Commissioner of Agriculture v. Waldrop

24CA1928 Commissioner of Agriculture v Waldrop 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1928
Arapahoe County District Court No. 24CV31081
Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge

Commissioner of Agriculture,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rebecca Waldrop,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Moultrie and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kelly B. Larson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Charles J. Kooyman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katie M.
Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Environmental and Animal Defense, Alexa McKay, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Rebecca Waldrop, appeals the district court’s order

dismissing the complaint filed by plaintiff, the Commissioner of

Agriculture (Commissioner), without imposing conditions and the

court’s post-dismissal order denying her request for attorney fees.

We dismiss the appeal as to the order dismissing the complaint and

affirm the order denying the request for fees.

I. Background

¶2 In the complaint, the Commissioner alleged the following.

¶3 Waldrop owned and operated Douglas County Canine Rescue

(DCCR), a pet animal rescue facility licensed under the Pet Animal

Care and Facilities Act (PACFA), §§ 35-80-101 to -117, C.R.S. 2025.

Waldrop made false and fraudulent statements in her application to

renew her pet animal facility license. The Commissioner denied the

application. Consequently, as of April 8, 2024, Waldrop did not

have a license to operate any type of pet animal facility. Waldrop

continued operating DCCR as a pet animal facility without a valid

license. The Commissioner issued Waldrop a cease-and-desist

order enjoining her from continuing to operate without a valid

license. Waldrop failed to comply with the cease-and-desist order.

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¶4 The Commissioner sought injunctive relief against Waldrop.

The district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order

the day after the complaint was filed. Several days later, the court

granted a preliminary injunction and set a hearing on a permanent

injunction.

¶5 Waldrop moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the

complaint sought to hold her liable for the actions of DCCR, which

was not named as a defendant in the complaint. Before the

hearing, the Commissioner also moved to dismiss the complaint

and vacate the hearing on the permanent injunction. Waldrop

opposed this dismissal and noted that the cease-and-desist order,

which was the basis for the claims, had been dismissed by an

administrative law judge. The district court dismissed the action

and vacated the hearing.

¶6 Two weeks later, Waldrop filed a motion for attorney fees.

Nearly two months after the case was dismissed, the district court

denied the motion, finding that the Commissioner had a good faith

basis for filing the original suit and that when action was taken

after the suit had been filed that undermined the basis for it, the

Commissioner promptly moved to dismiss it.

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II. Discussion

¶7 Waldrop contends that the district court erred by dismissing

the complaint while “failing to consider or impose conditions [on the

dismissal] as required by C.R.C.P. 41.” Waldrop also contends that

the court erred by denying her post-dismissal motion for attorney

fees. Because her challenge to the dismissal order is untimely, we

dismiss that portion of her appeal. And we discern no error in the

denial of her post-dismissal request for attorney fees.

A. The Dismissal Order

¶8 A final judgment on the merits is separately appealable from

any order resolving a later request for attorney fees. Baldwin v.

Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 1988). A dismissal

may be such a final judgment, regardless of whether it is designated

as with or without prejudice, if it “ends the particular action in

which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court

pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of

the parties involved in the proceeding.” Schaden v. DIA Brewing

Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶¶ 46-48 (quoting In re Water Rts. of Elk Dance

Colo., LLC, 139 P.3d 660, 668 (Colo. 2006)).

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¶9 Because they are separately appealable, a party must appeal

each within the proper timeline — i.e., “within 49 days” of the entry

of the order. C.A.R. 4(a)(1).

¶ 10 Waldrop filed a single notice of appeal 48 days after the

district court entered its order denying Waldrop’s attorney fees

request but 104 days after the order of dismissal. Thus, Waldrop’s

appeal is timely as to the attorney fees order but untimely as to the

order granting the motion to dismiss. In light of this untimeliness,

we lack jurisdiction to consider her contention that the court

should have conditioned the C.R.C.P. 41(a)(2) dismissal on the

payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to

that order.

B. The Order Denying Attorney Fees

¶ 11 Regarding the order denying her request for attorney fees,

Waldrop contends that the district court should have granted her

fees under C.R.C.P. 41; C.R.C.P. 11; section 13-17-102, C.R.S.

2025; and C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 When reviewing a trial court’s dismissal under C.R.C.P.

41(a)(2), we review for an abuse of discretion “[t]he trial court’s

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decision to impose terms and conditions, or to refrain from doing

so.” FSDW, LLC v. First Nat’l Bank, 94 P.3d 1260, 1265 (Colo. App.

2004). The decision to award attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 11 or

section 13-17-102 is similarly committed to the discretion of the

district court, and we will not disturb such a ruling on appeal

absent an abuse of that discretion. Stearns Mgmt. Co. v. Mo. River

Servs., Inc., 70 P.3d 629, 633 (Colo. App. 2003). A court abuses its

discretion when it misapplies or misconstrues the law or its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Int’l

Network, Inc. v. Woodard, 2017 COA 44, ¶ 24.

¶ 13 A district court must set forth findings that are sufficient to

allow appellate review of its decision to deny a fees request. Munoz

v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1035 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 14 To the extent our review depends on an interpretation of

PACFA, we review such questions de novo. See Hassler v. Acct.

Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 2012 CO 24, ¶ 15. Our primary

purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to

the General Assembly’s intent. Id. We look first to the statute’s

language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary

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meanings. Id. If the statute is unambiguous, we need not conduct

any further statutory analysis. Id.

¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 11(a) imposes affirmative obligations on an attorney

signing a pleading:

The signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation.

If a pleading is signed in violation of this rule, the court “shall

impose . . . an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to

pay to the other party . . . the amount of the reasonable expenses

incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including a

reasonable attorney’s fee.” C.R.C.P. 11(a). But

[r]easonable expenses, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee, shall not be assessed if, after
filing, a voluntary dismissal or withdrawal is
filed as to any claim, action or defense, within
a reasonable time after the attorney or party
filing the pleading knew, or reasonably should
have known, that he would not prevail on said
claim, action, or defense.

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Id.

¶ 16 Under section 13-17-102(4), a court shall assess attorney fees

if it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action,

or any part of an action, “that lacked substantial justification or

. . . was interposed for delay or harassment” or that an attorney or

party “unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper

conduct, including . . . abuses of discovery procedures.” An action

lacks substantial justification if it is “substantially frivolous,

substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”

§ 13-17-101.5(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 17 “A claim or defense is frivolous if the proponent can present no

rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that

claim or defense.” W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063,

1069 (Colo. 1984). A claim is not considered frivolous merely

because it ultimately proves unsuccessful. Id. “A vexatious claim is

one brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass.” Bockar

v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994). “It may include

conduct that is arbitrary, abusive, stubbornly litigious, or

disrespectful of truth.” Id.

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2. Analysis

¶ 18 As an initial matter, Waldrop contends that the district court

did not explicitly consider each rule under which she requested

attorney fees and made insufficient findings to deny her request.

We disagree.

¶ 19 The district court cited section 13-17-102, section

13-17-102(5), and Rule 11; in addition, the court noted the

standard for when an action lacks substantial justification and

stated that a claim is not frivolous simply because the action proved

unsuccessful. Moreover, as noted, the district court found that the

Commissioner had a good faith basis for filing the original suit and

when the cease-and-desist order was dismissed, the Commissioner

promptly moved to dismiss the complaint and vacate the permanent

injunction hearing.

¶ 20 Because we can discern the basis for the district court’s

decision, we conclude that it made sufficient findings to allow for

meaningful appellate review as to the denial of attorney fees under

section 13-17-102 and Rule 11. Contrast Munoz, 247 P.3d at 1035-

36 (concluding that trial court’s denial of the fees request was

supported by sufficient findings), with Stearns Mgmt. Co., 70 P.3d at

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634 (concluding that district court’s statement that “[d]efendants’

motion for attorney fees is denied” was insufficient finding).

¶ 21 As to Waldrop’s request for attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 121,

section 1-15, while the district court did not specifically cite this

rule, we conclude that we can still review the district court’s implicit

rejection of Waldrop’s invocation of it, as discussed more fully

below, because the plain language of the rule does not provide a

basis for the court to award Waldrop attorney fees.

a. C.R.C.P. 41

¶ 22 We reject Waldrop’s contention that the district court should

have granted her request for attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 41 as a

condition for dismissing the complaint. The court had already

dismissed the complaint in the order that Waldrop did not timely

appeal. Waldrop cites no authority — and we are aware of none —

that would permit a court to retroactively impose conditions on a

dismissal that had already been granted. And, as noted above, her

avenue for challenging the court’s omission of any such conditions

in the order of dismissal was to file a timely appeal of that order —

which she did not.

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b. C.R.C.P. 11

¶ 23 Waldrop contends that the district court erred by denying her

attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 11(a) because the Commissioner

intentionally and erroneously named her in the complaint when it

should have named DCCR. She also contends that the subsequent

dismissal of the cease-and-desist order did not absolve the

Commissioner of initially determining if she was the correct party

against whom to file the complaint. We discern no error.

¶ 24 The Commissioner filed the complaint for injunctive relief

under section 35-80-111(2)(b), (3), C.R.S. 2025, which allows the

Commissioner to seek injunctive relief against any person who has

violated PACFA. See Kourlis v. Dist. Ct., 930 P.2d 1329, 1334 (Colo.

1997). Nothing in this statute requires the Commissioner to only

sue a licensee as Waldrop contends. Rather, section 35-80-

111(2)(b), (3) provides that the Commissioner can seek a temporary

restraining order and an injunction against “any person.”

¶ 25 Section 35-80-111(2)(b) also provides that the Commissioner

can seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction against

“any person” who has failed to comply with a cease-and-desist order

within twenty-four hours. The cease-and-desist order was issued

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against DCCR and Waldrop, and when the complaint was filed, it

was a valid order. Thus, contrary to Waldrop’s contention, the

Commissioner did not violate Rule 11 by filing the complaint

against Waldrop.1

¶ 26 Once the cease-and-desist order was dismissed, the

Commissioner no longer had a good faith basis to pursue an

injunction against Waldrop and moved for dismissal of the

complaint. As noted, C.R.C.P. 11(a) does not allow reasonable

attorney fees to be assessed if a voluntary dismissal is filed within a

reasonable time after the party filing the pleading knew, or

reasonably should have known, that they would not prevail.

Indeed, the district court found that the Commissioner promptly

moved to dismiss the complaint once the basis for the suit had been

undermined. Thus, the district court did not err by not awarding

Waldrop attorney fees under Rule 11.

1 Notably, the administrative law judge, in the order dismissing the

cease-and-desist order, did not make a finding about whether
Waldrop or DCCR was the licensee. Rather, the judge dismissed
the cease-and-desist order because it had been issued before the
license had expired and, thus, was premature.

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c. Section 13-17-102

¶ 27 Waldrop next contends that the district court erred by denying

her attorney fees under section 13-17-102 because the claim was

substantially frivolous and/or vexatious. Specifically, Waldrop

again argues that the district court could not rely on the

subsequent dismissal of the cease-and-desist order as the basis for

denying her request for attorney fees. We disagree.

¶ 28 Like C.R.C.P. 11(a), section 13-17-102(5) provides that

[a]ttorney fees . . . shall not be assessed if,
after filing suit, a voluntary dismissal is filed
as to any claim or action within a reasonable
time after the attorney . . . or party filing the
dismissal knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the attorney . . . or party would
not prevail on the claim or action.

And, again, the district court found that the Commissioner

promptly moved to dismiss the complaint once the basis for the suit

had been undermined.

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¶ 29 Further, for the same reasons, we again reject Waldrop’s

argument that the Commissioner should have named DCCR, not

her, as the defendant.2

¶ 30 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not

awarding Waldrop attorney fees under section 13-17-102(4).

d. C.R.C.P. 121, Section 1-15

¶ 31 Finally, Waldrop contends that the district court erred by

denying her attorney fees under Rule 121, section 1-15 because of

the Commissioner’s failure to confer before filing her motion to

dismiss the complaint. We discern no error.

¶ 32 As relevant here, C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(8) states that

“[u]nless a statute or rule governing the motion provides that it may

be filed without notice, moving counsel and any self-represented

party shall confer with opposing counsel and any self-represented

parties before filing a motion.” It further provides that

2 We decline to address Waldrop’s undeveloped argument that the

Commissioner relied on “legal impossibilities” to the extent it goes
beyond the two aforementioned contentions and merely references
her trial court briefing. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252
P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We will not consider a bald legal
proposition presented without argument or development.”); Castillo
v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006).

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[t]he motion shall, at the beginning, contain a
certification that the movant in good faith has
conferred with opposing counsel and any
self-represented parties about the motion. If
the relief sought by the motion has been
agreed to by the parties or will not be opposed,
the court shall be so advised in the motion.

C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(8). And it provides that “[i]f no conference has

occurred, the reason why, including all efforts to confer, shall be

stated.” Id.

¶ 33 This same rule states that “[i]f a frivolous motion is filed or if

frivolous opposition to a motion is interposed, the court may assess

reasonable attorney’s fees against the party or attorney filing such

motion or interposing such opposition.” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(7).

¶ 34 Waldrop does not contend — nor could she — that the

Commissioner’s motion to dismiss (as opposed to the complaint

itself) was frivolous. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(7). Indeed, because a

C.R.C.P. 12 motion to dismiss is not an answer or a motion for

summary judgment, see Burden v. Greeven, 953 P.2d 205, 208

(Colo. App. 1998), the Commissioner did not need to file a motion to

dismiss the complaint at all; she could have simply dismissed the

action by notice. C.R.C.P. 41(a)(1). Thus, we discern no

impropriety in the alleged lack of conferral.

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¶ 35 Thus, the district court did not err by declining to award

Waldrop attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15.

III. Disposition

¶ 36 The appeal is dismissed as to the order dismissing the

complaint. The attorney fees order is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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