Kuretich v. Smith

24CA1949 Kuretich v Smith 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1949
Fremont County District Court No. 24CV1013
Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge

Tyler Kuretich,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Michelle Smith,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 13, 2025

Tyler Kuretich, Pro Se

Michelle Smith, Pro Se
¶1 Tyler Kuretich appeals the district court’s judgment in his

wrongful eviction case against Michelle Smith, on the grounds that

the court did not grant him an adequate remedy. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At a bench trial, the court heard testimony from the parties,

both of whom appeared pro se, and made factual findings. A

transcript of the hearing is not included in the appellate record,

however.

¶3 Kuretich and Smith orally agreed that Kuretich, who needed a

place to live, could reside on Smith’s property in a camper that she

owned. In exchange, the parties agreed that Kuretich would

perform work for Smith, including property maintenance and

animal care. Smith originally allowed Kuretich to enter her home to

access water and electricity. The parties did not establish a

timeframe or end date for the arrangement. At some point, Smith

told Kuretich that he could keep the camper.

¶4 After a dispute arose between the parties, Smith asked

Kuretich to leave her property. When he refused, Smith restricted

his access to her home. Smith then sold the camper and forced

Kuretich to vacate it without notice, hoping that doing so would

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cause him to leave her property. But Kuretich slept in his car on

Smith’s property. Kuretich finally left the property after Smith

obtained a temporary protection order against him. He then filed

this wrongful eviction case.

¶5 The court found that the parties entered an oral agreement for

a month-to-month tenancy with an uncertain end date. It

concluded that Smith “wrongfully evicted” Kuretich and ordered her

to return the camper (or its value of $1,200) to Kuretich. It also

ordered her to reimburse Kuretich for a $199 veterinary bill that he

apparently incurred while caring for her animals.

¶6 The court did not, however, award Kuretich the full amount of

damages he requested, which included $1,000,000 and a criminal

fine for Smith’s alleged stalking. He accused Smith of stalking him

because she installed security cameras on her property and

declined to provide him with copies of the security videos. The

court found that the requested damages and fine were “completely

unreasonable and without merit” and that the evidence did not

support them. (The court also rejected Kuretich’s argument that he

was entitled to $5,000 in damages based on Smith’s “outrageous

conduct,” which Kuretich does not challenge on appeal.) Smith

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complied with the order, reimbursed Kuretich for the veterinary bill,

and relinquished ownership of the camper to Kuretich.

¶7 Kuretich then filed motions for “clarification” of the court’s

order, contending that he was entitled to (1) compensation for

various state and federal crimes and civil offenses that Smith

committed; (2) copies of the surveillance videos; and (3) possession

of Smith’s property and home. The court denied Kuretich’s

motions.

II. Analysis

¶8 On appeal, Kuretich asserts that the court erred by rejecting

his requests for relief in addition to the value of the camper and

reimbursement of the veterinary bill. He asks this court to award

him “possession of the stolen property and bedroom camper along

with restitution in the exact amount of $1,000,000.00 [and] treble

charges applied as legal relief from the crime that [Smith] and

affiliates committed and the hardship the appellant was forced to

deal with.” Kuretich further asserts that, “at the minimum,” he

should have “restoration of the premises and contents including the

bedroom camper and $1,000,000.00 monetary restitution,

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surveillance and the arrest of all parties involved including judicial

and law enforcement.”

A. Preservation

¶9 Kuretich did not preserve his argument that he was entitled to

“the arrest of all parties involved including judicial and law

enforcement” because he did not present such argument to the

district court. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must bring

the issue to the court’s attention so the court has the opportunity to

rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570

(Colo. App. 2010); see also Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis.,

2019 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600 (“It is axiomatic that in civil

cases, issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally

will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, this

court will not address the contention. (Even if Kuretich had

preserved this argument, he fails to cite any statute authorizing a

private right of action premised on the criminal acts he alleged. See

Winninger v. Kirchner, 2021 CO 47, ¶ 34, 488 P.3d 1091, 1097

(explaining that, “absent any language authorizing a private right of

action,” a criminal statute will not support a claim in a civil action

based on the alleged violation of the statute).)

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¶ 10 In contrast, Kuretich preserved his requests for $1,000,000 in

damages, possession of Smith’s property, possession of the camper,

and copies of the surveillance videos.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 11 A plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the fact and the

amount of damages. Veolia Water Techs., Inc. v. Antero Treatment

LLC, 2024 COA 126, ¶ 136, 564 P.3d 1089, 1114.

¶ 12 “The trial court ‘has the sole prerogative to assess the amount

of damages, and its award will not be set aside unless it is

manifestly and clearly erroneous.’” Ute Water Conservancy Dist. v.

Fontanari, 2022 COA 125M, ¶ 52, 524 P.3d 308, 318 (quoting In re

Estate of Chavez, 2022 COA 89M, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d 194, 205). But

whether the court “misapplied the law when determining the

measure of damages presents a question of law that we review de

novo.” Id. (quoting Estate of Chavez, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d at 205).

C. Kuretich Is Not Entitled to His Requested Relief

¶ 13 In his opening brief, Kuretich cites section 38-12-510(1),

C.R.S. 2025, which provides, “It is unlawful for a landlord to remove

or exclude a tenant from a dwelling unit without resorting to court

process . . . .” The statute allows a wrongfully evicted tenant to

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recover “statutory damages equal to the tenant’s actual damages

and the higher amount of either three times the monthly rent or five

thousand dollars, as well as any other damages, attorney fees, and

costs that may be owed.” § 38-12-510(2). It also gives the court

discretion to “order that possession be restored to a tenant who was

affected by a violation of this section.” § 38-12-510(3).

¶ 14 Kuretich fails to provide any legal basis supporting his request

for $1,000,000 in damages. To the extent that he argues section

38-12-510(2) entitles him to such an award, he did not prove that

he incurred actual damages in that amount. See Veolia Water

Techs., ¶ 136, 564 P.3d at 1114. The court found that, apart from

the value of the camper and the amount of the veterinary bill,

Kuretich presented “no evidence of any other actual costs owed.”

¶ 15 Because the record does not contain a transcript of the bench

trial, we presume that the court’s findings and conclusions are

supported by the evidence. See Love v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131,

¶ 18, 417 P.3d 862, 864, aff’d, 2018 CO 20, 413 P.3d 1267; see

also People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155, ¶ 11, 415 P.3d 869,

871 (“Where the record is silent the law presumes regularity.”

(quoting McClain v. People, 141 P.2d 685, 686 (Colo. 1943))).

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¶ 16 Although section 38-12-510(3) gives a court discretion to order

restoration of a tenant’s possession of the premises from which the

tenant was wrongfully evicted, Kuretich fails to assert any legal

basis for possession of Smith’s property and home. Further, the

court found, “This tenancy was very short in duration and after

such an escalation and exchange of words, regardless of blame, it is

not surprising that [Smith] wanted to end this landlord/tenant

relationship.” The exhibits from the bench trial support the court’s

finding and underlying determination that any restoration of the

previously agreed-upon living arrangement would be inappropriate

under the circumstances. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the

court’s decision not to award Kuretich possession of Smith’s

property or residence.

¶ 17 Kuretich next asks this court to award him “possession of the

bedroom camper.” But the district court already granted Kuretich

this remedy. Moreover, Kuretich appended to one of his “motions to

clarify” a copy of a bill of sale transferring ownership of the camper

from Smith to Kuretich, indicating that Smith complied with the

court’s transfer order. Thus, the record establishes that Kuretich’s

claim for possession of the camper is moot. See DePriest v. People,

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2021 CO 40, ¶ 8, 487 P.3d 658, 662 (“When an actual controversy

no longer exists, an issue becomes moot because any relief granted

by the court would have no practical effect.”).

¶ 18 Finally, Kuretich did not plead and has not established a

possessory right to the surveillance videos. See Woo v. Baez, 2022

COA 113, ¶ 22, 522 P.3d 739, 747 (Replevin — a “possessory action

in which a claimant seeks to recover both possession of personal

property that has been wrongfully taken or detained and damages

for its unlawful detention” — requires that a plaintiff prove the

“basic element[]” of “the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession.”

(citation omitted)); C.R.C.P. 104. To the extent Kuretich argues that

the videos provide evidence of stalking or any other criminal

offense, Kuretich may contact the district attorney regarding

prosecuting Smith’s alleged crimes. See Kailey v. Chambers, 261

P.3d 792, 798 (Colo. App. 2011) (“[I]n American jurisprudence at

least, a private citizen [ordinarily] lacks a judicially cognizable

interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” (quoting

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973))).

III. Disposition

¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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