Peo v. Roybal

23CA1313 Peo v Roybal 11-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1313
Adams County District Court No. 19CR907
Honorable Kyle Seedorf, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Timothy Nathaniel Roybal,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division B
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Taubman* and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 20, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Yaried A. Hailu, Assistant Attorney General
Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Timothy Nathaniel Roybal, appeals the district

court’s order revoking his Youthful Offender System (YOS) sentence

and imposing the previously suspended fifteen-year Department of

Corrections (DOC) sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 When Roybal was eighteen years old, he forcibly entered an

apartment and robbed five occupants at gunpoint, taking the

victims’ wallets, cell phones, clothes, and other personal items. He

pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a class 3 felony, in

exchange for the dismissal of the remaining fourteen charges. See

§ 18-4-302(1)(b), (3), C.R.S. 2025. The district court sentenced him

to fifteen years in the custody of the DOC, suspended on the

condition that he successfully complete a five-year term in the YOS.

¶3 At YOS, Roybal signed a contract that advised him of behavior

that could result in his removal or revocation from YOS. Shortly

thereafter, he successfully completed the intake, diagnostic, and

orientation (IDO) component of the program. He then advanced to

Phase I of his YOS sentence, a custodial period in which “a range of

core programs, supplementary activities, and educational and

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prevocational programs and services are provided to offenders.”

§ 18-1.3-407(3.3)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

¶4 More than three years into the sentence, YOS conducted an

administrative hearing to determine the suitability of Roybal’s

continued placement in the program. A multidisciplinary hearing

panel recommended revocation from the program based on his

failure to comply with the contract. Specifically, the panel

determined that Roybal had violated the terms and conditions of the

contract by, among other things, fighting other offenders,

advocating and creating a facility disruption, possessing

contraband, attempting to introduce drugs into the facility, and

engaging in other misconduct that demonstrated his lack of

progress toward rehabilitation.

¶5 After the YOS warden and the DOC executive director upheld

that determination, the prosecution moved to revoke Roybal’s YOS

sentence and reinstate his DOC sentence in accordance with

section 18-1.3-407(5)(c).

¶6 The district court held a revocation hearing and then granted

the motion. The court found that Roybal had violated the terms

and conditions of the contract and had not

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demonstrate[d] a pattern reflective of likely
success in the program. Instead, he
consistently demonstrated that he was
unwilling to comply with the program rules
and routinely engaged in disruptive behavior.

Consequently, the court revoked the YOS sentence and imposed the

suspended fifteen-year term in the custody of the DOC.

II. Analysis

¶7 On appeal, Roybal contends that the district court’s decision

to revoke his YOS sentence must be reversed because (1) the

prosecution did not present sufficient evidence establishing that he

violated the terms and conditions of the sentence, and (2) the court

based its decision on Roybal’s failure to progress to Phase II in the

YOS program even though he was statutorily ineligible to make the

progression when the suitability hearing occurred. We address

each contention in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶8 Roybal contends that the evidence was insufficient for the

district court to revoke his YOS sentence because the prosecution

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the specific

terms and conditions of the YOS underlying the prosecution’s

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revocation motion and (2) a violation of those terms and conditions.

We are not persuaded.

1. Applicable YOS Law and Standard of Review

¶9 The YOS statute provides a sentencing option for certain

youthful offenders convicted of felonies as adults. People v. Miller,

25 P.3d 1230, 1231 (Colo. 2001) (analyzing section 16-11-311,

C.R.S. 2000, the predecessor to section 18-1.3-407). Youthful

offenders1 may be sentenced under the YOS to serve their sentences

in a facility specifically designed for the program and separate from

inmates sentenced to the DOC. § 18-1.3-407(1)(c)(I). The program

consists of multiple phases, which are conducted in a controlled

and regimented environment. § 18-1.3-407(1)(a).

¶ 10 Under the statute, the district court must first sentence a

defendant to the DOC and then suspend that sentence on the

condition that the defendant successfully completes a term in the

1 For purposes of the statute, the term “[y]outhful offender”

encompasses “a juvenile or a young adult offender who has been
sentenced to the [YOS] or who is eligible for sentencing to the
[YOS].” § 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(III)(C), C.R.S. 2025. A “‘[y]oung adult
offender’ means a person who is at least eighteen years of age but
under twenty years of age when the crime is committed and under
twenty-one years of age at the time of sentencing.”
§ 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(III)(B).

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YOS. § 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(I). If a defendant successfully finishes the

YOS program, then the DOC sentence is deemed to have been

completed. § 18-1.3-407(2)(a)(II). But if a defendant does not

complete the YOS sentence or fails to comply with the terms or

conditions of the YOS, then the defendant must be returned to the

district court for revocation of the YOS sentence and imposition of

the suspended DOC sentence. § 18-1.3-407(5)(c).

¶ 11 Minimum due process protections are required at a YOS

revocation proceeding “for the same reason [those protections] are

required for revocation of a probationary sentence or parole.”

People v. McCoy, 939 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. App. 1997). This is so

because YOS “revocations may cause defendants to be placed in a

more restrictive confinement.” Id. Accordingly, due process in a

YOS revocation proceeding requires (1) written notice of the claimed

violations; (2) disclosure to the defendant of evidence supporting the

violations; (3) a fair opportunity to be heard in person and to

present evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine

adverse witnesses, unless good cause exists to deny such a right;

(5) a neutral and detached hearing officer or judge; and (6) the fact

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finder’s statement as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the

revocation. Id.

¶ 12 Nonetheless, a defendant facing revocation of a YOS sentence

isn’t entitled to the “full panoply of constitutional protections

guaranteed to an accused at trial.” Id. The prosecution must prove

a YOS violation by a preponderance of the evidence, with one

notable exception. See id.; see also § 16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 2025

(“[T]he prosecution has the burden of establishing by a

preponderance of the evidence the violation of a condition of

probation; except that the commission of a criminal offense must be

established beyond a reasonable doubt unless the probationer has

been convicted thereof in a criminal proceeding.”). In addition,

because the rules of evidence are relaxed in YOS revocation

proceedings, hearsay evidence is admissible so long as the

defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to rebut that evidence. See

McCoy, 939 P.2d at 540; § 16-11-206(3); see also People v. Kelly,

919 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo. App. 1996) (noting that, in section

16-11-206(3), the General Assembly expressed its intent to have all

probative evidence considered at probation revocation hearings,

even if that evidence would be excluded in a criminal trial).

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¶ 13 We review the record de novo to determine whether sufficient

evidence supported the district court’s revocation of a YOS

sentence. See Maestas v. People, 2019 CO 45, ¶ 2. In doing so, we

consider whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,

when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant violated a condition of the sentence. See People v.

Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 908 (Colo. App. 2002) (concluding that the

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of a

defendant’s probation when the fact finder could conclude that the

defendant had violated a condition of probation by using “a

controlled substance or other dangerous or abusable drug or

substance”).

2. Sufficient Evidence Supported the District Court’s
Revocation of Roybal’s YOS Sentence

¶ 14 The contract that Roybal signed on his arrival at YOS provided

that he could be removed or revoked from the program “as a result

of failure to actively participate[,] failure to meet the terms and

conditions of [his] sentence[,] and for serious misconduct.” The

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YOS contract also set forth a non-exhaustive list of prohibited

conduct, including, as applicable here,

• “[p]ossession of any contraband listed on the Administrative

Head’s Declaration of Contraband or as defined in the

[DOC’s] Code of Penal Discipline (COPD) [as] [c]lass I or II

offenses”;

• “[n]umerous violations of the [COPD]”;

• involvement in a gang and gang-related behaviors;

• “[n]umerous instances of remediation and/or removal from

[the general] population”; and

• “[f]ailure to participate in scheduled activities and events.”

¶ 15 At the revocation hearing, the prosecution presented extensive

evidence that Roybal had failed to comply with the contract during

his time at YOS. To begin, Roybal had amassed eight class I and

class II COPD convictions. Specifically, he was disciplined for

• fighting other offenders (twice), a class II violation;

• disobeying a lawful order, a class II violation;

• advocating or creating a facility disruption, a class II

violation;

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• theft, a class II violation;

• possessing a replica of a gun that he carved out of wood

during a vocational class, a class II violation; and

• attempting to introduce a synthetic cannabinoid into the

YOS (twice), a class I violation.

Roybal pled guilty to each COPD violation except for the

narcotics-related infractions.

¶ 16 In addition to Roybal’s disciplinary convictions, the record

shows he engaged in other conduct prohibited under the YOS

contract and the facility’s posted operational rules, as evidenced by

the fact that YOS staff generated roughly fifty incident reports

involving his misbehavior. See § 18-1.3-407(1)(d) (providing that

youthful offenders are required to follow DOC rules, regulations,

and standards); McCoy, 939 P.2d at 540-41 (concluding that the

trial court properly revoked a defendant’s YOS sentence because the

defendant, among other things, engaged in conduct contrary to YOS

facility regulations); cf. People v. Villela, 2019 COA 95, ¶ 18 (noting

that a district court may revoke a probationary sentence if the

probationer violates any condition of the sentence). For example,

although Roybal left a gang with which he had associated when he

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first arrived at YOS, he subsequently admitted joining another

gang. Further, Lieutenant Julio Miramontes, Roybal’s program

supervisor, testified that he had violated the contract and

operational rules by participating in three additional fights. In one

of them, Roybal was part of a melee that included seven other

offenders.

¶ 17 Similarly, Tony Fox, Roybal’s former case manager, testified

that roughly two gallons of homemade alcohol were found in

Roybal’s cell one week before his suitability hearing. According to

Fox, this conduct violated the COPD and was the second time

Roybal had engaged in it. Fox also testified about tattoo

paraphernalia that were found in Roybal’s locker box, a violation of

the COPD and posted YOS operational rules.2 And she said that

Roybal had failed to complete some work assignments in the past,

such as when he was terminated from a position in the kitchen

after not reporting to work at least three times.

2 Lieutenant Miramontes testified that the operational rules were

posted on the facility’s walls and available in each cell. As for the
COPD, Fox testified that offenders were “given the COPD books and
they [had] access to [the books] in the library and through [Fox].”

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¶ 18 We disagree with Roybal’s contention that Lieutenant

Miramontes’s and Fox’s testimony regarding his YOS violations

implicated due process concerns because the “witnesses lacked

almost any personal knowledge of the alleged violations beyond

what staff members had written in the[ir] reports.” As noted, in a

YOS revocation proceeding, all probative evidence is admissible so

long as the defendant has the opportunity to rebut any hearsay.

See McCoy, 939 P.2d at 540; § 16-11-206(3). Here, Roybal’s

counsel extensively cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses,

and the district court gave him the opportunity to present his own

evidence. See McCoy, 939 P.2d at 541 (upholding a YOS revocation

order that was supported by only hearsay evidence because the

“defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and

to rebut the evidence through her own testimony”).

¶ 19 Although Roybal’s misconduct varied in seriousness, the

district court concluded that his repeated violations of the YOS

rules hampered his ability to fulfill the requirements of the

program. As noted above, Roybal successfully completed the IDO

component of his sentence and progressed to Phase I, which

consisted of eight status levels. In Phase I, he attained the highest

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“Phoenix” status on two occasions but “regressed” each time due to

negative behavior. Moreover, the district court pointed to negative

chronological entries, which documented updates concerning

Roybal’s behavior at the YOS facility, COPD violations, and other

misconduct that it found precluded Roybal from advancing to

higher status levels in Phase I.

¶ 20 Indeed, Lieutenant Miramontes testified that Roybal’s rule

violations resulted in six regressions from Phase I to the initial IDO

phase, in which offenders are removed from the general population

for the purpose of addressing their behavioral problems. Lieutenant

Miramontes also testified that YOS staff sends an offender to the

IDO phase when the offender exhibits intractability or lack of

progress in the program.

¶ 21 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as we must, a reasonable fact finder could conclude

that Roybal failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the

YOS sentence and that he could not successfully complete the

program. Therefore, his sufficiency challenge to the district court’s

revocation order fails.

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B. The District Court’s Statement that Roybal Failed to
Progress from Phase I Doesn’t Warrant Reversal

¶ 22 Roybal next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by revoking his YOS sentence for failing to progress to

Phase II because he was statutorily ineligible to progress when YOS

staff recommended his revocation from the program. In support, he

directs us to the following statement that the court made in its

revocation order: “In the two years and nine months between the

beginning of his sentence and the . . . suitability hearing, Mr.

Roybal sometimes advanced to the highest level of Phase I, but

never advanced past Phase I.” (Emphasis added.) We discern no

error requiring reversal.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 23 As noted above, the YOS program consists of multiple

components. In addition to the IDO component and Phase I,

offenders must also successfully complete Phases II and III to

satisfy their YOS sentences. § 18-1.3-407(3.3). Offenders remain

in Phase I until becoming eligible for Phase II, “which may be

administered during the last three to six months of the period of

institutional confinement.” § 18-1.3-407(3.3)(c)(I). Roybal would

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have become Phase II eligible about four months after his suitability

hearing.

¶ 24 We review a district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s

YOS sentence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Johnson, 2022

COA 68, ¶ 35. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or is based on a

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. People v. Jones,

2025 COA 43, ¶ 19.

2. Any Error Was Harmless

¶ 25 Assuming, without deciding, that the challenged statement

was improper, we conclude that reversal is not warranted because

any error was harmless. An error is harmless if it does not affect

the substantial rights of the parties. Crim. P. 52(a). In the context

of a revocation proceeding, whether an error is harmless turns on

whether the district court would have revoked the defendant’s

sentence despite the error. When “one or more bases for revoking [a

sentence] are set aside on appeal, the revocation remains valid

provided at least one violation is sustained.” People v. Loveall, 231

P.3d 408, 416 (Colo. 2010). In addition, we may affirm a revocation

order when “the record clearly shows the trial court would have

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reached the same result even without consideration of the improper

factors.” Id. (quoting State v. Ojeda, 769 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ariz.

1989)) (applying this standard to a district court’s revocation of the

defendant’s sentence to sex offender intensive supervision probation

(SOISP)).

¶ 26 Here, the record demonstrates that the district court would

have revoked Roybal’s YOS sentence regardless of its finding

concerning his failure to advance beyond Phase I before his Phase II

eligibility. As discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.2, the

prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that Roybal violated

multiple terms and conditions of his sentence and that he could not

successfully complete the YOS program. The evidence established

that he engaged in several physical altercations with other

offenders, possessed contraband, received discipline for attempting

to introduce drugs into the facility and other violations of the

COPD, was involved in a gang, and repeatedly engaged in other

disruptive conduct despite being given numerous opportunities to

rectify his behavior. As a result of his YOS violations, Roybal was

unable to meaningfully progress in the program, and the court

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relied on these independent revocation grounds throughout its

order.3

¶ 27 Because the record makes clear that the district court would

have revoked Roybal’s YOS sentence even in the absence of its

reference to his lack of progress past Phase I, we conclude that any

error was harmless and, therefore, doesn’t require reversal. See id.;

see also People v. Howell, 64 P.3d 894, 897 (Colo. App. 2002)

(upholding a revocation order after finding that evidence

independent of the testimony challenged on appeal supported the

revocation of SOISP); cf. People v. Vigil, 2023 COA 12, ¶ 39

(reversing and remanding to the district court an order revoking

probation when the record didn’t clearly show that the outcome of

those proceedings would have been the same had the court properly

resolved the issue under appellate review).

3 For example, the court observed that Roybal demonstrated

intractability and could not satisfy the requirements of the YOS
because he “was returned to IDO multiple times”; “was cited for
multiple violations”; and “was given a variety of opportunities for
redirection and correction, designed to help adjust his behavior, but
he rejected these opportunities or otherwise failed to take advantage
of them.”

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III. Disposition

¶ 28 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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