Peo v. Davidson

24CA0593 Peo v Davidson 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0593
El Paso County District Court Nos. 22CR658 & 23CR1451
Honorable Diana K. May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Edward Lewis Davidson, Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Suzan Trinh Almony, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Edward Lewis Davidson, Jr., of

several counts of second degree burglary, criminal mischief, and

theft. He appeals his convictions, contending that the trial court

erred (1) by permitting three detectives to testify that they had

identified him as a suspect in their investigation and (2) by joining

two of his cases. We disagree with these contentions and therefore

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After a lengthy investigation, police identified Davidson as a

suspect in a string of burglaries occurring between late 2021 and

early 2022.1 During these burglaries, two or three people stole large

quantities of cigarettes and vaping products from convenience

stores. Police identified Philip Owens, who was Davidson’s

roommate, and Derek Jones as the other two suspects.

¶3 Cameras in the stores captured video footage of the 2022

burglaries. At least two men were visible in all the videos and a

third was present in two of the videos. Police first identified Owens

because the suspects used a truck registered to him during at least

1 El Paso County Case No. 22CR658 (2022 burglaries).

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one of the burglaries. In the truck, police found several objects and

clothing items that appeared similar to those in the surveillance

videos. Owens also had a distinctive neck tattoo that was visible in

at least one video. Police identified Jones because he did not cover

his face during one of the burglaries.

¶4 After he was arrested, Jones called Davidson from jail,

prompting police to investigate Davidson’s participation in the

burglaries. They learned that Davidson and Owens lived together in

Davidson’s house. Detectives later obtained a warrant directed to

Davidson’s cell phone service provider, which produced texts

referencing “selling smokes” and “cartons for sale,” and stating, “I

was in the middle of a lick when you called,” which a detective

testified was slang for a theft or burglary.

¶5 The People eventually charged Davidson with second degree

burglary, criminal mischief, theft, possession of burglary tools, and

attempted second degree burglary (twelve counts total) for these

crimes.

¶6 In early 2023, the police investigated another string of

burglaries that were similar to the 2022 burglaries. Again, the

perpetrators stole large quantities of cigarettes and vaping

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products. Police identified Davidson in the video surveillance from

the stores based on common clothing — including a plaid jacket —

as well as “physical characteristics and movements” and his “height

and weight.” Police also determined that the same laundry bag

used in the 2022 burglaries — a black bag with white cursive

writing on it — was used in the 2023 burglaries.

¶7 After reviewing still photos obtained from the video of a body-

worn camera during a traffic stop of Davidson, detectives identified

Davidson as the third suspect. At the time of the traffic stop,

Davidson was driving a vehicle that was recorded on surveillance

video leaving the scene of one of the burglaries. Police found in the

vehicle items of clothing and a black laundry bag that appeared

similar to those seen in the 2023 surveillance videos. The

prosecution eventually filed a second case charging Davidson with

twelve counts total of second degree burglary, criminal mischief,

and theft for the 2023 burglaries.2

¶8 Prior to trial, despite Davidson’s objection, the court

consolidated the 2022 and 2023 cases but declined to consolidate a

2 El Paso County Case No. 23CR1451.

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separate case involving a burglary charge from 2021. At the

consolidated trial, three detectives testified how and why their

investigations led them to identify Davidson as a primary suspect in

both the 2022 and 2023 burglaries. The jury convicted Davidson

on five counts of second degree burglary, four counts of criminal

mischief, and six counts of theft.

II. Analysis

A. Detective Identifications

¶9 Davidson contends that the trial court erred by permitting the

three detectives to testify about their identification of Davidson as a

suspect in both strings of burglaries. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 10 “[A] witness cannot testify that he believes that the defendant

committed the crime at issue.” People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31.

However, “[a] lay witness may testify about the identity of a person

depicted in a surveillance video ‘if there is some basis for

concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the

defendant from the [video] than is the jury.” People v. Grant, 2021

COA 53, ¶ 64 (quoting Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 384 (Colo.

1996)).

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¶ 11 “We review evidentiary rulings, including those concerning the

admission of lay witness testimony, for an abuse of discretion.”

People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26, ¶ 28. “A trial court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 12 The parties agree that this issue was not raised in the trial

court and therefore is unpreserved. See People v. Ujaama, 2012

COA 36, ¶ 37. So we review for plain error. Id. at ¶ 40. “Plain

error assumes that the [trial] court should have intervened sua

sponte because the error was so obvious” that no objection was

required to bring it to the court’s attention. Id. at ¶ 42 (citation

omitted). To warrant reversal, plain error must not only be obvious,

but also so prejudicial that it “undermine[s] the fundamental

fairness of the trial.” Id. at ¶ 43 (citation omitted).

¶ 13 Additional Facts

¶ 14 During trial, three detectives testified. Detective Rebecca

Rannow was the first. She testified about her extensive

investigation of the 2022 burglaries and a warrant she obtained

relating to Davidson’s phone. On redirect, the prosecutor asked

her, “Was there any one single factor that you based your

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conclusion on that this was Mr. Davidson committing these

burglaries?” Detective Rannow stated, “There was a mountain of

different pieces of evidence that linked back to Mr. Davidson . . .

being suspect number one in these cases.”

¶ 15 Detective Monique Garcia testified that she was present during

an interview of Davidson; she also recounted her extensive review of

the burglary videos. During her direct testimony, the following

exchange occurred with the prosecutor:

Q: And through the course of your combined
investigation, did you develop a common
suspect or suspects?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who were those individuals?

A: It was Edward Davidson and Philip Owens.

¶ 16 Lastly, Detective Steven Collins testified that he primarily

investigated the 2023 burglaries. He stated that he initially did not

have any suspects for the 2023 burglaries until he shared the

surveillance footage with Garcia, who thought that one of the men

in the videos looked like Davidson. Collins testified about how

police attempted to identify the individuals in the videos based on

their distinguishing characteristics, including clothing, shoes,

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movement, height, and shape. He also identified several objects in

the surveillance videos that appeared similar to items subsequently

found in Davidson’s possession, such as the black laundry bag with

white writing, a plaid jacket, and a pair of gloves that appeared in

one or more of the videos. Detective Collins also testified that he

obtained and reviewed photos of Davidson taken during the traffic

stop.

2. Analysis

¶ 17 Davidson argues that the three detectives “usurped the jury’s

role” by identifying him as a primary suspect in both strings of

burglaries. More specifically, in his opening brief he repeatedly

asserts that the detectives “opined that Davidson was guilty,” and

because identification was the central issue in the case, the

detectives’ testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the

trial and therefore warrants reversal under the plain error standard.

¶ 18 As a threshold matter, we find no record support for

Davidson’s assertion in his opening brief that the detectives “all

opined that . . . Davidson committed the crimes, and that the

detectives know this simply because they know.” Davidson did not

cite any portion of the record to support this claim or similar

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assertions that appear throughout the opening brief. Moreover, our

review of the record reveals no testimony from any detective in

which they opined that Davidson was guilty of any of the asserted

crimes.

¶ 19 In his reply brief, Davidson implicitly concedes that the

detectives did not offer such opinions of guilt: “Even if the detectives

did not use the term ‘guilty,’ the testimony was unequivocal that

Davidson was one of the men in the videos committing the crimes.”

But there is a wide gulf between identifying a person in a video and

opining that the person is guilty of the charged crime. See Gallegos

v. People, 403 P.2d 864, 873 (Colo. 1965) (“[T]o say [the witness]

identified the defendants does not give rise to the conclusion that

they were, therefore, guilty of the crime charged.”); Robinson, 927

P.2d at 384. The first is permitted in appropriate circumstances;

the second is improper. So we now turn to the properly framed

issue: whether the trial court erred by admitting the detectives’ lay

testimony identifying Davidson as one of the suspects in the videos.

¶ 20 In evaluating the propriety of lay witness testimony, we first

look to CRE 701, which authorizes a lay witness to provide

“opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the

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perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the

witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of Rule 702.” As previously noted, a court may

admit a lay opinion identifying a suspect in a video if there is some

basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly

identify the suspect than the jury. Id.

¶ 21 Here, the detectives reviewed surveillance videos in which the

perpetrators’ facial features were either obstructed or not captured.

They testified that Davidson was a primary suspect and described

their investigative and identification processes. In doing so, the

detectives explained their perceptions of the perpetrators’

movements, builds, heights, and clothing, as well as the tools they

used.

¶ 22 The detectives also testified that they identified Davidson as a

primary suspect based on the videos and then verified that

suspicion through other means:

• They reviewed still shots taken by a body-worn camera

during Davidson’s traffic stop.

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• They determined the ownership of Owens’s truck that

was used in one of the burglaries.

• They learned that Davidson and Owens lived together

and that Jones called Davidson from jail.

• They found that another car used to flee one of the

burglaries was the car Davidson was driving at the time

of a subsequent traffic stop.

• They found in that car several items of clothing and

accessories that were similar to those appearing in the

videos.

Detectives Rannow and Collins also testified to interviewing

Davidson face-to-face.3

¶ 23 Rannow’s testimony also discussed her investigation into the

2022 burglaries and that there were several pieces of evidence

linking Davidson to the burglaries, not just her perception of the

men in the videos. Collins likewise discussed his investigation into

the 2023 burglaries and finding several clothing items and tools in

Davidson’s possession that also resembled those in the videos.

3 Detective Garcia was also present during that interview.

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¶ 24 Davidson primarily takes issue with Garcia’s testimony. He

argues that Collins and Rannow both stated that Davidson was a

suspect only because Garcia told them so. But even if Garcia first

identified Davidson as a potential suspect in both strings of

burglaries, both Rannow and Collins testified about the many other

pieces of evidence that tied Davidson to these crimes. Therefore,

their identification of Davidson as one of the suspects was not

based solely on Garcia’s identification.

¶ 25 The detectives’ lay opinions were helpful to the jury. See

Robinson, 927 P.2d at 384. The identifications were grounded in

their intense study of the videos along with other evidence they

collected across the multiple burglaries. Thus, we perceive no

abuse of discretion — much less plain error — in the admission of

their testimony explaining why Davidson was a primary suspect in

these burglaries. See id.; Gallegos, 403 P.2d at 873.

B. Joinder of Cases

¶ 26 Davidson next contends that the trial court erred by joining

the two cases. Specifically, he reasons that the relevance of the two

sets of burglaries to each other was minimal because they were

separated by fifteen months and there were several aspects of the

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2022 burglaries that were not present in the 2023 burglaries.

Davidson argues that the perceived marginal relevance was

substantially outweighed by the prejudice associated with joining

the multiple offenses for a single trial, and therefore reversal is

warranted. We are not persuaded.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 “The decision to consolidate cases is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983, 985

(Colo. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the joinder

causes “actual prejudice as a result of the jury’s inability to

separate the facts and legal theories applicable to each offense.

There is no prejudice where evidence of each [offense] would be

admissible in separate trials.” Id. at 985-86 (citation omitted).

¶ 28 Under Crim. P. 8(a)(2),

Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or information in a separate
count for each offense if the offenses charged
. . . are of the same or similar character or are
based on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan.

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Crim. P. 13 allows the court to join cases, subject to the provisions

of Crim. P. 14. And Rule 14 provides that a defendant is entitled to

a separate trial if the court determines that a joint trial would result

in the prosecution presenting inadmissible, and prejudicial,

evidence.

¶ 29 CRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other acts is not

admissible if it is used to prove the character of a person and that

the person acted in conformity with that character on a particular

occasion. However, evidence of prior bad acts can be admitted

under CRE 404(b)(2) if the evidence is relevant to proving, among

other things, “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” When

determining the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s prior

crimes, wrongs, or acts under CRE 404(b), a court must apply the

factors listed in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 30 Spoto provides a four-part test for determining whether

evidence is admissible under CRE 404(b): (1) the evidence must

relate to a material fact; (2) the evidence must be logically relevant;

(3) the logical relevance must be “independent of the intermediate

inference . . . that the defendant has a bad character” and therefore

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is acting in conformity with that bad character; and (4) the

probative value of the evidence must not be substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Spoto, 795 P.2d at

1318.

¶ 31 With these standards in mind, we turn to the substance of the

court’s ruling to join the two cases.

2. Analysis

¶ 32 Several weeks before trial, the prosecution filed a motion to

join the 2022 and 2023 burglary cases with another burglary case

filed in 2022,4 and it provided notice of its intent to introduce

evidence of similar transactions. The court reviewed the motion

and joined the 2022 and 2023 burglary cases, leaving the other

2022 case (charging a burglary of a private residence) to stand

alone in a separate trial because the facts of that case were

significantly different from those of the others.5

4 El Paso County Case No. 22CR4289.
5 In addition to being a burglary of a house rather than a

convenience store, the trial court noted that the items taken in Case
No. 22CR4289 included medications and personal items, not
smoking- or vaping-related products.

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¶ 33 In its analysis, the court noted that although the 2022 and

2023 burglaries occurred over a year apart, they shared enough

common facts that they could be construed as part of a common

scheme. These commonalties included the time of day the

burglaries occurred; how the perpetrators got into the stores; the

type of goods stolen; the type of equipment used; and the masks,

clothing, and physical similarities of the suspects in each burglary.

Based on these similarities, the court determined that there was a

sufficient factual basis to establish a common scheme or plan,

which fulfilled the requirements of joinder under Crim. P. 8(a)(2).

See Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26, ¶¶ 41, 66 (joinder of charges

was proper because “the two cases shared common evidence, and

the investigations in the cases were intertwined”).

¶ 34 The trial court also found that evidence of the respective cases

would be cross-admissible in each case under CRE 404(b) and

Spoto if the cases were tried separately. This was so, the court

reasoned, because the evidence was relevant to material facts — the

common plan or scheme and the identity of Davidson as one of the

perpetrators — and that relevance was not substantially outweighed

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by any nonprobative prejudice associated with the evidence. See

CRE 403.

¶ 35 Davidson argues that the trial court erred by joining the cases

because the offenses were too attenuated in time to be considered

part of a common plan or scheme. We discern no error in the trial

court’s conclusion to the contrary.

¶ 36 Two or more criminal cases may be joined together if the

offense could have been joined in a single complaint, provided that

the joinder does not prejudice the defendant. See Crim. P. 13;

Crim. P. 14. Crim. P. 8(a)(2), in turn, allows two or more offenses to

be charged in a single complaint if the offenses are of the same or

similar character. Davidson argues that the offenses were not of

the same or similar character, pointing to the passage of more than

a year between the underlying crimes in the 2022 and 2023

burglaries. While we agree that the passage of time between the

two series of burglaries was a relevant consideration, we conclude

that the passage of fifteen months did not necessarily bar the

admission of related crimes under CRE 404(b). See Bondsteel, ¶ 40

(assaults separated by six months); see also People v. Janes, 942

P.2d 1331, 1336 (Colo. App. 1997) (concluding, in a sexual assault

16
case, that the seven-year time difference between the crimes

charged and the prior bad acts did not negate the relevance of

evidence showing a common method of operation); State v. Rutchik,

341 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Wis. 1984) (evidence of the defendant’s prior

burglary, committed several years before the current charge, was

relevant and admissible to show common scheme or plan).

¶ 37 Davidson is correct that these crime sprees were separated by

more than a year. There were also minor differences in the clothing

worn by the perpetrators in some of the videos. See People v. Rath,

44 P.3d 1033, 1042 (Colo. 2002) (noting that when other crime

evidence is offered solely to prove that the defendant committed the

charged offense, the distinctiveness and similarity of the crimes

must be greater than when the prior crime is offered to prove one of

the many other purposes set forth in CRE 404(b)). But given the

multiple similarities of the offenses, we conclude that the passage of

fifteen months did not preclude joinder.

¶ 38 We next turn to Davidson’s contention that the joinder was

impermissible because the evidence of each offense would not have

been admissible at separate trials. Initially, we note that “joinder

under Crim. P. 8(a)(2) does not always require the evidence of the

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respective incidents to be cross-admissible were there to be

separate trials.” Bondsteel, ¶ 44. Indeed, if the cases are of the

same or similar character, “joinder under Crim. P. 8(a)(2) is proper

regardless of whether the evidence would be cross-admissible in

separate trials.” Id. In view of our prior conclusion that the 2022

burglaries and 2023 burglaries were of the same or similar

character, the trial court’s CRE 404(b) analysis is arguably

irrelevant.

¶ 39 In any event, we discern no error in the trial court’s analysis

under CRE 404(b) and Spoto. The first three Spoto factors have to

do with the relevance of the evidence. Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318.

The evidence of other burglaries — with similar methods of entry,

times of day, tools used, and objects taken — is related because it

illustrates a common plan or scheme and points towards the

identity of Davidson as one of the burglars. The relevance of the

collective burglaries was independent of the potential inference that

Davidson simply had a bad character because the focus remained

on the facts demonstrating how the other crimes were committed

and by whom.

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¶ 40 Nor was the evidence unduly prejudicial. As the trial court

noted, the common features of, and the methods used by, the

burglars depicted in the videos far outweighed their dissimilarities.

Certainly, the differences were not so numerous or substantial that

their prejudicial impact substantially outweighed the probative

value of their commonalities. See CRE 403(b); Rath, 44 P.3d at

1043 (“Although there were obvious differences in the

circumstances surrounding each transaction admitted in this

prosecution, they shared a number of significant characteristics

that evidenced a pattern of behavior . . . .”). Thus, we conclude that

the noted differences went to the weight of the evidence, not its

admissibility.

¶ 41 Moreover, the consolidated cases were not disparate in terms

of the severity of the offenses committed. For example, this is not a

case in which a homicide charge was consolidated with an

unrelated burglary charge. The risk created by consolidating cases

involving such disparate charges is that the jurors’ passions may be

inflamed by the more severe crime and thereby blur their objectivity

in assessing the merits of the less severe unrelated charge. See

People v. Brown, 2014 COA 130M, ¶ 22 (noting that CRE 404(b)

19
evidence is “unduly prejudicial when it is more inflammatory,

sensational, or disturbing than the charged offense” (citing United

States v. Midyett, 603 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2009))). Here,

in contrast, the consolidated cases, and the charges therein, were

all burglaries. Thus, no risk of potential unfair prejudice was

created by the consolidation.

¶ 42 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining the two

cases.

III. Disposition

¶ 43 The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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