Stough v. ICAO

25CA0759 Stough v ICAO 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0759
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
WC No. 4-880-58302

Deborah A. Stough,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Department of
Revenue, and Self Insured,

Respondents.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Deborah A. Stough, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office

Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, D. Clay Thornton, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents Department of Revenue
and Self Insured
¶1 Deborah Stough appeals an order from the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (Panel) affirming a hearing officer’s denial of her

petition to reopen her workers’ compensation claim. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Stough worked for the Colorado Department of Revenue

(Employer) from 2006 until mid-2012. In 2012, Stough slipped and

fell while working, and she filed a workers’ compensation claim.

¶3 In April 2013, Dr. Daniel Olson determined Stough was at

maximum medical improvement (MMI) and assigned her a final

impairment rating. A few days later, Employer filed a Final

Admission of Liability detailing the total benefits that would be paid.

Stough objected but later entered into a settlement agreement with

Employer that resolved her claim. The Colorado Division of

Workers’ Compensation accepted the settlement agreement.

¶4 Ten years later, Stough filed an application for an evidentiary

hearing to reopen her settlement pursuant to section 8-43-303,

C.R.S. 2025, arguing that the settlement had been obtained

through fraud. At the hearing, Stough asserted that her cognitive

issues prevented her from recognizing the alleged fraud.

1
¶5 After the hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied

Stough’s request to reopen her settlement. The ALJ found that

Stough had failed to prove any fraud or show that she did not

understand the settlement agreement when she signed it.1 Stough

appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Panel, and the Panel affirmed.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 Under section 8-43-308, C.R.S. 2025, we may set aside the

Panel’s decision only when (1) the factual findings are not sufficient

to permit appellate review; (2) conflicts in the evidence are not

resolved in the record; (3) the findings of fact are not supported by

the evidence; (4) the findings of fact do not support the order; or

(5) the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable

law. In making this determination, we may not disturb the ALJ’s

factual findings if they are “supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

¶7 Substantial evidence is “probative, credible, and competent, of

a character which would warrant a reasonable belief in the

1 The ALJ also denied Stough’s request for an order levying

penalties against Employer, but Stough does not develop any
challenge to that ruling on appeal. See Vallagio at Inverness
Residential Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Metro Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69,
¶¶ 39-40 (declining to address undeveloped arguments).
2
existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to

the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.”

Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). It

is the ALJ’s role to assess the probative weight, credibility, and

sufficiency of the evidence, and the ALJ’s findings based on

conflicting evidence are conclusive on review. Delta Drywall v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 868 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Colo. App. 1993).

III. Analysis

¶8 Stough contends that her settlement should be reopened

based on fraud and her cognitive impairments. More specifically,

she asserts that she did not receive the neuropsychological

evaluation describing her cognitive deficits before she entered into

the settlement agreement. Because the Panel’s decision is

supported by the record, we perceive no basis to set it aside.

A. Fraud

¶9 A settlement of a workers’ compensation claim “may be

reopened at any time on the ground of fraud or mutual mistake of

material fact.” § 8-43-303(1). This authority is “permissive, and

whether to reopen a prior award when the statutory criteria have

been met is left to the sound discretion of the ALJ.” Kilpatrick v.

3
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2015 COA 30, ¶ 44 (citation omitted).

Absent an order reopening the proceedings, no further benefits may

be awarded after an award becomes final. Avalanche Indus., Inc. v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 166 P.3d 147, 152 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 10 Because the statute does not define “fraud,” we give the term

its common law meaning. See Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier, 2025 CO

36, ¶ 29 (noting that common law definitions may aid in

interpreting undefined statutory terms). Thus, to show fraud,

Stough must prove that (1) Employer made a false representation of

material fact; (2) Employer knew the statement was false; (3) Stough

was ignorant of the falsity; (4) Employer made the representation

with the intention that it be relied upon; and (5) Stough was

damaged as a result. See Vinton v. Virzi, 2012 CO 10, ¶ 15.

¶ 11 Stough appears to argue that Employer defrauded her by

failing to provide her a copy of a neuropsychological evaluation

completed by Dr. Dale Mann before she entered into the settlement

agreement. In her reply brief, she suggests that the original

evaluation was replaced with an altered copy. She made similar

claims at the ALJ hearing, testifying that (1) she did not receive a

copy of the evaluation until two years after she signed the

4
settlement agreement; (2) the evaluation she introduced as an

exhibit at the hearing was an altered version that omitted a post-

traumatic stress order diagnosis; and (3) multiple people conspired

to replace the original evaluation with the altered version.

¶ 12 But as the ALJ noted, Dr. Olson’s 2013 MMI report cited Dr.

Mann’s report and expressly noted that Dr. Mann found “some mild

difficulties with memory, attention, and concentration.” The MMI

report was attached to the Final Admission of Liability, which

Employer certified was sent to Stough and her then-attorney. The

ALJ found this evidence credible and reasonably inferred that

Stough and her attorney were on notice of Dr. Mann’s report before

executing the settlement agreement. The ALJ also found that

Stough failed to present any “credible or persuasive evidence” that

anyone replaced Dr. Mann’s original report with an altered version.

¶ 13 Thus, the ALJ found that Stough failed to prove that Employer

“purposely concealed any psychological diagnosis.” Because that

finding is supported by evidence in the record, we may not reweigh

the evidence or second-guess the ALJ’s credibility determinations.

See Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 57.

5
B. Competency

¶ 14 An ALJ may also set aside a settlement agreement when the

ALJ finds that the claimant was incompetent to enter into the

agreement. Powderhorn Coal Co. v. Weaver, 835 P.2d 616, 618-19

(Colo. App. 1992). In making this determination, the ALJ may

retroactively determine the claimant’s competency at the time of the

agreement. Id. at 619; see also § 8-43-207(1)(m), C.R.S 2025.

¶ 15 Stough appears to assert that her cognitive impairments, as

detailed in Dr. Mann’s evaluation, made her incompetent to enter

into the settlement agreement.2 But the only evidence she points to

on this point is the evaluation itself, which includes a finding of a

“mild,” unspecified “cognitive disorder.” Other than this evaluation

and her own testimony that she suffers some cognitive impairment,

Stough did not present any evidence that she did not understand

the settlement agreement when she signed it. In other words, she

2 We reject Employer’s argument that Stough failed to preserve this

argument. Although Stough did not use the term “competency” in
the ALJ proceedings, she asserted that she had “cognitive issues,”
and the ALJ found that “[t]he ALJ is not persuaded [Stough] did not
understand the settlement agreement at the time.” We therefore
deem the argument adequately preserved for appellate review. See
Cuevas v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2023 COA 64M, ¶ 35 n.3.
6
made no connection between her cognitive impairment and her

ability to understand the settlement agreement and its effect.

¶ 16 The ALJ found the evidence at the hearing insufficient to

establish that Stough was not competent to enter into the

settlement agreement when she signed it. Stough has not identified

any legal error in this determination, nor have we. And to the

extent Stough asks us to reweigh the evidence and reach a different

conclusion than the ALJ, we may not do so. See Sanchez, ¶ 57.

C. Other Issues

¶ 17 Stough alludes to several additional arguments for the first

time in her reply brief. We do not consider any arguments that

Stough did not raise in her opening brief. See IBC Denver II, LLC v.

City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 2008) (declining

to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief).

¶ 18 We also need not address Stough’s dispute of Employer’s

factual assertions in its answer brief that (1) Stough’s application to

reopen the settlement was initially dismissed for failure to plead

fraud with specificity, and (2) Stough’s fall caused her injuries.

These issues are irrelevant to the issues before us. See Pastrana v.

7
Hudock, 140 P.3d 188, 189 (Colo. App. 2006) (disregarding factual

statements in parties’ briefs that are irrelevant to issues on appeal).

IV. Disposition

¶ 19 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

8