Peo v. Woodard

23CA1308 Peo v Woodard 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1308
Chaffee County District Court No. 22CR78
Honorable Patrick W. Murphy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Cameron B. Woodard,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 11, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Cameron B. Woodard, was convicted of assaulting

a corrections officer. On appeal, he contends that the district court

erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “deadly weapon”

and by failing to note on the mittimus the amount of presentence

confinement credit (PSCC) awarded at sentencing. We affirm the

judgment of conviction and remand the case for the court to correct

the mittimus.

I. Background

¶2 The victim worked as a lieutenant in the correctional facility

where Woodard was serving a prison sentence in connection with

an unrelated case. During her morning rounds on the day in

question, the victim noticed that Woodard had placed a sheet over

the bars to his cell, and she ordered him to remove it. Later, the

victim saw that Woodard had placed the sheet back up on his cell’s

bars. When the victim attempted to remove the sheet, Woodard

struck her with a plastic chair, pushed her against a wall, and

punched her in the face. Woodard punched the victim five or six

more times while she was on the ground. The victim sustained

serious bodily injury from the attack.

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¶3 The State charged Woodard with two counts of first degree

assault, two counts of second degree assault, and six crime of

violence counts. Some of the substantive offenses and the crime of

violence counts had as an element the use or threatened use of a

deadly weapon.

¶4 During trial, the parties discussed how to instruct the jury on

the definition of “deadly weapon,” given that Woodard had used his

fists to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. Over defense

counsel’s objection, the district court granted the prosecution’s

request to add language to the definitional instruction to inform the

jury that body parts can be deadly weapons. Consequently, the

court instructed the jury as follows:

“Deadly weapon” means a knife, bludgeon, or
any other weapon, device, instrument,
material, or substance, whether animate or
inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or
intended to be used, is capable of producing
death or serious bodily injury. Any object can
be a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner
capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury; body parts can be deadly weapons
depending on the manner in which they are
used.

¶5 Woodard’s theory of defense was that although he had

physically assaulted the victim, he did not form the specific intent

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to cause serious bodily injury. The jury rejected that defense and

convicted him as charged. The district court sentenced Woodard to

an aggregate term of twenty-four years in prison and awarded him

seventy days of PSCC.

II. Deadly Weapon Jury Instruction

¶6 Woodard asserts that the district court erred by giving the

deadly weapon instruction. He argues, primarily, that the added

language concerning body parts as deadly weapons deviated from

the statutory definition of “deadly weapon” and “violated the

principle that jury instructions should not be pulled from judicial

opinions.” We perceive no error.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Authority

¶7 A court has a duty to instruct the jury on all matters of law

applicable to the case. Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 18. In

discharging this duty, “the trial court may instruct the jury

concerning a principle of law that is related to an issue in

controversy.” People v. Hayward, 55 P.3d 803, 805 (Colo. App.

2002). We review de novo the question of whether a court

accurately instructed the jury on the law. Tibbels v. People, 2022

CO 1, ¶ 22.

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¶8 “As long as the instruction properly informs the jury of the

law, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the form and

style of jury instructions.” McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, ¶ 54

(quoting Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011)). Thus,

we review a court’s decision to give a particular instruction for an

abuse of discretion. Id.

¶9 Section 18-1-901(3)(e), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “‘[d]eadly

weapon’ means . . . [a] firearm . . . knife, bludgeon, or any other

weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether

animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to

be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”

The corresponding model jury instruction uses the same language.

COLJI-Crim. F:88 (2024).

¶ 10 In interpreting section 18-1-901(3)(e), the Colorado Supreme

Court has consistently held that “fists may be deadly weapons if in

the manner they are used or intended to be used they are capable

of producing death or serious bodily injury.” People v. Ross, 831

P.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Colo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by

Montez v. People, 2012 CO 6, ¶ 16; see also Washington v. People,

2024 CO 26, ¶ 28 (fists can be deadly weapons); People v. Lee, 2020

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CO 81, ¶ 19 (“[H]ands may be deadly weapons if in the manner they

are used, they are capable of producing death or serious bodily

injury.”); People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Colo. 2002) (“Objects

which are not inherently deadly, such as feet and hands, can

become deadly weapons when used to start an unbroken,

foreseeable chain of events capable of producing serious bodily

injury or death.”). This legal principle is recognized in a comment

to the deadly weapon model jury instruction. See COLJI-Crim. F:88

cmt. 3.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The deadly weapon jury instruction at issue here contained

two sentences: (1) the unobjected-to first sentence that provided the

statutory definition of “deadly weapon”; and (2) the challenged

second sentence setting forth the rule, derived from case law, that

body parts can be deadly weapons.

¶ 12 We reject Woodard’s assertion that the inclusion of the second

sentence meant that the jury instruction impermissibly differed

from the statutory definition of deadly weapon. See People v.

Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Colo. 2005) (“A jury instruction

should substantially track the language of the statute describing

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the crime; a material deviation from the statute can result in

reversible plain error, depending on the facts of the case.”). The

first sentence tracked the statutory definition of “deadly weapon”

and the language of the corresponding model jury instruction. See

§ 18-1-901(3)(e)(II); COLJI-Crim. F:88. The second sentence is akin

to a supplemental instruction and explained, correctly, that body

parts can fall within the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.

See People v. Stellabotte, 2016 COA 106, ¶ 31, aff’d, 2018 CO 66;

People v. Holwuttle, 155 P.3d 447, 449 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 13 The fact that the second sentence derives from judicial

opinions does not necessarily render the instruction erroneous.

While a district court’s “use of an excerpt from an opinion in an

instruction” is disfavored, Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 800 (Colo.

1985), the practice does not inexorably result in error. See People v.

Benton, 829 P.2d 451, 453 (Colo. App. 1991) (explaining that, while

the supreme court has cautioned against the use of language from

opinions in instructions, there is no “prohibition against such

practice”). The problem with using excerpts from opinions to

formulate instructions is that the opinion language “may be a

proper expression of the law as related to th[e] facts and issues” in

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that particular case but may not be “sufficiently general, clear, or

accurate to serve as a satisfactory or full instruction to the jury.”

People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1366 (Colo. 1985) (quoting Cohen v.

People, 103 P.2d 479, 480 (1940)). But here, the statement that

body parts can constitute a deadly weapon is an accurate and

generally applicable expression of the law. See Stellabotte, ¶ 31

(“Colorado’s appellate courts have consistently upheld courts giving

the jury supplemental instructions, even when unnecessary, if the

instructions properly state the law.”). And the supplemental

instruction was appropriately tailored to the facts of the underlying

case, which involved allegations that Woodard used his hands to

assault the victim. See Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752, 754 (Colo.

1991) (“[A]lthough an instruction couched in terms of the language

of the statute is proper, a trial court must tailor instructions to the

particular circumstances of a given case when the instructions,

taken as a whole, do not adequately apprise the jury of the

[applicable] law . . . .” (citation omitted)).

¶ 14 Finally, we are not persuaded by Woodard’s argument (raised

for the first time on appeal) that the instruction improperly

emphasized certain evidence — that his body parts could be deadly

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weapons. According to Woodard, because the instruction already

explained that any “weapon, device, instrument, material, or

substance” can constitute a deadly weapon if capable of producing

death or serious bodily injury, the additional language about body

parts as deadly weapons improperly suggested that Woodard

intended to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. But under

that theory, the instruction would improperly emphasize evidence

in any case involving a firearm, knife, or bludgeon, which are also

mentioned separately in the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.

In any event, we reject the notion that by clarifying that body parts

can constitute deadly weapons, the instruction “made it seem more

likely” that Woodard had the requisite mens rea for certain of the

charged offenses. It was undisputed that Woodard used his hands

to repeatedly punch the victim, causing serious bodily injury.

Whether he specifically intended to cause such serious injuries was

a separate issue, unaffected by the definition of deadly weapon.

¶ 15 As the district court noted, body parts do not intuitively satisfy

the definition of deadly weapon, which refers to a weapon, device,

instrument, material, or substance. For the reasons explained

above, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by

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giving the supplemental instruction to ensure that the jury was not

confused as to whether body parts could be deadly weapons.

III. Presentence Confinement Credit

¶ 16 Woodard contends, the People concede, and we agree that a

remand is required for correction of the mittimus. The mittimus

should be amended to reflect the seventy days of PSCC that were

awarded at the sentencing hearing. See People v. Tennyson, 2023

COA 2, ¶ 37 (a court’s oral pronouncement of sentence takes

precedence over the mittimus), aff’d, 2025 CO 31; Crim. P. 36;

People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 21.

IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded

for the court to amend the mittimus.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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