Peo v. Lewicke

22CA1377 Peo v Lewicke 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1377
Larimer County District Court No. 21CR169
Honorable Daniel M. McDonald, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Geoffrey James Lewicke,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lipinsky and Grove, JJ., concur

Prior Opinion Announced March 28, 2024, Vacated in 24SC390

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 13, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Levin Jacobson Japha P.C., David C. Japha, Evan J. House, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Geoffrey James Lewicke, appeals his judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted

second degree murder and several other offenses.

¶2 We previously issued an opinion affirming in part and

reversing in part. People v. Lewicke, (Colo. App. No. 22CA1377,

Mar. 28, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

Specifically, we rejected Lewicke’s contentions that several trial

errors warranted reversal. But we concluded that the trial court

erred with respect to restitution, and we agreed with the parties

that the mittimus inaccurately reflected the parole period. Lewicke

sought certiorari on one of the trial error contentions (involving a

challenge to the prosecutor’s voir dire) and the division’s resolution

of the restitution challenge.

¶3 While Lewicke’s certiorari petition was pending, the supreme

court decided a collection of cases involving restitution-related

issues not resolved in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75: Johnson v.

People, 2025 CO 29; People v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30; Tennyson v.

People, 2025 CO 31; and Snow v. People, 2025 CO 32. Shortly

thereafter, the supreme court granted certiorari in this case,

vacated our judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of

1
Johnson, Tennyson, and Snow. Lewicke v. People, (Colo. No.

24SC390, Aug. 4, 2025) (unpublished order).

¶4 Having reconsidered the matter, we again reject Lewicke’s

challenges to his conviction. But we vacate the restitution order

and remand for entry of an order that no restitution is owed and for

correction of the mittimus.1

I. Background

¶5 From the evidence presented at trial, a jury could reasonably

have found the following.

¶6 One evening, Lewicke invited two friends, Jenna

Holmstrom-Wetzel and Jessica Delapp, to hang out at his house.

They all drank together and consumed cocaine.

¶7 According to Delapp, Lewicke had been “getting kind of

aggressive” as the night progressed. She was concerned, and

eventually she asked Holmstrom-Wetzel to step outside with her

and smoke a cigarette.

1 The supreme court’s remand instructions pertain only to the

restitution issue. Nevertheless, because the supreme court’s order
vacating our judgment was not restricted or qualified in any way, it
effectively abrogated our entire original opinion. So we reiterate our
analysis and conclusions on the other issues.

2
¶8 While they were outside, Delapp looked through a window and

saw Lewicke “chug[] alcohol” and then turn off the lights and lock

the back door. Holmstrom-Wetzel went to the door to ask for her

phone and keys, which she had left inside, but Lewicke would not

let her in. While Holmstrom-Wetzel was at the back door, Delapp

waited further away because she was “terrified.” Lewicke then shot

through the door, striking Holmstrom-Wetzel in the face, severely

injuring her.

¶9 Holmstrom-Wetzel and Delapp left and called an ambulance.

When police later arrived at Lewicke’s house, he had barricaded

himself inside. Eventually, the police rammed through his door,

and he surrendered. Among the several guns police found in his

home was a nine millimeter handgun suspected to have been used

against Holmstrom-Wetzel.

¶ 10 Lewicke was charged with attempted first degree murder,

among other offenses. At trial, Lewicke testified that he was likely

responsible for shooting Holmstrom-Wetzel:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you have any doubt
now that you probably are the person that
hurt her?

3
LEWICKE: Unfortunately, yeah. It’s not fun
finding out you hurt one of your best
friends . . . .

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you have any idea
how the shot got through the door?

LEWICKE: It looks like I — looks like I did it,
because there was no one else in the house at
the time.

However, Lewicke emphasized that he had no reason to want to

hurt Holmstrom-Wetzel. He also reiterated that he had memory

issues and that he could not remember the shooting.

¶ 11 The jury found Lewicke guilty of attempted second degree

murder, second degree assault, reckless endangerment, and

prohibited use of a weapon.

II. Trial Issues

¶ 12 Lewicke raises three issues with his trial. Because none of the

issues is preserved, we review them for plain error. Hagos v. People,

2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. Plain errors are obvious and substantial. Id.

For an error to be obvious, it “must contravene (1) a clear statutory

command; (2) a well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case

law.” Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Pollard,

2013 COA 31M, ¶ 40), abrogated on other grounds by, Whiteaker v.

People, 2024 CO 25. Further, we reverse only if the error “so

4
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious

doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 15

(citing People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)).

¶ 13 Lewicke contends that the trial court erred by not sua sponte

(1) correcting the prosecutor’s statements on gun control during

voir dire; (2) denying the admission of Lewicke’s guns into evidence

(except for the nine millimeter involved); and (3) correcting the

prosecutor’s closing argument, which, according to Lewicke,

expressed improper opinions and referenced facts not in evidence.

We discern no reversible errors.

A. Voir Dire Inquiries

¶ 14 Lewicke argues that, during voir dire, the prosecutor

improperly asked potential jurors about their feelings on gun

control. We disagree.

¶ 15 The purpose of voir dire is to “allow[] counsel to determine

whether any potential jurors possessed any beliefs that would bias

them such as to prevent . . . a fair trial.” People v. O’Neill, 803 P.2d

164, 169 (Colo. 1990). This is a case involving gun violence, and

gun control is a sensitive topic that could improperly influence a

juror’s reasoning. Thus, we are not convinced that the trial court

5
abused its discretion by permitting this line of inquiry. People v.

Flockhart, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 37 (“[T]he ‘propriety of questions to

potential jurors on voir dire is within the discretion of the trial

court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless

an abuse of that discretion is shown.’” (quoting People v. Collins,

730 P.2d 293, 300 (Colo. 1986))).

¶ 16 In any event, the cases Lewicke cites to support his contention

that voir dire was improper and undermined the fairness of his trial

are distinguishable. They involve jurors commenting on the

credibility of witnesses or on the bad character of a defendant —

neither of which occurred here. See Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630,

632, 634 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding prejudice when prospective juror,

a social worker for child protective services, said sexual assault had

been confirmed whenever a child had made an accusation); State v.

McMahon, 894 P.2d 313, 316 (Mont. 1995) (finding prejudice when

prospective jurors commented on defendant’s reputation, and one

said she was fearful of him). Moreover, both cases are from other

jurisdictions, and thus they fail to establish that permitting this

particular inquiry ran afoul of “well-settled legal principle[s]” or

“Colorado case law” sufficient to make any error obvious. Scott,

6
¶ 17 (“[A]n error is generally not obvious when nothing in Colorado

statutory or prior case law would have alerted the trial court to the

error.”).

B. Admission of Multiple Guns

¶ 17 Lewicke next contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting into evidence his guns that were not used in

the shooting. (Lewicke does not challenge the admission of the gun

that was used in the shooting.) We disagree.

¶ 18 Initially, we note that Lewicke again relies largely on case law

from other states to argue that the admission of his guns was

erroneous. He contends there was no “sufficient nexus” between

the guns and the crimes charged, and thus the guns were

inadmissible. See, e.g., People v. Maldonado, 608 N.E.2d 499, 505

(Ill. App. 1992) (concluding that a weapon may be admitted if there

is a sufficient nexus between the weapon and the crime alleged,

meaning that there must be a showing that the weapon is “suitable

for the crime charged”). But we are aware of no Colorado authority

establishing such a narrowly defined “sufficient nexus” requirement

for the admission of firearm evidence. To the contrary, under

Colorado case law, “although it is not claimed nor proved that the

7
articles introduced in evidence were actually used in the

commission of the crime, a weapon or other instrument found in

the possession of the accused when arrested has been held

admissible as part of the history of the arrest.” Davis v. People, 321

P.2d 1103, 1105 (Colo. 1958); see also People v. Watson, 650 P.2d

1340, 1343 (Colo. App. 1982) (concluding that “weapons found

during a search are admissible as a part of the history of the arrest,

notwithstanding that there is no evidence that they were used in

the commission of the crime” (citing Hafer v. People, 492 P.2d 847,

850 (Colo. 1972))).2

¶ 19 To the extent Lewicke proffers the “sufficient nexus” argument

as a relevancy challenge, we reject it. Evidence is relevant if it has

“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

2 We recognize that this line of cases is perhaps a vestige of the res

gestae doctrine, which our supreme court has since abolished. See
Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 41. But that connection is not
entirely clear; notably, Rojas did not explicitly overrule or abrogate
these cases. Thus, the trial court and we are bound by Davis v.
People, 321 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1958). In any event, the fact that
these opinions remain undisturbed defeats any claim that
admission of the guns was contrary to existing law and thus
obvious error.

8
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401.

The People contend that the guns were relevant to Lewicke’s

consciousness of guilt. Specifically, the People contend that, when

combined with the evidence that Lewicke barricaded himself inside

the house after the shooting, a jury could reasonably infer that he

knew he had shot Holmstrom-Wetzel and understood the

seriousness of his actions — thus refuting his claims of intoxication

and lack of memory. The People also assert that the manner in

which the guns were found undermined the credibility of Lewicke’s

statements, made shortly after the incident, regarding his handling

and storage of the weapons.3

¶ 20 We agree with the People. The evidence of the guns was

particularly relevant to Lewicke’s credibility, as well as, albeit to a

lesser extent, his consciousness of guilt.

¶ 21 Lewicke also challenges the gun evidence under CRE 403. He

relies on People v. Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶ 35, for the notion that

3 At oral argument, the People proffered a third justification: that

the arsenal of loaded weapons strewn about the home supported
the prosecution’s theory of the case that Lewicke shot
Holmstrom-Wetzel with the goal of setting up a violent confrontation
with police to get himself killed. We do not consider this argument,
however, as it was raised too late.

9
there was “at least some possibility of prejudice” in admitting the

guns into evidence. But the possibility of prejudice alone does not

amount to a CRE 403 violation. Rather, the prejudice must be

unfair and must substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative

value. CRE 403. Moreover, “[b]ecause the balance required by

CRE 403 favors admission, a reviewing court must afford the

evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable

fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably

expected.” People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 44 (quoting People v.

Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002)). Thus, even if Lewicke’s

plethora of firearms could have possibly prejudiced jurors who

disliked guns (or, for that matter, jurors who were responsible gun

owners), the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the

guns given that they were probative of Lewicke’s consciousness of

guilt and credibility. See id. at ¶ 20 (“Trial courts have broad

discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence based on its

relevance, its probative value, and its prejudicial impact.”).

C. Closing Argument

¶ 22 We also reject Lewicke’s claim that prosecutorial misconduct

during closing arguments warrants reversal because the prosecutor

10
(1) expressed improper opinions and (2) referenced facts not in

evidence.

¶ 23 First, Lewicke contends that each of the following statements

was improper:

• The prosecutor’s argument that Holmstrom-Wetzel’s

recounting of events was “extremely credible under those

circumstances.”

• The prosecutor’s comment that “we know that [Lewicke]

doesn’t have memory problems; he has [attention deficit

disorder (ADD)].”

• The prosecutor’s statement that Lewicke’s explanation of

Holmstrom-Wetzel’s location at the time of the shooting was

“clearly . . . not credible.”

¶ 24 But a prosecutor may argue that a witness’s testimony was or

was not credible, so long as the arguments are anchored in the

evidence. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1051 (Colo.

2005). And each of these statements was connected to facts in

evidence:

• The statement about Holmstrom-Wetzel’s credibility addressed

her ability to recall facts after waking from a coma. The

11
prosecutor was arguing that Holmstrom-Wetzel was a credible

witness even though “she may not have gotten things perfect”

during her testimony due to “the effect of trauma and the fact

that she had been in a coma for a week.”

• The comment about Lewicke’s memory, seen in context, was

not a statement of the prosecutor’s personal opinion but,

rather, a reference to Lewicke’s testimony that doctors had

only diagnosed Lewicke with ADD and not with “memory

problems.”

• The prosecutor’s argument regarding Lewicke’s description of

Holmstrom-Wetzel’s location when she was shot reminded the

jury that the evidence showed that, at the time of the shooting,

Lewicke had a clear view of Holmstrom-Wetzel; when viewed in

context, the prosecutor was asking the jury to conclude that

Lewicke’s testimony regarding Holmstrom-Wetzel’s location at

the time of the shooting was not credible.

In short, none of the statements was an expression of the

prosecutor’s personal opinion.

¶ 25 Likewise, the statement Lewicke contends was an opinion on

Lewicke’s guilt was not improper. The prosecutor asked the jury to

12
consider all the facts and reach “the only verdicts that were

consistent with the truth of the case.” This was “simply asking the

jury to make a reasonable inference that defendant was guilty

based on the evidence presented at trial.” People v. Villa, 240 P.3d

343, 358 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that the prosecutor’s closing

argument to “[f]ind [defendant] guilty, because he is guilty” was not

a personal opinion of defendant’s guilt but, rather, a request that

the jury reasonably infer guilt based on the evidence).

¶ 26 Second, Lewicke contends that the prosecutor referenced facts

not in evidence during closing argument. Specifically, the

prosecutor told the jury that Lewicke had “patted the gun in his

holster” as he made a comment to Delapp that he could “pull a gun

and take you guys out with me.” However, Delapp testified that she

did not see a gun. Nor did she describe Lewicke wearing or patting

a holster, though she did say that he “like motioned.”

¶ 27 A prosecutor is not permitted to intentionally misstate

evidence or mislead the jury as to inferences it may draw from that

evidence. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. The People contend

that the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence (or at least did not

intentionally do so) because (1) Delapp testified that, though she did

13
not see a gun, Lewicke “motioned” as he made the statement; and

(2) Lewicke had a holster on his waistband when he was arrested.

¶ 28 But we need not determine whether the prosecutor

intentionally misstated the evidence because even assuming without

deciding that the statement was improper, it does not warrant

reversal. Reversal under a plain error standard is not required

when there is overwhelming evidence to support the conviction. See

Martinez v. People, 2017 CO 36, ¶ 38 (considering overwhelming

evidence in rejecting argument that jury’s access to out-of-court

interviews was plain error); People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 76

(considering overwhelming evidence when rejecting argument that

evidentiary error was plain); cf. Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029,

1034 (Colo. 1991) (holding that overwhelming evidence rendered

constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt after

assuming aerial surveillance evidence was wrongly admitted). And

there was overwhelming evidence that Lewicke knowingly shot

Holmstrom-Wetzel.

¶ 29 Holmstrom-Wetzel testified that, after she knocked on the

locked door and asked to get her belongings, she heard “a cocking

of the gun”; she again knocked and asked to retrieve her

14
possessions, took one step, and then was shot through the door.

Lewicke did not contradict Holmstrom-Wetzel’s testimony, nor did

he contradict Delapp’s description of the veiled threat to “take [the

women] out.” Instead, he asserted that he had no recollection of

much of the night. Despite his lack of memory, though, he

acknowledged that he was likely the person who shot

Holmstrom-Wetzel because “there was no one else in the house at

the time.”

¶ 30 Moreover, no testimony or other evidence suggested that

Lewicke acted with mere negligence or recklessness. Consistent

with the evidence presented, the jury convicted Lewicke of

attempted second degree murder and second degree assault.

Therefore, in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, any

error does not cause us to doubt the reliability of the judgment of

conviction. See Hagos, ¶ 14.4

4 We also reject Lewicke’s cumulative error claim. We have
identified at most a single error — mischaracterization of the
evidence during closing. See Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO
69, ¶ 25.

15
III. Restitution

¶ 31 Lewicke next challenges the trial court’s orders regarding

restitution, both as contained in the judgment of conviction entered

on July 1, 2022, and in a separate order for restitution entered on

November 2, 2022. Specifically, he contends that the trial court

erred at sentencing by reserving restitution “on an ongoing basis.”

In light of Snow, we agree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 32 At sentencing, the prosecutor informed the trial court that

Holmstrom-Wetzel said in her victim impact statement that her

medical costs were “ongoing,” and, thus, they were not yet

“enumerated.” The prosecutor requested that, for this reason, the

court “make a finding of good cause to allow the People to file for

restitution on an ongoing basis as that information comes in to us.”

The trial court agreed that there was “good cause to preserve the

right to file for ongoing restitution” and, accordingly, noted in the

judgment of conviction that restitution was “reserved on an ongoing

basis.”

16
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 33 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. People v.

Wiseman, 2017 COA 49M, ¶ 22. A sentence is illegal if it is

“inconsistent with the statutory scheme outlined by the legislature.”

Id. (quoting People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo. App.

2006)).

¶ 34 Colorado’s sentencing statute requires that every judgment of

conviction include one or more of four specific orders regarding

restitution:

(a) An order of a specific amount of restitution
be paid by the defendant;

(b) An order that the defendant is obligated to
pay restitution, but that the specific
amount of restitution shall be determined
within the ninety-one days immediately
following the order of conviction, unless
good cause is shown for extending the time
period by which the restitution amount
shall be determined;

(c) An order, in addition to or in place of a
specific amount of restitution, that the
defendant pay restitution covering the
actual costs of specific future treatment of
any victim of the crime; or

(d) Contain a specific finding that no victim of
the crime suffered a pecuniary loss and

17
therefore no order for the payment of
restitution is being entered.

§ 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2022.5 A sentence that does not include at

least one of these four provisions is illegal and must be corrected.

Snow, ¶ 24.

C. Tennyson, Johnson, and Snow

¶ 35 As noted, the supreme court instructed us on remand to

reconsider our previous opinion in light of its decisions in

Tennyson, Johnson, and Snow.

¶ 36 In Tennyson, the supreme court held that when the trial court

enters a proper (albeit implicit) order at sentencing under section

18-1.3-603(1)(b) that establishes the obligation to pay restitution

but defers until later the determination of the amount the

defendant will owe, any challenge to the timeliness of the ultimate

determination of that amount is a claim that the sentence was

imposed in an illegal manner. Tennyson, ¶ 45.

5 Section 18-1.3-603 was amended in 2025, but the amendments

only apply to “defendants sentenced on or after” May 30, 2025. See
Ch. 307, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-603, 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606-07. For
the remainder of this opinion, references to section 18-1.3-603 are
to the statute in effect in 2022.

18
¶ 37 The opinion in Tennyson has little bearing on this case, as

Lewicke asserted his challenge to the restitution order in his direct

appeal rather than in a Crim. P. 35(a) proceeding. We do, however,

recognize that, in Tennyson, the supreme court gave effect to an

implicit determination of the obligation to pay restitution;

specifically, it treated as an implicit section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) order

the sentencing court’s language giving the prosecution ninety days

to determine “not whether there would be restitution, but rather

‘what restitution is due and owing.’” Id. at ¶¶ 10, 45. Thus, the

case also stands for the proposition that compliance with section

18-1.3-603(1)(b) can be implied from the sentencing order. This

aspect of the case is relevant to our analysis, as we discuss below.

¶ 38 In Johnson, the supreme court held that the statutory

deadline for determining the amount of restitution is not

jurisdictional and can therefore be waived. Johnson, ¶ 25. The

court concluded that the defendant waived his challenge to the fact

that restitution was not ordered at sentencing because he signed a

plea agreement that said restitution would be determined within

ninety-one days after sentencing. Further, the defendant waived

the untimeliness of the ultimate determination of the amount of

19
restitution because he did not object to the sentencing court’s

scheduling order that would necessarily delay the resolution of the

prosecution’s restitution request until after the statutory period had

expired.

¶ 39 As with Tennyson, the court’s opinion in Johnson has little

bearing on this case. Lewicke did not enter a plea agreement. Nor

was there any scheduling order to which Lewicke failed to object

that necessarily resulted in the determination of the amount of

restitution after expiration of the statutory period. More

importantly, Johnson did not involve a sentence that failed to

include one of the four restitution provisions; the court entered a

valid order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b). Here, in contrast, for

reasons we discuss below, the error in Lewicke’s sentence is the

absence of any of the four required provisions at the time of

sentencing. In other words, while Johnson (and Tennyson) involved

the determination of the amount of restitution, this case centers on

whether there was a timely determination of the obligation to pay

restitution.

¶ 40 We turn, then, to the impact of Snow. In Snow, the supreme

court held that the sentence was illegal because the sentencing

20
order failed to include one of the four statutory provisions

establishing the obligation to pay restitution. Snow, ¶ 23.

Moreover, the court held that the sole remedy for such an illegal

sentence is vacatur of the untimely restitution order and entry of an

order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that no restitution is owed. Id.

at ¶ 38.

D. Analysis

¶ 41 As noted, the trial court ordered that restitution was “reserved

on an ongoing basis.” This may have been intended as a section

18-1.3-603(1)(b) order because the prosecutor had indicated he

could not yet determine the amount of restitution. See § 18-1.3-

603(2)(a) (authorizing reservation of restitution for ninety-one days

if the restitution information is “not available prior to the order of

conviction”). Or the trial court may have intended to order,

pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), that Lewicke owed restitution

“covering the actual costs of specific future treatment” for

Holmstrom-Wetzel. The restitution language in the judgment of

conviction does not give us any indication which of the two orders

the trial court intended.

21
¶ 42 Nor does the language satisfy either provision. By definition,

“ongoing” does not establish a closed-end ninety-one-day period.

And the court did not identify what “specific future treatment” (or

treatments) Lewicke would be responsible for. Certainly, the

prosecutor’s statement that Holmstrom-Wetzel had “ongoing

medical costs” that had “not been enumerated yet” provided

justification to grant the prosecution more time to submit

restitution information. And given Holmstrom-Wetzel’s horrific

injuries (which, according to her victim impact statement, included

“a shattered cheekbone, broken eye socket, slashed palate, broken

lower jaw, slashed nasal septum, injured sinus and lost [two]

teeth”), it is possible that she would need to undergo one or more

specific treatments for some time, thus justifying a proper section

18-1.3-603(1)(c) order. But the order reserving restitution “on an

ongoing basis” does neither.

¶ 43 Further, while Tennyson permits us to give effect to a

sentencing court’s implicit determination of the obligation to pay

restitution in compliance with section 18-1.3-603(1), we do not

think the trial court’s language is sufficiently clear to give it such

effect. The court did not say that the amount of restitution was to

22
be determined on an ongoing basis; rather, the mittimus said

“restitution reserved on an ongoing basis.”6 In our view, this

language is not sufficient to imply the determination that Lewicke

was responsible for restitution but that the amount would be

determined later. Nor, in our view, can the order be read as

implicitly ordering restitution for the actual costs of specific future

treatment, as there was no specificity at the time of sentencing as to

what treatment or treatments Holmstrom-Wetzel was undergoing.7

¶ 44 We pause to note an arguable disconnect between the

narrowness of the factual scenario in Snow and the breadth of the

supreme court’s holding in the case. In describing the facts of the

case, the supreme court noted, “As pertinent here, the prosecution

did not request restitution or give any indication that it intended to

seek restitution. Instead, it simply asked the court ‘to reserve

6 With respect to the second degree assault sentence, the mittimus

uses slightly different language: “[R]estitution to be filed on an
ongoing basis.”
7 Indeed, even the ultimate restitution order was, at least in part,

insufficiently tied to specific future treatment. The trial court
broadly ordered that Lewicke would be responsible “for the actual
costs of the ongoing or future treatment of [Holmstrom-Wetzel] for
medical expenses pertaining to this case and mental health
therapy.”

23
restitution at this point in time.’” Snow, ¶ 7. Indeed, in a footnote,

the court further emphasized that the prosecutor did not “even so

much as inform the court and Snow that it intended to seek

restitution, until it submitted the restitution information some two-

and-a-half months after the sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 38 n.13.

¶ 45 Nevertheless, the court did not narrow its holding to scenarios

in which such facts were present. Rather, it broadly held that the

sentence was not authorized by law “because the mere reservation

of the issue of restitution in its entirety failed to adhere to

subsection [18-1.3-603](1).” Id. at ¶ 22. Further, “because the

district court failed to enter at least one of the four restitution

orders authorized by subsection [18-1.3-603](1), Snow received an

illegal sentence.” Id. at ¶ 23. Perhaps most importantly, the court

did not leave any room for the application of a remedy other than

vacatur and remand for an order that no restitution is owed.

¶ 46 The People argue that Snow is distinguishable from this case

because everyone in this case knew the prosecution would

eventually seek extensive restitution. The prosecutor began his

sentencing argument by noting that the victim’s impact statement

indicated there were ongoing medical costs that had not yet been

24
“enumerated.” The defense attorney urged the court to impose the

minimum prison sentence specifically because “[t]here’s going to be

a substantial amount of restitution due and owing in this case, and

he is not going to be paying any of it while he is in the penitentiary.”

And the court said that it had “heard testimony, evidence, and [it]

has read plenty that there are going to be ongoing medical bills that

we do not know yet and cannot be quantified today.”

¶ 47 We note that the mere fact restitution was actually

contemplated at sentencing is not dispositive. In Weeks, the

prosecutor informed the court at sentencing that “he would be

seeking restitution but hadn’t filed a motion yet.” Weeks, ¶ 11. As

a result, the sentencing court in that case entered an order under

section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), establishing the defendant’s obligation to

pay restitution but reserving determination of the amount. Id.

Nevertheless, because that amount was not determined within the

statutory timeline, the supreme court held that vacating the

restitution order was the proper remedy. Id. at ¶ 28; see also Snow,

¶ 31 (“We chose the remedy of vacatur in Weeks because we could

conceive of no other appropriate remedy” for the failure to comply

with the statute.).

25
¶ 48 Similarly, here, the trial court did not comply with the statute.

As noted, the court neither (1) ordered that Lewicke was responsible

for restitution while reserving for ninety-one days the determination

of the amount of restitution nor (2) ordered at sentencing that

Lewicke was obligated to pay all costs of any specific treatment or

treatments. Instead, the court allowed the prosecution to, “on an

ongoing basis, file for restitution.” The restitution statute simply

does not allow for that path.

¶ 49 Thus, factual distinctions notwithstanding, we are bound by

the supreme court’s holding in Snow that a sentence is illegal if the

district court fails to enter “at least one of the four restitution orders

authorized” by the restitution statute.” Snow, ¶ 23. And because

Lewicke’s sentence is illegal in this way, under Snow, the sole

remedy is vacatur of the restitution order and remand for the

imposition of an order that no restitution is owed. Id. at ¶ 38.

IV. Mittimus

¶ 50 Finally, Lewicke and the People agree that the mittimus

misstates the term of parole associated with Lewicke’s attempted

second degree murder conviction. Attempted second degree murder

is a class 3 felony. See § 18-2-101(4), C.R.S. 2025 (“[C]riminal

26
attempt to commit a class 2 felony is a class 3 felony.”); § 18-3-

103(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (“[M]urder in the second degree is a class 2

felony.”). The mandatory parole period for a class 3 felony is thirty-

six months. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), C.R.S. 2025. But the

mittimus reflects a mandatory parole period of sixty months.

Because the trial court will have to issue a new mittimus reflecting

that no restitution is owed, we direct the trial court to note the

correct parole period on the new mittimus.

V. Disposition

¶ 51 The order for restitution is vacated. The case is remanded for

entry of an order pursuant to section 18-1.3-603(1)(d) that no

restitution is owed and an amended mittimus reflecting the correct

parole period. The judgment of conviction is otherwise affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE GROVE concur.

27