People v. Jenkins

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
November 26, 2025

2025COA90

No. 25CA0630, People v. Jenkins — Criminal Law — Release
from Custody Pending Final Adjudication — Appellate Review
of Terms and Conditions of Bail or Appeal Bond; Appellate
Procedure — Appeals in Criminal Cases — Time for Filing a
Notice of Appeal

Addressing an unresolved issue of Colorado law, a division of

the court of appeals considers whether a petition for appellate

review of the terms and conditions of a criminal defendant’s appeal

bond under section 16-4-204, C.R.S. 2025, is subject to any filing

deadline. The division holds that C.A.R. 4(b)’s forty-nine-day

deadline for seeking appellate review in a criminal case applies to

appeal bond petitions filed under section 16-4-204. The division

further concludes that, although the defendant submitted his

petition late, he has shown good cause for filing it beyond the

deadline. The division therefore accepts the defendant’s petition as

timely filed.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA90

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0630
Fremont County District Court No. 23M499
Honorable Kaitlin B. Turner, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Willis Jenkins,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DISCHARGED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Welling and Lum, JJ., concur

Announced November 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert P. Borquez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 We issued an order directing defendant, Willis Jenkins, to

show cause why we shouldn’t dismiss as untimely his petition for

review of the district court’s appeal bond decision under section 16-

4-204, C.R.S. 2025. Addressing an unresolved issue of Colorado

law, we hold that C.A.R. 4(b)’s forty-nine-day deadline for appealing

a trial court’s judgment or order in a criminal case applies to appeal

bond petitions filed under section 16-4-204. But because Jenkins

has shown good cause for filing his petition beyond the deadline, we

discharge the order and accept Jenkins’ petition as timely filed. We

will address the merits of Jenkins’ petition by separate order.

I. Background

¶2 In 2023, Jenkins was charged with four counts of indecent

exposure in Fremont County. Because the sole county court judge

in Fremont County recused herself, Jenkins’ case was transferred

to a district court judge. Before trial, Jenkins pleaded guilty. The

court sentenced Jenkins to twenty-four months in jail. Jenkins

timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.

¶3 Just as his appeal was getting started, Jenkins filed a motion

in the district court to stay the execution of his sentence pending

appeal. The district court denied Jenkins’ motion. Jenkins then

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filed another motion with the district court, this time asking the

court to (1) reconsider its denial of his request for a stay of

execution pending appeal and (2) grant him an appeal bond under

sections 16-4-201 to -205, C.R.S. 2025. The district court denied

Jenkins’ motion on May 20, 2025.

¶4 On August 13, 2025, Jenkins filed a petition for review with

this court under section 16-4-204. In his petition, Jenkins asks

that we grant his requests for an appeal bond and for a stay of

execution pending appeal. We subsequently issued an order to

show cause directing Jenkins to explain why we shouldn’t dismiss

the petition as untimely. See People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9

(appellate court may raise jurisdictional defects on its own accord).

Jenkins and the People both filed responses.

II. Discussion

¶5 We conclude that C.A.R. 4(b)’s forty-nine-day deadline for

seeking appellate review in a criminal case applies to an appeal of a

trial court’s appeal bond decision under section 16-4-204. But

because Jenkins had good cause for filing his petition beyond the

deadline, we accept his petition for review as timely.

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A. Standard of Review

¶6 This case requires us to interpret section 16-4-204 and

multiple appellate rules. The interpretation of a statute or court

rule is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Zhuk,

239 P.3d 437, 438 (Colo. 2010). When interpreting a statute, our

primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the General

Assembly’s intent. People v. Burdette, 2024 COA 38, ¶ 46.

¶7 Whether a party has shown good cause to permit the late filing

of a notice of appeal “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the

court of appeals.” Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241, 1246-47 (Colo.

1988).

B. C.A.R. 4(b) Applies to Petitions for Review of an Appeal Bond
Decision Under Section 16-4-204

¶8 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, a court “may grant

bail after a person is convicted, pending sentencing or appeal, only

as provided by statute as enacted by the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.”

Colo. Const. art. II, § 19(2.5)(a); accord People v. Lewis, 2024 CO 57,

¶ 13; People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20, ¶ 7. The General Assembly’s

appeal bond statutes, sections 16-4-201 to -205, govern the

procedure for seeking an appeal bond and provide factors that the

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trial court must consider when deciding whether to grant an appeal

bond. Lewis, ¶ 14.

¶9 After the trial court grants or denies an appeal bond, either

the defendant or the People may seek appellate review under

section 16-4-204, which provides the “exclusive appellate process”

for review of an appeal bond ruling. Id. at ¶ 23. The statute states:

After entry of an order pursuant to section 16-
4-109[, C.R.S. 2025,] or 16-4-201, the
defendant or the state may seek review of said
order by filing a petition for review in the
appellate court. If an order has been entered
pursuant to section 16-4-104[, C.R.S. 2025],
16-4-109, or 16-4-201, the petition shall be
the exclusive method of appellate review.

§ 16-4-204(1).

¶ 10 Noticeably absent from the statute is any deadline for seeking

appellate review; it simply directs parties to “fil[e] a petition for

review in the appellate court.” Id. C.A.R. 9 also addresses appeal

bonds but similarly doesn’t specify a filing deadline.

¶ 11 The Colorado Appellate Rules fill the gap for appeals to this

court, however, providing default filing deadlines when no other

deadline applies. See C.A.R. 1(b) (“An appeal must be taken in

accordance with these rules except for special proceedings in which

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a different time period for taking an appeal is set by statute.”).

Under C.A.R. 3(a), “[a]n appeal permitted by law as of right from a

lower court to an appellate court must be taken by filing a notice of

appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within the time allowed

by C.A.R. 4.” In turn, C.A.R. 4(b) says that the appellant in a

criminal case, be it the defendant or the People, must file a notice of

appeal within forty-nine days after entry of the judgment or order

being appealed. C.A.R. 4(b)(1), (b)(6)(A).

¶ 12 Taken together, these rules make clear that C.A.R. 4(b)

supplies the applicable deadline for seeking appellate review in a

criminal case unless a different deadline is specified by statute or

rule. Because section 16-4-204 and C.A.R. 9 are silent on the

deadline for seeking review of an appeal bond ruling, C.A.R. 4(b)’s

forty-nine-day deadline applies. See Said v. Magdy, 2024 COA 109,

¶¶ 1, 8 (applying C.A.R. 4’s default deadline to appeals authorized

under statute that didn’t specify a filing deadline); see also Chavez

v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 20 (“Timeliness is determined by the

Colorado Appellate Rules.” (citing C.A.R. 4(a))). Had the General

Assembly intended a different filing deadline to apply to appellate

review of an appeal bond ruling, it could have stated that deadline

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expressly in section 16-4-204. Indeed, it has done so in other

statutes. See, e.g., § 22-63-302(10)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (twenty-one-day

filing deadline applies to teacher appeals of dismissals from

employment); § 8-74-107(2), C.R.S. 2025 (party must file appeal of

Industrial Claim Appeals Panel’s decision within twenty-one days of

decision being mailed).

¶ 13 Reliance interests and principles of finality also support our

interpretation. Absent C.A.R. 4(b) applying, nothing would prevent

an appellant from seeking review of an appeal bond ruling months,

perhaps years, after the trial court issued its decision. The People,

for example, could choose to belatedly challenge a defendant’s

appeal bond years after the defendant had been released,

potentially derailing important life decisions the defendant had

made in the interim in reliance on having been granted an appeal

bond. We don’t believe the General Assembly intended such a

result. Cf. People in Interest of J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 331

(Colo. 2002) (“Individual parties who rely on existing judgments

could be irreparably damaged by subsequent modifications to those

judgments.”); E.J.R. v. Dist. Ct., 892 P.2d 222, 226 (Colo. 1995) (“We

have long recognized that a definite public interest exists in the

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assured final adjudication of controversies and conclusiveness of

judgments.”).

¶ 14 We recognize that C.A.R. 4(b) requires the appealing party to

file a “notice of appeal,” not a petition for review as Jenkins filed in

this case. C.A.R. 4(b)(1), (b)(6)(A). But substantial compliance with

the rule governing the contents of a notice of appeal, C.A.R. 3, is all

that is required. People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Colo. 1989).

So long as the prevailing party couldn’t be misled concerning the

appellant’s intention to appeal or the judgment or order being

appealed, any technical defect in the notice of appeal is harmless.

Id. An appellant’s failure to designate in the caption that the

document is a notice of appeal, for example, will not defeat

substantial compliance. Widener v. Dist. Ct., 615 P.2d 33, 34 (Colo.

1980).

¶ 15 Applying a substantial compliance standard, we conclude that

Jenkins’ petition for review satisfied the requirements of a notice of

appeal. As an initial matter, we note that several Colorado laws, in

addition to section 16-4-204(1), require the party seeking appellate

review to file a “petition” to initiate the appellate process. See, e.g.,

C.A.R. 4.2(d) (party must file a “petition to appeal” for interlocutory

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review of unresolved questions of law in civil cases); § 11-59-117(3),

C.R.S. 2025 (party must file “a petition in the court of appeals” to

appeal a final order of the securities commissioner); § 24-34-307(3),

C.R.S. 2025 (judicial review of decisions by the Colorado Civil

Rights Commission initiated by “the filing of a petition in the court

of appeals”). Thus, depending on the context, a “petition” can serve

the same function as a notice of appeal by initiating the appeal.

¶ 16 Moreover, Jenkins’ petition substantially complied with

C.A.R. 3(g)’s requirements. Although the petition wasn’t captioned

as a notice of appeal, no party could be misled by its contents

regarding Jenkins’ intent to appeal the district court’s order

denying his requested appeal bond. As a result, we will treat

Jenkins’ petition as a notice of appeal. See Bost, 770 P.2d at 1213

(concluding a notice of appeal was adequate when the opposing

party wasn’t misled and the notice “clearly designated the issues to

be resolved on appeal and the order of dismissal from which that

appeal would be taken”); Widener, 615 P.2d at 34-35 (concluding

motion to stay judgment and to approve appeal bond substantially

complied with C.A.R. 3 and was adequate to constitute a notice of

appeal).

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¶ 17 To promote consistency and prevent confusion going forward,

we provide the following guidance to parties seeking to appeal a trial

court’s appeal bond decision. The appealing party should file a

“petition for review” as contemplated by section 16-4-204 within

forty-nine days of the trial court’s ruling on the request for an

appeal bond. See C.A.R. 4(b)(1), (b)(6)(A). Failure to file the petition

by the deadline may preclude appellate review. See People v. Baker,

104 P.3d 893, 895 (Colo. 2005). In addition to satisfying the

requirements of section 16-4-204, the appealing party should

include in the petition the information required by C.A.R. 3(g) for a

notice of appeal in a criminal case.

¶ 18 In the rare case in which the appealing party is unable to

prepare a complete petition for review within forty-nine days — for

example, when the hearing transcript required by section 16-4-

204(2) isn’t yet available — the party should timely file a notice of

appeal and an accompanying motion for an extension of time to file

the petition for review, keeping in mind that appellate review of an

appeal bond decision is expedited. See Jones, ¶ 15. The court will

then provide direction regarding when the petition itself, which

serves as an opening brief, is due.

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C. Jenkins Has Shown Good Cause for His Late Appeal

¶ 19 Jenkins filed his petition for review on August 13, 2025,

eighty-five days after the district court denied his request for an

appeal bond. Thus, Jenkins’ appeal is untimely under C.A.R.

4(b)(1)’s forty-nine-day deadline. And we may only extend the

deadline by thirty-five days under the “excusable neglect” provision

in C.A.R. 4(b)(3). Accordingly, Jenkins’ petition isn’t timely under

that provision either.

¶ 20 But C.A.R. 26(c) permits us to extend the filing deadline

beyond eighty-four days for “good cause shown.” See Baker, 104

P.3d at 896; Estep, 753 P.2d at 1246. This reflects the legal

tradition that, when a litigant is subject to continuing

imprisonment, “the important public interests in judicial efficiency

and finality must occasionally be accommodated.” Stutson v. United

States, 516 U.S. 193, 196 (1996).

¶ 21 In determining whether good cause exists to accept a late

appeal, we must assess the totality of the circumstances. Baker,

104 P.3d at 896. Three nonexclusive factors inform our analysis:

(1) the potential prejudice suffered by the People from the late filing;

(2) the interests of judicial economy; and (3) the propriety of

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requiring the defendant to pursue other remedies. Id. at 896-97

(citing Estep, 753 P.2d at 1248).

¶ 22 Applying those factors here, the People acknowledge that they

aren’t prejudiced by Jenkins’ late filing and that the delay wasn’t

extreme. We also note that Jenkins and his counsel didn’t have the

benefit of our opinion when preparing his petition for review.

Further, if we decline to accept Jenkins’ petition, Jenkins may well

have a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.

at 898. But such a claim would likely have to be litigated through a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief. See Baker, 104 P.3d

at 898. Given Jenkins’ relatively short twenty-four-month sentence

and the length of time it would take to fully litigate a postconviction

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, forcing Jenkins to pursue

this alternate remedy wouldn’t serve the interests of judicial

economy or substantial justice. Thus, we conclude good cause

exists to accept Jenkins’ late petition for review. See Estep, 753

P.2d at 1248 (finding good cause when the People weren’t

prejudiced by the late filing and defendant’s alternate remedy was

to file another motion for postconviction review and argue ineffective

assistance of counsel).

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III. Conclusion

¶ 23 We accept Jenkins’ petition for review as timely filed and

discharge the order to show cause.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LUM concur.

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