Abrams v. Star Builders

24CA2223 Abrams v Star Builders 12-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2223
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV541
Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge

Abrams & Associates, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

v.

Star Builders, LLC, and Aaron LaPedis,

Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 31, 2025

Resnick & Louis, P.C., Clayton D. Manceaux, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Sean M. McDermott, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees and Cross-
Appellants
¶1 Plaintiff, Abrams & Associates, LLC (the firm), appeals the

court’s judgment in favor of defendants, Star Builders, LLC, and

Aaron LaPedis (collectively, Star Builders), on Star Builders’

counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, the firm and Star Builders entered into a contract for

legal services. The firm agreed to represent Star Builders in a

construction defect dispute between Star Builders and a plumbing

company in Jefferson County Case No. 22CV30823.1 Either party

could terminate the contract by written notice. The contract

provided that “if permission for withdrawal [wa]s required by the

court, the [f]irm shall apply for such permission and termination

shall coincide with the court order for withdrawal.”

¶3 Star Builders’ managing partner, LaPedis, was dissatisfied

with the firm’s work and expressed concerns with the way the firm

was handling the underlying case. On February 22, 2023, LaPedis

emailed Robert Abrams and Kyle Thompson, attorneys at the firm,

and told them to “put a hard stop on everything.” The email also

1 The litigation later involved a third-party insurance brokerage firm

as well.

1
indicated that Star Builders had a new attorney who would be

handling the case moving forward.

¶4 On February 23, the firm sent a demand letter to Star

Builders’ insurance company, which indicated that “[the firm]

continues to represent Star Builders.” The firm sent Star Builders a

copy of the demand letter on February 24 and apprised it of the

status of the underlying case. On February 26, Abrams responded

to LaPedis’s February 22 email and agreed to stop all work, told

LaPedis that new counsel could file a notice of substitution of

counsel in the case, and that the firm expected Star Builders to pay

its outstanding fees. On February 28, Abrams sent LaPedis another

email informing LaPedis that he had not heard from new counsel.

That same day, Abrams forwarded LaPedis a notice of the

propounded discovery and indicated that the “new lawyer can assist

in answering this discovery.” The next day, LaPedis asked Abrams

if he could respond to the discovery issues before transferring Star

Builders’ case to new counsel. On March 3, LaPedis called Abrams,

asking if they could “patch things up” and whether the firm could

remain on the case.

2
¶5 On March 6, the firm filed a motion to withdraw from the

underlying case.2 The motion indicated that the firm had conferred

with Star Builders and that the motion was unopposed, but LaPedis

testified that neither Abrams nor Thompson had conferred with

him. That same day, LaPedis emailed Abrams to check in and to

ask if he was moving forward with the case.3 On March 7, Abrams

sent LaPedis a copy of the firm’s motion to withdraw. The firm filed

an amended motion to withdraw with the court on March 7, again

representing that Star Builders did not oppose withdrawal. That

2 The motion to withdraw filed in Case No. 22CV30823 was not

included in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, we take judicial
notice of it. See Vento v. Colo. Nat’l Bank, 985 P.2d 48, 52 (Colo.
App. 1999) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of the contents of
court records in a related proceeding.”).
3 The record is missing several trial exhibits detailing the parties’

communications, including this email. We admonish the firm’s
counsel for failing to comply with the obligation to file all trial
exhibits as part of the record despite the district court’s warning
that if they weren’t included by the due date, “the certified record
w[ould] be sent to the appellate court without them.” The party
asserting a trial court error bears the burden of presenting a record
which discloses the error. Hunter v. Colo. Mountain Jr. Coll. Dist.,
804 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. App. 1990). When the appellant has failed
to provide a complete record on appeal, “it is well settled that
appellate courts must presume the trial court’s findings and
conclusions are supported by the evidence.” People v. Helmstetter,
914 P.2d 474, 477 (Colo. App. 1995). We therefore presume that
the missing trial court exhibits support the trial court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law.

3
same day, the Jefferson County District Court granted the firm’s

original motion to withdraw.

¶6 In June 2023, the firm filed a complaint, alleging that Star

Builders failed to pay for legal services as provided by the contract.

Star Builders filed counterclaims, alleging breach of fiduciary duty

and breach of contract. The counterclaims related to the firm’s

withdrawal in Case No. 22CV30823.

¶7 The court ultimately found that Star Builders failed to pay the

firm $3,395 for “reasonably incurred legal services.” With respect to

the counterclaims, the court found in the firm’s favor on the breach

of contract claim and in Star Builders’ favor on the breach of

fiduciary duty claim. The court concluded that the firm breached

its fiduciary duty to Star Builders when it withdrew as counsel in

Case No. 22CV30823. The court found that as Star Builders’

counsel, the firm was in a position of trust with its client and

breached its fiduciary duties to be truthful in communications with

the court and to provide its client with sufficient information to

make an informed decision about withdrawal. The court awarded

Star Builders $17,797 in damages, including exemplary damages —

which the court concluded were warranted, given its finding that

4
the firm willfully and wantonly violated multiple rules of

professional conduct and rules of civil procedure.

II. Analysis

¶8 The firm contends that the court erred by (1) denying its

motion to dismiss under section 13-20-602, C.R.S. 2025;4 (2)

concluding that no expert testimony was necessary to prove Star

Builders’ fiduciary duty claim; (3) finding that the firm made the

decision to withdraw; and (4) finding that the firm failed to comply

with its duty of candor to the tribunal. We disagree with each

contention.

A. Certificate of Review and Expert Testimony

¶9 The firm contends that the court erred by (1) denying its

motion to dismiss Star Builders’ counterclaims for failure to file a

certificate of review under section 13-20-602(4) and (2) determining

that no expert testimony was needed to establish that the firm

4 The firm’s opening brief incorrectly cites “C.R.S. § 13-22-602,”

which does not exist. The correct statute to which we will refer is
section 13-20-602, C.R.S. 2025. Because the statute has not
changed since this action was filed in the district court, all citations
are to the 2025 statute.

5
breached its fiduciary duty. We address these arguments together

and disagree with both.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 10 After the firm filed its complaint, Star Builders filed

counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty,

alleging the following:

• After spending money on legal fees and determining the goals

of the case weren’t being met, LaPedis sent the firm an email

on February 22, 2023, asking that a “hard stop be put on the

case” and explaining that another attorney would handle the

case.

• After LaPedis sent the email, he was advised not to change

attorneys, given the imminent expert disclosure deadlines

and upcoming trial in Case No. 22CV30823.

• On February 27, the attorney who was supposed to replace

the firm notified LaPedis that he would not represent Star

Builders.

• Around March 3, LaPedis had a conversation with Abrams

where the two agreed to “patch up any differences” and work

6
together. Abrams was on vacation but told LaPedis that he

would contact him on Monday, March 6.

• Abrams did not contact LaPedis on March 6; instead, the firm

filed a motion to withdraw in Case No. 22CV30823. The

motion to withdraw indicated that Star Builders had

instructed the firm to withdraw, that the firm had conferred

with Star Builders, and that Star Builders did not oppose the

withdrawal. The motion did not mention subsequent

communications between the parties or the conversation that

LaPedis had with Abrams.

• LaPedis emailed Abrams on March 6 to “check in” based on

their prior conversation that the firm would remain on the

case.

• On March 7, Abrams responded to LaPedis’s email, citing

LaPedis’s February 22 email ordering the firm to stop work.

Abrams also sent LaPedis a copy of the motion to withdraw.

• The firm filed an amended motion to withdraw on March 7,

but the amended motion didn’t correct the “false statement”

that Star Builders had instructed the firm to withdraw. The

7
motion also didn’t mention that LaPedis had contacted

Abrams and expected the firm to continue handling the case.

• The court granted the motion to withdraw on March 7.

• Because of the firm’s withdrawal, Star Builders had to obtain

new counsel in Case No. 22CV30823, seek a continuance,

and incur over $12,000 for substitute counsel to “get up to

speed” on the case.

Star Builders claimed that the motion and the amended motion to

withdraw violated C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-1(2)(b), which details the

procedures that an attorney must follow before a court may allow

the attorney to withdraw from a case, and C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-

15(8), which requires moving counsel to consult with the opposing

party before filing a motion.

¶ 11 Eleven months after Star Builders filed its counterclaims, the

firm moved to dismiss them for failure to file a certificate of review

as required by section 13-20-602.5 Because Star Builders’ claims

for breach of contract and fiduciary duty alleged inadequate and

improper professional legal representation, the firm argued that a

5 The court previously denied the firm’s motion to dismiss Star

Builders’ counterclaims pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

8
certificate of review was warranted. And because one was not filed,

the counterclaims had to be dismissed. See § 13-20-602(4) (“The

failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with this section

shall result in the dismissal of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross

claim.”).

¶ 12 In response, Star Builders argued that a certificate of review

was unnecessary because expert testimony wasn’t needed to

establish that the firm had acted improperly based on “the

untruths” contained in the motion and amended motion to

withdraw.

¶ 13 The court held a hearing to resolve several motions, including

the firm’s motion to dismiss for failure to file a certificate of review.

The court ordered the parties to prepare trial briefs on the issue

and to be ready to discuss the issue at trial. At trial, Abrams

renewed the motion to dismiss, which the court denied.

¶ 14 The court noted that, based on case law, whether a certificate

of review was required hinged on whether an expert witness was

necessary “to establish the standard of care.” The court determined

that expert testimony wasn’t required “to establish the standard of

care” here because Star Builders’ claims against the firm pertained

9
to the motion and amended motion to withdraw “and whether or

not the veracity of those motions w[as] correct or incorrect.” The

court found that the standard of care “was so apparent on its face

that . . . you don’t need expert testimony” and that “the negligence

was so apparent that no certificate need[ed] to be filed.”

¶ 15 In support, the court looked to C.R.C.P. 11 and stated that it

requires an attorney to sign and confirm “that everything [] filed

[with the court] is correct”; the court also looked to Colo. RPC

3.3(a), “which says that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false

statement of material fact or law to a tribunal, or fail to correct a

false statement of material fact or law previously made to the

tribunal [by] the lawyer.”

2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 16 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to

dismiss. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 16. We review the

district court’s ruling requiring or dispensing with a certificate of

review for an abuse of discretion. Woo v. Baez, 2022 COA 113,

¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies or

misinterprets the law, or when its decision is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Est. of Ford v. Eicher, 220 P.3d 939, 942

10
(Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 250 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2011). “[T]he decision

of the trial court that a claim may proceed without the filing of a

certificate of review will not be disturbed upon appellate review

unless the plaintiff’s” reason for not filing the certificate lacked

arguable merit. Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 984

P.2d 623, 627 (Colo. 1999).

¶ 17 To prove a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must

prove that (1) the defendant was acting as a fiduciary; (2) the

defendant breached its fiduciary duty; (3) the plaintiff incurred

damages; and (4) the damages incurred were caused by the

defendant’s breach of the fiduciary duty. Graphic Directions, Inc. v.

Bush, 862 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Colo. App. 1993). “Breach of fiduciary

duty claims are in some, but not all, contexts basically negligence

claims incorporating particularized and enhanced duty of care

concepts . . . .” Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 251-52 (Colo.

1992). Some courts recognize a distinction between breach of

fiduciary duty claims and attorney negligence claims, seeing

“fiduciary obligations as part of a standard of conduct and

professional negligence as part of a standard of care.” Aller v. Law

Off. of Carole C. Schriefer, P.C., 140 P.3d 23, 27 (Colo. App. 2005).

11
¶ 18 A party filing a professional negligence claim must file a

certificate of review within sixty days of the commencement of the

claim, certifying that they have “consulted a person who has

expertise in the area of the alleged negligent conduct,” and that the

person “has reviewed the known facts” and concluded that the

claim or counterclaim “does not lack substantial justification.”

§ 13-20-602(1)(a), (3)(a); see Woo, ¶ 14. The purpose of section 13-

20-602 is to prevent frivolous lawsuits or baseless professional

malpractice actions. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 503 (Colo. 2000).

¶ 19 A certificate of review is only necessary, however, where the

professional negligence claim requires expert testimony to establish

a prima facie case. Giron v. Koktavy, 124 P.3d 821, 825 (Colo. App.

2005). Not all professional negligence claims require expert

testimony. Martinez, 842 P.2d at 249; cf. Kelton v. Ramsey, 961

P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Except in the clearest cases,

expert testimony is necessary to establish the standards of

acceptable professional conduct in legal malpractice cases.”).

¶ 20 The touchstone for determining whether expert testimony is

necessary is whether the testimony “will provide assistance on a

matter not within the knowledge or common experience of people of

12
ordinary intelligence.” Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Colo.

App. 1993). When the judge serves as the trier of fact and

testimony concerns matters of legal practice, the trial court is “in a

particularly appropriate position to assess whether [expert]

testimony would be helpful in its deliberations.” Id.

3. Analysis

¶ 21 The firm contends that all claims based upon alleged

professional negligence, regardless of the claim’s formal

designation, require a certificate of review. See Martinez, 842 P.2d

at 251-52. Therefore, it argues, the court erred by denying the

firm’s motion to dismiss under section 13-20-602(4), which

mandates dismissal of the counterclaims for failure to file a

certificate of review. We disagree.

¶ 22 The crux of Star Builders’ claim is not for professional

negligence based on a standard of care or malpractice; rather, its

claim is that the firm breached its fiduciary duty when it filed a

motion and an amended motion to withdraw with the court

containing the following misrepresentations: (1) the motions were

unopposed, (2) the firm informed Star Builders that it intended to

withdraw, and (3) the firm’s withdrawal could be accomplished

13
without any material adverse effects to Star Builders. In concluding

that the firm breached its fiduciary duty, the court focused on the

rules governing attorney conduct and not on the standard of care or

degree of knowledge, skill, or judgment ordinarily possessed by

attorneys in the legal field. See Aller, 140 P.3d at 28 (“We can

foresee circumstances where a breach of fiduciary duty may be

characterized as something other than professional negligence, for

example, where an attorney abuses a position of trust with the

client . . . .”).

¶ 23 For instance, the court looked to C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-

1(2)(b), which provides that an attorney’s request to withdraw may

not be granted until the motion is served on the client and other

parties, and either both the client and all counsel for the other

parties consent in writing at or after the time of the service of the

motion, or fourteen days have passed. It also pointed out that

under C.R.C.P. 11, an attorney’s signature on a pleading represents

“that to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and belief, . . .

[the pleading] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing

law or a good faith argument.” Further, the court acknowledged

Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not

14
knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a

tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law

previously made.” These rules govern the baseline for attorney

conduct, trustworthiness, and honesty; they have nothing to do

with knowledge, skill, or legal expertise.

¶ 24 Expert testimony wasn’t necessary to determine whether the

firm breached its fiduciary duty. The court determined that the

rules at issue “pertain[ed] to an [attorney’s] duties to a court and to

the client about filed pleadings and withdrawal [that] are

elementary, clear, and foundational for all attorneys.” And the

question here — whether the firm breached its fiduciary duty to its

client when it knowingly made false statements in its motions to

withdraw — was so obvious on its face that Star Builders’ expert

testified that the court could decide the matter without his

expertise.

¶ 25 In Giron, a division of this court determined that expert

testimony was not required to establish negligence or breach of a

fiduciary duty when an attorney failed to file a claim within the

applicable statute of limitations because the skill required to

determine whether the statute had run was within a layperson’s

15
common knowledge. Giron, 124 P.3d at 825. Like the statute of

limitations issue in Giron, the issue here is whether the firm

breached the fiduciary duty it owed Star Builders — to be truthful

to the court — when it filed its motion and amended motion to

withdraw containing false statements. Because the question was

obvious on its face and the rules governing attorney conduct and

candor are commonly understood, no expert testimony was

necessary.

¶ 26 The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that

expert testimony and a certificate of review were unnecessary, given

the record and the basis of the fiduciary duty claim. Accordingly,

we conclude that the court properly denied the firm’s motion to

dismiss Star Builders’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty under

section 13-20-602(4).

B. The Court’s Findings Are Supported by the Record

¶ 27 The firm contends that, contrary to the evidence presented at

trial, the court erroneously found that the firm made the decision to

withdraw as counsel of record and failed to comply with its duty of

candor to the court. We disagree.

16
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 We defer to the factual findings of the district court unless

they are clearly erroneous. Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo.

App. 2008). “A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only if

there is no support for them in the record.” Van Gundy v. Van

Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.

¶ 29 Additionally, as we previously mentioned, the firm failed to

include in the record several trial exhibits detailing email exchanges

between the parties. We therefore presume that the missing

evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Love v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131, ¶ 18, aff’d on other grounds,

2018 CO 20.

2. The Court Did Not Err by Finding that the Firm Made the
Decision to Withdraw

¶ 30 The firm contends that Star Builders “unequivocally” directed

it to cease litigation activities in the underlying matter when

LaPedis sent his February 22 email to Abrams and Thompson

ordering the firm to “put a hard stop on everything.” In support,

the firm argues that the instruction was accompanied by multiple

accusations that the firm tried to run up costs and fees and that

17
the email named the attorney who was going to replace the firm. It

further contends that Star Builders did not submit evidence

indicating that it objected to the firm’s withdrawal.

¶ 31 The firm’s contentions are misplaced. The firm doesn’t

acknowledge LaPedis’s requests for it to continue representing Star

Builders or the work that it continued to perform after the February

22 email.

¶ 32 As the court found, the February 22 email did not ask the firm

to withdraw from representation; it just asked the firm to stop work

and provided the name of new counsel. LaPedis testified that the

other attorney declined to represent Star Builders and that because

of the impending deadlines in the underlying matter, LaPedis was

advised to work things out with the firm. He therefore called

Abrams on March 3, asking the firm to remain as counsel. Abrams

was on vacation, but LaPedis testified that the two agreed Abrams

would call on Monday, March 6. While Abrams gave conflicting

testimony, the court found that his testimony wasn’t credible. We

defer to the court’s determinations of credibility. See In re Marriage

of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (“It is the

responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the

18
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and

weight of the evidence.”). LaPedis also testified that he paid the

firm’s outstanding fees to induce the firm to stay on the case and

that he emailed Abrams on March 6 to “check in” to see if the firm

was moving forward with the case.

¶ 33 Likewise, several of the firm’s actions after the February 22

email are contrary to the stop work order and undermine the firm’s

argument that Star Builders terminated the relationship. For

instance, on February 24, Thompson had a phone call with

opposing counsel in Case No. 22CV30823 to negotiate a settlement

and continued to prepare a demand letter, which noted that the

firm represented Star Builders. That same day, Thompson emailed

LaPedis a copy of the demand letter, asked him to make edits, and

gave LaPedis an update on his conversation with opposing counsel.

On February 28, the firm had not received new counsel’s

information, so Abrams emailed LaPedis, copying Thompson and a

paralegal, stating, “BTW, we have not seen nor heard from new

counsel under a subst[itution] of counsel[;] . . . if we have no

[substitution] of counsel today, [withdraw] from [LaPedis’s] case per

his instructions.” The comment to withdraw if no substitution of

19
counsel was received indicates that the firm was waiting for new

counsel to enter an appearance before withdrawing. The firm

continued to work on the case and did not file a motion to withdraw

immediately following the “hard stop” email; instead, it waited

nearly two weeks before filing a motion.

¶ 34 Moreover, the firm’s argument that Star Builders failed to

submit evidence that it objected to the firm’s withdrawal is

misleading. At trial, LaPedis testified that he “felt [he] had no

recourse” when he learned of the firm’s motion to withdraw and

that he “just had to accept it [and] . . . was not told that [he] could

counter it or make an objection.” And when LaPedis learned that

the court had granted the motion one day after it was filed, he

testified that he “was devastated.” The testimony supports the

court’s findings that Star Builders and LaPedis were unaware that

the firm had filed its motion to withdraw and that Star Builders did

not consent to the motion.

¶ 35 Based on our review of the record, the timeline, and the

parties’ testimony, ample evidence supports the court’s finding that

the firm made the decision to withdraw as legal counsel in the

underlying case.

20
3. The Court Did Not Err by Finding That the Firm Failed to
Comply With Its Duty of Candor to the Tribunal

¶ 36 As mentioned above, Colo. RPC 3.3 (a)(1) states that “[a] lawyer

shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or

law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact

or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”

¶ 37 The original motion to withdraw indicated that the firm

“conferred with . . . its client, Star Builders, LLC, with respect to the

relief requested in this Motion. Star Builders, LLC is unopposed.”

Thompson testified that he drafted and filed the motion but did not

discuss it with LaPedis before filing it. The motion also noted that

Star Builders “hired new counsel and has instructed [the firm] to

withdraw as counsel of record.”

¶ 38 Although the parties discussed new counsel during their email

exchanges, the firm was never instructed to withdraw. Further,

Thompson testified at trial that the firm hadn’t heard from new

counsel and that new counsel had not entered an appearance when

he filed the motion to dismiss. The firm also certified that it

complied with the notice requirements by sending the motion via

21
email and standard mail. However, the court found that LaPedis

did not receive the motion before it was filed.

¶ 39 The court did not err in finding that the firm’s representations

were knowingly false because there was no conferral with Star

Builders, the firm had not been instructed to withdraw, and it did

not provide Star Builders with a copy of the motion to withdraw

until after the motion was filed.

¶ 40 Additionally, the amended motion to withdraw filed on March

7 did not correct these misrepresentations. Although the amended

motion clarified that Star Builders “informed undersigned to stop all

work and notified [the firm] of potential new counsel,” and that the

firm “informed [Star Builders] it intends to withdraw as counsel of

record,” the amended motion still indicated that the motion was

unopposed, the parties had conferred, and the firm’s withdrawal

could be accomplished without material adverse effect to Star

Builders.

¶ 41 The trial court’s findings that the firm knowingly made false

representations to the Jefferson County District Court is supported

by ample evidence in the record. We therefore discern no error with

its finding that the firm violated its duty of candor.

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III. Request for Sanctions and Attorney Fees

¶ 42 Star Builders requests sanctions under C.A.R. 38(d),6 alleging

that the firm’s appeal is a continuation of frivolous, groundless, and

vexatious proceedings. C.A.R. 38(b) grants appellate courts the

authority to award damages if an appeal is deemed frivolous. An

appeal may be deemed frivolous if there is no appealable issue

because the judgment below “was so plainly correct and the legal

authority contrary to appellant’s position is so clear that there is

really no appealable issue,” or when an “appellant’s misconduct in

arguing the appeal” justifies deeming the appeal frivolous. Castillo

v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006) (citation

omitted). Here, while we disagree with the firm’s arguments, we

don’t think the appeal is frivolous and decline to award damages.

¶ 43 Likewise, although we may impose sanctions, including

attorney fees, under C.A.R. 38(a) for failure to comply with the

appellate rules, including those pertaining to providing the trial

6 We note that there is no C.A.R. 38(d), but C.A.R. 38(b) provides

that we may award damages, including attorney’s fees, if we
determine that an appeal is frivolous.

23
court record, we decline to impose sanctions even though the firm

failed to include several trial exhibits in the record.

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.

24