Peo v. Williams

22CA1727 Peo v Williams 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1727
Jefferson County District Court No. 21CR2438
Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Destiny Rose Williams,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meredith K. Rose, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Destiny Rose Williams, appeals the trial court’s

judgment of conviction entered on a jury’s verdict finding her guilty

of second degree murder. We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

A. Shooting and Arrest

¶2 Williams testified that she and the victim, Camren Tomlinson,

started dating in summer 2021. They became familiar with each

other through mutual friends at the tattoo parlor that she ran.

Williams’s business was largely cash based, and she worked late

hours, so she often carried a .38 caliber handgun and was

experienced in handling it.

¶3 Williams testified that she became concerned a few weeks into

their relationship after noticing that Tomlinson’s behavior

drastically changed within a short period; specifically, he became

more aggressive, his sleeping patterns changed, and he abruptly

quit his job. When Williams found drug paraphernalia at her home

she confronted Tomlinson, and he admitted that he was using and

dealing drugs.

¶4 Williams stated that, after the revelation, the couple frequently

argued because she wanted him to stop his drug activity.

1
¶5 In late August 2021, Williams and Tomlinson met at a local

bar on their motorcycles. They had a disagreement, and Williams

became upset with Tomlinson after realizing that he had left the bar

without her. At around 2 a.m., they started arguing via text; she

sent him the following message: “Fucking coward I love to put men

like you in their fucking place.” At 2:32 a.m. she also sent him a

message that said, “Thanks for pushing the final button.” She later

went home. Tomlinson called her and they started arguing again.

They arranged to meet in a gas station parking lot. Williams

testified that she drove her SUV instead of her motorcycle because

she was emotional and concerned that she would not be safely

visible at night. Williams’s handgun was in the center console of

the SUV.

¶6 Tomlinson arrived at the gas station on his motorcycle.

Williams arrived a few minutes later, and they started arguing in

her SUV. Williams got frustrated and left the vehicle. Tomlinson,

who was taller and at least forty pounds heavier than Williams,

followed her on the sidewalk and violently grabbed her left arm.

Williams felt a “pop” in her shoulder and a burning, stabbing pain

(it was later revealed that she suffered a dislocated shoulder). She

2
started screaming and Tomlinson allegedly squeezed her throat,

telling her to “shut . . . up before one of them [catches] a . . . DV.”

¶7 She testified that while holding her keys in her right hand, she

punched Tomlinson in the face, hurried back to the SUV, and drove

away. At some point she realized that Tomlinson was following her

on his motorcycle. She testified that she slammed on her brakes as

she approached a curve, which resulted in Tomlinson crashing his

bike. He was not wearing a helmet or protective body gear. She got

out of the vehicle and asked if he needed medical assistance or help

picking up the bike. Tomlinson yelled at her to “fucking leave,” so

she left in the SUV.

¶8 Williams then turned around, purportedly because she was

concerned that Tomlinson may have been seriously injured. When

she arrived at the crash scene, she saw Tomlinson pacing and

seemingly enraged. She stayed in the SUV. Tomlinson thew his

goggles at her, striking the door jamb.

¶9 Williams testified that Tomlinson then rushed toward the SUV

with his arms and hands outstretched. She stated that she pulled

her handgun from the center console, and when Tomlinson was

about three feet from her, she fired a single shot in his direction.

3
Williams stated that Tomlinson had a look in his eyes that she had

never seen before and she was afraid he would kill her.

¶ 10 Williams testified that, after firing the shot, she panicked,

drove away, called Devon Garduno (her friend), and packed a bag.

¶ 11 When he arrived, Garduno observed Tomlinson lying on his

back, bleeding profusely, and unresponsive. Garduno put

Tomlinson into the back seat of his car and transported him to a

parking lot near the front of a hospital and called 911. Tomlinson

eventually died from the gunshot wound.

¶ 12 Williams and Garduno subsequently drove to Fort Morgan,

where they stayed in a hotel. Garduno testified that while driving

there, Williams concealed her phone in a potato chip bag so it could

not be tracked. After speaking with her father, Williams eventually

turned herself in to law enforcement. In a subsequent police

interview, Williams confessed to shooting Tomlinson. She and

Garduno were both arrested for their roles in Tomlinson’s death.

The prosecution charged Williams with first degree murder,

tampering with a deceased human body, and two crime of violence

counts.

4
B. Trial and Conviction

¶ 13 Williams’s counsel filed a pretrial motion to allow a defense

expert to be present and observe the prosecution’s anticipated

testing of the shirt that Tomlinson was wearing when he was shot.

Defense counsel argued that the prosecution’s testing might be

consumptive or destructive to evidence that was critical to the

defense. The prosecution responded by assuring the court and

defense that it would comply with its obligations under section 16-

3-309(1), C.R.S. 2025, which requires the prosecution’s agents,

when handling evidence that they reasonably foresee may be

favorable to the defense, to act in “good faith and in accordance

with regular procedures designed to preserve the evidence.” The

trial court denied Williams’s motion but required the prosecution to

provide her counsel notice of any testing that presented a risk of

being consumptive or destructive.

¶ 14 The prosecution subsequently sent Tomlinson’s shirt to the

Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for forensic testing, without

providing notice to the defense. The CBI testing damaged the shirt

in a manner that prevented the defense expert from conducting

planned tests. As a result, Williams moved to dismiss the case.

5
The court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to trial,

where Williams testified that she acted in self-defense.

¶ 15 The jury found Williams guilty of second degree murder but

acquitted her of the remaining charges. The court sentenced her to

twenty-five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. The Destruction of Evidence

¶ 16 Williams contends that the trial court deprived her of due

process by denying her motion to dismiss because the CBI’s testing

destroyed evidence that the prosecution knew or should have

known was exculpatory or potentially exculpatory.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 17 The defense engaged Richard Tewes as a crime scene expert.

The defense explained that the “bullet wipe1” was removed during

the CBI’s testing and moved to dismiss the case. Specifically, the

motion to dismiss alleged that “Tewes’[s] analysis of the shirt worn

[was] absolutely vital to [Williams’s] defense” and that Tewes had

planned to “conduct analysis of the fibers of the shirt” and “use the

shirt (in particular its[] bullet hole) to reconstruct the crime scene

1 “Bullet wipe” refers to the black ring of residue that is sometimes

present around a bullet hole.

6
using mannequins, a model of the car, and firing rods.” Williams

also asserted that “bullet ring residue would have been used to give

‘the elliptical angle of the bullet upon contact’” and that the

“removal of this material also render[ed] useless any microscopic

examination of the bullet hole” to independently determine the

distance from which the fatal shot had been fired.

¶ 18 Based on the consumption or destruction of this evidence,

Williams moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively, for dismissal of

the first degree murder charge, exclusion of testimony from the

prosecution’s expert witness, and the giving of an instruction to the

jury that the prosecution had destroyed evidence, thereby

precluding the defense’s ability to independently test Tomlinson’s

shirt.

¶ 19 Relying on Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the trial

court denied Williams’s motion, reasoning as follows:

[T]he notice the People had was with respect to
testing of the bullet hole to reconstruct the
crime scene using mannequins and model of
the car and firing rods, and not any reference
specifically to the angle of the bullet wipe here.
So even to the extent that there might be the
consumption of this bullet wipe based on the
chemical tests that have been administered,
the defense has not been deprived of the ability

7
to reconstruct the incident here, and they
haven’t shown how that ring would be
exculpatory or what the exculpatory value of
that evidence would be, and . . . they failed to
show any bad faith on the [part of the] People
as well given that the issue seems to be
different than what was originally raised with
the Court with respect to that evidence.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 We review preserved due process contentions de novo. People

v. Burlingame, 2019 COA 17, ¶ 11. The Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution requires the state to disclose favorable

evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or punishment.

People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 172 (Colo. 2001). “In considering

whether the prosecution’s acts amount to a suppression of

evidence, . . . ‘when evidence can be collected and preserved in the

performance of routine procedures by state agents, the failure to do

so is tantamount to suppression of the evidence.’” People v.

Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334, 337 (Colo. 1987) (quoting People ex rel.

Gallagher v. Dist. Ct., 656 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 1983)). Thus, the

prosecution must preserve evidence that may be favorable to the

accused. Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 172 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963)). To establish a violation of the prosecution’s duty to

8
preserve exculpatory evidence, a defendant must show that (1) the

state destroyed the evidence; (2) the evidence possessed exculpatory

value that was apparent before it was lost or destroyed; and (3)

comparable evidence was not available through reasonable means.

Id. at 172-73 (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489

(1984)).

¶ 21 If the evidence in question was not apparently exculpatory but

rather only potentially useful to the defense, to establish a due

process violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the state

suppressed or destroyed the evidence in bad faith. See Youngblood,

488 U.S. at 57-58; People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Colo.

1990).

¶ 22 If a defendant establishes that a due process violation has

occurred because of the destruction of evidence, the court may

impose various remedial sanctions, including dismissal of the case,

dismissal of particular claims, or other less severe sanctions.

People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 55 (Colo. 1985).

C. Analysis

¶ 23 Williams contends that Tewes’s ability to conduct bullet wipe

testing was essential because it could have revealed the position of

9
Tomlinson’s body when she shot him and therefore could have

supported her defense that she fired the handgun at close range

and in self-defense. The People counter that the trial court

correctly denied the motion because Williams could not show that

the prosecution’s failure to preserve the evidence met the Trombetta

prongs.

1. State Action

¶ 24 The parties dispute whether the State’s testing was wholly

versus partially consumptive. But the People do not seem to

dispute that the State’s testing precluded Tewes from testing the

bullet wipe. Thus, we assume that additional testing of the bullet

wipe was rendered impossible by the State’s action.

2. Exculpatory Value of the Bullet Wipe

¶ 25 To meet the exculpatory prong of Trombetta, a defendant must

show that the evidence would have been materially relevant to the

defendant’s theory of the case. Greathouse, 742 P.2d at 338. But

mere speculation about what the bullet wipe would have shown is

not sufficient to meet the exculpatory prong. See People v. Young,

2014 COA 169, ¶ 74 (The Due Process Clause “does not invariably

require a state to preserve evidence which might be favorable to the

10
accused when dealing with evidentiary material ‘of which no more

can be said than it could have been subjected to tests.’” (quoting

Wyman, 788 P.2d at 1279)). Nor is it met through conclusory

assertions. See People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54, ¶ 48.

¶ 26 Williams contends that the bullet wipe would have helped to

determine the position of Tomlinson’s body at the time of the

shooting. Tewes conceded that other evidence established the

bullet’s trajectory through Tomlinson’s body but maintained that

the bullet wipe would have allowed him to make a more precise

calculation of Tomlinson’s body angle.

¶ 27 But Tewes did not provide testimony supporting a conclusion

that the bullet wipe would have led to trajectory evidence materially

different from that which was available through the report

measuring the bullet’s trajectory through Tomlinson’s body. The

following exchange with the trial court is illustrative:

THE COURT: What [will the bullet wipe] show
you independent of the information that you
have as it relates to reconstruction?

[TEWES]: It’s one more piece of the puzzle,
Your Honor. The angle that it strikes the shirt
gives you the positioning of the shirt. You can
have a lot of different movements of the body.

11
THE COURT: What is the significance of the
position of the shirt as it relates to your
assessment?

[TEWES]: That, I can’t tell you, because I can’t
do the exam.

¶ 28 But even if we assume that the bullet wipe could have

provided relevant information with respect to the posture of

Tomlinson’s body, Williams does not explain how Tomlinson’s body

position would have materially advanced her self-defense theory

beyond the evidence that was already in the record. See People v.

Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 39 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Speculative assertions

regarding the possible exculpatory effect had the evidence been

available for testing are not sufficient to meet this burden.”). In the

absence of a showing of how evidence about the angle of the bullet

at the time it penetrated the shirt would have assisted her self-

defense theory, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by

finding Williams failed to meet her burden under the second

Trombetta prong.

3. Availability of Comparable Evidence by Reasonable Means

¶ 29 Williams’s claim also fails to satisfy the third Trombetta prong

— that she could not obtain comparable evidence by another

12
reasonable means. As the People note, one of the prosecution’s

witnesses — the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy —

explained that Williams shot Tomlinson at “near-contact range,”

which corroborated Williams’s testimony that Tomlinson was very

close to her when she pulled the trigger. The medical examiner also

testified that the photograph of Tomlinson’s shirt had gunshot

residue around the bullet hole, which indicated the barrel of the

gun could not have been “more than a few inches” away from his

shirt.

¶ 30 Williams fails to explain how the absence of the test results

from the bullet wipe could not be mitigated by the other available

evidence that supported her narrative. Indeed, in her motion to

suppress, her counsel acknowledged that the medical examiner

reported that Tomlinson’s gunshot wound “was sustained at ‘near-

contact range’ and that there was black soot surrounding the

gunshot hole on the shirt.”2 And Williams’s counsel said that

“[b]oth of these facts would have been important for arguing self-

defense . . . as the discharge of a single shot at close range could

2 The photograph of the shirt showed the black soot around the

bullet hole.

13
help substantiate Ms. Williams’s claim that she shot . . . Tomlinson

as he was charging at her in order to seriously injure or kill her.” In

addition, in an affidavit submitted in support of the motion to

dismiss, Tewes stated that the medical examiner concluded that

“the shooting was from ‘near contact’ range” and “that usually

means within inches. This distance is an extremely important

component of any self-defense claim.”

¶ 31 Similar evidence was admitted at trial. In addition, Williams

herself testified that Tomlinson was three to four feet from her when

she fired. And even the prosecution’s CBI expert testified that

Tomlinson was within four to seven feet of her. Thus, the evidence

indicated that Tomlinson was either a few inches or a few feet from

Williams when she fired. Given this record, we discern no error in

the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.3

3 Our analysis of the third Trombetta prong would be the same even

if we concluded that the consumed or destroyed bullet wipe
evidence was not apparently exculpatory, but rather only potentially
useful, and that Williams had demonstrated that the prosecution
acted in bad faith. See People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278, 1279
(Colo. 1990). Thus, we need not address the “bad faith” exception
further.

14
III. Specific Evidence of Tomlinson’s Abuse of a Former Girlfriend

¶ 32 Williams contends that the trial court violated her

constitutional right to present a full defense by precluding her from

calling Tomlinson’s ex-girlfriend, Sara Gentile, to testify about

Tomlinson’s prior acts of violence against her until after Williams

testified that she was aware of such acts. We perceive no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s ruling.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 33 The defense listed Gentile as a pretrial witness. The

prosecution objected to Gentile’s proffered testimony, which was

about specific instances of Tomlinson’s violent acts toward her

during their relationship. The prosecution argued that if Williams

lacked knowledge about those acts, they were irrelevant to her self-

defense claim. The trial court agreed that the evidence of

Tomlinson’s specific abusive acts would become relevant only if

Williams testified that she was aware of such acts. Thus, the court

ruled that Gentile could not testify until after Williams testified that

she was aware of them before she shot Tomlinson.

¶ 34 Defense counsel renewed their request to call Gentile on the

basis that Tomlinson’s specific acts toward Gentile could be

15
admitted to prove Tomlinson’s alleged character trait for violence.

The court denied defense counsel’s motion after finding that

character evidence must be confined to either reputation or opinion

evidence.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 35 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20. A trial court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on an erroneous view of the

law. Id.

¶ 36 If a trial court’s evidentiary ruling effectively deprives a

defendant of the opportunity to present a defense or conduct

meaningful cross-examination on material issues, it may violate a

defendant’s due process rights, in which case we review for

constitutional error. People v. Beilke, 232 P.3d 146, 149 (Colo. App.

2009). Deprivation of the right to present a complete defense

occurs only if the ruling “effectively barred the defendant from

meaningfully testing evidence central to establishing [her] guilt.”

Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2009). But

Williams did not preserve her constitutional contention. Thus, we

16
review this claim for plain error. Plain error is error that is “obvious

and substantial,” and we reverse only if the error casts serious

doubt on the reliability of the conviction. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO

63, ¶ 14.

¶ 37 Evidence that a person acted in conformity with a character

trait is prohibited under the Colorado Rules of Evidence, unless it

falls within an enumerated exception. See CRE 404(a). One of

those exceptions is evidence offered to prove “a pertinent trait of

character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused.”

CRE 404(a)(2); People v. Rogers, 690 P.2d 886, 888 (Colo. App.

1984).

¶ 38 Defendants are usually permitted to introduce only reputation

or opinion testimony about the victim’s character, not evidence of

specific prior acts. CRE 405(a). However, if a defendant knows of

the victim’s prior violent acts at the time of the offense, evidence of

the specific acts may be admitted to prove the reasonableness of a

defendant’s belief that they were in imminent danger of being

victimized by unlawful physical force. People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9,

17 (Colo. 1984). To present such specific evidence, the defendant

must show that

17
(1) [she] contends that [she] acted in self-
defense and there is competent evidence to
support the contention, (2) either the act
occurred or [the] defendant became aware of
its occurrence within a reasonable time of the
homicide, and (3) the defendant knew of the
victim’s prior violence at the time of the
homicide.

People v. Ferrell, 613 P.2d 324, 326 (Colo. 1980).

¶ 39 CRE 104(b) provides that when “the relevancy of evidence

depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall

admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient

to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.”

C. Analysis

¶ 40 Contrary to Williams’s arguments on appeal, the trial court did

not bar the admission of Gentile’s testimony. Rather, the court

ruled that her testimony would not be admitted until after Williams

— the only witness who could verify that she knew of Tomlinson’s

prior acts of violence against Gentile — had actually testified that

she was aware of the specific instances of domestic violence that

Gentile planned to describe. Thus, the court did not exclude the

evidence; rather, it controlled its timing by delaying it until after

Williams’s testimony.

18
¶ 41 After the prosecution presented its case-in-chief, Williams’s

counsel called Gentile as a witness. The prosecution objected to

her testifying about specific acts of violence committed against her

by Tomlinson. Defense counsel responded by arguing that Williams

was aware of these prior acts based on statements Tomlinson had

made to her. Counsel argued that such evidence was relevant to

address the credibility of Williams’s anticipated testimony that she

was aware of these incidents and that her awareness contributed to

her reasonable fear that Tomlinson was about to use unlawful

physical force against her when she shot him. Counsel also argued

that evidence of these prior abusive incidents was admissible to

establish Tomlinson’s character trait for domestic violence.

¶ 42 The prosecutor conceded that Gentile could testify about

specific acts of past violence, provided that Williams first testified

that she was aware of those acts before she shot Tomlinson. In

response, Williams’s counsel assured the court that Williams would

testify that she was aware of those prior acts. The trial court

responded by noting that the decision whether Williams would

testify did not rest with defense counsel, and instead was Williams’s

personal decision. See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 512 (Colo.

19
1981) (“[T]he decision on whether to take the stand is ultimately to

be made by the defendant.”). Thus, the court expressed concern

that counsel’s assurance alone was insufficient for admission of

Gentile’s testimony.

¶ 43 Defense counsel then offered to call Williams to briefly testify

to the court — outside the presence of the jury — that she was

aware of Tomlinson’s prior acts of violence against Gentile. The

trial court denied this request. The court inquired about whether

there were scheduling problems with obtaining Gentile’s testimony.

Williams’s counsel responded that Gentile had travelled from Grand

Junction, and it was likely that if Williams was required to testify

first, Gentile’s testimony would not be presented until the following

day.

¶ 44 At oral argument, Williams’s counsel acknowledged that

Gentile was under subpoena to testify. And the record does not

disclose what difficulties, if any, Gentile would experience by

delaying her testimony.

¶ 45 Ultimately, Williams elected to testify. She stated that she was

aware of one specific act of violence against Gentile because

Tomlinson had told her about it. Contrary to the proffer offered by

20
Williams’s counsel, Williams did not testify that she was aware of

multiple incidents of prior violence against Gentile. But Williams

also testified that she knew Tomlinson had assaulted a man who

had testified against him, and Tomlinson’s stepbrother.

¶ 46 Williams contends that the trial court erroneously concluded

that the admission of her testimony was a condition precedent to

the admission of Gentile’s testimony. To the extent that the court’s

ruling lends itself to this interpretation, we agree that it was

erroneous. The supreme court has expressly rejected the

proposition that “there must be competent evidence to satisfy the

Ferrell test as a condition precedent to the presentation of the prior

violence evidence.” People v. Lyle, 613 P.2d 896, 898 (Colo. 1980).

In rejecting the “condition precedent” argument, the court noted

that CRE 104(b) was expressly designed to permit the parties and

the court flexibility and efficiency in presenting evidence in a

manner that is not unduly confusing or prejudicial. Id.

¶ 47 Williams seems to argue that Lyle establishes a per se rule

that a court must permit a third party to testify concerning specific

acts of violence based on a representation from counsel that the

defendant will eventually take the stand and confirm that she was

21
aware of such prior acts. But we do not read Lyle so broadly. As

the supreme court there stated, “[T]o comply with the requirements

of [CRE] 104(b), the defendant must, at a minimum, make an offer of

proof that there will be ‘the introduction of evidence sufficient to

support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.’” Id. (emphasis

added). But it does not necessarily follow from this statement that

the court must permit the third party to testify based on counsel’s

representation that the defendant will testify that they were aware

of the prior incident.

¶ 48 Because a defendant alone controls whether they will testify,

no matter the confidence of counsel’s good faith representation,

whether a defendant will testify remains uncertain until they

actually take the stand. And clearly, the court was concerned

about this possibility. When counsel represented that “the

defendant is absolutely testifying and . . . will be saying that this is

one of the things she was aware of and was under consideration at

the moment that we’re talking about,” the court responded, “[B]ut

that’s not your choice. That’s [Williams’s] choice.” See Curtis, 681

P.2d at 512.

22
¶ 49 If, despite counsel’s assurances, Williams exercised her right

to remain silent, the admission of Gentile’s testimony concerning

Tomlinson’s specific acts of violence could have resulted in a

mistrial. See Lyle, 613 P.2d at 898 (“If there was no evidence to

satisfy the Ferrell test, it would have been proper for the trial court

to declare a mistrial or impose any other appropriate sanction.”).

Moreover, as illustrated by Williams’s testimony in this case,

sometimes counsel misapprehends the scope of the testimony a

defendant may be able to provide. Williams only testified that she

was aware of one of the prior violent acts against Gentile, not the

multiple acts that counsel had forecasted eliciting from Gentile.

¶ 50 Moreover, the record provides no explanation of whether

Williams’s counsel tried to present Gentile’s testimony — in person

or remotely — after Williams had testified. Nor does the record

reflect any request to preserve Gentile’s testimony via video so it

could be presented to the jury after Williams testified.

¶ 51 For these reasons, we reject Williams’s contention that the

trial court necessarily erred by requiring Williams to testify to her

knowledge about the specific acts before Gentile testified.

23
¶ 52 But even if we were to assume the trial court erred, we would

conclude that the error was harmless. First, we reject Williams’s

argument that the court’s ruling deprived her of the ability to

present a complete defense. To deprive a defendant of their right to

present a complete defense, the court’s ruling must effectively deny

a defendant the opportunity to meaningfully test evidence central to

establishing her guilt. Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at 1062. That did not

occur here.

¶ 53 In addition, Williams testified about one of the specific acts

that Gentile would have addressed. Furthermore, she described the

other violent acts that Tomlinson perpetrated against his

stepbrother and a witness who had testified against him in an

unrelated matter. And the evidence was undisputed that

Tomlinson injured Williams during the extended physical

altercation that preceded his death. Given these facts, there is little

doubt that the jury was aware of Tomlinson’s propensity for

physical violence and that Williams was aware of that propensity.

¶ 54 True, as Williams argues, Gentile’s testimony would have

provided independent corroboration of Williams’s testimony about

the prior acts of violence. But given the substantial evidence of

24
Tomlinson’s violence against Williams and others, we cannot

conclude that the court’s ruling regarding Gentile’s testimony

substantially influenced the verdict or the fairness of the trial.

See Hagos, ¶ 12. And because we conclude that any error does not

require reversal under the harmless error standard, it necessarily

follows that reversal is not required under the plain error standard

applicable to her constitutional argument. Id. at ¶ 14 (A plain error

“must impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction to a

greater degree than under harmless error to warrant reversal.”).

IV. Initial Aggressor Instruction

¶ 55 Williams next contends that the trial court violated her right to

due process by instructing the jury on the initial aggressor

exception to self-defense. We discern no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 56 A trial court has a duty to properly instruct the jury on the

applicable law. People v. Claycomb, 2025 COA 36, ¶ 14. We review

de novo whether the trial court’s instructions, read as a whole,

correctly informed the jury on the controlling law. Tibbels v. People,

2022 CO 1, ¶ 22. Generally, we review “a trial court’s decision to

give, or not to give, a particular jury instruction for an abuse of

25
discretion.” People v. Payne, 2019 COA 167, ¶ 16. But we review

de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant an initial

aggressor instruction. Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 32.

¶ 57 A person is justified in using physical force upon another

person “in order to defend [herself] . . . from what [she] reasonably

believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by

that other person.” § 18-1-704(1), C.R.S. 2025. For the use of

deadly physical force to be justified, the defending person must

reasonably believe that a lesser degree of force is inadequate and

that “[she] or another person is in imminent danger of being killed

or of receiving great bodily injury.” § 18-1-704(2)(a).

¶ 58 When properly raised, the prosecution must disprove beyond a

reasonable doubt the existence of self-defense. Castillo, ¶ 39. One

way for the prosecution to meet that burden is to prove that an

exception to self-defense applies. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 59 Initial aggressor is one such exception. A defendant may be

the initial aggressor if they “initiated the physical conflict by using

or threatening the imminent use of unlawful physical force.” Id. at

¶ 41 (citation omitted). A court may give an initial aggressor

instruction “if the evidence will support a reasonable inference that

26
the defendant initiated the physical conflict by using or threatening

the imminent use of unlawful physical force.” People v. Griffin, 224

P.3d 292, 300 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 60 In light of these authorities, the court gave a self-defense

instruction stating, as relevant here, that Williams was entitled to

use deadly physical force against Tomlinson provided

she was not the initial aggressor, or, if she was
the initial aggressor, she had withdrawn from
the encounter and effectively communicated to
the other person her intent to do so, and the
other person nevertheless continued or
threatened the use of unlawful physical force.

B. Analysis

¶ 61 Williams contends that giving this instruction was reversible

error because, in her view, there was insufficient evidence to

support a conclusion that she was the initial aggressor in the

interaction that resulted in Tomlinson’s death. The People respond

that the trial court properly instructed the jury because there was

some evidence showing that Williams was the initial aggressor.

¶ 62 As Williams contends, there was evidence produced at trial to

support a conclusion that Tomlinson was the initial aggressor at all

times, including when he was shot. But we disagree with Williams’s

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argument that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror

to infer that Williams was acting as the initial aggressor at the time

of the shooting.

¶ 63 Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that Tomlinson

was the initial aggressor at some point during the parties’

protracted interactions that night, an initial aggressor may lose that

status by withdrawing from the confrontation and effectively

communicating that intention to withdraw to the other party.

See Castillo, ¶ 43 (“After an initial aggressor effectively withdraws

from an encounter, the original non-aggressor becomes the

aggressor when the original non-aggressor ‘continues or threatens

the use of unlawful physical force.’” (quoting § 18-1-704(3)(b))).

¶ 64 Williams concedes that, during the early stages of the

altercation, she could have been viewed as the initial aggressor

based on her conduct in the gas station parking lot. But she

argues that she was no longer the initial aggressor at the time of the

shooting because she disengaged from that initial confrontation by

driving away. She argues that thereafter Tomlinson was the initial

aggressor because he pursued her on his motorcycle, and he was

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continuously the initial aggressor through the time that Williams

shot him. That is a possible interpretation of the evidence.

¶ 65 But the question before us is narrower: whether a reasonable

juror could conclude from the evidence that Williams was actually

acting as the initial aggressor at the time she shot Tomlinson. Like

the trial court, we answer that question affirmatively.

¶ 66 When a trial court instructs the jury on self-defense, it should

instruct the jury on any exception to self-defense “if the exception is

supported by some evidence.” Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 25.

The supreme court has declared that “some evidence” is comparable

to “‘any credible [even if highly improbable] evidence,’ ‘a scintilla of

evidence,’ ‘any evidence,’ [and] a ‘small quantum of evidence.’”

Id. at ¶ 24 n.7.

¶ 67 Tomlinson crashed his motorcycle when Williams abruptly

braked in front of him. After Williams stopped and spoke briefly

with him, he told her to “just fucking leave,” and she did. This

arguably constituted a mutual disengagement from the events that

had occurred before that time. But shortly after leaving the crash,

Willliams returned. And she was armed with a loaded handgun in

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her center console when she did so. Within seconds of returning,

Williams used that gun to shoot Tomlinson.

¶ 68 Even if a jury concluded that Williams reasonably believed

that Tomlinson was about to injure or kill her and that a lesser

degree of force was inadequate, that same jury could conclude that

by returning to the crash scene armed with a gun that she

eventually fired at Tomlinson, Williams was acting as the initial

aggressor in the renewed confrontation. See People v. Roberts-

Bicking, 2021 COA 12, ¶ 36 (“[M]erely producing the pistol during

an argument was sufficient to warrant instructing the jury on initial

aggressor principles.”); Griffin, 224 P.3d at 300 (“[E]ntering the

house, returning with a gun, and shooting the [victim] in the back[]

indicate [the defendant] had acted with intent, not in self-defense.”);

People v. Newell, 2017 COA 27, ¶ 28 (If “the prosecution has offered

evidence that the defendant was the initial aggressor, the jury

should be provided with the . . . initial aggressor exception, and be

permitted to weigh the evidence to decide whether self-defense has

been disproved.”).

¶ 69 Thus, the court did not err by giving the initial aggressor

instruction.

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V. Evidence of Flight

¶ 70 Williams also contends that the trial court erroneously

instructed the jury that it could consider her post-shooting

departure in determining her guilt or innocence. Again, we discern

no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 71 We review a trial court’s decision to give a particular jury

instruction for an abuse of discretion. Payne, ¶ 16. Williams’s

counsel did not object to the flight instruction at trial, so we review

for plain error. Hagos, ¶ 14.

¶ 72 In Colorado, evidence of a defendant’s flight may be admissible

to show consciousness of guilt if certain conditions are met.

See People v. Summitt, 132 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2006). Flight refers

to a deliberate attempt to avoid detection and arrest. Id. The

supreme court has cautioned that when the defendant’s identity is

undisputed, giving a flight instruction is “rarely advisable and

should never be given unless the peculiar facts of the case appear

to make it essential.” Robinson v. People, 165 P.2d 763, 765 (Colo.

1946). However, the supreme court has also stated that providing a

flight instruction is not reversible error if the “defendant had reason

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to believe that [she] had committed a crime, that [her] identity was

known, that [her] pursuit and apprehension would probably ensue,

and that [she] fled or concealed [herself] for any length of time to

frustrate this apprehension.” People v. Larson, 572 P.2d 815, 817

(Colo. 1977) (quoting Robinson, 165 P.2d at 765).

¶ 73 A number of jurisdictions do not merely caution against

instructing the jury on a defendant’s flight, but limit or expressly

forbid the instruction. See Hadden v. State, 42 P.3d 495, 508 (Wyo.

2002) (“[W]e hold that hereafter . . . the giving of a flight instruction

to the jury, in a criminal case, shall be reversible error.”); Dill v.

State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 2001) (“Because this flight

instruction is confusing, unduly emphasizes specific evidence, and

is misleading, we hold . . . that it was error to give the instruction.”);

Renner v. State, 397 S.E.2d 683, 686 (Ga. 1990) (“Hereafter, while

the state may offer evidence of and argue flight, it shall be error for

a trial court in a criminal case to charge the jury on flight.”

(footnote omitted)); see also Ford v. State, 206 So. 3d 486, 493

(Miss. 2016) (a flight instruction should only be given when (1) the

flight is unexplained and (2) the circumstance has considerable

probative value).

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B. Analysis

¶ 74 At trial, the court instructed the jury as follows:

If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime charged in the
information was committed by some person,
and that immediately after such crime was
committed the defendant fled, such flight
would be a circumstance, not sufficient in
itself to establish the guilt of the defendant,
but a circumstance which you may consider,
in connection with all the other facts and
circumstances proven at the trial, in
determining the question of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. It is for you to
determine from the evidence whether such
flight was caused by a consciousness of guilt
or by some other and innocent motive.

¶ 75 Williams contends that instructing the jury to consider

evidence of her flight was plain error because the supreme court

has cautioned courts to only give a flight instruction when it is

“essential” to a case. See Robinson, 165 P.2d at 765. She also

argues that the instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of

proof by unduly highlighting one piece of evidence and improperly

suggested that Williams had the burden to prove her innocence.

¶ 76 The People reason that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion or plainly err by giving the instruction because all four

Robinson factors were present, and the court merely instructed the

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jury that the flight evidence was “a circumstance” that the jury

“may consider, in connection with all the other facts.” (Emphasis

added.)

¶ 77 We discern no error — much less plain error — in the trial

court’s instruction. Neither party points to any case law in

Colorado holding or suggesting that it is reversible error to give a

flight instruction when a defendant’s identity is undisputed.

Indeed, to the contrary, the supreme court has approved giving

such an instruction when the Robinson factors are satisfied. See id.

¶ 78 There was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Williams

had reason to know that shooting Tomlinson was a crime. Second,

her efforts to conceal her cell phone to avoid being tracked suggest

that she was aware people may be able to identify her as the person

who shot Tomlinson. Third, there was sufficient evidence to

suggest that Williams knew that law enforcement would likely

pursue her. Finally, Williams fled to Fort Morgan. Because there is

sufficient evidence to support the instruction, and the supreme

court has authorized giving it in these circumstances, we discern no

error.

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¶ 79 Nor are we persuaded by Williams’s argument that the

instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof by unduly

focusing on evidence of her flight. The instruction properly

informed the jury that it may, but was not required to, consider the

circumstances of Williams’s flight along with “the other facts and

circumstances proven at the trial.” Finally, we see no merit in

Williams’s argument that the instruction required her to prove her

innocence simply because it permitted the jury to consider the flight

evidence in determining “her guilt or innocence.”

¶ 80 In the absence of further direction from the supreme court, it

is not error to give a flight instruction when the Robinson factors

are satisfied. Thus, the trial court did not error — plainly or

otherwise — by giving the flight instruction.

VI. The Detective’s Testimony

¶ 81 Williams next argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by precluding defense counsel from eliciting testimony from a

detective about the “21-foot rule.” We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 82 Recall that we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Elmarr, ¶ 20. For evidence to be admissible, it must be

35
relevant. CRE 402; see People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1038 (Colo.

2002). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the

existence of any consequential fact more or less probable than it

would be without the evidence. CRE 401. But under CRE 403,

otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its relevance is

substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.

B. Analysis

¶ 83 During the trial, Williams’s counsel attempted to elicit

testimony from a detective about a police training standard known

as the “21-foot rule.” The prosecutor objected on relevancy

grounds, and the court sustained the objection. Outside the

hearing of the jury, Williams’s attorney explained that “the reason

it’s relevant is the 21-foot rule talks about how police officers know

that anyone who gets within 21 feet of you, even if you have a

weapon, can get to you faster than you can raise the weapon.” The

prosecutor maintained his objection, arguing that police training

standards were irrelevant to Williams’s self-defense claim, and the

court again sustained the objection on relevancy grounds.

¶ 84 Williams argues that the exclusion of this testimony violated

her constitutional right to put forth a full defense because it would

36
have supported her self-defense theory. Specifically, Williams

reasons that testimony about the 21-foot rule would have provided

support for her use of lethal force against Tomlinson. The People

respond that the trial court correctly determined that evidence

about a police officer’s use-of-force standard was irrelevant to the

self-defense theory.

¶ 85 First, we reject Williams’s argument that the court’s ruling

deprived her of her constitutional right to present a complete self-

defense theory. Through both her testimony and the experts’

testimony, Williams was permitted to present extensive evidence

supporting her self-defense theory. See Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at

1062. Thus, we review this evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion. Elmarr, ¶ 20.

¶ 86 Williams was not a member of the law enforcement

community, and there was no evidence that she was familiar with

the rule. Moreover, a person in a violent domestic confrontation is

not similarly situated to a law enforcement officer performing their

professional duties. The substantial distinctions between those

relationships could have blurred the jury’s assessment of both the

objective and subjective reasonableness of Williams’s actions. See

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People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006, 1010 (Colo. App. 2002) (“Self-defense

under [section] 18-1-704 takes into account both the reasonable

belief and the actual belief of the defendant.”). Thus, admission of

such testimony may have misled and confused the jury.

See CRE 403.

¶ 87 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

excluding evidence related to the “21-foot rule.”

VII. Cumulative Error

¶ 88 Finally, Williams contends that the cumulative effect of all the

alleged errors warrants reversal. “The doctrine of cumulative error

is based on the notion that multiple errors, in isolation, may be

viewed as harmless, but the synergistic effect of the multiple errors

may be so prejudicial that they deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”

People v. Serna-Lopez, 2023 COA 21, ¶ 47. “Stated simply,

cumulative error involves cumulative prejudice.” Howard-Walker v.

People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. We have identified one possible error as

it relates to the trial court’s analysis of the admissibility of Gentile’s

testimony. But we have not identified any other actual or potential

error. Because we have not identified multiple errors, Williams’s

cumulative error claim fails. See id.

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VIII. Disposition

¶ 89 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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