Peo v. Vann

23CA1224 Peo v Vann 12-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1224
Adams County District Court No. 22CR488
Honorable Kyle Seedorf, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Skaia Lauren Marie Vann,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Harris and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 4, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Barbara A. Snow, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Skaia Lauren Marie Vann (Vann), appeals her

judgment of conviction for assault in the second degree and child

abuse, both of which the jury found constituted acts of domestic

violence. Vann alleges that, because her apartment was unlawfully

searched and she was arrested without a warrant, the court erred

by denying her motion to suppress evidence and statements made

stemming from the arrest. Specifically, she contends that (1) the

victim did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a

search of Vann’s apartment and (2) the officers unlawfully seized

her. We disagree with her contentions and, therefore, affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The victim, C.R., and Vann had been in a two-year

relationship and shared an apartment in Thornton. One afternoon,

C.R. called law enforcement to report that she and her one-year-old

daughter had been assaulted by Vann. Police responded to a

complex where they found C.R. and her daughter outside of an

apartment unit. C.R. exhibited physical symptoms consistent with

strangulation, and her daughter had a head contusion. C.R. and

her daughter were then taken to the hospital.

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¶3 At the suppression hearing, officers testified that C.R. told

them that Vann may still be in the apartment unit, but that she

was uncertain because she and her daughter had fled. Officers

further testified that C.R. told them she lived in the apartment and

paid rent. Based on this information, C.R. signed a form

consenting to the police searching the residence.

¶4 While waiting for C.R.’s written consent, some of the officers

still at the apartment building knocked loudly on Vann’s door and

announced their presence repeatedly — staying outside for forty-five

minutes to an hour. One of the officers testified that he did not

know if Vann was inside.

¶5 Once the officers had C.R.’s written consent, the officers

obtained a key from the property management office because C.R.

did not have a key in her possession. The officers entered the

apartment and saw Vann exiting from a back bedroom; they

subsequently arrested her and took photographs of the apartment

and Vann.

¶6 Vann moved to suppress evidence acquired at the apartment

and statements made during her arrest. Following a suppression

hearing, the district court denied the motion, determining that C.R.

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had authority to consent to the search of Vann’s apartment and

that the police had probable cause to arrest Vann once inside her

apartment.

¶7 After a jury trial, Vann was convicted of second degree assault

and child abuse. The court sentenced Vann to three years of

probation, sixty days of in-home detention, and various other terms

and conditions.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 Review of a district court’s order on a motion to suppress

involves a mixed question of law and fact. See People v. Cline, 2019

CO 33, ¶ 13. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and will

not be disturbed on review “so long as ‘they are supported by

competent evidence in the record.’” Id. (quoting People v. Threlkel,

2019 CO 18, ¶ 15). The district court’s legal conclusions are

reviewed de novo. Id.

III. Warrantless Search

¶9 Vann contends that the court erred by finding that C.R. had

authority to consent to the search. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution prohibit

unreasonable searches and seizures. “Although a warrant is

generally required to search a home, ‘certain categories of

permissible warrantless searches have long been recognized.’”

People v. Peluso, 2021 CO 16, ¶ 11 (quoting Fernandez v. California,

571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014)).

¶ 11 One such category of a constitutionally permissible

warrantless search is when law enforcement obtains consent. See

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974). Cohabitants

are considered to have actual authority to consent to a search

where there is “mutual use of the property by persons generally

having joint access or control for most purposes.” Id. at 172 n.7.

¶ 12 But officers may also obtain consent from a third party who

has apparent authority, someone “whom officers, at the time of the

entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the

premises, even if the person in fact does not.” Peluso, ¶ 14. The

facts “available to the officer at the moment” must be such that a

person “of reasonable caution” would believe that “the consenting

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party had authority over the premises.” Id. (quoting Illinois v.

Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)). But if officers find

themselves presented with ambiguous circumstances “regarding the

authority of the third party to consent to the search,” they should

“make reasonable inquiries.” People v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d 467,

473 (Colo. 1993).

B. Analysis

¶ 13 Vann contends that C.R. did not possess actual or apparent

authority to consent to a search. It is not entirely clear from the

court’s order whether it determined that C.R. had actual authority

or only apparent authority. Regardless, because we conclude that

the record supports a finding that C.R. had apparent authority, we

likewise conclude that the court properly denied the motion to

suppress. See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161 ¶ 39 (an appellate

court “may affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground supported

by the record”); Peluso, ¶ 20 (“Because parole officers reasonably

believed [a third party] had authority to consent to a search of [the

defendant’s] residence, [the third party’s] apparent authority was

sufficient to validate the warrantless search . . . .”).

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¶ 14 The district court determined that law enforcement had

authority to enter Vann’s apartment without a warrant because

C.R. provided officers with information that “was reasonable . . . [to]

lead law enforcement to believe . . . [C.R.’s] authority rest[ed] on

mutual use of the property” and C.R. consented to the officers

entering the apartment. The district court’s findings and legal

conclusion are supported by the record from the suppression

hearing.

¶ 15 Specifically, law enforcement found C.R. and her daughter

near the residence with visible injuries, and at least one officer

testified that C.R.’s injuries appeared to have “occurred recently.”

Officers testified that C.R. told them that she and Vann had been in

a relationship for two years, she and her daughter lived in Vann’s

apartment, and she helped to pay rent for the unit. One officer

testified that C.R. “made it sound like [C.R.] just paid the rent

recently as well.”

¶ 16 C.R. told officers that her name was not on the apartment’s

lease and that she did not have a key to the unit but explained that

her key may have been thrown while fleeing. Officers testified that

C.R. did not ask questions while they advised her about the consent

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form before she signed it. And based on this consent, the officers

went to the property management office for the apartment complex,

where an employee of the management company provided a key

after being informed about the form. Thus, based on the officers’

knowledge at the time C.R. gave consent, we agree with the district

court that it was reasonable for law enforcement to believe that C.R.

had authority to consent to a search of the apartment.

¶ 17 Nonetheless, Vann argues that these facts presented officers

with an ambiguous situation, thus requiring the officers to conduct

further inquiry. Specifically, Vann points to the police meeting C.R.

at a different apartment, C.R. not having a key, and the officers

needing to obtain a key from the management office.

¶ 18 As to an officer meeting C.R. at a different apartment, an

officer testified that dispatch told him to go to Vann’s apartment but

was then told by dispatch that C.R. had fled to a different unit.

This testimony does not reflect that C.R. was confused or uncertain

about where she lived; it just shows she went to a different

apartment after the reported assault.

¶ 19 Regarding C.R.’s lack of a key, officers testified that C.R.

volunteered the information that she did not have one, but she

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provided an explanation. And although the officers searched

outside and did not find a key, without more, this does not

necessarily create an ambiguous situation, as there may be many

reasons, besides not being an authorized occupant of a home, as to

why a person may not have a key. See, e.g., United States v. Gillis,

358 F.3d 386, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding apparent authority

where the victim who consented to the search had no keys to the

apartment but made statements to the police that she lived there

and had been in the place earlier that morning); Iron Wing v. United

States, 34 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a defendant’s

argument that the victim did not have apparent authority because

she lacked a key and climbed through a bedroom window to let in

officers).

¶ 20 Vann also relies on Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 177, to contrast the

facts of this case and suggest that apparent authority existed in

that case only because the victim had a key to the residence.

Besides the victim not having a key in this case, Rodriguez is

similar in its facts, as the victim in that case referred to the

residence as “our” apartment and said her belongings were inside.

Id. at 179. But factual issues aside, Rodriguez only recognized the

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doctrine of apparent authority and did not decide whether such

authority existed based on the facts in the case; instead, it

remanded the matter for a determination by the lower court. Id. at

189.

¶ 21 Rodriguez also does not help Vann because the Supreme

Court said that warrantless entry based upon apparent authority is

not automatically lawful and rests on whether “the surrounding

circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person

would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.”

Id. at 188. C.R. did not try to hide the fact that she did not have a

key in her possession, nor did she hide that her name would not be

found on the lease. The “surrounding circumstances” — that she

fled, that she said she lived in the apartment with Vann and her

daughter, and that she paid rent — all went to the district court’s

reasoning that objectively, based on these facts, the police officers

had no reason to doubt C.R.’s veracity and thus no further inquiry

was necessary. See United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 308 (6th

Cir. 2009) (recognizing that in the modern era, it is not

unreasonable for police to not conduct further investigation as to

whether someone’s name is on a lease, “as it is a reality in today’s

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world that consenting adults often co-habitat [sic] together without

benefit of legal formalities — including those formalities relating to

the establishment of property interests”).

¶ 22 Finally, we reject the argument that because the police

obtained the key from the management office, C.R. lacked apparent

authority, or at the very least, put the police on notice it should

make further inquiry. Absent any evidence in the record that the

management office, for example, questioned C.R.’s written consent

because C.R.’s name was not on the lease or that it did not know

that C.R. was an occupant of the apartment, we cannot say that

this alone created an ambiguous situation warranting further police

inquiry.

¶ 23 Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by

holding that the warrantless search was reasonable because the

police had consent from C.R.

IV. Warrantless Seizure

¶ 24 Next, Vann contends that she was unlawfully seized without

an arrest warrant. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 25 A warrantless arrest is “only valid if supported by probable

cause.” People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo. 2011).

Probable cause exists when “the objective facts and circumstances

available to a reasonably cautious officer at the time of arrest justify

the belief that (1) an offense has been or is being committed (2) by

the person arrested.” Id. (quoting People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d

1145, 1149 (Colo. App. 2009)).

¶ 26 Law enforcement is prohibited “from making a warrantless

and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a

routine felony arrest.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576

(1980) (emphasis added). Stated differently, probable cause does

not permit warrantless entry into a suspect’s home “to effect a

warrantless arrest absent consent or exigent circumstances.”

People v. Prescott, 205 P.3d 416, 421 (Colo. App. 2008).

B. Analysis

¶ 27 Vann argues that (1) the record does not support a finding

that officers lacked knowledge of Vann’s presence in the apartment,

so they obtained C.R.’s consent in a fraudulent manner; and (2) the

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district court misapprehended the law on warrantless arrests. We

address, and reject, each contention in turn.

¶ 28 First, Vann contends that the police knew she was in the

apartment and so secured C.R.’s consent on a fraudulent basis, as

the police did not want to search the apartment, but simply sought

to gain access to the residence to arrest her. Even if the police had

mixed motives, the record supports the district court’s finding that

“law enforcement officers did not know that [Vann] was [present in

the apartment]” because “there was nothing that was testified to

that would give a reasonable officer information to conclude that

[Vann] was in the apartment.” Specifically, the record supports that

there was no response from inside the unit when officers knocked

loudly and announced themselves, no lights were turned on or off,

and officers did not hear voices from inside the unit. The district

court credited the officers’ testimony that they were unsure if Vann

was inside the residence, and as the finder of fact, it was for the

district court, not us, to make credibility determinations and weigh

the evidence. See In re Estate of Romero, 126 P.3d 228, 231 (Colo.

App. 2005). Because this factual finding was supported by

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competent evidence in the record, we cannot disturb it on appeal.

See Cline, ¶ 13.

¶ 29 Second, the district court correctly applied the legal standards

on warrantless arrests. It held that, because law enforcement had

consent to enter Vann’s apartment and “already had probable cause

to arrest,” the warrantless arrest was lawful. This was a correct

application of the law, as police who enter a suspect’s home with

consent may make a warrantless arrest based on probable cause.

See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576 (the police may not engage in a

“warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in

order to make a routine felony arrest” (emphasis added)).

¶ 30 Vann argues that because C.R. did not have authority to

consent — a contention we have already rejected —the police could

only enter the premises to effectuate a warrantless arrest under

exigent circumstances. This contention fails because police only

needed consent or exigent circumstances to enter the apartment if

they had probable cause to arrest Vann. Prescott, 205 P.3d at 421

(finding that the police could not enter a hotel room “to effect a

warrantless arrest absent consent or exigent circumstances”

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(emphasis added)). Because the police had consent to enter the

apartment, no exigent circumstances were required.

¶ 31 And because Vann does not contest the district court’s

determination that police had probable cause to arrest Vann once

they entered the apartment with C.R.’s consent, Vann’s arrest

satisfies the exception to the prohibition on in-home warrantless

arrests.

V. Conclusion

¶ 32 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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