Marriage of Moretti

25CA1125 Marriage of Moretti 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1125
Mesa County District Court No. 20DR543
Honorable Kevin R. Kennedy, Magistrate
Honorable Jeremy Chaffin, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Emily Rose Moretti n/k/a Emily Rose Chadwick,

Appellant,

and

Michele Mike Moretti,

Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 15, 2026

Emily Rose Moretti n/k/a Emily Rose Chadwick, Pro Se

Michele Mike Moretti, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Emily

Rose Moretti, now known as Emily Rose Chadwick (mother), and

Michele Mike Moretti (father), mother appeals from the district

court’s adoption of the magistrate’s order denying her motion to

relocate with the parties’ child. We reverse the order and remand

the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The parties divorced in 2022 and have one child. In the

permanent orders, mother was awarded sole decision-making

responsibilities and the majority of parenting time. Father was

allocated regular parenting time consisting of one weekend,

including an overnight, every other week.

¶3 In November 2024, mother filed a motion to relocate with the

child to Arkansas. Mother cited her new husband’s need to move to

Arkansas to improve the family’s finances and her desire to keep

the child and her two other children together as a family unit.

Following a hearing, a district court magistrate found that

relocation would not be in the child’s best interests and denied

mother’s request. Mother petitioned for district court review and

the district court judge adopted the magistrate’s order.

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II. Appellate Review of District Court Orders

¶4 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 22. We must accept the

magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In

re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 8. However, we review de

novo questions of law, including questions of statutory

interpretation. Sheehan, ¶ 22; In re Marriage of Gallegos, 251 P.3d

1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2010).

III. Standards Governing a Post-Decree Motion to Relocate

¶5 Section 14-10-129(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, establishes the

procedure that the court must follow in deciding a majority or equal

parent’s post-decree motion to relocate. See In re Marriage of

Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 140-42 (Colo. 2005); In re Marriage of

DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. App. 2006). The court must

consider the best interest factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),

C.R.S. 2025, and the relocation factors in section 14-10-129(2)(c)

when evaluating the child’s best interests as well as the parents’

interests relative to the requested relocation. See Ciesluk, 113 P.3d

at 140, 142-48.

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¶6 The court must begin its analysis with each parent on equal

footing and may not presume either that a child is better off or

disadvantaged by relocating with the moving parent. Id. at 147.

Each parent has the burden to persuade the court that the

relocation would be in, or contrary to, the best interests of the child.

Id. at 148. The court must disclose the reasons for its decision and

make specific findings with respect to the relevant statutory factors.

Id. at 148, 150; see also § 14-10-129(2)(c); C.R.C.P. 52 (district

court shall “set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law

which constitute the grounds of its action”).

¶7 We review the court’s relocation decision for an abuse of

discretion, Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 148, meaning that we will not

disturb the decision unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair, In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 8.

IV. Consideration of Mother’s Participation in the Address
Confidentiality Program

¶8 Mother first contends that the district court erred in adopting

the magistrate’s order because the magistrate improperly

considered her participation in Colorado’s address confidentiality

program. We agree.

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A. The Address Confidentiality Program

¶9 Colorado’s address confidentiality program, § § 24-30-2101

to - 2115, C.R.S. 2025, was enacted to “help victims of domestic

violence, a sexual offense, human trafficking, or stalking,” § 24-30-

2102(1.5). The program permits a participant to use “a substitute

address for purposes of public records and confidential mail

forwarding” when doing business with state or local government

agencies, including the state judicial branch. § 24-30-2102(1.5);

§ 24-30-2103(13); § 24-30-2108(1). Moreover, a participant in the

program is generally protected from the compelled disclosure of

their actual address in court proceedings. See § 24-30-2111.

¶ 10 When a program participant is involved in an allocation of

parental responsibilities proceeding, “[n]othing in . . . part 21, nor

participation in the program, shall affect an order relating to the

allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time in effect

prior to or during program participation.” § 24-30-2112(1).

Likewise, “[p]rogram participation . . . shall not be considered for

purposes of making an order allocating parental responsibilities or

parenting time; except that a court may consider practical

measures to keep a program participant’s actual address

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confidential when making an order allocating parental

responsibilities or parenting time.” § 24-30-2112(2).

B. Relevant Portions of the Magistrate’s Ruling

¶ 11 When weighing whether relocation was in the child’s best

interests, the magistrate found that a reasonable parenting time

schedule could be fashioned if mother were to relocate with the

child to Arkansas. See § 14-10-129(2)(c)(VIII). However, the

magistrate was skeptical that mother would comply with such a

schedule. By way of explanation, the magistrate noted that mother

had previously unilaterally withheld parenting time from father —

which, in conjunction with other actions taken by mother, led the

magistrate to conclude that mother would be fine “with [father]

never seeing [the child] again.” And while the magistrate

acknowledged that mother had since followed the permanent

orders, he nonetheless expressed concern that mother’s

“compliance was based, at least in part, on the specter of a

contempt proceeding.”

¶ 12 Reiterating his finding from the permanent orders, the

magistrate also expressed concern about mother’s ability to

encourage the child’s relationship with father. See § 14-10-

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124(1.5)(a)(VI). Noting mother’s “open disdain for [f]ather,” the

magistrate concluded that “[i]t is clearly foreseeable that once

relocation occurs, [f]ather’s relationship with [the child] will wither

on the vine.”

¶ 13 Having noted these concerns, the magistrate turned to

mother’s participation in the address confidentiality program and

concluded that it could hinder father’s attempts to exercise his

rights with respect to the child. Specifically, the magistrate found

that, because mother’s address would remain confidential, father

“would not know where to find her” for purposes of serving her with

a contempt petition if she were to relocate to Arkansas and refuse to

comply with the parenting time schedule. The magistrate further

reasoned that father would be unable to extradite mother from

Arkansas if the court issued a warrant arising from mother’s failure

to appear at a contempt proceeding and expressed concern that

mother may attempt to have an Arkansas court assume jurisdiction

over the proceedings, forcing father to litigate from afar.

C. Discussion

¶ 14 We agree with mother that the magistrate erred by considering

her participation in the address confidentiality program when

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resolving the motion to relocate. The statute is clear that program

participation “shall” not affect an order involving an allocation of

parental responsibilities and “shall not be considered” when

entering such an order. § 24-30-2112(1), (2); see In re Marriage of

Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 33 (“The word ‘shall’ in a statute is presumed

mandatory.”). Despite this unambiguous statutory prohibition, the

magistrate considered mother’s participation in the address

confidentiality program when weighing her request to relocate with

the child.

¶ 15 We acknowledge that section 24-30-2112(2) permits a court to

“consider practical measures to keep a program participant’s actual

address confidential when making” a parenting time order. We do

not, however, consider the magistrate’s denial of mother’s proposed

relocation based — at least in part — on her participation in the

program to be such a practical measure.

¶ 16 In sum, because the magistrate impermissibly considered

mother’s participation in the address confidentiality program, we

reverse the magistrate’s order denying her motion to relocate and

remand the case to the district court. On remand, the court must

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reconsider mother’s motion without considering her participation in

that program.

¶ 17 Given our conclusion that the magistrate erred by considering

mother’s participation in the address confidentiality program in the

first instance, we need not address mother’s additional contentions

of error concerning other portions of the magistrate’s order

interpreting the statutory scheme associated with that program.

V. Remand Instructions and Mother’s Other Contentions

¶ 18 On remand, the district court should consider, as of the time

of remand, the child’s best interests, the section 14-10-129(2)(c)

relocation factors, and the parents’ interests relative to the

requested relocation. See Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140, 142-48; In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27

(recognizing that because circumstances may have changed since

the order or judgment being appealed, a child’s best interests must

be reweighed “based on [the] circumstances existing at the time of

remand proceedings”). Therefore, although on remand the court

may rely on the existing record, it should also provide the parties an

opportunity to present evidence concerning the current

circumstances. M.W., ¶ 27.

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¶ 19 The district court on remand must follow the procedure

described herein for deciding mother’s motion to relocate and the

court must make findings sufficiently explicit to give a reviewing

court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage

of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008); Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at

148 (“[T]he court must thoroughly disclose the reasons for its

decision and make specific findings with respect to each of the

statutory factors.”). If the court again denies mother’s request to

relocate, and mother nevertheless wishes to relocate without the

child, the court must formulate a new parenting plan based on

mother’s relocation. See Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 148 (“[I]f the majority

time parent still wishes to relocate, a new parenting time plan will

be necessary.”).

¶ 20 Having concluded that mother’s request to relocate with the

child must be reconsidered, we need not address her related

assertions that the magistrate inadequately considered certain

factors under sections 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and 14-10-129(c) and

otherwise failed to adequately consider her interest in relocating

under Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140, 142-48. Moreover, we may not

consider mother’s assertion that the magistrate disregarded the

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mandatory domestic violence considerations under section 14-10-

124(4), because she did not advance such an argument in her

petition for district court review. People in Interest of K.L-P., 148

P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006). Mother, of course, may make

these arguments when the court considers the parties’ current

circumstances in the remand proceedings.

¶ 21 Finally, because the issue may arise on remand, we reject any

suggestion by mother that the court cannot consider any past

refusal by her to allow father to exercise parenting time with the

child. Unless an action was “to protect the child from witnessing

domestic violence or from being a victim of child abuse or neglect or

domestic violence,” a party’s unilateral withholding of parenting

time or other refusal to follow a parenting time order may be

indicative of that party’s ability or inability “to encourage the

sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the

other party.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI).

VI. Disposition

¶ 22 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and J. SCHUTZ concur.

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