Peo in Interest of GS

24CA2192 Peo in Interest of GS 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2192
Crowley County District Court Nos. 21JV14, 22JV6, & 23JV30012
Honorable Mark A. MacDonnell, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.S., E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S., and Z.S.,
Children,

and Concerning Ja.S. and Jo.S.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Josi McCauley, Special County Attorney, Superior, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for G.S.

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem for E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S.,
and Z.S.

R. Jordan Edmondson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Arvada,
Colorado, for Appellant Ja.S.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Jo.S.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, Jo.S. (mother) and

Ja.S. (father) appeal the judgments terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with G.S., E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S.,

and Z.S. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2021, the Crowley County Sheriff’s Department

responded to the family home based on a call that the parents’

eight-month-old son, Joh.S., had been found unresponsive and not

breathing. Joh.S. was later pronounced dead.

¶3 The Crowley County Department of Human Services initiated

Crowley County Case No. 21JV14, a dependency and neglect action

concerning the six children living at the time, G.S., E.S., Ji.S.,

Jas.S., Je.S., and Jay.S. The Department alleged that the children

were dependent and neglected based on the condition of the family

home, which was described as “similar to hoarding conditions with

trails and paths located throughout the house [and] debris, clothes

and items stacked up that were an obvious hazard for the children,”

and the parents’ neglect of the children, who were found dirty and

malnourished. The children were removed from the home and

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placed in foster care. Following a jury trial, they were adjudicated

dependent and neglected.

¶4 The parents appealed, and a division of this court reversed the

judgment adjudicating the children due to the erroneous admission

of highly prejudicial evidence regarding Joh.S.’s death during the

jury trial. People in Interest of G.S., (Colo. App. No. 22CA1044,

March 30, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶5 While the appeal was pending, mother gave birth to D.S. The

Department opened Crowley County Case No. 22JV6 concerning

that child, she was placed in foster care, and the court adjudicated

her dependent and neglected based on stipulations by the parents,

which the court accepted.

¶6 In April 2023, while the cases were pending, both parents were

criminally charged with offenses concerning Joh.S.’s death and with

child abuse offenses concerning the six older children.1

1 The juvenile court took judicial notice of the charges filed in the

criminal cases against the parents in Crowley County Case Nos.
2023CR32, 2023CR33, and 2023CR34. Similarly, we take judicial
notice of the existence — and the resolution — of those charges.
See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A court may
take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related
proceeding.”).

2
¶7 The Department later amended its petition in the original case,

adding further allegations of physical and emotional abuse,

starvation, deprivation of basic hygiene, unsafe sleeping

environments, and a lack of understanding of the children’s basic

needs. Then mother gave birth to Z.S., and the Department opened

a third case (Crowley County Case No. 23JV30012) regarding that

child, who was also placed in foster care.

¶8 Not long after, in October 2023, the court adjudicated the six

older children and Z.S. dependent and neglected based on the

parents’ stipulations, which the court accepted. The court adopted

a consolidated treatment plan for both parents that pertained to all

eight children in all three cases.

¶9 The treatment plans required the parents to

• participate in cognitive behavioral therapy to “recognize

how their actions or inactions made the children unsafe

previously and accept responsibility”;

• address their individual mental health concerns;

• participate in family therapy when their individual

therapists deemed the parents ready;

• engage in family time;

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• maintain a safe home environment;

• engage in nutritional education and create a nutritional

plan that ensures the children’s individual needs are met

and allows them adequate access to appropriate food;

• complete the Nurturing Parenting Program;

• complete a psychological evaluation and a parent-child

interactional evaluation and follow all recommendations;

and

• understand the children’s developmental stages and

promote prosocial growth in each child at their given

stages.

¶ 10 In July 2024, the Department moved to terminate the parents’

parent-child legal relationships with all eight children. Soon

thereafter, on August 1, 2024, the prosecution dismissed the child

abuse charges against the parents regarding the six older children,

leaving only the charges relating to Joh.S.’s death. Following a

four-day hearing in late October 2024, the court terminated the

parents’ parent-child legal relationships with all the children.

¶ 11 This appeal followed. While the appeal was pending, the

prosecution dismissed the remaining charges brought against

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father, and mother pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide

in exchange for a deferred judgment and sentence and dismissal of

the other charges brought against her.

II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 12 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and

(4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 13 A juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law involving application of

the termination statute to the evidentiary facts. People in Interest of

A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses and

the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are all within

the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. We review the juvenile court’s

factual findings for clear error and, thus, will set them aside only if

they lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48. But we

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review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those

facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 14 Both parents contend that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to reunite them with the children — specifically

that the Department didn’t make necessary referrals, rejected the

services they participated in without providing timely alternatives,

delayed starting family therapy, and failed to offer sufficient family

time. We are not persuaded.

A. Mootness

¶ 15 As a preliminary matter, we address the issue of potential

mootness — an issue the Department and the guardian ad litem

(GAL) raised in a joint objection to mother’s request for oral

argument — as it affects our jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

See People in Interest of K.A., 155 P.3d 558, 560 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 16 “A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical legal

effect on the existing controversy.” Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70,

¶ 10. When issues become moot as a result of subsequent events,

appellate courts will decline to render an opinion on the merits

unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. See id.

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¶ 17 The Department and GAL suggest that the issue of reasonable

efforts with respect to mother is “likely moot.” Relying on section

19-3-604(1)(b)(IV), they assert that “[r]easonable efforts are no

longer required for termination” of mother’s parental rights in light

of her guilty plea to criminally negligent homicide. We disagree.

¶ 18 The issue of reasonable efforts as to mother is not moot, as

her guilty plea is not tantamount to the juvenile court finding that

(1) she is unfit because her proven parental abuse or neglect

resulted in serious bodily injury or death of the children’s sibling

and (2) an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised to address

such unfitness. See § 19-3-604(1)(b)(IV). Nor has the juvenile court

made any such findings. To the contrary, the court found that an

appropriate treatment plan could be — and was — devised for

mother. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I). So even if the first element might

be satisfied by the plea, the second one is not.

¶ 19 Therefore, we conclude that this issue is not moot.

B. Preservation

¶ 20 The Department and the GAL argue that father failed to

establish that he preserved this issue for our review because he

directed us to one of the other proposed orders (mother’s) presented

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to the juvenile court rather than his own. We agree that father’s

opening brief doesn’t meet C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)’s requirement to

provide “the precise location in the record where the issue was

raised and where the court ruled.” But father provided the correct

citation in his reply brief, and it is clear that he raised this issue in

the juvenile court.

¶ 21 The Department and the GAL further note that divisions of

this court have split as to whether a parent must challenge a

department’s reasonable efforts before a termination hearing to

preserve the issue for review. Compare People in Interest of S.N-V.,

300 P.3d 911, 913 (Colo. App. 2011) (the issue didn’t have to be

raised before the termination hearing), with People in Interest of

D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355 (Colo. App. 2007) (the issue had to be

raised before the termination hearing). But the Department and the

GAL don’t detail each parent’s attempts (or lack thereof) to raise the

issue of reasonable efforts before the termination hearing, and they

don’t ask us to find that either parent failed to preserve the issue on

this basis. Accordingly, we don’t address the issue of preservation

further, and we will presume that the parents’ arguments were

preserved. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo.

8
App. 2004) (declining to address an issue where a party didn’t

“make specific arguments” in support of it).

C. Relevant Law

¶ 22 To determine whether a parent is unfit at a termination

hearing, the juvenile court must consider whether the department

of human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the

parent and reunite the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2025; S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. “Reasonable efforts” means

the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-

home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services provided

in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy the

reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 23 Among other services, section 19-3-208 requires assessments

and individual case plans for the provision of services, information

and referral services to available public and private assistance

resources, family time services, and placement services. § 19-3-

208(2)(b). Other services, such as transportation assistance and

diagnostic and mental health services, must be provided if they are

determined to be “necessary and appropriate” and if the state has

sufficient funding for them. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

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¶ 24 In assessing a department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915, measuring the services and resources provided holistically

rather than in isolation, People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11,

¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using those

services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285

(Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, a court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether

a department made reasonable efforts. E.D., ¶ 12.

¶ 25 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual

findings for clear error but review de novo its legal determination,

based on those findings, as to whether the department satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

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D. Analysis

1. Mother’s Contentions

¶ 26 Mother contends that the Department’s efforts were deficient

because the Department (1) failed to make necessary referrals;

(2) delayed starting family therapy; and (3) never expanded or

liberalized her family time with the older children. We consider —

and reject — each contention in turn.

a. Failure to Make Referrals

¶ 27 Mother first contends that the Department “roundly” failed to

make referrals for needed services, forcing the parents to

independently identify providers. In support, mother points to her

testimony that she didn’t recall receiving any referrals from the

Department, as well as father’s testimony that the only referral or

resource the Department provided was a life skills services referral.

¶ 28 But the juvenile court found this testimony “unconvincing”

and credited the caseworker’s testimony that the Department sent

multiple referrals on the majority of the treatment plan objectives,

though the parents opted to pursue their own treatment providers

rather than work with the referral sources provided by the

Department. To that end, the caseworker testified about initiating

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referrals to several services, including cognitive behavioral

therapy, Early Head Start home visitor services for child

development education, life skills services to help establish a safe

home environment, a facility and supervisor for therapeutic family

time, and a nutrition course.

¶ 29 Mother’s assertions about the Nurturing Parenting Program —

the only referral she specifically discusses in this part of her brief —

don’t convince us otherwise. The treatment plans required the

parents to complete “no less than [sixteen] weeks” of the program.

Mother claims that the Department didn’t submit a referral for such

a program. She also claims that she and father first took a shorter

version of the course, were told it was insufficient, and then

“doubled up” classes at another agency and had “no way” to know

the Department would deem this modality improper.

¶ 30 The record reveals, however, that the parents took the courses

in the opposite order: they first “doubled up” the sixteen-session

course to complete it online in eight weeks with one agency and

then took an eight- to ten-week course with a second agency. As to

the first course the parents took, the parent-child interactional

evaluator, who testified as an expert on nurturing parenting, opined

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that it wasn’t proper to take the course virtually, with doubled

sessions over a short period of time. And, as to the second, shorter

course, the court heard evidence that a course satisfying the

treatment plan requirement was offered to the parents before they

started their separate course, the caseworker and an employee of

the second agency reminded the parents before they started their

separate course of the treatment plan requirement that the course

be sixteen weeks, and the shorter course didn’t contain all the

information the version required in their treatment plan contained.

¶ 31 Based on this and other evidence, the juvenile court

appropriately found that the parents were offered — but did not

engage in — a course that met the family’s needs.

b. Delayed Family Therapy

¶ 32 Next, mother contends that the Department substantially

delayed the parents from beginning family therapy due to its failure

to secure a family therapist until two and a half months before the

termination hearing.

¶ 33 Under the treatment plan applicable to both parents, family

therapy was to commence when both parents’ individual therapists

deemed the parents ready for it. And it is true that once the first of

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the two parents (father) was deemed ready to participate in family

therapy, the Department had some difficulty securing and

coordinating with family therapy providers. However, the record

reveals that most of the delay in starting family therapy was caused

by the lack of confirmation from individual therapists that family

members were ready to participate.

¶ 34 About a year into the case, the juvenile court resolved a

dispute about which family therapy provider to use. But even then,

the parents’ and the children’s therapists were all indicating that

the family members weren’t yet ready for family therapy, as they

had more work to do first in individual therapy.

¶ 35 About six months later, the criminal charges were filed against

the parents. At that point, the parents revoked most of their

releases of information, including those allowing access to mental

health information, and they didn’t sign new releases until several

months later, in January 2024. Still, the record shows that father’s

individual therapist didn’t recommend family therapy until May

2024. And mother’s individual therapist didn’t recommend family

therapy until August 2024.

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¶ 36 The family therapist started treatment that same month with

separate sessions with the parents and the three oldest children.

However, as of the time of the termination hearing, the therapist

didn’t believe the family members were ready to attend joint

sessions all together.

¶ 37 Thus, there is no indication in the record that the Department

failed to provide reasonable efforts relating to family therapy.

c. Family Time with the Older Children

¶ 38 Finally, mother contends that the Department didn’t satisfy its

reasonable efforts obligation because it never liberalized or

expanded her family time with the six older children beyond one

supervised three-hour session per week.

¶ 39 Mother relies on section 19-3-217(1.5)(d), C.R.S. 2025, which

went into effect on January 1, 2024. See Ch. 284, sec. 4, § 19-3-

217, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 1677-78. Under this new statutory

provision, when a court is making decisions about family time for a

child placed outside the home, it may restrict or deny family time

only when doing so is necessary to protect a child’s safety or

mental, emotional, or physical health, and it must order family time

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at the least restrictive setting and supervision level to satisfy the

child’s mental, emotional, or physical health. § 19-3-217(1.5)(d).

¶ 40 Here, the court initially ordered that family time be supervised,

and the parents had only supervised family time throughout the

case, as provided for in their treatment plans. That transitioned to

therapeutic family time in September 2022 based on the parent-

child interactional evaluator’s recommendation from her

assessment of the family’s needs.

¶ 41 Nothing in the record suggests that the juvenile court entered

any further orders regarding family time after section 19-3-

217(1.5)(d) went into effect at the beginning of 2024 — and,

certainly, mother hasn’t pointed us to any such orders. Nor has

mother pointed us to any place in the record where she requested a

change to the modality or the amount of her parenting time based

on this statute. See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d

567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (an issue is preserved when it is brought

to the court’s attention and the court has an opportunity to rule on

it). Thus, mother’s reliance on the statute now is inapposite. Cf.

E.D., ¶¶ 32-33 (rejecting a parent’s arguments based on a different

subsection of section 19-3-217 because the juvenile court hadn’t

16
amended its orders regarding parenting time after that subsection

went into effect and the parent hadn’t raised the issue to the

juvenile court); see also People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,

¶ 14 (an appellate court generally only reviews matters presented to

and ruled on by the juvenile court).

¶ 42 More generally, mother asserts that the Department prioritized

the children’s connections with their foster parents over their

reunification with the parents. Mother relies on People in Interest of

D.G., a case in which a department failed to satisfy its reasonable

efforts obligation when it prohibited any face-to-face visitation

between the parent and the children in the months preceding

termination based on the caseworker’s and other professionals’ view

that it was more important for the children to develop strong ties

with the foster parents. 140 P.3d 299, 302-06 (Colo. App. 2006).

No such facts are present here. Mother had visits with the children,

and neither the caseworker nor anyone else expressed a desire to

cut off the parents’ contact with the children in favor of the foster

parents. And, as noted, the family transitioned to therapeutic

supervised family time based on the recommendation of the parent-

child interactional evaluator following her evaluation of the family.

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¶ 43 Because we reject mother’s contentions of error, and because

the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we discern no

error in its conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts

with respect to mother. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

2. Father’s Contentions

¶ 44 Father contends that the Department rejected the services he

independently identified and participated in without providing any

timely alternatives. He cites three services in particular.

¶ 45 First, father points to the nutrition course he and mother took.

But the record shows that the parents declined to participate in the

nutrition course the Department had referred them to and instead

took a course with another provider before signing releases,

resulting in the provider being unaware of the family’s needs. The

caseworker — whose testimony the court found “credible and

reliable” — opined that the course the parents took wasn’t adequate

to address their nutrition issues, as it was too short and wasn’t

tailored to the family’s needs.

¶ 46 Second, father cites the Nurturing Parenting Program. But, as

discussed above, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding

that the parents were offered an appropriate course but elected to

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take other courses that didn’t adequately meet their needs. Father

also argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the court erred

by relying on the caseworker’s “seventeen-year-old expertise”

regarding the appropriate length of the Nurturing Parenting

Program. However, we don’t consider arguments raised for the first

time in a reply brief. In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

¶ 47 And third, father points to his progress in individual therapy

and his participation in a few initial sessions with the family

therapist. But he doesn’t indicate that the Department refused to

acknowledge his participation in therapy, nor does he develop any

argument about the Department’s failure to assist him in locating a

therapist. In other words, father doesn’t connect his participation

in these services to the Department’s reasonable efforts obligation.

¶ 48 On this record, we discern no error in the court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts with

respect to father. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

IV. Fitness within a Reasonable Time

¶ 49 Arguing that they made substantial progress on their

treatment plans, mother and father both contend that the juvenile

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court erred by finding that they were unlikely to become fit within a

reasonable time. We disagree.

A. Preservation

¶ 50 The Department and the GAL again point out that father’s

statement of preservation directed us to one of the other proposed

orders (the Department’s) to the juvenile court rather than his own.

Again, while we agree that father’s opening brief doesn’t satisfy

C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)’s requirements, it’s clear that he raised this issue

in the juvenile court. And even if he hadn’t, the outcome would be

the same. Cf. L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536

(Colo. App. 2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the outcome

wouldn’t change); People in Interest of R.R., 607 P.2d 1013, 1015

n.2 (Colo. App. 1979) (same). Thus, we address the merits of

father’s argument.

B. Relevant Law

¶ 51 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders

them unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

D.P., 160 P.3d at 353. Reasonable parental care requires, at a

minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting

adequate to meet a child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs

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and conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152

(Colo. App. 2006). A juvenile court can also consider a parent’s

noncompliance with a treatment plan in determining unfitness.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 52 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a reasonable time and, thus, whether the parent

can become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider, among other things, whether any change has occurred

during the proceeding. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584,

588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 53 When children are under six years old, the juvenile court must

also consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,

which require that they be placed in permanent homes as

expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

C. Analysis

1. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness Findings

¶ 54 In determining the parents were unfit, the juvenile court found

that, while the parents were compliant with some of the objectives

of their treatment plans, they weren’t successful with the treatment

21
plans. See E.S.V. v. People, 2016 CO 40, ¶ 20 (a parent’s partial or

even substantial compliance may not result in a successful

treatment plan that renders the parent fit).

¶ 55 Specifically, the juvenile court found that the parents hadn’t

“successfully internalize[d]” their treatment, “ma[d]e sustained

changes in their behavior,” or “correct[ed] the conduct and

conditions that led to the [Department’s] intervention.” The court

also found that the trauma the children had endured, “stemming

from their home environment,” was “ongoing and severe.” And it

found that for the parents to make sustained change, they needed

to recognize the trauma the children had experienced and change

their parenting. Yet the court found that, although the parents

eventually “superficially acknowledge[d] some accountability, they

were either [i]ncapable of or unwilling to take accountability for the

children’s circumstances and experiences in a way that evidenced

acknowledgment of the need for change.” And while the court

didn’t make express findings about whether the parents’ conduct or

condition was likely to change in a reasonable time, see section

19-3-604(1)(c)(III), it determined that “there [we]re myriad issues

and barriers with the parents suggesting the[] children may never

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be appropriately returned to their parents’ care and custody

regardless of how much time the parents are given to rehabilitate”

and that “these children cannot afford to wait any longer for

permanency.”

¶ 56 It was undisputed that the parents had made some progress

during the pendency of the case, particularly in the few months

leading up to the termination hearing. For instance, the

therapeutic family time facilitator testified that in the three months

before the hearing, the parents showed progress in engaging with

the children when the children became dysregulated. And

according to the caseworker, the parents were “starting to engage in

more feedback than they ha[d] before.”

¶ 57 However, the record contains ample support for the court’s

findings that the parents didn’t internalize their treatment or make

sustained changes in their behavior in a way that suggested they

might become fit within a reasonable time.

¶ 58 For instance, the court observed that the family home at the

start of the case was “completely untenable as a residence for the

children,” noting that “[i]t was filled with debris to the point that

movement was severely restricted” and “[t]he various places where

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the children slept were so cluttered and filthy as to be shocking to

the conscience.” The court further found, with record support, that

the parents hadn’t demonstrated their ability to maintain a healthy

and safe environment that could meet the children’s needs and

hadn’t acknowledged that their home at the start of the case was

unsafe for the children.

¶ 59 The court also found it “unacceptable” that the parents weren’t

forthcoming about their living situation during the case, including

showing the Department homes where they were supposedly living

that bore “little evidence that the parents were residing there” and

(in at least one instance) didn’t appear to contain “several of the

items the parents brought to family time.” Thus, it wasn’t clear

where the parents were living, what home they intended to bring

the children home to, and whether that home was appropriate for

the children. And the caseworker testified that the home the

parents said they intended to return the children to (a two-

bedroom, one-bathroom house) was a “small, tight environment”

that wouldn’t have allowed the children to use the coping

mechanism at least one of them uses of “tak[ing] space when they’re

feeling dysregulated to keep them from biting or pinching or hitting

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each other.” As the court explained, “these particular children as a

result of prior trauma struggle with small spaces in a way that

other children may not.”

¶ 60 The court also observed that malnourishment was another

initial concern in the case, as “there was food in the home but the

children were not always allowed to eat it.” And while the parents

had completed a nutrition course, mother was later seen eating food

out of the trash can and hiding her food, suggesting to the

caseworker that food may have been used as a source of control.

¶ 61 Other evidence indicated that the parents struggled to

implement change around ensuring the children’s access to an

appropriate quantity and quality of food. The parents often brought

meals for the children during visits, but they repeatedly brought too

little food or brought expired food and spoiled milk, including in the

months immediately preceding the termination hearing. The

caseworker testified that there was no indication that financial

constraints were preventing the parents from providing adequate

food for the children. She also said the Department’s concern was

“less about [the parents] . . . [not] hav[ing] any understanding about

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nutrition and more about [whether they] were . . . choosing to feed

their kids or choosing not to.”

¶ 62 As to family time, which was provided separately for the six

older children and the two younger children, the court found that

the parents had missed some of their visits with the older children

and had displayed “inconsistent attendance” and “lack of attention”

in visits with the younger children. The caseworker opined that

when visiting with the six older children at once, the parents

weren’t able to recognize and meet all of the children’s needs,

leading the children to become dysregulated; seek out other

providers to meet their needs; and leave visits angry, anxious,

worked up, and scared. She also opined that the parents struggled

to implement feedback they learned in one family time setting and

apply it to similar settings with the other children. For instance,

the parents received support in making more of a connection with

one of the children, such as through more meaningful greetings and

physical contact, but they didn’t use those same strategies with the

other children. The caseworker further said that father slept during

nearly every single visit with the two younger children and often left

for long periods of time during the visits.

26
¶ 63 As to family therapy, as indicated, the parents and the three

oldest children had begun the process in separate sessions a few

months before the termination hearing but were not yet ready to

attend joint sessions together. The family therapist, testifying as an

expert in family therapy and counseling, opined that before those

joint sessions could occur, “the children need[ed] to be able to feel

safe and they need[ed] accountability with details and specifics of

their [traumatic] experiences and if they don’t feel safe, it just

disrupts their development.” But according to the family therapist

and her clinical supervisor, the parents hadn’t yet taken

accountability for the trauma the children had experienced in the

home, aside from some generic statements of accountability. The

court also found that “the children’s continued feelings that they

lack safety” were a “barrier” to progress in family therapy. Indeed,

the three oldest children — who the court found credible — testified

that they didn’t feel safe returning home to the parents.

¶ 64 More broadly, the caseworker opined that the parents didn’t

successfully complete the treatment plans and didn’t display

substantial enough growth to make the children safe. The

caseworker also said she was concerned that the parents wouldn’t

27
be able to sustain the progress they had made shortly before the

termination hearing.

¶ 65 Finally, as the court noted, the EPP provisions applied to the

children in all three cases.2 And by the time of the termination

hearing, the six older children had spent over three years in foster

care and the two younger children had spent their entire lives in

foster care.

2. Mother’s Contentions

¶ 66 Despite these well-supported findings, mother contends that

she was either fit or capable of becoming fit within a reasonable

period. We are not persuaded.

¶ 67 Mother first asserts that the court’s fitness determination was

erroneous because of the “substantial” progress she had made on

her treatment plan, emphasizing in particular the treatment she

2 When the Department filed the petition in the initial case, several

of the children in that case were under six. Accordingly, the court
had the discretion to apply the EPP provisions to all the children
and appropriately exercised its discretion in doing so. See § 19-3-
104, C.R.S. 2025 (a dependency and neglect hearing conducted
under the EPP provisions shall, if appropriate, include all other
children residing in the same household); People in Interest of T.M.,
240 P.3d 542, 546 (Colo. App. 2010) (the statutory scheme places
discretion in the juvenile court to apply the expedited procedures to
the older children when such application is appropriate).

28
undertook and the family time facilitator’s testimony about her

progress in the months before termination. Yet the juvenile court

considered the evidence favoring mother’s argument — such as her

treatment efforts and her progress in family time — and weighed

that against the contrary evidence in determining that mother was

unfit. Contrary to mother’s argument, the record supports the

court’s findings by the clear and convincing evidence standard, and

we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that

of the juvenile court. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 29; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo.

2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court . . . when it

hears contradictory testimony on material issues.”).

¶ 68 Second, mother claims that her progress on the treatment

plan mitigated the child protection concerns that triggered the

Department’s intervention, such that the children’s need for

permanency was not a sufficient basis to terminate her parental

rights. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 60 (“Given that the evidence didn’t support

a finding that the parents were unfit, the need for permanency

alone wasn’t sufficient to terminate the parents’ constitutional

interest in the care and the custody of their children.”). But, unlike

29
in S.R.N.J-S., the evidence in this case supports the juvenile court’s

determination that mother remained unfit. And while the court

appropriately gave primary consideration to the children’s needs,

see § 19-3-604(3), as detailed above, their need for permanency was

not the sole basis upon which it rested its termination decision.

¶ 69 Third, mother contends that, even if termination was proper

with respect to the six older children, the court’s fitness

determination was in error as to the two younger children. She

asserts that the younger children are situated differently because

they didn’t experience any trauma in the family home (since they

never lived there) and they had lived in out-of-home placement for a

shorter time than the older children.

¶ 70 While mother correctly points out the divergence in

experiences among the two sibling groups, the juvenile court

explained that it was considering each child “separately” to reach a

resolution “in the child’s best interest.” See People in Interest of

J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Parental rights are

personal between each parent and each child.”). Indeed, the court

evaluated the family time objective as to the two younger children

separately from that as to the six older children, and it correctly

30
noted in its ruling that the younger children had never been placed

with the parents. And, contrary to mother’s claim that the court

“ignored” the different experiences of the younger children, the

court properly considered mother’s capacity to provide reasonable

parental care to each of the children, given their needs. See

S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 59 (“[A] determination of parental fitness is intertwined

with a determination of the child’s best interests.”).

¶ 71 Fourth, to the extent that mother contends the court erred

because it didn’t measure her progress from the time of the

stipulated adjudications about a year before the termination

hearing, we don’t address that issue because mother didn’t raise it

in the juvenile court. See M.B., ¶ 14 (we generally only reviews

matters presented to and ruled on by the lower court). Further,

mother didn’t develop her contention on the issue until her reply

brief. See Dean, ¶ 31 (we don’t consider arguments developed for

the first time in a reply brief).

¶ 72 Fifth, mother raises two constitutional contentions that she

didn’t fully preserve in the juvenile court. For her first contention,

she argues that the Department and the court unfairly punished

31
her for exercising her Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination, given the then-pending criminal charges.

¶ 73 In mother’s proposed order to the juvenile court, she briefly

noted the “impossible position” the parents faced of “having to

choose between their constitutional right to parent and their

constitutional right against self-incrimination,” but she stated that

“this concern is not the concern of the juvenile [c]ourt in deciding

the outcome for this termination hearing.” Thus, while mother

indicated that she was “concerned [about] sharing anything in

therapy with the children that may not be properly protected” under

section 19-3-207, C.R.S. 2025, she didn’t at any point ask the court

to address the issue. See Berra, 251 P.3d at 570.

¶ 74 Nonetheless, even assuming that mother preserved the issue

by alluding to her alleged constitutional dilemma, we perceive no

such dilemma. That’s because mother didn’t actually attend family

therapy sessions with the children, as the family therapist

determined the parties weren’t yet ready for such therapy as of the

time of the termination hearing. Thus, to the extent that the

caseworker and others expressed concern that mother wasn’t

taking accountability for her actions, it instead had to do with

32
mother not taking accountability in individual therapy sessions,

family therapy sessions not involving the children, and interactions

with service providers — all of which plainly were within the scope

of section 19-3-207’s protection. See § 19-3-207(2) (“No

professional shall be examined in any criminal case without the

consent of the respondent as to statements made pursuant to

compliance with court treatment orders . . . .”).

¶ 75 Moreover, any statements mother might have made in joint

therapy with the children likewise would have been protected from

disclosure. Under section 13-90-107(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025, no “person

who has participated in any psychotherapy . . . , including group

therapy sessions,” may be “examined concerning any knowledge

gained during the course of such therapy without the consent of the

person to whom the testimony sought relates.”

¶ 76 At any rate, as the juvenile court noted, even after the child

abuse charges relating to the six older children were dismissed a

few months before the termination hearing, the parents still didn’t

take accountability for the trauma the children had experienced.

¶ 77 Thus, it was appropriate for the juvenile court to rely in part

on the parents’ failure to “take full accountability for [their] prior

33
actions,” particularly given the court’s finding that “the evidence

overwhelmingly exhibits the children’s need for such accountability

if reunification [wa]s to occur.”

¶ 78 For her second constitutional contention, mother argues that

the Department and the court penalized her for living in accordance

with her religious beliefs, such as having a large family and letting

father play a dominant role in the family, in violation of her free

exercise rights under the First Amendment.

¶ 79 Instead of raising to the juvenile court the First Amendment

argument she now makes on appeal, mother raised only the vague

argument that “all families and parents can be rendered fit

regardless of their personal beliefs” and, thus, that “[p]eople’s

strongly held beliefs and faith are never a barrier to the successful

reunification of the family.” Therefore, mother’s assertion didn’t

adequately alert the juvenile court to consider and rule on the full

scope of the constitutional challenge she advances on appeal. See

Berra, 251 P.3d at 570.

¶ 80 With respect to the argument mother did preserve, the record

doesn’t suggest that the court based its conclusion that mother was

unfit on her religious beliefs. To the contrary, the court didn’t even

34
mention mother’s beliefs, and it based its findings of unfitness on

mother’s failure to correct the specific conduct and conditions that

had led to departmental intervention. See Part IV.C.1.

¶ 81 In sum, because the record supports the court’s findings

regarding mother’s fitness, we won’t disturb its conclusion that the

termination criteria were satisfied. See A.M., ¶¶ 15, 48; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

3. Father’s Contention

¶ 82 Father similarly maintains that he could become fit within a

reasonable period because he “substantially complet[ed] all aspects

of his treatment plan and ma[de] positive changes throughout th[e]

case.” Like mother, he cites the treatment he underwent and the

progress he made before the termination hearing. But the juvenile

court weighed that evidence along with contrary evidence in finding

that while father had complied with some of the treatment plan

objectives, the plan hadn’t been successful and father hadn’t been

rendered fit. See Part IV.C.1. And, as noted, we do not reweigh

that evidence. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29; A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250.

¶ 83 Father also contends that he should’ve been provided

additional time to engage in individual and family therapy. Yet the

EPP provisions applied to these cases, the longest of which had

35
been open over three years, and the court concluded that expedited

permanency for the children was “critical.” And no witnesses could

predict a probable return home date for the children. The family

therapist testified that such a timeline was “impossible to predict”

but estimated (assuming cooperation by everyone) that the process

could take “several weeks working with [the] parents more” and

then “several months from that point forward with the children.”

See S.Z.S., ¶ 25 (a reasonable time is not an indefinite time and

must be determined by considering the children’s needs).

¶ 84 Father concedes that “some delay” in starting family therapy

arose from his unwillingness to take accountability, but, like

mother, he asserts that he was put in the “impossible position” of

having to choose between his constitutional rights to parent and

against self-incrimination. To the extent that father may have

preserved this constitutional argument by making statements

similar to those mother made in the juvenile court, we don’t

perceive any constitutional problem for the same reasons we

explained as it relates to mother.

¶ 85 Thus, as with mother, the juvenile court’s findings regarding

father’s fitness are appropriate and supported by the record.

36
Therefore, we won’t disturb the court’s conclusion that the

termination criteria were satisfied. See A.M., ¶¶ 15, 48; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

V. Disposition

¶ 86 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

37