Rather, in concluding that an APR

was not in the children’s best interests, the court properly

considered their need for stability and permanency in conjunction

with the placement providers’ preferences for adoption. See People

in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29, 463 P.3d 330, 335 (“In

considering less drastic alternatives, the court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs.”); see also S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920

(“Permanent placement is not a viable less drastic alternative if the

child needs a stable, permanent home that can only be assured by

adoption.”).

¶ 30 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination, we cannot

disturb it. See B.H., ¶ 80, 488 P.3d at 1042. Mother also argues

that the juvenile court erred by finding that termination was in the

children’s best interests. We reject this argument, as well, in light

of our rejection of mother’s arguments that she was progressing in

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her treatment plan and the court failed to consider the benefits to

the children of maintaining their sibling and parental bonds.

IV. Due Process

¶ 31 Father I.C. asserts that the juvenile court violated his due

process rights by (1) holding the termination hearing on six

separate days over the span of more than three months; and

(2) considering evidence from a hearing at which he did not

participate. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 32 Because “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the care, custody, and management of their children,”

A.M., ¶ 17, 480 P.3d at 687, the termination of the parent-child

legal relationship must satisfy due process by providing

“fundamentally fair procedures,” People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO

39, ¶ 20, 370 P.3d 1151, 1158 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982)). “Under this principle, a parent must be

provided with ‘notice of the allegations in the termination motion,

the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to have counsel if

indigent, and the opportunity to call witnesses and engage in cross

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examination.’” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 16, 521

P.3d 637, 640 (quoting A.M., ¶ 18, 480 P.3d at 687).

¶ 33 We review procedural due process claims de novo. People in

Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26, 482 P.3d 519, 524. But a

parent cannot prevail on a due process claim absent a showing of

harm or prejudice. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262

(Colo. App. 2007).

B. Additional Background

¶ 34 The court initially set the termination hearing in January 2025

based on a request from mother’s counsel. During the pretrial

conference, the court added a second day, February 12, 2025, for

the hearing based on concerns that one day would be insufficient.

One week before the January 2025 hearing date, father I.C.’s

counsel moved for a continuance, which the court granted. The

court ordered that the hearing would begin on February 12, 2025,

and later added two additional hearing dates — February 26 and

March 14, 2025. Father I.C. requested a continuance — which the

court denied — at the start of both February hearing dates. During

the third day of the termination hearing — March 14, 2025 — the

court scheduled three additional hearing dates — April 23, April 25,

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and May 21, 2025 — to ensure the parties would have sufficient

time to present their evidence. The court conducted the hearing

over all three additional scheduled days, and the hearing concluded

on May 21, 2025.

¶ 35 During the termination hearing, mother filed a forthwith

motion requesting that C.F.W. be returned to maternal

grandparents’ care from the foster home to which she had been

moved. The court held a hearing on that motion on April 7, 2025

(the April hearing). The caseworker and maternal grandfather

testified at the hearing, but neither father I.C. nor his counsel

appeared at or participated in it. In its termination order, the

juvenile court acknowledged their nonparticipation at the April

hearing, but it noted that it did not consider evidence from that

hearing when deciding to terminate father I.C.’s parental rights.

C. Length of the Termination Hearing

¶ 36 Father I.C. asserts that he preserved his claim regarding the

length of the termination hearing by arguing during his closing

argument that the extended length of the hearing violated his due

process rights. But at no point during the pendency of the hearing

did he object to a continuation of the hearing, additional hearing

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dates, or the length of the hearing. Indeed, father I.C.’s counsel

requested continuances of the first three scheduled termination

hearing dates. Thus, we conclude that father I.C. did not preserve

these arguments. See People in Interest of O.J.S., 844 P.2d 1230,

1233 (Colo. App. 1992) (requiring a timely, specific objection in the

trial court to preserve an issue for appellate review).

¶ 37 We similarly reject father I.C.’s argument that the duration of

the termination hearing exceeded the statutory time limit for a

hearing in an EPP case. Specifically, father I.C. asserts that section

19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025, requires that, in EPP cases, termination

hearings be held within 120 days of the date of filing of the

termination motion and that the hearing in this case did not

conclude until 237 days from the filing date. But father I.C. never

raised this argument in the juvenile court. See People in Interest of

V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Colo. App. 1998) (declining to address

an argument raised for the first time on appeal); see also Berra v.

Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010)

(holding that to properly preserve an argument, the party must

have “presented to the trial court the sum and substance of the

argument it now makes on appeal”). In addition, we note that 120

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days after the filing of the termination motion was January 24,

2025. As noted above, father I.C. requested continuances of the

termination hearing both before and after that date. Consequently,

he forfeited his right to challenge the court’s compliance with the

statutory time frames for an EPP case. See People v. Rediger, 2018

CO 32, ¶ 40, 416 P.3d 893, 902 (defining forfeiture as “the failure to

make the timely assertion of a right” (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))).

¶ 38 Moreover, even if father I.C. had preserved this argument, we

do not see how the length of the termination hearing prejudiced

him. Father I.C. asserts that the extended duration of the hearing

prejudiced him because it (1) caused the evidence of his treatment

plan progress to become “stale”; (2) enabled the People to present

evidence of his recent setbacks; and (3) allowed the children to

strengthen their bond with the foster family. We are unpersuaded

because father I.C. does not demonstrate how the length of the

hearing, in and of itself, caused these changes in circumstance.

Further, father I.C. fails to establish that, but for the length of the

termination hearing, the outcome of the case would have been

different. Rather, his lack of participation in the CPP process,

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inconsistent family time attendance, and concerns related to his

sobriety throughout the case, as well as his recent incarceration,

contributed to the court’s finding that he was unfit. Moreover,

father I.C. had the same opportunity as the other parties to present

evidence, including any recent or new evidence, in support of his

opposition to the termination motion. We must reject father I.C.’s

argument regarding the length of the hearing in the absence of

prejudice. J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262.

D. Evidence from April 2025 Hearing

¶ 39 As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the Department’s

and GAL’s argument that father I.C. failed to preserve his

contention that the juvenile court erred by considering evidence

presented at the April 2025 hearing. But father I.C. could not have

raised this argument until after the court ruled. A party need not

object to a court’s findings to preserve a challenge to those findings.

In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17, 490 P.3d 1087, 1091;

see C.R.C.P. 52. Accordingly, we consider, and reject, father I.C.’s

assertion of error regarding the evidence of the April hearing.

¶ 40 Father I.C. acknowledges the juvenile court’s statement that it

did not consider the evidence presented at the April 2025 hearing

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when adjudicating the petition to terminate his parental rights.

Even so, he asserts that the juvenile court “would have had to

consider the testimony” when finding there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. Specifically, he contends that

(1) “[t]here was very little testimony offered at the termination

hearing about the maternal grandparents’ viability as a possible

placement”; and (2) the only support for the caseworker’s opinion

that placement with maternal grandparents was not in the

children’s best interests was the length of time the children spent

in, and lack of safety concerns at, their other placements. But this

argument disregards the caseworker’s testimony at the termination

hearing, discussed above, detailing her concerns about maternal

grandparents as a placement option. Because father I.C. had notice

of the termination hearing and his counsel was able to present and

question witnesses during the hearing, we discern no due process

violation. See E.B., ¶ 16, 521 P.3d at 640.

¶ 41 Even if the juvenile court erroneously considered evidence

from the April 2025 hearing, there was no prejudice to father I.C.

The court found that an APR or guardianship to any placement, not

just maternal grandparents, was not in the children’s best interests.

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In other words, regardless of the suitability of maternal

grandparents as a placement option, or the evidence on which the

court relied to reach this conclusion, the court determined that

termination was in the children’s best interests. Thus, father I.C.’s

due process claim fails absent a showing of actual prejudice. See

J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262.

V. Disposition

¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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