Peo v. Sharrett

23CA1372 Peo v Sharrett 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1372
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2693
Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jason Michael Sharrett,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 11, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

T. Marshal Seufert, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jason Michael Sharrett, appeals the district court’s

sentence imposed on the judgment of conviction entered on his

guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence (fourth or

subsequent offense) and one count of vehicular assault (reckless).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 During an afternoon rush hour, Jefferson County 911

dispatchers received multiple calls about a rollover traffic collision

on Colorado State Highway 470. Callers and victims reported that

someone was driving a silver GMC Yukon about eighty miles an

hour on the highway shoulder. They also told dispatchers that the

Yukon had rammed a vehicle four times at a stoplight, crashed into

several other vehicles, and ultimately rolled over. In total, the

Yukon hit eleven vehicles. Several victims in those vehicles

sustained injuries requiring medical treatment; one victim had a

nasal fracture requiring eighteen stitches.

¶3 Police identified Sharrett as the Yukon’s driver. Police also

discovered that he had five prior convictions for driving while ability

impaired (DWAI) or driving under the influence (DUI). Sharrett was

taken to the hospital, where medical personnel measured his blood

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alcohol content at 0.372. (The legal limit for DUI is 0.08.) He later

said that he had received a head injury the day before the incident,

had no memory of the day of the incident, and only remembered

waking up in the hospital days later.

¶4 The People charged Sharrett with twenty-two counts, including

DUI (fourth or subsequent offense), vehicular assault and vehicular

assault (reckless), assault in the third degree, reckless

endangerment, reckless driving, driving under restraint, failure to

report accident or return to the scene, and failure to possess

insurance while operating a vehicle.

¶5 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sharrett pleaded guilty to two of

the charges: DUI (fourth or subsequent offense) and vehicular

assault (reckless). In exchange, the People dismissed the other

charges. Sharrett signed a petition to plead guilty by admitting that

his actions met the elements of both counts to which he was

pleading guilty. He acknowledged that the district court had the

discretion to find extraordinary aggravating circumstances and

could sentence him to a term up to twice the longest sentence in

the presumptive range for each offense. He also acknowledged that

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the district court could require that he serve the sentences

consecutively to each other.

¶6 The district court accepted Sharrett’s guilty plea. On June 2,

2023, the court sentenced him to twelve years in prison for the DUI

conviction and to six years in prison for the vehicular assault

conviction, to be served consecutively.

II. Discussion

¶7 Sharrett contends that the district court erred by sentencing

him to consecutive sentences based on his guilty plea because the

two offenses were based on identical evidence. We disagree.

A. Timeliness of Appeal

¶8 Before we can address the merits, we must review the

timeliness of Sharrett’s appeal. If his appeal was untimely, we lack

jurisdiction to consider it. See People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896

(Colo. 2005) (citing Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Colo.

1988)). Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.

People v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119, ¶ 21.

¶9 Shortly after Sharrett began serving his prison sentence, he

sent a letter to his attorney asking counsel to appeal his sentence.

According to the Public Defender’s appellate division, his attorney

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immediately notified the appellate division of his request. But the

appellate division said that it didn’t receive that notification until

the filing deadline had passed.

¶ 10 Eventually, the appellate division filed a notice of appeal on

August 10, 2023, twenty days late.1 Along with the notice, the

appellate division filed a motion to accept the notice of appeal as

timely filed. The appellate division later withdrew due to a potential

conflict of interest as a result of the late filing.

¶ 11 A motions division of this court reviewed the motion, deferred

its resolution, and ordered the parties to address timeliness in their

merits briefs.

¶ 12 Sharrett contends that we have jurisdiction over his appeal

because, even if his notice was untimely, we may exercise our

discretion to extend his time to file based on good cause or other

1 Sharrett argues that the time for appealing didn’t begin to run

until July 18, 2023, at the earliest, when the court entered a
written order granting the prosecution’s motion to impose an
undetermined amount of restitution. But at sentencing, the court
ordered restitution while deferring determination of the amount.
Thus, the time for appealing began to run on the date of sentencing,
June 2, 2023. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 41.

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grounds. The People agree that we have the discretion to accept

Sharrett’s notice of appeal as timely.

¶ 13 We have broad discretion to decide whether to accept a late-

filed notice. Baker, 104 P.3d at 896. Taken together, the rules of

appellate procedure allow us to enlarge the time to file a notice of

appeal when there is excusable neglect or good cause shown. Id. at

895-96 (citing C.A.R. 2, 4(b)(1), 26(b)). Excusable neglect requires a

showing of some “unavoidable hindrance or accident.” Id. at 896

(quoting Farmers Ins. Grp. v. Dist. Ct., 507 P.2d 865, 867 (Colo.

1973)). But we may review the totality of the circumstances to find

whether other good cause exists. Id. In doing so, we consider a

nonexclusive list of factors, including (1) the potential prejudice the

People may suffer from a late filing; (2) interests of judicial

economy; and (3) the propriety of requiring the defendant to pursue

other remedies. Id. at 896-97 (citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248).

¶ 14 Based on consideration of these factors and our review of the

record, we conclude that good cause exists to accept Sharrett’s

notice of appeal as timely. The record appears to show that

Sharrett wanted to appeal his sentence before the deadline to

appeal passed. We accept the appellate division’s representations

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that Sharrett sent a letter to his attorney asking to appeal and that

his trial counsel immediately attempted to contact the appellate

division. As well, the People concede that they won’t suffer any

prejudice if Sharrett is allowed to appeal and point out that the

issues Sharrett raises could be raised in a postconviction

proceeding. We therefore exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 2,

4(b)(1), and 26(b) and accept Sharrett’s notice of appeal as timely.

B. Double Jeopardy and Merger

¶ 15 As noted, Sharrett contends that his sentences for DUI (fourth

or subsequent offense) and vehicular assault (reckless) must run

concurrently because the two offenses are based on identical

evidence.2 We disagree.

2 Sharrett also appears to contend that the district court couldn’t

sentence him to a controlling sentence of eighteen years in prison
based on his guilty plea because a jury’s guilty verdict on all counts
would have resulted in a shorter sentence. He is mistaken. Had a
jury found him guilty of felony DUI (a class 4 felony), vehicular
assault (DUI) (a class 4 felony), and vehicular assault (reckless) (a
class 5 felony), the sentencing court would have merged the felony
DUI and vehicular assault (DUI) convictions, leaving a felony DUI
conviction and a vehicular assault (reckless) conviction. So the
sentencing court would have been in the identical position to
sentence Sharrett to consecutive sentences on felony DUI and
vehicular assault (reckless). In any event, Sharrett is bound by the
terms of his plea agreement.

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1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 16 “The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and

Colorado Constitutions protect an accused against being twice

placed in jeopardy for the same crime.” Woellhaf v. People, 105

P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005); see U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo. Const.

art. II, § 18. “[T]o determine whether punishments imposed by a

court after a defendant’s conviction are constitutionally proper, we

must determine what punishments the legislature has authorized.”

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 50 (citing Whalen v. United

States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980)). “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause

simply embodies the constitutional principle of separation of powers

by ensuring that courts do not exceed their own authority by

imposing multiple punishments not authorized by the legislature.”

Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 214; see Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688; § 18-1-

408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 17 “Absent legislation to the contrary, sentencing courts in

Colorado have discretion to order sentences for different convictions

to be served either consecutively or concurrently.” Thompson v.

People, 2020 CO 72, ¶ 59 (citing Schneider v. People, 2016 CO 70,

¶ 22). But a district court must sentence a defendant concurrently

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when identical evidence supports multiple convictions, unless

multiple victims are involved. Id. (citing § 18-1-408(3)). “[T]o decide

whether identical evidence supported multiple convictions, we must

‘determine if the separate convictions were based on more than one

distinct act and if so, whether those acts were separated by time

and place.’” Id. at ¶ 60 (quoting Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896, 901

(Colo. 2007)). “In conducting this analysis, we focus on the

evidence that supported the convictions, not on the evidence

necessarily required to prove the elements of those convictions.” Id.

(citing Juhl, 172 P.3d at 902).

¶ 18 We review de novo whether a district court’s sentence was

authorized by law. Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, ¶ 10.

2. Analysis

¶ 19 Contrary to Sharrett’s assertion, each conviction is based on

separate, independent evidence. DUI is a strict liability crime,

meaning no mental state is required for a conviction. Given

Sharrett’s prior DUI and DWAI convictions, Sharrett committed the

felony DUI offense as soon as he began operating the vehicle after

consuming enough alcohol to put him over the legal blood-alcohol

limit. That is, the felony DUI offense was established by evidence

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that Sharrett began operating his vehicle while under the influence,

after having at least three prior similar offenses. But that evidence

didn’t prove the vehicular assault offense. That offense was

established by evidence that at some later time and place, Sharrett

drove recklessly and thereby caused serious bodily injury to

another person. See § 18-3-205(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 20 We therefore conclude that each conviction was based on

different evidence, so it doesn’t matter that the offenses may have

arisen out of the same criminal episode. See Juhl, 172 P.3d at 899-

900 (convictions for offenses arising out of the same criminal

episode must be sentenced concurrently only if the convictions are

based on identical evidence).

¶ 21 Sharrett also appears to argue that felony DUI is a lesser

included offense of vehicular assault. It isn’t. The elements of the

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offenses differ such that proof of vehicular assault doesn’t prove

felony DUI. See § 18-1-408(5)(a); Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64.3

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

3 To the extent Sharrett argues that each conviction concerned the

same victim, we aren’t persuaded. While the vehicular assault
charge named a victim, the felony DUI charge didn’t because the
offense doesn’t require a victim. See § 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
Indeed, comments by sponsors for the bill enacting felony DUI
indicate that the victims of repeat felony DUI offenses are public
safety and the DUI offender himself. 2d Reading on H.B. 15-1043
before the H., 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 14, 2015).

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