Marriage of Melendez

24CA1571 Marriage of Melendez 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1571
Elbert County District Court No. 24DR21
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Enid Jannette Melendez,

Appellant,

and

Omar Munoz,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Enid Jannette Melendez, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 Enid Jannette Melendez (wife) appeals the district court’s

judgment dissolving her marriage with Omar Munoz (husband). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In early 2024, wife filed a motion for a civil protection order

against husband. The court entered a temporary protection order

and set a hearing to determine whether it should be made

permanent. Then, in a separate case, wife filed a petition to

dissolve the four-year marriage between her and husband. The

court consolidated the dissolution case and the protection order

case, and it continued the temporary protection order.

¶3 In late 2024, the court held a final hearing to dissolve the

marriage and determine the permanent protection order. Wife

didn’t appear at the hearing. After hearing testimony from

husband, the court dissolved the marriage and entered permanent

orders. In doing so, the court adopted husband’s trial management

certificate as its permanent orders, which allocated to each party

approximately $30,000 of marital equity, and it ordered husband to

pay wife maintenance. The court dismissed the protection order.

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II. Discussion

¶4 Wife contends that the district court’s permanent orders

should be reversed on numerous grounds. We address and reject

her arguments as best we understand them.

A. Preliminary Matters

¶5 Wife represents herself on appeal, and we, therefore, liberally

construe the arguments she raises. See Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA

133, ¶ 10. Nonetheless, “pro se parties must comply with

procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by

attorneys.” Id. Under C.A.R. 28, an appellant’s opening brief must

include, among other things, a statement on “the applicable

standard of review with citation to authority”; a statement on

“whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise

location in the record where the issue was raised and where the

court ruled”; and “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds

upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal . . ., with citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)-(B).

¶6 Wife’s opening brief doesn’t comply with C.A.R. 28. These

requirements are necessary to facilitate our appellate review, and

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wife’s arguments are difficult to discern. See Cikraji v. Snowberger,

2015 COA 66, ¶ 10. We exercise our discretion to review wife’s

contentions, but we are limited by the information wife provided in

her brief. See id. We therefore won’t develop her arguments or

search the record for the relevant facts that may support her

claims. See id.; see also Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289,

291 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that it’s not the appellate court’s task

to locate and synthesize the relevant facts, arguments, and legal

authority). Nor will we consider any material that wife referenced or

relied on that was not included in the appellate record. See In re

Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Only

facts appearing in the record can be reviewed . . . .”); McCall v.

Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[W]e are bound by

the record presented and may consider only arguments and

assertions supported by the evidence in the record.”).

¶7 Wife also didn’t provide transcripts of the district court

hearings. See C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (It is the appellant’s responsibility to

“include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for

considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”). In the absence of

the transcripts, we must presume that the missing portions of the

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record support the court’s findings and conclusions. See In re

Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15; McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1223.

B. Due Process

¶8 Wife contends that the district court violated her due process

rights by (1) denying her accommodations under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, during

the proceedings; and (2) striking “properly submitted exhibits.” We

disagree.

¶9 The essence of due process is fundamental fairness. A.M. v.

A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28. It requires that a party be provided with

notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Am. Heritage

Rys., Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2025 CO 27, ¶ 48. But “due

process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972); accord A.M., ¶ 28.

¶ 10 We review de novo whether a party was accorded sufficient

procedural due process. See People in Interest of C.J., 2017 COA

157, ¶ 25.

¶ 11 First, wife argues that the court’s refusal to grant her requests

for ADA accommodations, “including bilingual access, remote

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filings, assistive technology, and access to transcripts,” violated

federal law and denied her due process rights. Wife doesn’t direct

us to the location in the record where she made any specific

requests for an ADA accommodation or where the court denied her

an accommodation that she had requested. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A);

Castillo, 148 P.3d at 291; see also O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629,

631 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting that we are “under no obligation” to

scour the record to determine whether, and if so how, an issue was

raised and resolved by the district court).

¶ 12 Nonetheless, on our review of the record, it appears that, early

in the dissolution case, wife informed the court that she

experienced “language barriers to effective communication” and was

“identified as LEP (Limited English Proficiency) and ESL (English as

a Second Language).” She also told the court that she needed a

Spanish interpreter. In line with her disclosure, the court provided

wife with an interpreter during the court hearings. Additionally,

wife noted her language barrier when she asked the court for an

award of prospective attorney fees so that she could hire an

attorney. The court granted her request and directed husband to

pay $5,000 to the attorney of wife’s choosing. (However, an

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attorney never entered an appearance for wife in the dissolution

case.) The record, therefore, reveals that the court provided wife

with resources that allowed her to participate in the proceedings in

accordance with her due process rights.

¶ 13 Wife asserts that federal law entitled her to more, but she

doesn’t explain why the provisions on which she relies required the

court to provide her with any of the resources or accommodations

she mentions that went beyond those discussed above. See 42

U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2025); Exec. Order 13,166, 65

Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000), revoked by, Exec. Order 14,224,

90 Fed. Reg. 11363 (Mar. 1, 2025). And wife doesn’t direct us to

any other legal authority to establish that the court violated federal

law. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting the

appellant’s burden to provide legal authority to support a

contention of error).

¶ 14 Second, wife argues that the court “struck 180 pages of

properly submitted exhibits” that “included critical evidence related

to ADA violations, financial abuse, guardianship rights, and

domestic violence” “without notice, hearing, . . . justification,” “or

any articulated legal basis” in violation of her due process rights.

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However, wife doesn’t identify when she submitted the purported

exhibits to the court or when the court purportedly struck them

from the record. Nor does she direct us to anything in the record

demonstrating that the court engaged in improper conduct

concerning the purported exhibits. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); O’Quinn,

250 P.3d at 631; Castillo, 148 P.3d at 291. Our review is limited to

the appellate record, and the record doesn’t reveal any ruling by the

court striking 180 pages of exhibits. See McSoud, 131 P.3d at

1223; McCall, 94 P.3d at 1272. We therefore reject wife’s claim of a

due process violation on this basis.

¶ 15 Moreover, to the extent wife intended to present these exhibits

at the permanent orders hearing, the record reveals that she

uploaded forty-nine pages of exhibits for the hearing. Wife failed to

appear at the hearing to admit those exhibits, and it’s unclear

whether any of these exhibits were part of the 180 pages

purportedly stricken by the court. A party who chooses not to

appear at a hearing despite advance notice isn’t deprived of due

process. In re Petition of Taylor, 134 P.3d 579, 584 (Colo. App.

2006).

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¶ 16 In sum, we conclude that based on the record before us, wife

was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and we

therefore aren’t persuaded that the court violated her due process

rights. See, e.g., Ortega v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 207 P.3d 895,

899 (Colo. App. 2009) (“Due process . . . calls for no specific

procedure as long as the basic opportunity for a hearing and

judicial review is present.”).

C. Attorney Withdrawal

¶ 17 Wife next contends that her “retained attorney withdrew

without motion, consent, or substitution,” and that the attorney

“met with opposing parties without [her] authorization, gave

harmful legal advice, and knowingly placed [wife] in financial and

procedural jeopardy.” We discern no reversible error.

¶ 18 As best we can understand, wife refers to the attorney who

represented her in the earlier county court case concerning her

motion for a protection order against husband. See Harriman v.

Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (acknowledging that an appellate

court may take judicial notice of the court file and a court file in a

related proceeding). Wife’s former attorney indicated that her

representation was limited to that county court case. After wife

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filed her pro se petition to dissolve the marriage, her former

attorney filed a motion to withdraw in the county court case. Wife

didn’t oppose the attorney’s motion. The temporary protection

order from the county court case was then consolidated into the

dissolution of marriage case. And wife litigated the dissolution of

marriage case without an attorney.

¶ 19 Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that wife’s former

attorney improperly withdrew her representation, a litigant in a

dissolution of marriage case has no constitutional right to be

represented by an attorney. See People v. Cobb, 944 P.2d 574, 576-

77 (Colo. App. 1996). And wife develops no argument to explain

how the withdrawal of her former attorney impacted the dissolution

of marriage proceedings or warrants reversal of the court’s

judgment. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining to address a legally and factually

undeveloped argument); People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844,

845 (Colo. App. 2007) (an alleged error, without a valid allegation of

prejudice, is not grounds for reversal). We therefore won’t disturb

the court’s judgment based on wife’s allegations concerning her

former attorney.

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D. Wife’s Adult Son

¶ 20 Wife contends that the “court failed to include” her adult son

in its “decisions involving the marital estate,” arguing that the

court’s exclusion of her son violated section “14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI),

[C.R.S. 2025,] the ADA, and federal guardianship protections under

the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.”

Section 14-10-124 concerns the allocation of parental

responsibilities for “the minor children of the marriage.” § 14-10-

124(1); see § 14-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025; see also In re Marriage of

Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 21 (concluding that “the parties’

eighteen-year-old child is no longer subject to the dissolution

court’s jurisdiction”). Wife’s adult son isn’t a minor, and the record

doesn’t show that he is a child of the marriage. Wife also fails to

legally and factually develop her suggestion that the court violated

federal law. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Wife therefore hasn’t established that

the court erred by not including her adult son in the dissolution

proceedings.

¶ 21 Wife also contends that the court erred by excluding her adult

son from the “protective orders.” She develops no argument in

support of this assertion. See id. Moreover, in a separately filed

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county court case, wife’s son filed his own motion for a protection

order against husband. See Harriman, ¶ 64. That court considered

and denied his motion in early 2024. Wife can’t now challenge that

decision in this appeal of the district court’s judgment. See, e.g.,

C.R.C.P. 411.

E. Alleged Discrimination and Bias

¶ 22 Wife contends that she was “subjected to threats,

discrimination, and obstruction by Colorado public officials, court

staff, and law enforcement based on her Puerto Rican origin,

[limited English proficiency] status, and disability.” Wife directs us

to nothing in the record supporting that claim. See McSoud, 131

P.3d at 1223; McCall, 94 P.3d at 1272. She fails to describe what

specific “threats, discrimination, and obstruction” she experienced

or when such purported conduct occurred. She also gives us no

explanation for how the alleged misconduct related to the

dissolution of marriage proceedings or why it warrants reversal of

the court’s judgment. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29; A.C., 170 P.3d at 845.

¶ 23 To the extent wife suggests that the district court exhibited

bias against her, for such a claim to succeed the record must

clearly demonstrate that “the judge’s conduct departed from the

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required impartiality to such an extent as to deny [wife] a fair trial.”

People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391 (Colo. 1997). Her bare

assertions and speculative statements of bias, unsupported by the

record, are insufficient. See id.

F. Remaining Contentions

¶ 24 Wife generally asserts that the court disregarded evidence of

domestic violence, dismissed her financial and legal contributions,

and forced the parties to mediate, and she claims that

“[d]ocuments” were manipulated, improperly accessed, and ignored.

Because wife failed to develop any argument in support of these

assertions, we won’t further address them. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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