Marriage of Danis

24CA2274 Marriage of Danis 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2274
Arapahoe County District Court No. 12DR2914
Honorable Kevin Sidel, Judge

In re the Marriage of

John Marcel Danis,

Appellant,

and

Brooke Annette Danis n/k/a Brooke Annette Greene,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED,
ORDERS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 8, 2026

Griffiths Law PC, Christopher Griffiths, Anthony J. Zarsky, Kimberly A.
Newton, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Appellant

Driskell & Ray, LLC, Scott Ray, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 John Marcel Danis (husband) appeals the district court’s order

finding him in remedial contempt for underpaying maintenance to

his ex-wife, Brooke Annette Greene (wife), and imposing remedial

contempt sanctions; denying his motion to terminate or modify

maintenance (the motion to modify); and setting the amount of

husband’s maintenance obligation from July 14, 2023, through the

conclusion of the fifteen-year maintenance term. We affirm in part

and reverse in part, as explained below.

I. Background

¶2 After filing a joint petition for dissolution of marriage, husband

and wife participated in a mediation that culminated in their

execution of a “Memorandum of Understanding” (the MOU) in

November 2012. The MOU includes a provision specifying the

formulas for calculating the amount of husband’s maintenance

payments to wife (the maintenance provision) over the next fifteen

years (the maintenance term).

¶3 The maintenance provision identifies three discrete

“maintenance period[s].” During each period, the amount of

husband’s maintenance payments is calculated using a variation of

1
the same basic formula: adding a specified percentage of his “gross

salary” to a specified percentage of his “gross bonus” (the formula).

¶4 The court incorporated the MOU into its decree of dissolution

of marriage. The MOU thus became a court order.

¶5 Consistent with the maintenance provision, husband began

paying wife maintenance in January 2014. Although husband

complied with wife’s request to provide her with his 2014 W-2 for

tax purposes, over the next six years, husband disregarded wife’s

requests for his W-2s and other income information.

¶6 In 2020, wife obtained information regarding husband’s

income as part of a mortgage refinancing. Upon reviewing that

information, wife concluded that husband had underpaid

maintenance for several years.

¶7 In August 2022, wife filed a motion for a contempt citation (the

contempt motion) against husband based on his alleged

underpayment of maintenance from 2014 through 2022 (the

underpayment period). Four months later, wife filed a motion to

compel husband to produce information regarding his gross salary

and gross bonuses, which the court granted in May 2023.

2
¶8 On July 14, 2023, husband filed the motion to modify, in

which he asked the court to terminate his maintenance obligation

or modify it to “a set figure” to “reduce conflict” because, according

to husband, the parties had intended that wife receive “a steadily

decreasing amount of monthly spousal maintenance.” One year

later, wife filed an amended contempt motion, in which she

specified the amount of unpaid maintenance husband allegedly

owed her for each year during the underpayment period.

¶9 On October 1, 2024, the court conducted a hearing (the

October hearing) on the contempt motion and husband’s motion to

modify.

¶ 10 One month later, the court issued a written order (the

November order) in which it found, as relevant to this appeal, that

• husband had correctly calculated the amount of

maintenance from 2014 through 2017 and from January

1, 2018, through September 4, 2018, when husband

began working for a company called Wheel Pros;

• husband, after receiving an August 31, 2018, offer letter

from Wheel Pros (the offer letter), asked Wheel Pros to

3
shift a portion of his compensation described in the offer

letter from salary and bonuses to new income categories;

• husband requested this shift to lower the gross salary

and gross bonuses he received from Wheel Pros and,

thereby, to reduce his maintenance payments to wife;

• the shift did not change his total compensation from

Wheel Pros; and

• husband provided no evidence of the gross salary or

gross bonuses (if any) he received from Wheel Pros.

The court concluded that “husband’s actions were an obvious

manipulation of his pay to reduce maintenance” for 2019, 2020,

and 2021.

¶ 11 Based on its finding that husband had manipulated his pay

structure, the court used the numbers in the offer letter to calculate

husband’s gross salary and gross bonuses for 2019 through 2021.

After making this calculation, the court found that husband owed

wife $207,054 in unpaid maintenance from 2014 through 2022. In

addition, the court found husband in remedial contempt and

sanctioned him by ordering him to provide wife with his tax returns

and other documentation of his income for the remainder of the

4
maintenance term and pay wife the attorney fees and costs she

incurred in connection with the contempt motion.

¶ 12 In addition, the court rejected husband’s request for

termination or modification of his maintenance obligation.

(Husband does not appeal the court’s denial of his termination

request.) As explained further below, the court found that husband

was “voluntarily unemployed” at the time of the October hearing

and explained that voluntary unemployment “cannot be the basis

for modification of maintenance.”

¶ 13 Wife did not file her own motion for modification of

maintenance. In the contempt motion, she addressed husband’s

underpayment of maintenance for the underpayment period but did

not ask the court to determine the amount of maintenance husband

owed after the underpayment period. But at the October hearing

and in her written closing argument following the hearing, wife

asked the court to modify the maintenance provision and determine

the amount of maintenance husband owed through the conclusion

of the fifteen-year maintenance term.

¶ 14 In response to wife’s request for determination of husband’s

maintenance obligation following the underpayment period, in the

5
November order, the court specified the amount of husband’s

monthly maintenance obligation for the period from July 14, 2023

(the date husband filed the motion to modify), through October 31,

2024 (the 2023-24 maintenance period), and fixed husband’s

maintenance obligation at $8,347 per month from November 1,

2024, through the end of the maintenance term.

¶ 15 To determine husband’s gross salary and gross bonuses for

these time periods, the court looked to his average gross salary and

gross bonuses for 2017 through 2021. The court said those figures

were “representative of husband’s recent earning ability.”

¶ 16 On December 10, 2024, wife filed a verified entry of support

judgment, in which she sought a judgment against husband in the

amount of $116,741.85 — his total unpaid maintenance for July

14, 2023, through December 9, 2024. The court granted wife’s

request and entered a judgment against husband in such amount

(the judgment) on December 23, 2024.

¶ 17 On appeal, husband contends that the court (1) erred by

finding him in remedial contempt and entering remedial contempt

sanctions against him; (2) abused its discretion by denying

husband’s motion to modify; and (3) erred by calculating the

6
amount of maintenance from the conclusion of the underpayment

period through the end of the maintenance term.

II. Analysis

A. The Court Did Not Err by Finding Husband in
Remedial Contempt or Imposing Sanctions under C.R.C.P. 107

1. Standard of Review

¶ 18 “A contempt finding is within the discretion of the district

court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” In re

Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23, 511 P.3d 708, 715. We

must accept a district court’s factual determinations regarding

contempt unless they lack record support or are clearly erroneous.

In re Marriage of Webb, 284 P.3d 107, 108-09 (Colo. App. 2011). “A

court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no support for

it in the record.” Gagne v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17, 459 P.3d

686, 692.

¶ 19 “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it is based on a

misapplication of the law.” Sheehan, ¶ 23, 511 P.3d at 715. In

considering whether a court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unfair, we ask whether the decision “fell within a range

7
of reasonable options” and review whether it was based on credible

evidence and did not “exceed[] the bounds of the rationally available

choices.” Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 74, 285 P.3d

986, 1008 (first quoting E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140

P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006); and then quoting Hall v.

Moreno, 2012 CO 14, ¶ 54, 270 P.3d 961, 974).

2. Substantive Law

¶ 20 A court may hold a party in contempt for “disobedience or

resistance . . . to or interference with any lawful . . . order of the

court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1). Remedial contempt seeks to force

compliance with a lawful court order. C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5).

¶ 21 Remedial contempt sanctions “must be supported by findings

of fact establishing the contemnor (1) did not comply with a lawful

order of the court; (2) knew of the order; and (3) has the present

ability to comply with the order.” In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d

88, 92 (Colo. App. 2008). “The burden of proving inability to comply

with the order rests on the alleged contemnor.” Id. When imposing

remedial contempt sanctions, a court must “enter an order in

writing or on the record describing the means by which the person

8
may purge the contempt and the sanctions that will be in effect

until the contempt is purged.” C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).

¶ 22 Thus, in this case, we review whether the court made findings,

with record support, that husband (1) did not comply with the

maintenance provision during the underpayment period; (2) knew of

the maintenance provision; and (3) had the present ability to

comply with it. See Sheehan, ¶¶ 23, 25, 511 P.3d at 715-16; Webb,

284 P.3d at 108-09; Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91-92.

3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Finding Husband in Remedial Contempt

¶ 23 In the November order, the court found that, during the

underpayment period, husband did not pay wife the full amount of

maintenance to which she was entitled under the maintenance

provision, which was a court order; knew of the maintenance

provision; and had the present ability to comply with it.

a. The Court Did Not Err by Finding that
Husband Did Not Comply with
the Unambiguous Maintenance Provision

¶ 24 The court specifically found that husband manipulated the

categories of compensation he received from Wheel Pros — he “set

out to renegotiate and re-characterize his compensation

9
package . . . to minimize his salary and bonus income for the

purpose of reducing maintenance he would owe to wife” during the

time he worked at Wheel Pros.

¶ 25 The offer letter says that Wheel Pros would pay husband a

base salary of $310,000 and “an annual performance-based bonus

with a target of 50% of [his] base salary.” The offer letter also

provides that “Wheel Pros would pay husband 50%” of the bonus he

would have received had he remained at his prior employer. The

same day husband received the offer letter, he sent wife an email

saying that Wheel Pros had “offered a lower base pay at $220,000

and a bonus at 30 percent.”

¶ 26 Less than one month later, the compensation numbers in the

offer letter changed at husband’s request. In a letter dated

September 18, 2018 (the September letter), Wheel Pros said that

husband’s “final compensation package” consisted of an annual

salary of only $220,000 and a target bonus of 25% to 30% of his

base salary. (The record is not clear as to this percentage amount.

The specific number is not relevant to our analysis, however.)

According to the September letter, husband’s total compensation

from Wheel Pros would remain at $310,000, although $90,000 of

10
his base salary would be shifted to four new income categories — a

car allowance, tax equalization, dual household expense allowance,

and travel expense allowance. The chief executive officer of Wheel

Pros later said in an affidavit that husband had asked Wheel Pros

to change his compensation structure to shift a portion of his base

salary to the new categories documented in the September letter.

¶ 27 The new categories of income, together with his September

base salary, totaled $310,000 — not coincidentally, the same

amount of base salary referenced in the offer letter. The court

found that “[h]usband’s actions were an obvious manipulation of

his pay to reduce maintenance. There was no other explanation

provided why husband sought to reclassify aspects of his income to

these new categories and all of the categories husband negotiated

appear to have been taxed as regular income.” The record supports

these findings.

¶ 28 Husband nonetheless contends that the court erred by holding

him in contempt because the terms “gross salary” and “gross

bonus” in the maintenance provision are ambiguous. Husband

argues that, because the terms are ambiguous, he reasonably

interpreted them when he calculated the amount of his

11
maintenance payments during the underpayment period, and the

court should have construed the ambiguities in his favor.

¶ 29 Husband relies on a single case to support his argument —

People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158, 173 (Colo. App. 1999). But Kriho

involved a “juror contempt prosecution” and does not stand for the

proposition that a court must construe ambiguities in a court order

in favor of a contemnor. Id.

¶ 30 We review de novo whether a contract is ambiguous. Gagne v.

Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 50, 338 P.3d 1152, 1163. “In determining

whether a provision in a contract is ambiguous, the instrument’s

language must be examined and construed in harmony with the

plain and generally accepted meaning of the words used, and

reference must be made to all the agreement’s provisions.”

Fibreglas Fabricators, Inc. v. Kylberg, 799 P.2d 371, 374 (Colo.

1990). A provision is ambiguous if it is fairly susceptible to more

than one interpretation. Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909,

912 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 31 Husband is correct that the maintenance provision does not

define “gross salary” or “gross bonus.” But “a term is not

12
ambiguous solely because it is not defined.” USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Anglum, 119 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 32 Husband further argues that “gross salary” and “gross bonus”

are presumptively ambiguous because he and wife interpret them

differently. But a definitional dispute also does not create

ambiguity. See Dorman, 914 P.2d at 912 (“[T]he mere fact that the

parties differ on their interpretations of an instrument does not of

itself create an ambiguity.” (quoting Kylberg, 799 P.2d at 374)).

¶ 33 Significantly, “gross,” “salary,” and “bonus” have common

meanings. “Gross” means “an overall total exclusive of deductions

(as taxes, expenses).” Ringquist v. Wall Custom Homes, LLC,

176 P.3d 846, 850 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 1002 (1986)); see Black’s Law Dictionary

843 (12th ed. 2024). A “[s]alary” is “a fixed annual or periodical

payment for services,” Div. of Emp. & Training v. Moen, 767 P.2d

1230, 1233 (Colo. App. 1988) (quoting Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co.

v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 27 S.E.2d 159, 163 (Va. 1943)), or

“[a]n agreed compensation for services . . . paid at regular intervals

on a yearly basis,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1607 (12th ed. 2024).

And a “bonus” is defined as “[a] premium paid in addition to what is

13
due or expected” or “a payment by way of division of a business’s

profits, given over and above normal compensation.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 224 (12th ed. 2024); see also, e.g., Bukuras v. Mueller

Grp., LCC, 592 F.3d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 2010) (defining “bonus” per

its “plain and ordinary” meaning as “any additional funds over and

above [a] salary”).

¶ 34 Combining “gross” with “salary” and “bonus” indicates that the

formula requires calculation of the amount of husband’s

maintenance payments based on his total salary and total bonus,

without any adjustment. See Ringquist, 176 P.3d at 850; Black’s

Law Dictionary 843 (12th ed. 2024).

¶ 35 The maintenance provision provides an example of how

husband’s maintenance payments are to be calculated as of the

date of the MOU. The example specifies that, for the first

maintenance period, husband would pay wife 35% of his gross

salary, which “currently equals $4,813.00 per month.” Husband

contends that, “[u]nder the plain language of the MOU,” the

$4,813.00 maintenance amount is an “initial baseline” that “serves

as a presumptive ceiling or guidepost for future payments.” But the

use of “currently” in the MOU indicates the parties’ recognition that

14
husband’s gross salary was likely to fluctuate throughout the

maintenance term; “currently” means “at the present time.”

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4MXU-YH4U. The

MOU does not refer to a “presumptive ceiling” or “guidepost.” Thus,

the $4,813.00 figure is merely illustrative.

¶ 36 Nothing in the maintenance provision — or anything else in

the MOU — indicates that the meanings of these terms as they are

used in the maintenance provision deviate from their common

meanings. Regardless of husband’s efforts to manipulate the

categories of his compensation, the new income categories in the

September letter still comprised “agreed compensation for

services . . . paid at regular intervals.” Husband could not evade

his maintenance obligation by affixing new labels to portions of the

gross salary and gross bonuses he received from Wheel Pros.

¶ 37 Furthermore, the court found that husband paid the correct

amount of maintenance from 2014 through 2017 — nearly

one-third of the maintenance term — even though, during that

time, the amounts of his gross salary and gross bonuses fluctuated.

Husband’s compliance with the maintenance provision for four

15
years demonstrates that he understood the meanings of “gross

salary” and “gross bonus.”

¶ 38 For these reasons, we conclude that the terms “gross salary”

and “gross bonus” in the maintenance provision are unambiguous.

b. The Court Did Not Err by Finding that
Husband Knew of the Maintenance Provision and
Had the Present Ability to Comply with It

¶ 39 Moreover, the court found that husband knew the terms of the

maintenance provision. The undisputed evidence showed that he

signed the MOU and fully complied with it for the first four years of

the fifteen-year maintenance term. The parties acknowledged in the

MOU that “each has read and understands this Agreement, that it

represents their Agreement, and that they believe it is fair and not

unconscionable in all its terms.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 40 In addition, the court found in the November order that

“husband had the present ability” to pay the correct amount of

maintenance he owed wife during the underpayment period.

Although husband was unemployed at the time of the October

hearing, a sworn financial statement he submitted to the court in

September 2024 showed that husband owned $2,472,140.21 in

assets — a sufficient sum to enable him to purge the portion of the

16
contempt sanction requiring him to pay wife $207,054 in unpaid

maintenance. Thus, the record supports the court’s finding that

husband was in contempt for underpaying maintenance.

¶ 41 We therefore hold that the court did not abuse its discretion

by finding husband in remedial contempt and imposing sanctions

against him.

c. The Court Did Not Hold Husband in Contempt Based on
a Modification of the Maintenance Provision

¶ 42 In addition, husband contends that the court erred by finding

him in contempt only after it retroactively modified the maintenance

provision. According to husband, the court modified the

maintenance provision when it calculated his maintenance

obligation, not based on husband’s actual gross salary and gross

bonuses, but instead based on the income the court “believe[d] he

should have earned” from Wheel Pros. Husband asserts that he

had no way of knowing that the court would retroactively change

the maintenance provision years after he made maintenance

payments in reliance on the original provision.

¶ 43 We disagree that the court held husband in contempt

premised on a modified version of the maintenance provision.

17
Husband asserts that the court improperly imputed income to him

to calculate his maintenance obligation for the time he worked at

Wheel Pros. We reject this argument because the court’s

calculation of that maintenance obligation was based on husband’s

actual gross salary from Wheel Pros, without regard to husband’s

attempt to recharacterize portions of his gross salary as other forms

of income. A court “imputes” income when it attributes income to

the payor spouse that the payor never actually received. See, e.g.,

In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 20, 446 P.3d 968, 971

(describing imputed income as “potential” or “[u]nrealized” income).

¶ 44 The evidence showed that husband earned at least the amount

of compensation from Wheel Pros that the court attributed to him.

Husband argues the court “repeatedly rejected actual W-2 evidence”

and used amounts husband “never earned” to determine husband’s

gross salary and gross bonuses during his employment at Wheel

Pros. Husband’s W-2s, which do not distinguish between gross

salary and gross bonus, show that husband earned more money

from Wheel Pros than the $310,000 the court used to calculate his

unpaid maintenance. Furthermore, husband provided no other

evidence of the actual gross salary or gross bonuses he received

18
from Wheel Pros. That husband elected to shift his total

compensation into categories other than gross salary and gross

bonus does not mean he did not earn it or that the court imputed

salary income to him.

¶ 45 As noted above, the terms “gross salary” and “gross bonus” in

the formula are not ambiguous. A court interprets an

unambiguous contract by “ascertain[ing] and implement[ing] the

intent of the parties” and generally affording the “words in [the]

contract their plain meaning.” Johnson Nathan Strohe, P.C. v. MEP

Eng’g, Inc., 2021 COA 125, ¶ 12, 501 P.3d 826, 829 (quoting Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 11, 292 P.3d 934, 937).

¶ 46 The court properly applied the formula when it calculated the

amount of husband’s maintenance payments for the underpayment

period. Based on its findings that husband manipulated his income

categories when he worked at Wheel Pros, and that he provided no

evidence of his actual gross salary and gross bonuses during that

time, the court possessed the discretion to determine the correct

amount of husband’s actual gross salary and gross bonuses when

he was a Wheel Pros employee.

19
¶ 47 In calculating husband’s maintenance payments for the

underpayment period, the court did not modify the maintenance

provision because, as the court noted, the maintenance provision

“clearly states that wife will receive a percentage of husband’s ‘gross

salary’ and a percentage of husband’s ‘gross bonus.’” The court

explained that, but for husband’s reclassification of his income

categories as reflected in the September letter, Wheel Pros would

have divided his compensation between gross salary and gross

bonuses as specified in the offer letter. The court then applied the

gross salary and gross bonus figures that appeared in the offer

letter, so the amount of husband’s maintenance payments during

the underpayment period would not be premised on manipulated

numbers.

¶ 48 Therefore, the court’s calculation of maintenance for the

underpayment period did not represent a modification of the

maintenance provision but, rather, a determination of husband’s

underpayment of maintenance premised on the most accurate

available gross salary and gross bonus figures. For these reasons,

the court did not err by holding husband in contempt after

20
determining that he manipulated the categories of compensation he

received from Wheel Pros to underpay maintenance.

¶ 49 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment finding husband in

remedial contempt and imposing remedial sanctions. And we affirm

the portion of the November order ordering him to pay $207,054 in

unpaid maintenance.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Denying Husband’s Motion to Modify

¶ 50 Husband argues that the court erred by modifying the

maintenance provision and then, inconsistently, denying husband’s

motion to modify. As explained above, see supra Part II.A.3.c, we

disagree with husband’s assertion that the court modified the

maintenance provision to calculate the amount of maintenance he

owed during the underpayment period. For that reason, we need

not further consider this argument in the context of the court’s

denial of husband’s motion to modify.

¶ 51 Next, husband challenges the court’s determination that he

was not entitled to modification of his maintenance obligation

because he was voluntarily unemployed at the time of the October

hearing. He asserts that he was not shirking his maintenance

21
obligation by choosing not to work. We disagree that the court

erred.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 52 We review an order denying a modification of maintenance for

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 7,

497 P.3d 524, 528. For the reasons noted above, supra Part II.A.1,

this is a “highly deferential” standard of review. Jackson v. Unocal

Corp., 262 P.3d 874, 879 (Colo. 2011).

2. Substantive Law

¶ 53 A party seeking modification of maintenance must

demonstrate “changed circumstances so substantial and continuing

as to make the existing terms unfair.” Young, ¶ 12, 497 P.3d at 528

(quoting § 14-10-122(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020). The moving party bears a

“heavy burden” of proving that the maintenance order’s provisions

have become “unfair under all relevant circumstances.” Id.

¶ 54 We will not disturb a court’s findings supporting a

determination that a party is voluntarily unemployed or

underemployed unless the court’s determination is not supported

by the record and, therefore, is clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of

Bregar, 952 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. App. 1997). When determining if

22
a party is voluntarily unemployed, a court may consider that party’s

efforts to find new employment and available positions for which the

party is qualified. See id. at 785-86. “A payor spouse whose

income is reduced or terminated due to his or her retirement after

reaching full retirement age is entitled to a rebuttable presumption

that the retirement is in good faith.” § 14-10-122(2)(b), C.R.S.

2025. “[F]ull retirement age” means “the payor’s usual or ordinary

retirement age when he or she would be eligible for full United

States social security benefits, regardless of whether he or she is

ineligible for social security benefits for some reason other than

attaining full retirement age.” § 14-10-122(2)(c).

¶ 55 This statutory rebuttable presumption “is not conclusive on

the question of whether the court should terminate the payor’s

maintenance obligation.” In re Marriage of Thorstad, 2019 COA 13,

¶ 36, 434 P.3d 165, 172, superseded by statute on other grounds,

Ch. 176, sec. 1, § 14-10-114(5), 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 648. “[I]f a

payor [spouse] asks a court to modify or to terminate a

maintenance obligation because he or she intends to retire, then

the court should follow a general rule.” Id. at ¶ 43, 434 P.3d at

173. Under the general rule, the court must first decide whether

23
“the payor’s decision to retire was made in good faith” and, second,

“incorporate its findings concerning the payor’s decision to retire as

one of the factors to consider in deciding whether, under [section

§ 14-10-122(1)(a)], circumstances have changed in such a

substantial and continuing way as to make the original order

unfair.” Id.

3. Husband’s Arguments Regarding Voluntary Unemployment

¶ 56 Husband argues that, under the maintenance provision, the

court was required to grant husband’s motion to modify because he

had retired and was therefore unemployed. He points to the

language of the maintenance provision specifying that, “[i]f

husband’s compensation structure changes, the maintenance terms

shall be modified with the intent to achieve a comparable result.”

¶ 57 Although there was no dispute that husband was unemployed,

the court found he was voluntarily unemployed. A party may not

shirk a maintenance obligation by choosing not to work. See

Young, ¶ 22, 497 P.3d at 530. (Because husband was fifty-seven

when the court entered the November order, he was not entitled to

the statutory rebuttable presumption that he had retired in good

faith. See § 14-10-122(2)(b).)

24
¶ 58 The court reached this conclusion after considering whether

husband had decided in good faith to retire (or otherwise not to

work). See Thorstad, ¶ 38, 434 P.3d at 172. “[G]ood faith” in this

context means that the spouse’s decision not to work was “not

primarily motivated by a desire to decrease or eliminate

maintenance” and was “objectively reasonable based on factors

such as the obligor’s age, the obligor’s health, and the practice of

the industry in which the obligor was employed.” In re Marriage of

Swing, 194 P.3d 498, 501 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 59 The court found that husband did not intend to seek further

employment; he did not seek a job comparable to the positions he

held before 2022 because they required international travel that, he

said, adversely impacted his relationships and his health; and he

had talked about retiring after leaving Wheel Pros in 2022.

Husband testified that he took a job with JM Contracting in 2022 at

a salary of $80,000 per year — an approximately $230,000 annual

salary reduction — and that he stopped working altogether in June

2023.

¶ 60 But the court also found there was no evidence

25
• indicating that “husband ha[d] looked for a job consistent

with his previous employment with [his employer before

Wheel Pros] and Wheel Pros since he left Wheel Pros early

in 2022 or even a job that would pay husband less”; or

• suggesting that “husband had sought employment in a

different field to avoid his previous travel, or to focus on a

relationship, or even for his fulfillment.”

In other words, the court found that husband had not undertaken a

good faith search for a new position that did not require

international travel or otherwise negatively impact his relationships

and health.

¶ 61 After examining the relevant evidence, the court concluded

that “husband had simply chosen not to seek employment” and

observed that “[h]usband’s choice not only would unduly diminish

his support to wife” but that, under husband’s theory, “his support

would be eliminated as he would have no salary or bonus to share.”

¶ 62 We may not reweigh the court’s assessment of the facts, and

we cannot say that the record does not support the court’s findings.

See In re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995).

Thus, the court’s finding that husband was voluntarily unemployed

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was not clearly erroneous, and the court did not abuse its

discretion by denying husband’s motion to modify after finding that

he chose not to work. We therefore affirm the portion of the

November order denying the motion to modify.

C. We Reverse the Court’s Order Regarding
Husband’s Maintenance Obligations
On and After July 14, 2023

¶ 63 Husband further argues that the court impermissibly modified

the maintenance provision when it determined the amount of

maintenance he owed on and after July 14, 2023 (the date husband

filed the motion to modify), and ordered him to pay a fixed monthly

amount of maintenance from November 1, 2024, through the end of

the maintenance term (the fixed maintenance period). He also

asserts that the court erroneously expanded the scope of the

contempt proceeding by ordering him to pay $116,741.85 in

maintenance for the 2023-24 maintenance period.

¶ 64 As we explain further below, the court’s findings and

statements regarding its calculation of husband’s maintenance

obligation on and after July 14, 2023, were contradictory at worst

and unclear at best. We are unable to discern from the November

order whether, by ordering husband to pay specified maintenance

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amounts during the fixed maintenance period, the court believed it

was modifying the maintenance provision or merely enforcing the

maintenance provision by plugging imputed gross salary and gross

bonus figures into the formula. Because the record does not reveal

the rationale for the court’s calculation of husband’s maintenance

obligations from July 14, 2023, through the conclusion of the

maintenance term, we reverse the portion of the November order

setting such maintenance amounts and remand to the court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 65 Although wife had not asked the court before the October

hearing to determine the amount of maintenance that husband

owed for the remainder of the maintenance term, at the hearing,

wife testified that the court “need[ed] to determine how much

[husband was] making” and “how much [he was] able to make” and

“set up . . . a payment for an X amount of money, determining what

would be appropriate for his income” for the remainder of the

maintenance term. Similarly, in wife’s written closing argument,

her counsel asked the court to modify maintenance to “complete the

15-year term of maintenance, ending in December 2028, in the

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monthly amount of $11,069 per month. This is the average amount

of monthly maintenance that [w]ife should have received between

the years of 2014 and 2022 had all of [h]usband’s [W-2] income

been used.” But wife did not point to “changed circumstances so

substantial and continuing” that they made the maintenance

provision “unfair” — the statutory standard for modification of

maintenance awards. § 14-10-122(1)(a).

¶ 66 In the November order, the court acknowledged that “[w]ife

requests the [c]ourt modify the remaining term of maintenance to a

set monthly amount” and that “[h]usband took a similar position.”

The court said that, because it “ha[d] not modified the current

orders concerning maintenance,” it could not “enter the type of

order suggested by the parties” by setting a monthly amount. The

court “recognize[d] that following the current orders/formula [could]

lead to continued disagreements between the parties and litigation

concerning the calculation of maintenance” but that the parties

could “modify their agreement at any time to create a new

maintenance arrangement.” After making these pronouncements,

however, the court proceeded to determine the amount of

maintenance that husband owed on and after July 14, 2023.

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¶ 67 To calculate the amount of husband’s future maintenance

payments, the court plugged into the formula husband’s average

salary and bonuses for 2017 through 2021, which the court

imputed to husband based on its finding that he was voluntarily

unemployed. The court specified that husband owed wife

“$45,908.00 for maintenance for July 14, 2023[,] through December

31, 2023”; he owed her “$83,470.00 for maintenance for January 1,

2024[,] through October 31, 2024” (four days before the court

entered the November order); and he “continue[d] to owe current

maintenance of $8,347 per month.”

¶ 68 The court said that, “[i]n determining these figures and

applying these figures,” it “ha[d] not modified maintenance but

ha[d] simply applied the existing formula to the imputed income.”

But then it seemingly contradicted itself by saying, “Although the

[c]ourt has authority to impute income and apply the parties’

formula, the [c]ourt does not have the authority based on the

contents of the pending Motion to Modify and pending [c]ontempt to

enter orders concerning payment(s) during 2023” and “from 2024.”

¶ 69 The amount of the money judgment that wife sought in the

verified entry of support judgment — $116,741.85 — was based on

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the maintenance figures in the November order. On December 23,

2024, the court entered a money judgment in favor of wife in the

amount she requested.

2. The Court’s Calculation of Maintenance from
July 14, 2023, Through the End of the Maintenance Term

¶ 70 Husband contends the court “effectively rewr[ote]” the

maintenance provision when it imputed a gross salary and gross

bonus to him “[e]ffective July 14, 2023,” and ordered that husband

“continues to owe current maintenance of $8,347.00 per month”

through the end of the maintenance term. Although the court

asserted that it did “not modify maintenance” by applying “the

existing formula to the imputed income,” we cannot tell whether the

court modified the maintenance provision when it ordered husband

to pay $8,347.00 in monthly maintenance from July 14, 2023,

through the conclusion of the maintenance term. The court did not

make a finding that it could order husband to pay a fixed monthly

maintenance amount for the remainder of the maintenance term

without modifying the maintenance provision.

¶ 71 We do not take issue with the court’s general statements

regarding imputed income. We agree with the court that, when a

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party is voluntarily unemployed, the court may impute income to

that party to calculate maintenance. See In re Marriage of Tooker,

2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 25-27, 444 P.3d 856, 861 (holding that if a party

is voluntarily unemployed maintenance is based on the party’s

potential income, which a district court has broad discretion in

determining); § 14-10-114, C.R.S. 2025. We also find no error in

the court’s method of imputing income to husband. See Tooker,

¶ 26, 444 P.3d at 861 (“‘Potential income’ is . . . the amount a party

could earn from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s

demonstrated earning ability. In determining potential income, the

district court may consider several factors, including the party’s

historical income, education, and work experience.” (citation

omitted)); In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶¶ 32-35,

561 P.3d 417, 425 (“In situations where a party’s income fluctuates

or there is conflicting evidence regarding the income amount, the

district court may, in its discretion, consider and use an average of

the party’s past income.”). But the court left unresolved the

fundamental question of whether it needed to modify the

maintenance provision before it could calculate husband’s

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maintenance obligation based on imputed gross salary and gross

bonus amounts that he never received.

¶ 72 Wife argues on appeal that the court merely interpreted and

enforced the maintenance provision when it inserted the imputed

income figures into the formula to calculate husband’s maintenance

obligation from July 14, 2023, through the conclusion of the

maintenance term. But wife requested a modification at the

October hearing and when she filed her written closing argument.

She apparently believed that, to award such maintenance amounts,

the court needed to modify the maintenance provision.

¶ 73 In addition, the parties do not point to, the court did not cite,

and we are unaware of any reported Colorado case holding that a

court may impute income to a spouse outside the context of an

initial award or modification of maintenance. See, e.g., Capparelli,

¶ 27, 32, 561 P.3d 424-25 (averaging a party’s past income to

calculate maintenance for permanent orders); Tooker, ¶¶ 23-39, 444

P.3d at 861-63 (addressing imputed income in the context of

adjudicating a motion to modify maintenance).

¶ 74 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the November order

setting husband’s maintenance obligation on and after July 14,

33
2023, and remand for consideration of whether the court could

(1) award such maintenance without modifying the maintenance

provision; (2) award a fixed monthly amount of maintenance during

the fixed maintenance period without modifying the maintenance

provision; and (3) whether wife established the statutory grounds

for modifying maintenance if modification of the maintenance

provision was required before the court could set such maintenance

amounts.

III. Disposition

¶ 75 The judgment finding husband in remedial contempt and

imposing remedial sanctions is affirmed.

¶ 76 The November order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The portions of the November order ordering husband to pay wife

$207,054 in unpaid maintenance and denying the motion to modify

are affirmed.

¶ 77 The portions of the November order addressing maintenance

from July 14, 2023, forward are reversed. Accordingly, the order for

the December money judgment is also reversed. The case is

remanded to the court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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