Peo in Interest of KE

25CA0861 Peo in Interest of KE 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0861
Mesa County District Court No. 22JV5
Honorable Craig P. Henderson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.E., G.E., and E.E., Children,

and Concerning K.S. and J.E.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant K.S.

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant J.E.
¶1 J.E. (father) and K.S. (mother) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with K.E., G.E.,

and E.E. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2022, the Mesa County Department of Human

Services received a report about a law enforcement investigation

into an allegation that father had punched S.E. — the couple’s

fifteen-year-old daughter — and threatened to kill her. During the

investigation, law enforcement learned of other allegations of

physical abuse by father, including incidents in which he reportedly

shot S.E. with an “airsoft gun” and wrapped duct tape around her

head. Based on these reports, law enforcement arrested the

parents, removed the children from the home, and placed them into

the Department’s custody.

¶3 The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect,

alleging physical abuse by father, failure to prevent that abuse by

mother, domestic violence between the parents, and concerns about

the condition of the home. The parents accepted a deferred

adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025, and they

agreed to comply with treatment plans adopted by the court. Before

1
the deferred period expired, the parents resolved their criminal

cases: (1) a jury found father not guilty after a trial, and (2) the

criminal court dismissed mother’s case at the district attorney’s

request. After resolving their criminal cases, the parents believed

that the children should be returned to them, but they nevertheless

agreed to admit to the petition so that the court could enter a

formal adjudication. However, the parents requested a return home

hearing, which occurred over multiple days between May 2023 and

January 2024. After the hearing, a magistrate entered a written

order denying the parents’ request.

¶4 In March 2024, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. Before the termination hearing occurred,

S.E. turned eighteen, and the court dismissed her from the case.

The juvenile court held a hearing on whether to terminate the

parents’ parental rights to the other three children over five days in

January and March 2025, and it heard testimony from three

caseworkers, a life skills worker, a foster parent, individuals

involved with the criminal cases, father’s therapist, a family time

coordinator, father’s expert witnesses, and both parents. After

hearing the evidence, the court determined that, although the

2
criminal cases were resolved in the parent’s favor, “there were

numerous issues arising” from those incidents that the parents

needed to address to become fit, as well as other issues not related

to the criminal cases. But the court found that the parents had not

addressed any of those issues because they did not comply with

their treatment plans and were therefore unfit. The court

terminated the parent-child legal relationships between the parents

and the children.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶5 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

3
factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency,

probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and

conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s

discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.

2010).

III. Treatment Plan

¶7 Father asserts that his treatment plan was inappropriate

because the components requiring him to complete a capacity to

parent evaluation and neuropsychological evaluation were

unnecessary. We discern no reversible error.

A. Additional Background

¶8 Father’s original treatment plan under the deferred

adjudication agreement required him to (1) participate in family

time; (2) address his mental health and/or substance abuse issues;

(3) complete a psychological evaluation; (4) maintain stable housing

and income; (5) engage in life skills training and parenting

education; (6) cooperate with the caseworker and other

4
professionals; and (7) comply with the conditions of his criminal

case.

¶9 In March 2023, the Department moved to amend father’s

treatment plan as follows: (1) substitute the psychological

evaluation for a neuropsychological evaluation (component three)

and (2) add a capacity to parent evaluation (component eight).

Father objected to these modifications. At the adjudication and

dispositional hearings in April 2023, the magistrate noted the

objection to the new components and stated that the parties would

“probably have to set [a] hearing[] on the motion[] to modify the

treatment plan.” The court then adopted the original treatment

plan.

¶ 10 In August 2023, the Department filed a motion for permanent

plan review, in which it requested that the magistrate amend the

treatment plan to remove the objective related to father’s criminal

case. However, the form order submitted alongside the motion

included an amended treatment plan that not only removed the

criminal case objective but also included amended component three

and component eight. Although the magistrate did not address the

amended treatment plan at the permanency planning hearing, it

5
signed the form order and therefore effectively adopted the amended

treatment plan.

¶ 11 In December 2023, the Department filed another motion for

permanent plan review; that motion did not request any

amendments to the treatment plan, and the form order submitted

alongside the motion still included the new components. On the

final day of the return home hearing in January 2024, father’s

counsel asked the magistrate to allow her to present testimony from

her expert witness on the appropriateness of components three and

eight. In response, the magistrate stated that counsel never filed a

written response to the motion filed in December (even though that

motion did not request amendments to the treatment plan). The

magistrate did not permit father’s counsel to question the witness

about the amended treatment plan, but the magistrate gave counsel

seven days to respond to the December motion.

¶ 12 Father’s counsel responded, arguing that the amended

treatment plan was inappropriate. But at the next permanency

review hearing, the magistrate told counsel that she could not

object to the components at that point because he had already

ordered them in August 2023. Counsel then said that she would

6
“change [her] pleading to a motion to amend to delete th[ose]

portion[s]” of the treatment plan, and she requested an evidentiary

hearing on removing components three and eight from the plan.

The court held a hearing over four days in July 2024. After hearing

the evidence, the magistrate denied father’s request to amend the

treatment plan, finding that the amended treatment plan was

“reasonable and appropriate.”

¶ 13 At the termination hearing, the juvenile court found that

father’s treatment plan was appropriate, and it noted that

components three and eight were “clearly necessary for

reunification.”

B. Analysis

¶ 14 On appeal, father first asserts that he was deprived of due

process when the magistrate denied him an opportunity to be heard

on the amended components. But as father acknowledges, he never

challenged any of the magistrate’s rulings. A petition for review of

the magistrate’s order is a prerequisite before an appeal may be

filed with this court. See § 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. 2025. Therefore,

we lack jurisdiction to consider father’s challenges to the

magistrate’s rulings. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

7
J.H., 2021 COA 94, ¶ 14 (dismissing an appeal of a parentage

adjudication because the appealing party did not file a petition for

review with the district court).

¶ 15 Father also asserts that his attorney was ineffective for failing

to challenge the magistrate’s rulings. In evaluating a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency or neglect

proceeding, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance

was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance

and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the parent —

that is, a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s outcome would have been

different. A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 60. “If the parent fails to

establish either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest

of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

¶ 16 Even assuming, without deciding, that counsel provided

deficient performance, father’s allegations are not sufficient to prove

prejudice. See A.R., ¶ 63 (when a parent’s allegations lack

sufficient specificity, the appellate court may summarily deny the

ineffective assistance claim). In his brief, father alleges that he was

prejudiced because, but for counsel’s deficient performance, “there

8
would have been clarity as to what was included in the court-

ordered treatment plan and there would have been appellate

review.” But father has not explained how the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different if counsel had filed a petition

for magistrate review. What’s more, father does not allege that, had

counsel filed a petition for magistrate review, he would have

succeeded, the components would have been removed, and his

parental rights would not have been terminated. We therefore

reject father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

¶ 17 Finally, father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the amended treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.

¶ 18 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required the government’s intervention. K.D. v.

People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006). A treatment plan is

appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to

provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time

and relates to the child’s needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 19 As for component three, father asserts that he did not need a

neuropsychological evaluation because the purpose of the

9
evaluation was to discover if he had any disabilities, but he had

already told the Department that he had disabilities and needed

accommodations. Although the record indicates that father told the

Department about his disabilities and made some requests for

accommodations, the evidence also shows that a

neuropsychological evaluation was necessary to help accommodate

father. For example, father said that he had a brain injury and

“borderline autism,” but he did not offer the Department any

information about a formal diagnosis or specific accommodations.

The second caseworker testified that the neuropsychological

evaluation (which father’s attorney originally requested) could have

provided clear diagnoses and made recommendations on the

services that the Department could have offered father. Therefore,

the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that component

three was appropriate.

¶ 20 As for component eight, father asserts that he did not need a

capacity to parent evaluation because “there was no identified

problem during the parents’ parenting time that would necessitate a

parent capacity evaluation.” In support of this argument, father

relies on the opinion of his own expert witness. But the juvenile

10
court did not rely on this expert’s opinion when it made its decision.

In other words, the court did not find father’s expert persuasive,

and we must defer to that decision when the evidence supports the

court’s judgment. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50. In this case, two

caseworkers, who were designated as experts in child protection,

testified that the treatment plan was appropriate with components

three and eight. Therefore, because the record supports the court’s

finding, we cannot disturb its decision.

IV. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 21 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 22 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court must consider whether the county department of

human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent

and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the

department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

11
¶ 23 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the

department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and

individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;

(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and

(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d

911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the

circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 33.

¶ 24 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the juvenile court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

whether the department made reasonable efforts. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

12
B. Analysis

¶ 25 The juvenile court determined that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with

the children, but the parents did not use the resources the

Department provided to become fit. The court found that the

caseworkers “authorized services, attempted to facilitate the

completion of every aspect of the treatment plans, [provided]

financial assistance, and . . . tried to ascertain appropriate

accommodations for the parent’s needs.” The court noted that, in

response to these efforts, the caseworkers “were met with

resistance, stonewalling, and hostility.”

¶ 26 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. As noted

above, father’s treatment plan included components addressing

family time, mental health and/or substance abuse, a psychological

or neuropsychological evaluation, housing and employment, life

skills and parenting education, and a capacity to parent evaluation.

Mother had a similar treatment plan, except that she was required

to complete a danger/risk assessment instead of a

psychological/neuropsychological evaluation.

13
¶ 27 Neither parent contends that the Department generally failed

to offer the services necessary to complete the objectives in the

treatment plan. Indeed, the record shows that the Department

provided supervised family time services, co-occurring assessments

for the parents’ mental health and substance abuse issues, a

danger/risk assessment for mother, a psychological and a

neuropsychological evaluation for father, life skills training,

parenting classes, and capacity to parent evaluations.

¶ 28 But the record shows that, other than family time, the parents

minimally engaged in the services. To be sure, the parents

completed co-occurring assessments, and mother completed the

danger/risk assessment, but neither parent followed the

recommendations from those assessments. Father never complied

with the psychological or neuropsychological evaluation and neither

parent participated in the capacity to parent evaluation. The

parents met with a life skills worker for a short time, but essentially

“fired” the worker and never engaged with another one. The

Department also made referrals for parenting classes, but the

parents did not sign releases, so those classes were never set up.

14
¶ 29 Nevertheless, the parents assert, for the five reasons below,

that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We address

and reject all five arguments.

¶ 30 First, father contends that the Department failed to make

appropriate and timely referrals to services. We discern no

reversible error.

• Father asserts that the Department did not provide a

parenting class because the identified class was canceled

for lack of participants. Not so. Although the caseworker

said that one class was canceled because of a lack of

participants, she could have referred father to the next

class if he had signed the release of information. And

even if the class lacked participants, the caseworker

testified that the provider was willing to work with father

on an individual basis.

• Father argues that he requested a life skills worker who

had experience working with parents with disabilities,

but the Department never referred him to one. Father

had a life skills worker that he refused to work with after

a few months. The Department attempted to refer father

15
to another life skills worker, but he decline to participate.

And father told the caseworkers that he did not need life

skills. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that

the Department failed to provide the requested worker.

• We are not persuaded by father’s contention that the

Department failed to make timely referrals to the

neuropsychological evaluation and capacity to parent

evaluations. Although the record shows that the second

caseworker did not make referrals when the magistrate

amended the treatment plan in August 2023, she made

referrals in early 2024. Father therefore had close to a

year to complete these evaluations but did not do so.

• Nor are we convinced by father’s assertion that the

Department should have referred him to a different

provider to complete the evaluations because the

Department’s provider had a conflict of interest.

Contrary to father’s argument, he did not ask for a

different provider because of a conflict of interest; rather,

he told the caseworker that the Department’s provider

had refused him services, which was not accurate.

16
¶ 31 Second, father argues that the Department withheld gas cards

from him as a punishment. If a department has additional funds,

section 19-3-208(2)(d) requires it to provide transportation to

services when other appropriate transportation is not available.

The record shows that the Department provided father with gas

cards in the amount of forty dollars for most of the case. However,

the second caseworker testified that the Department reduced the

amount to twenty dollars for two or three months because father

was not attending services, except for parenting time. The

caseworker said that, after talking to her supervisors, she managed

to reinstate the full amount. Father does not direct us to anything

in the record indicating that he missed any services or

appointments because of the short-term reduction in gas cards. We

therefore discern no reversible error.

¶ 32 Third, the parents assert that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it never expanded or liberalized their

family time. Section 19-3-208(2)(b) only requires that the

Department provide family time services “as determined necessary

and appropriate by individual case plans.” Stated another way, to

satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, the Department must

17
provide family time as ordered by the court. It is undisputed that

the Department provided the court-ordered family time. The record

therefore shows that the Department satisfied its burden under

section 19-3-208, and we are not convinced that it had any duty to

exercise its discretion to expand or liberalize family time, especially

considering that the parents were not addressing the concerns in

the case.

¶ 33 Fourth, the parents assert that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not make reasonable

accommodations for them as required by the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA). We are not persuaded.

¶ 34 Services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply with

the ADA. See § 19-3-208(2)(g). The ADA mandates that public

entities — such as a county department of human services — make

reasonable modifications to existing policies and services to

reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities. 42

U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). A parent may be a qualified individual with a

disability if the parent has a “physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A).

18
¶ 35 A parent is responsible for disclosing information about a

disability and any accommodations that are needed to address the

disability. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21.

Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability under

the ADA requires a fact-specific determination that, if disputed, the

juvenile court should resolve. See id. at ¶ 21 n.2. And if the court

determines that a parent is a qualified individual with a disability, it

must consider if reasonable accommodations were made for the

parent’s disability when determining whether the department made

reasonable efforts. Id. at ¶ 34.

¶ 36 The record shows that father never provided the Department

with any information about his disabilities, except for a letter

indicating that he received Social Security Disability Insurance

(SSDI). Father said that he had a shoulder injury, a brain injury,

and autism spectrum disorder. But the record is unclear if he was

receiving SSDI for one or all of these disabilities. Because father

did not provide a formal diagnosis for his disabilities, the

Department asked him to complete a neuropsychological

evaluation. As discussed, father never completed the evaluation.

19
¶ 37 In any event, assuming that father was a person with a

qualifying disability, he testified that he never asked for

accommodations. Nevertheless, he now argues that the

Department did not make reasonable accommodations because it

did not (1) provide him with a life skills worker experienced in

working with disabled parents or (2) refer him to an online

parenting class. We reject these arguments for the same reasons

described above.

¶ 38 Father also asserts that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to file a petition for magistrate

review after the magistrate denied his motion for accommodations.

But he does not develop this argument, and we therefore conclude

that his allegations are insufficient. See A.R., ¶ 63.

¶ 39 As for mother, the record shows that she had epilepsy,

cerebral palsy, and scoliosis. Like father, mother provided the

Department with her SSDI paperwork, but the Department could

not ascertain the nature of mother’s disabilities or what

accommodations she needed. And mother does not direct us to

anything in the record indicating that she ever formally requested

ADA accommodations from the Department during the case. At the

20
termination hearing, she testified that her disabilities never

“prevented [her] from being a parent or doing things that needed to

be done for this case.”

¶ 40 That said, the record shows that mother sometimes had

problems with physical labor because of her disabilities, and she

told the first caseworker that she wanted a more “hands-on” life

skills worker to help her with the condition of the home. The

second caseworker said that she contacted a provider to see if it

had someone who could engage in “physical labor,” but they did not

provide that service or know of anyone in the area who did. In any

event, even if the Department could have done more to provide a

“hands-on” life skills worker, we discern no reversible error because

(1) the record shows that the parents improved the condition of the

home without additional assistance and (2) the juvenile court did

not base its termination judgment on the condition of the home.

¶ 41 Finally, mother contends that the Department did not provide

her with an appropriate danger/risk assessment. The Department’s

original proposed treatment plan for mother required her to

complete a domestic violence evaluation. Mother objected to this

component, and the parties compromised by changing the

21
component to require a danger/risk assessment. The Department

referred mother to the assessment, but she took issue with the

assessment’s focus on domestic violence. The second caseworker

testified that the danger/risk assessment had to consider domestic

violence if that was one of the risk factors for the parent. Therefore,

we are not convinced by mother’s assertion that the Department

failed to provide her with the necessary assessment to become a fit

parent.

¶ 42 In sum, we conclude that the record supports the juvenile

court’s findings that the Department provided the necessary

resources for the parents to comply with their treatment plans, but

they did not use those resources to become fit parents. See A.V., ¶

12; J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. We therefore decline to disturb the

court’s judgment.

V. Fitness

¶ 43 The parents next argue that the juvenile court erred by finding

that they were unfit. We are not persuaded.

¶ 44 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

22
Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A

parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs

and, therefore, may also be considered in determining unfitness.”

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 45 The juvenile court found that the parents were unfit. The

court noted that “neither parent meaningfully engaged in their

respective treatment plans, and, in fact, actively resisted them.” It

further found that the parents’ “pattern of resistance, mistrust, and

hostility . . . ultimately culminated in the overall failure of the

parents in complying with the treatment plans.” As a result, the

court determined that “neither parent had made sufficient progress

towards becoming fit parents.”

¶ 46 The record supports the court’s findings. As described in Part

IV.B., above, the parents participated in family time and some of

the evaluations but did not otherwise participate in any services

necessary to rehabilitate them. The second and third caseworkers

23
said that the parents resisted working on their treatment plans,

noting that they would say that they did not need the services or

that they simply would not do them. The caseworkers also opined

that the parents were unfit because they did not understand the

children’s needs, address the concerns about abuse and violence in

the home, comply with their treatment plans, show that they could

be protective parents, and make any behavioral changes.

¶ 47 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding him

unfit because he “complied with the majority of his treatment plan

and was appropriate in parenting time,” while mother contends that

she was fit because she “maintained a loving relationship with the

children and ensured that the family home was a safe and stable

environment in which they could return.” Although the record

supports aspects of the parents’ assertions, the court considered

that evidence, weighed it against the evidence to the contrary (as

described above), and concluded that the parents were unfit. We

must reject the parents’ assertions because it would require us to

reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court, which we cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

24
VI. Children’s Best Interests

¶ 48 Finally, the parents maintain that the juvenile court erred by

terminating their parental rights because termination was not in

the children’s best interests. We disagree.

¶ 49 In addition to the statutory criteria in section 19-3-604(1)(c),

the court must also consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives

to termination. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). “These criteria require the [juvenile] court to give

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

needs.” A.M., ¶ 20. Therefore, the “primary and controlling issue in

termination proceedings, even though parental rights are at stake,

is the determination of what will best serve the interests and welfare

of the child.” Id. (quoting K.D., 139 P.3d at 701).

¶ 50 In this case, the juvenile court determined that the parents

had not complied with their treatment plans, were unfit, and were

unlikely to change in a reasonable time. The court also found that

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination and that

termination was in the children’s best interests. In doing so, the

court noted that the children needed “stability, permanency, and a

safe environment,” which they could receive in an adoptive home

25
but not from the parents. The court concluded that it could not

return the children home because doing so “would be detrimental to

the children’s needs and unnecessarily damage what progress ha[d]

been made.”

¶ 51 The record supports the court’s findings. The second

caseworker testified that termination was in the children’s best

interests because (1) the parents had not engaged in their treatment

plans to address the safety concerns and (2) the children needed

permanency after “three years in limbo.” She also said that there

were no less drastic alternatives available because there were no

kin options willing to take the children; nor would more time serve

the children’s best interests because the parents refused to work on

their treatment plans. The third caseworker agreed that

termination was in the children’s best interests, noting that they

needed a safe and stable environment and deserved to have a

permanent home that could meet all their needs. She further noted

that the children were in an adoptive home and the placements

were currently meeting all those needs. Finally, the third

caseworker confirmed that the Department had not located any

26
relatives willing to take placement or participate in an allocation of

parental responsibilities.

¶ 52 Despite this evidence, the parents assert that other evidence in

the record refutes the juvenile court’s finding that termination was

in the children’s best interests. For example, they note that the

evidence showed that one child was injured in foster care, another

child experienced inappropriate touching by a fellow foster child,

the children expressed a desire to return home to their parents, and

the children would be separated if not returned home because they

were in different placements. The parents also assert that, because

they attended family time regularly throughout the case, they

continued to have a strong bond with the children.

¶ 53 We recognize that these are some of the factors a court may

consider when determining whether termination is in a child’s best

interests. See People in Interest of H.L.B., 2025 COA 86, ¶ 27. But

as described above, the evidence supported the court’s finding that

returning the children home would not be in their best interests.

And the parents do not argue for a less drastic alternative other

than returning the children home. Because the record supports the

court’s findings, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our

27
judgment to reach a different conclusion. See id. at ¶ 34

(acknowledging that the record “could support a contrary outcome”

but noting that an appellate court “must defer to the juvenile

court’s weighing of the conflicting evidence”). We therefore reject

the parents’ assertions.

VII. Disposition

¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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