Marriage of Middleton

24CA2191 Marriage of Middleton 12-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2191
El Paso County District Court No. 16DR340
Honorable Amanda J. Phillips, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Amy Diane Middleton,

Appellee,

and

Austin Miles Middleton,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 4, 2025

The Law Office of Andrew Bryant, LLC, Catherine H. Ford, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellee

Austin Miles Middleton, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving

Austin Miles Middleton (father) and Amy Diane Middleton (mother),

father appeals the district court’s order modifying parental

responsibilities concerning their child. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After nearly three years of marriage and the birth of a son,

mother filed a petition for dissolution in 2016. In the permanent

orders, the district court approved the parties’ stipulations

concerning decision-making responsibility and parenting time.

Under those stipulations, the parties shared decision-making

responsibility, except that mother had the final say regarding

religion, and mother was the child’s primary residential parent.

¶3 In 2020, during proceedings on a motion mother had filed to

modify parenting time, a child and family investigator (CFI) credited

mother’s allegations that father had committed numerous acts of

domestic violence during the marriage. Father admitted to the CFI

only that he had recently shoved mother and said that he didn’t

think it was a “big deal.” The CFI requested, and the court agreed,

that father could receive equal parenting time after completing a

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domestic violence evaluation. Father did so. The court didn’t

modify the allocation of decision-making during those proceedings.

¶4 Three years later, mother filed the underlying motion to modify

decision-making responsibility and parenting time. The district

court held an evidentiary hearing on mother’s motion, after which it

made the following findings:

• Father committed acts of domestic violence against

mother during the marriage.

• Father failed to take any responsibility for his actions,

thereby denying the reality of the abuse and its

continuing effects on mother and the child. “[T]he

underlying problem [was] domestic violence and [f]ather

simply being unwilling to relinquish control.”

• A supplemental parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE)

testified that she observed father’s ongoing controlling

behavior in the parties’ online communications. And

mother testified that she still struggled to be in the same

room with father.

• The child was “suffering from emotional dysregulation

due to the incredibly problematic relationship that [the

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parties] have and their inability to get past their dislike

for each other.”

• The PRE testified that the child’s behaviors were

consistent with exposure to domestic violence and that

the parties “cannot do things cooperatively together,”

which was causing the child to experience “distress” and

was “emotionally endangering his development.”

• Despite years of warnings that their behavior was

harming the child, the parties had made no meaningful

or lasting changes. They were incapable of change; could

not encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact

between the child and the other party; and could not

place the child’s needs above their own.

• Mother objected to joint decision-making responsibility.

¶5 The district court determined that the ongoing impact of

father’s domestic violence made the current joint decision-making

responsibility arrangement and equal parenting schedule contrary

to the child’s best interests and placed the child in danger. The

court named mother as the child’s sole decision-maker and primary

parent and granted father three weekends of parenting time per

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month during the school year and equal parenting time during the

summer.

¶6 Father filed a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59,

which the district court denied.

¶7 On appeal, father contends that the district court erred by

modifying decision-making responsibility and parenting time. We

address — and reject — each contention in turn.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 A district court has broad discretion when modifying decision-

making responsibility and parenting time, and “we exercise every

presumption in favor of upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of

Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26. A court abuses its discretion when it

acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner, or

when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA

107, ¶ 45.

¶9 However, we review the district court’s factual findings for

clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the findings unless

they lack any support in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,

2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.

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III. Discussion

A. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 10 Father argues that the district court was aware of his domestic

violence by 2020 — three years before mother filed the underlying

motion to modify — and, thus, that there are no new circumstances

to support a modification of decision-making responsibility under

section 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. We discern no error.

¶ 11 Section 14-10-131(2) allows a district court to modify decision-

making responsibility if it finds, based on facts that have arisen

since or were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order,

that (1) a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or

the party to whom decision-making responsibility was allocated and

(2) the modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.

In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA 92M, ¶ 17.

¶ 12 When, as here, a party requests a change in decision-making

based on endangerment of the child, the district court must retain

the existing order unless the order endangers the child’s physical

health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development

and the advantage of a change outweighs the harm likely to result

to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c); Humphries, ¶ 20.

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¶ 13 Additionally, when a party has committed domestic violence, it

is not in the child’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making

responsibility over the abused party’s objection unless the court

finds credible evidence of the parties’ ability “to make decisions

cooperatively in the best interest of the child” and “in a manner that

is safe for the abused party and the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(b),

(4)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 14 Here, in making its decision, the district court didn’t rely solely

on father’s history of domestic violence during the marriage.

Instead, the court emphasized new and continuing facts showing

that the child was endangered by the lingering effects of father’s

abuse. See § 14-10-131(2). In particular, the court found, with

record support, that mother and the child both continued to

experience trauma from father’s domestic violence; father’s coercive

control persisted in the parties’ interactions; the parties were

unable to make decisions cooperatively in the child’s best interests;

and mother objected to joint decision-making responsibility.

¶ 15 Father also argues that other findings made by the district

court and other evidence in the record justify a different outcome.

We decline his invitation to reweigh the statutory factors and

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evidence in his favor and substitute our judgment for that of the

district court. See Wenciker, ¶ 26; see also In re Marriage of Nelson,

2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an abuse of discretion,

even where “there is evidence in the record that could have

supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the district court.”); In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to determine witness

credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the

evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

therefrom); In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (an

appellate court may presume that the district court considered all

the evidence admitted).

¶ 16 In sum, we cannot say that the district court abused its broad

discretion in allocating sole decision-making responsibility to

mother. See Wenciker, ¶ 26.

B. Parenting Time

¶ 17 Father also asserts that the district court erred by

substantially modifying parenting time without making adequate

findings. Relying on section 14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and In re

Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 35, he argues that the court

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was required to make express findings regarding (1) the

presumption in favor of retaining the prior parenting time order;

(2) whether the child was endangered by the status quo and

whether the advantages of the modification outweighed any harm

likely caused by the change; and (3) whether the modification was

in the child’s best interests. We discern no error.

¶ 18 Section 14-10-129(2)(d) and Schlundt apply only when a

parenting time modification is substantial and results in changing

the primary residential parent. See Schlundt, ¶ 24. However, the

prior order here provided for equal parenting time and, therefore, it

didn’t designate either party as the primary parent. Thus, the best

interests analysis applied, and the court’s findings were sufficient.

See In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002)

(“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting

responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is

governed by the best interests standard.”); In re Marriage of

McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 331-33 (Colo. App. 1998) (where the

parents had equal parenting time, a modification naming one

parent as the child’s residential parent requires only a best

interests showing).

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¶ 19 Nor are we persuaded by father’s related assertion that the

modification constituted a restriction under section 14-10-

129(1)(b)(I), requiring an endangerment analysis.

¶ 20 Section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) provides that if a modification

restricts a party’s parenting time, the district court must find that

the existing parenting time order endangers the child’s physical

health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development.

¶ 21 The modification order at issue is a purely quantitative

reduction in father’s parenting time and is not a restriction within

the meaning of section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). See In re Marriage of

Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32 (cert. granted in part July 21, 2025).

A restriction occurs only when the court imposes a qualitative

limitation, such as requiring supervision, prohibiting overnights, or

limiting the location of visits. Id. So, contrary to father’s argument,

an endangerment finding was not required.

¶ 22 In any event, even if the endangerment standard did apply, the

district court expressly found, with record support, that the status

quo was endangering the child’s emotional development and

“significant changes” were necessary “to essentially save this child.”

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¶ 23 According to father, there are other district court findings and

evidence in the record that compel a different parenting time

determination under the best interests standard. But again, we

decline to reweigh the statutory factors in his favor and substitute

our judgment for that of the district court. See Wenciker, ¶ 26;

Nelson, ¶ 35; Thorburn, ¶ 49; Collins, ¶ 21.

¶ 24 Because the district court applied the correct legal standard

and the record supports the court’s exercise of its broad discretion

to name mother the child’s primary parent, we see no error. See

Wenciker, ¶ 26.

¶ 25 Given our disposition, we don’t need to resolve mother’s claim

that father failed to preserve his parenting time assertions. See

In re Marriage of Mack, 2022 CO 17, ¶ 12 (because a contention was

unavailing, the appellate court needn’t decide whether it was

preserved); accord Collins, ¶ 48.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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