Peo v. Valles-Dominguez

23CA1937 Peo v Valles-Dominguez 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1937
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR2121
Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge
Honorable LaQunya Baker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rigoberto Valles-Dominguez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER VACATED, AND
CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Welling, J., concurs
Sullivan, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Kimberly Alderman Rufe, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsey Bradley,
Alternate Defense Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 After a shootout with two police officers and a carjacking,

defendant, Rigoberto Valles-Dominguez, was charged with and

convicted of attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and

other offenses. In addition to being sentenced to a total of 128

years in the Department of Corrections, he was ordered to pay

nearly $350,000 in restitution. Valles-Dominguez now appeals the

judgment of conviction and the restitution order. He contends that

there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on the

attempted murder and aggravated robbery charges. He also

contends that the restitution order must be vacated because it was

entered after the statutory deadline. We disagree with his first

contention but agree with the second. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of conviction but vacate the restitution order and remand

the case to the trial court to amend the mittimus to reflect that no

restitution is owed.

I. Background

¶2 One night, Valles-Dominguez and his then-girlfriend, B.A.,

visited a laundromat and a 7-Eleven. The two then drove back

toward B.A.’s Littleton apartment in her car, a gold Chevrolet

Impala. On the way, they parked on a street near her apartment,

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where they talked about their relationship. At one point, Valles-

Dominguez, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, got upset,

pulled out a gun, and fired a few times out the passenger window.

¶3 After receiving a report of gunshots, Corporal Jeff Farmer,

Officer David Snook, and another officer from the Littleton Police

Department responded to the area. While they were on their way,

they received a second report that someone had witnessed a person

in a car matching the description and license plate number of B.A.’s

car reach out the window and shoot a gun.

¶4 Corporal Farmer arrived at B.A.’s apartment building and

pulled up next to Valles-Dominguez and B.A., who had by then

parked at the apartment, gotten out, and started walking. Corporal

Farmer asked the two if they had heard any gunshots. Valles-

Dominguez responded that they had heard shots about twenty

minutes earlier. This was suspicious to Corporal Farmer, as he had

received the report of gunshots only two to three minutes earlier.

¶5 Then, Officer Snook, who had arrived in a separate patrol car,

quickly walked toward them, saying that Valles-Dominguez was the

suspect and was under arrest. Valles-Dominguez took off running

toward the back door of the apartment building. The two officers

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followed on foot. As Valles-Dominguez ran, he pulled out a gun.

Officer Snook followed him inside the building. Valles-Dominguez

ran up a stairwell and fired repeatedly at Officer Snook, who was hit

seven times. Corporal Farmer went inside to rescue Officer Snook,

and Valles-Dominguez started firing at Corporal Farmer, too, but

didn’t hit him. Eventually, Corporal Farmer and the other officers

who had arrived on the scene were able to get Officer Snook to a

patrol car and take him to the hospital. He survived. Valles-

Dominguez evaded capture that night.

¶6 In the early hours of the next morning, Valles-Dominguez ran

up to a man, I.A., as he was getting into his car in a parking lot

near B.A.’s apartment. Valles-Dominguez pointed a gun at him and

demanded to be driven somewhere. I.A. refused. Valles-Dominguez

then shot into the driver’s side window, hitting the seat next to I.A.,

and got in the back seat of the car. I.A. got out and ran off. Valles-

Dominguez drove away in the car.

¶7 The next day, Valles-Dominguez contacted B.A. and asked her

to meet him at a location across town. When she arrived, he asked

her to buy him a new cell phone and a change of clothes, which she

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did at a nearby Walmart. I.A.’s car was later recovered near the

location where Valles-Dominguez and B.A. had met up.

¶8 Investigators eventually found Valles-Dominguez hiding in a

house in Brighton. He was arrested at the house following a seven-

hour standoff. A dismantled gun was recovered from under the

floorboards in the attic of the house.

¶9 Valles-Dominguez was charged with, and ultimately convicted

of, multiple offenses.

¶ 10 After merging some of the offenses, the trial court entered

judgment on two counts each of attempted first degree murder and

first degree assault (as to Corporal Farmer and Officer Snook); one

count each of aggravated robbery (as to I.A.) and prohibited use of a

weapon; and multiple crime of violence sentence enhancers.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 11 Valles-Dominguez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the attempted murder and aggravated robbery

convictions. We reject both challenges.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

de novo, determining whether the evidence presented was sufficient

4
in both quantity and quality to support the defendant’s conviction.

McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63.

¶ 13 In doing so, we assess whether the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a reasonable

conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 17. However, we may not

“serve as a thirteenth juror and consider whether [we] might have

reached a different conclusion than the jury.” People v. Harrison,

2020 CO 57, ¶ 33. Thus, we will disturb the verdict only if, despite

drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the prosecution, the

record is unsubstantial and insufficient to support a guilty verdict

beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10;

Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Colo. 2010).

B. Attempted Murder

¶ 14 As to the attempted murder charges, Valles-Dominguez

asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he was the person

who shot at the two officers. We disagree.1

1 Although it appears that Valles-Dominguez challenges only the

attempted murder conviction concerning Officer Snook, and not the
conviction concerning Corporal Farmer, the same evidence supports
both convictions. Accordingly, we address them both here.

5
¶ 15 The People presented ample evidence at trial pointing to

Valles-Dominguez as the shooter.

¶ 16 First, B.A. testified that Valles-Dominguez said things to her

after the shooting that came close to confessions, such as that “he

didn’t mean to,” and “[h]e was just trying to get away.” She further

testified that on the night in question, she was with Valles-

Dominguez at a laundromat and a 7-Eleven and then on a street

near her apartment building, where he shot a gun out of her car

window. She also testified that police officers stopped her and

Valles-Dominguez as they were walking back to her apartment

building, Valles-Dominguez ran off toward the building, the officers

ran after him, and she heard gunfire after they went inside.

Surveillance video from the laundromat and the 7-Eleven, as well as

shell casings found in the area where B.A. said Valles-Dominguez

shot outside the car, corroborated B.A.’s description of the events of

that night. The video also showed B.A. and Valles-Dominguez in

the gold Impala that officers were looking for in connection with the

initial shooting and that they later found B.A. and Valles-

Dominguez walking away from outside the apartment building.

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¶ 17 Also, although by the time of trial Officer Snook couldn’t

identify Valles-Dominguez or remember having identified him as the

shooter, another witness testified that shortly after the shooting,

Officer Snook identified Valles-Dominguez in a photo array. And

Corporal Farmer testified that he was shown a screen shot from the

7-Eleven surveillance video and identified the man in it as the

person who had shot at him. He also identified Valles-Dominguez

at trial as the shooter.

¶ 18 Additionally, ballistics evidence tied the bullets and shell

casings collected from the location of the shooting, as well as other

shell casings associated with the shooting outside of B.A.’s car, to

the gun police recovered from the house where Valles-Dominguez

was arrested. And Valles-Dominguez’s DNA was found on the gun.

¶ 19 Finally, there was evidence presented at trial that Valles-

Dominguez acted in ways indicating consciousness of guilt following

the shooting. B.A. testified that Valles-Dominguez asked her to get

him a new phone and a change of clothes, which was corroborated

by surveillance video showing her buying those things at Walmart.

Further, Valles-Dominguez engaged in a seven-hour standoff with

officers at the house in Brighton before surrendering.

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¶ 20 Valles-Dominguez contends that this evidence is insufficient,

identifying some weaknesses in the evidence. For instance, he

points out that Officer Snook wasn’t able to identify him at trial,

that Corporal Farmer was shown only a photo of him (not a full

array including other individuals) and admitted to not having gotten

a clear view of the shooter, and that DNA from three other persons

(two of whom were never identified) was also found on the gun.

¶ 21 But it was up to the jury to weigh these issues and determine

Valles-Dominguez’s guilt. See Harrison, ¶ 33. And even if we were

to disregard the evidence Valles-Dominguez takes issue with, there

was still ample evidence that he was the shooter. Giving the People

the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from

the evidence, the evidence supports a fair-minded jury’s finding that

Valles-Dominguez was the person who shot at the officers. See

Thomas, ¶ 10; Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291-92.

C. Aggravated Robbery

¶ 22 Similarly, as to the aggravated robbery charge, Valles-

Dominguez asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he was

the person who carjacked I.A. Again, we disagree.

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¶ 23 The People presented evidence that, although I.A. and Valles-

Dominguez didn’t know each other, Valles-Dominguez’s DNA was

found on the steering wheel of I.A.’s car. Additionally, I.A.’s car was

recovered near the location where Valles-Dominguez met with B.A.

the day after the carjacking. Further, a ballistics expert determined

that the bullet fired into the car came from the same gun that was

used in the earlier shooting and was recovered in the house where

Valles-Dominguez had been hiding. And I.A. identified Valles-

Dominguez as the carjacker from a photograph.

¶ 24 Valles-Dominguez again points to weaknesses in the evidence,

such as I.A.’s inability to identify Valles-Dominguez in a photo array

or in court, I.A.’s identification of him in only one of the two photos

of him shown by investigators, the possibility that his DNA in I.A.’s

car could have come from secondary transfer, and the absence of

any evidence of his fingerprints in I.A.’s car. But again, giving the

People the benefit of every reasonable inference, we conclude that

the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Valles-

Dominguez was the person who committed the carjacking. See

Thomas, ¶ 10; Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291-92.

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III. Restitution

¶ 25 Finally, Valles-Dominguez contends that the trial court erred

by imposing restitution after expiration of the ninety-one-day

deadline in section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023. We agree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 26 At Valles-Dominguez’s sentencing hearing on September 25,

2023, the prosecution made an initial request for about $2,000 in

restitution, payable to the Victim Compensation Fund in relation to

Corporal Farmer. The prosecution also requested forty-five days to

supplement its motion with additional amounts relating to Officer

Snook. Valles-Dominguez, in turn, asked for fourteen days after

the prosecution’s filing to lodge an objection to both the amount

initially requested and any additional amounts. The court agreed to

reserve ruling on the amount of restitution and entered a minute

order establishing the deadlines for the amended motion and any

objections to it.

¶ 27 The prosecution filed a timely amended motion requesting a

total of about $355,000 in restitution. That same day, the court

held a status conference at which the parties discussed scheduling

a restitution hearing. Aware of the ninety-one-day statutory

10
deadline for determining the final amount of restitution, which was

December 25, the court set the hearing for December 13. However,

for reasons unstated in the record, that hearing was vacated and

rescheduled outside the deadline. After the restitution hearing,

which was ultimately held on February 2, 2024, the court entered

an order awarding $349,998.68 in restitution. There was no

discussion at that hearing of the deadline for ordering restitution

having passed.

B. Waiver

¶ 28 As a preliminary matter, the People assert that Valles-

Dominguez waived this issue because he didn’t object to the

restitution hearing being set outside the statutory ninety-one-day

deadline.

¶ 29 We review de novo whether a claim is waived. Babcock v.

People, 2025 CO 26, ¶ 28. In doing so, we “indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver,” as we don’t presume

acquiescence in the loss of a defendant’s rights. People v. Garcia,

2024 CO 41M, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39).

¶ 30 Waiver of a statutory right, as is argued here, “must be

voluntary, but need not be knowing and intelligent.” People v.

11
Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 13 (quoting Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38,

¶ 16). Waiver may be explicit, such as “when a party expressly

abandons an existing right or privilege,” or implied, such as “when

a party engages in conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish a

right or privilege or acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette

v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28. Waiver extinguishes error and therefore

any appellate review. Rediger, ¶ 40.

¶ 31 Although it doesn’t appear that Valles-Dominguez objected to

the restitution hearing being held after the ninety-one-day deadline,

his failure to object, standing alone, doesn’t constitute waiver. See

Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 21 (“the mere failure to raise an

issue” isn’t sufficient to establish an unequivocal act indicative of

waiver or a clear manifestation of an intent to relinquish a claim,

both of which are necessary to establish waiver). And there is no

indication in the record that Valles-Dominguez consented to —

much less requested — a hearing date beyond the ninety-one day

deadline. Cf. Babcock, ¶ 30 (the defendant waived his right to have

the court determine the amount of restitution within ninety-one

days where he requested a hearing date that fell after expiration of

the deadline); Roberson, ¶ 17 (the defendant waived her right to

12
have the court determine the amount of restitution within ninety-

one days where she didn’t object to the trial court’s suggestion to

hold a hearing after expiration of the deadline and then requested

four additional continuances of that hearing).

¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that while Valles-Dominguez’s

actions equate to forfeiture, they don’t amount to waiver. See

Rediger, ¶¶ 39-40 (distinguishing the two doctrines).

¶ 33 While waiver extinguishes error, and thus appellate review,

forfeiture does not. Id. at ¶ 40. And while we ordinarily review

forfeited claims for plain error, claims that could be brought as

illegal manner claims under Crim. P. 35(a) don’t need to be

preserved and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.

Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, ¶ 13. A claim that the defendant

was ordered to pay restitution in violation of the deadlines and

procedures set forth in section 18-1.3-603 may be raised under

Rule 35(a). See People v. Tennyson, 2023 COA 2, ¶ 33, aff’d, 2025

CO 31. Thus, despite the lack of preservation, we review this issue

de novo. See People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 24; People v. Martinez

Rubier, 2024 COA 67, ¶¶ 23, 25.

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C. Timeliness of the Restitution Order

¶ 34 At the time of Valles-Dominguez’s sentencing, section 18-1.3-

603(1)(b) required that when a trial court ordered restitution at

sentencing but left the amount open, the court had to resolve the

amount within ninety-one days, absent an extension of that

deadline for good cause. A trial court “lack[s] authority” to order

restitution when it neither determines the restitution amount

within ninety-one days nor expressly finds good cause to extend the

deadline before the deadline has expired. Weeks, ¶¶ 5, 45.

¶ 35 The trial court here did not determine the restitution amount

within the ninety-one-day deadline, and there is no indication in

the record that the court found good cause to extend the deadline.

Therefore, the court lacked authority to order restitution.

¶ 36 While Valles-Dominguez asks us to vacate the restitution order

based on the violation of the statutory deadline, the People dispute

whether vacatur is the proper remedy. But in a recent opinion, our

supreme court reaffirmed that the appropriate remedy for entry of

an untimely restitution order is to vacate the order. See Snow v.

People, 2025 CO 32, ¶¶ 4, 30-40; accord Weeks, ¶ 47.

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¶ 37 Accordingly, we vacate the restitution order and remand the

case to the trial court to amend the mittimus to reflect that no

restitution is owed.

IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed, the restitution order is vacated, and

the case is remanded for amendment of the mittimus to reflect that

no restitution is owed.

JUDGE WELLING concurs.

JUDGE SULLIVAN concurs in part and dissents in part.

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JUDGE SULLIVAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 39 I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned decision that

sufficient evidence supported Valles-Dominguez’s convictions for

attempted murder and aggravated robbery. As a result, I agree that

the convictions should be affirmed. I part ways, however, from the

majority’s conclusion that Valles-Dominguez didn’t waive his

argument based on the statutory deadline for imposing restitution.

In my view, the majority’s waiver analysis (1) doesn’t align with the

record or the supreme court’s precedent and (2) will incentivize

gamesmanship in restitution proceedings. I therefore respectfully

dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s

restitution order.

¶ 40 First, the majority rejects the People’s argument that Valles-

Dominguez waived the ninety-one-day deadline in section 18-1.3-

603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023.2 But in my view, that conclusion doesn’t

line up with either the record or the supreme court’s recent

2 In 2025, the General Assembly amended the deadline to sixty-

three days following the later of (1) the prosecution’s presentation of
restitution information or (2) the order of conviction. Ch. 307, sec.
1, § 18-1.3-603(1)(b), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606. Like the
majority, I cite to the 2023 version of section 18-1.3-603 that was in
effect at the time the trial court ordered restitution.

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decisions on waiver. At the November status conference to set the

restitution hearing, defense counsel said she “defer[red] to the

[p]rosecution” and to “when the other parties are available” because

she anticipated waiving Valles-Dominguez’s appearance. The

prosecutor then raised the ninety-one-day deadline; said it expired

on December 25, 2023; and twice requested the court set the

restitution hearing “within that time period . . . to make sure the

[c]ourt is preserving” its ability to order restitution. Although the

court initially set the restitution hearing within the statutory period,

it later postponed the hearing for unexplained reasons to February

2, 2024, a date beyond the ninety-one-day deadline.

¶ 41 Despite being made aware of the ninety-one-day deadline at

the status conference, defense counsel never filed an objection to

the court postponing the restitution hearing beyond the deadline.

Nor did the defense attorney who represented Valles-Dominguez at

the restitution hearing — the same attorney who was present at the

status conference and heard the prosecutor repeatedly mention the

ninety-one-day deadline — verbally object at the February hearing

to the court imposing restitution beyond the deadline. See Finney

17
v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16 (“Counsel may waive a defendant’s

statutory rights.”).

¶ 42 Our supreme court has recently made clear that a defendant

impliedly waives their objection, and thus extinguishes appellate

review, when they are fully aware of an alleged error but decline to

request corrective action. See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 30,

34. In Forgette, the prosecutor alerted the court and defense

counsel that one of the jurors appeared to be asleep. Id. at ¶ 25.

Although defense counsel suggested that the trial court try to

“rouse” the juror, which the court attempted, defense counsel

sought no further relief from the court. Id. at ¶ 26. Because

defense counsel was “fully aware” of the sleeping juror but didn’t

object or ask the court to take further corrective action, the

supreme court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to

object on appeal. Id. at ¶ 34.

¶ 43 Thus, under Forgette, a defendant’s inaction, when coupled

with their full awareness of a potential error, amounts to an implied

waiver of the error. Accord Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48,

¶¶ 10-16 (concluding defendant waived his right to argue that he

18
was denied a public trial when defense counsel was aware of the

courtroom closure but failed to object).

¶ 44 Admittedly, some tension exists between Forgette and the

earlier supreme court cases cited by the majority that say a

defendant’s failure to raise an issue, without more, isn’t enough to

constitute a waiver. See Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 21; People

v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 42, 46. But those cases are

distinguishable. Unlike Forgette, the supreme court perceived no

evidence that the defendants in those cases were fully aware of the

unobjected-to errors. See Phillips, ¶ 26; Rediger, ¶ 43.

¶ 45 Given these recent developments in the supreme court’s case

law, whether a defendant is fully aware of the unobjected-to error

becomes critical to the waiver analysis. This begs the question:

How does an appellate court suss out whether the defendant was

fully aware of the error or whether they simply overlooked it

through mere inadvertence? The supreme court has recently

provided guidance on that question, too.

¶ 46 In People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 4, the trial court at

sentencing ordered the defendant to pay restitution but reserved

the amount. In doing so, the trial court mentioned section 18-1.3-

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603(1)(b)’s ninety-one-day deadline. Id. The trial court later

proposed a restitution hearing date that fell outside the ninety-one-

day window, which date defense counsel accepted. Id. at ¶ 1. On

appeal, the supreme court held that the defendant had waived her

objection to the timeliness of the court’s restitution order. Id. at

¶ 17. Applying Forgette, the supreme court explained that the

defendant’s failure to object to the court’s proposed hearing date,

“when it fell outside of the ninety-one-day deadline and when the

statutory deadline had been expressly mentioned at the sentencing

hearing, constituted a voluntary waiver of a statutory right.”3 Id.

(emphasis added).

¶ 47 Accordingly, based on Roberson and Forgette, a defendant is

deemed fully aware of — and impliedly waives their right to object to

any noncompliance with — the statutory deadline for imposing

restitution when their defense counsel is informed at sentencing of

3 The majority points out that the defendant in Roberson did more

than merely accept the court’s proposed restitution hearing date;
she also requested four continuances of the hearing after the
ninety-one-day deadline had already passed. People v. Roberson,
2025 CO 30, ¶ 16. But again, Forgette makes clear that such
affirmative acts aren’t essential to show an implied waiver; defense
counsel’s inaction when they are fully aware of the error is enough.
See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶¶ 26, 34.

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the deadline but nonetheless accepts a restitution hearing date

beyond the deadline. Cf. People v. Franco, 74 P.3d 357, 359 (Colo.

App. 2002) (“[A] defendant cannot stand mute and allow a trial

schedule to be adopted without registering his complaint that such

schedule violates his speedy trial rights.” (citation omitted)).

Because those are the exact facts of this case, I would hold that

Valles-Dominguez impliedly waived his right to object to the

timeliness of the trial court’s restitution order.

¶ 48 Second, I worry that the version of the waiver rule applied by

the majority will encourage sandbagging and gamesmanship. As

the majority notes, a trial court’s error in entering an untimely

restitution order requires that we automatically vacate the order,

even when the defendant failed to object below to the delay. See

Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32, ¶¶ 4, 30-40. Unlike most unpreserved

errors, no plain error analysis applies.

¶ 49 Given this strict rule, I have difficulty imagining a scenario in

which a defendant will ever object to the trial court scheduling a

restitution hearing beyond section 18-1.3-603(1)(b)’s deadline.

They will instead await the outcome of the (untimely) restitution

hearing and, if adverse, seek automatic vacatur on appeal. In my

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view, a defendant who chooses to refrain from objecting to an

untimely restitution hearing, despite being fully aware of the

applicable deadline, shouldn’t receive such a windfall. See, e.g.,

Stackhouse, ¶ 16 (“Allowing a defense attorney who stands silent

during a known [courtroom] closure to then seek invalidation of an

adverse verdict on that basis would encourage gamesmanship”); cf.

Phillips, ¶ 29 (finding no waiver, in part, because “no real danger of

sandbagging” exists when the defendant must show plain error

through a sufficiently developed factual record).

¶ 50 For these reasons, although I agree with the majority that

Valles-Dominguez’s convictions should be affirmed, I respectfully

dissent from its decision to vacate the trial court’s restitution order.

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