Peo v. Claypoole

23CA1206 Peo v Claypoole 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1206
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR1033
Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jamie Linn Claypoole,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER VACATED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Jamie Linn Claypoole, appeals the district court’s

order imposing restitution for losses arising from a dismissed case.

We vacate the portion of the district court’s order awarding

restitution in the dismissed case.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2021, M.B. reported to law enforcement that his

motorcycle was stolen from the parking lot of his apartment

complex. The surveillance video from the apartment complex

showed two male suspects arrive in a white truck, attach the

motorcycle to the truck’s trailer hitch, and drive off.

¶3 Several months later, Claypoole was seen leaving a stolen

truck. When officers approached Claypoole, he was attempting to

start a white and red dirt bike. Claypoole attempted to flee but was

taken into custody. Although the vehicle identification number

(VIN) was ground off the motorcycle, it was later identified as the

vehicle M.B. reported stolen.

¶4 As reflected in the charging documents, Claypoole was

charged with first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft with two or

more prior offenses under section 18-4-409(2), (3)(b), C.R.S. 2025,

and chop shop activity under section 18-4-420(3), (4), C.R.S. 2025,

1
in El Paso County Case No. 22CR1033. As part of a global plea

deal, Claypoole pleaded guilty to five counts of felony motor vehicle

theft across five separate cases, including Case No. 22CR1033.

Claypoole received a controlling sentence of sixteen years in the

Department of Corrections’ custody. As part of the plea agreement,

the prosecution dismissed a traffic case and three other pending

felony cases, including El Paso County Case No. 22CR725. The

agreement to dismiss these matters was not included in the plea

paperwork, but Claypoole’s counsel made a record at the

providency hearing that the parties agreed to dismiss the cases as

part of the plea agreement. The plea agreement did not mention the

specific amount of restitution to be ordered in Case No. 22CR1033

or Case No. 22CR725. The court granted the prosecution forty-two

days in which to file its restitution request. Neither party, nor the

court, addressed which cases were subject to restitution during the

providency hearing.

¶5 The prosecution filed its restitution request in April 2023,

seeking $4,529.99 to be paid to M.B. in Case No. 22CR1033 and

$9,800.44 to the victim in “Case 22CR725 DISMISSED PER PLEA.”

Claypoole filed an objection. At the restitution hearing, the

2
prosecutor introduced testimonial evidence for the restitution

sought in Case No. 22CR1033. Claypoole objected to the restitution

amount requested in Case No. 22CR1033. The court found that the

prosecution established that Claypoole’s conduct proximately

caused M.B.’s losses in Case No. 22CR1033 but reduced the

requested payment amount to $3,547.50.

¶6 The prosecution did not provide testimony or evidence

supporting the $9,800.44 in restitution requested for Case No.

22CR725. Claypoole objected, arguing the prosecution did not

provide evidence to support the restitution sought. The prosecutor

requested a continuance, claiming he thought that defense counsel

had only objected to the amount requested in Case No. 22CR1033

and not in Case No. 22CR725, and he was unprepared to address

restitution in Case No. 22CR725. The court agreed with the

prosecution and, over the defense’s objection, found good cause to

continue the hearing.

¶7 The prosecution submitted an amended restitution request

lowering the restitution amount in Case No. 22CR1033 but

continuing to seek $9,800.44 for dismissed Case No. 22CR725. The

amended request also noted that “[t]he decrease in restitution is in

3
case 22CR1033 only. All costs in the dismissed case 22CR725

remain the same.”

¶8 At the second restitution hearing, defense counsel indicated as

follows:

I’ve reviewed the additional documentation for
the 22CR725 case which was dismissed as part
of the plea. Outside of maintaining my
objection regarding the timing under good
cause, I don’t have a further objection to the
amount. [The prosecution] did provide me with
supporting documentation. So we don’t need to
have a hearing. And I let [the prosecutor] know
that so he did not have to appear today.

¶9 Over defense counsel’s objection, the court ordered restitution

in the amount of $13,347.94, with $3,547.50 as restitution for M.B.

in Case No. 22CR1033, and $9,800.44 as restitution for the victim

in Case No. 22CR725. Claypoole appeals the court’s order of

restitution for Case No. 22CR725.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Claypoole contends that the district court did not have

authority to order $9,800.44 in restitution for the dismissed case

4
and that we should vacate that portion of the restitution order.1 We

agree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Although a sentencing court has broad discretion to determine

a restitution order’s terms and conditions, whether the court had

authority to impose restitution is a legal question we review de

novo. People v. Lockett, 2025 COA 1, ¶ 29; People v. Roddy, 2021

CO 74, ¶ 23. We also apply the de novo standard when interpreting

a party’s obligation under a plea agreement. Craig v. People, 986

P.2d 951, 960 (Colo. 1999) (citing St. James v. People, 948 P.2d

1028, 1030 (Colo. 1997)).

¶ 12 A sentence that is inconsistent with the statutory scheme is

an illegal sentence, and an illegal sentence may be challenged at

any time. People v. Suttmiller, 240 P.3d 504, 507 (Colo. App. 2010).

“[W]hen a trial court lacks authority to impose restitution, the

resulting sentence is illegal.” People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772

(Colo. App. 2010).

1 Claypoole was also sentenced to sixteen years in the Department

of Corrections’ custody. That portion of the sentence, which was
not challenged on appeal, remains undisturbed. See People v.
Thomas, 2021 COA 23, ¶ 33 n.7.

5
¶ 13 In Roddy, our supreme court held that “a court may not order

restitution for injury or losses proximately caused by conduct that

forms the basis of only [a] dismissed charge.” Roddy, ¶ 28; People

v. Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 13. That said, however, “the prosecution

and the defendant may strike a plea agreement that extends the

scope of the restitution order to include . . . dismissed counts.”

Roddy, ¶ 28; People v. Sosa, 2019 COA 182, ¶ 30 (“[W]hen a

defendant agrees to make restitution for losses stemming from . . .

dismissed counts, [the defendant] is bound by that agreement.”).

¶ 14 Roddy clarified that the defendant had to agree to pay

restitution for the dismissed charge “at the time” the defendant and

prosecution entered into the plea agreement on the record. Roddy,

¶ 32 (emphasis omitted). To order a defendant to pay restitution

beyond this time was “improper for a court to order.” Id. The

General Assembly codified Roddy’s holding in 2022 when it clarified

that “[a]bsent an agreement between the defendant and the

prosecution at the time the plea is entered, a court may not impose

restitution for pecuniary losses proximately caused by conduct

exclusively related to dismissed charges.” § 18-1.3-603(11), C.R.S.

2025; Ch. 263, sec. 3, § 18-1.3-603, 2022 Colo. Sess. Laws 1927.

6
¶ 15 Plea agreements are “contractual in nature,” and we interpret

them in accordance with contract principles. Keller v. People, 29

P.3d 290, 295 (Colo. 2000). The question we must consider is

“whether the interpretation the defendant claims to have taken is a

reasonable one.” Craig, 986 P.2d at 960-61 (“Our task is not to

rewrite the bargain in question, but to interpret it consistently with

the reasonable intent of the parties in light of the defendant’s right

to be treated fairly by the government.”).

¶ 16 Whether the defendant’s interpretation is reasonable is an

objective test. Id. at 960. A court interpreting a plea agreement

“focuses on the meaning a reasonable person would have attached

to the agreement at the time the agreement was entered into.”

People v. Antonio-Antimo, 29 P.3d 298, 303 (Colo. 2000). We look at

the plea agreement’s plain language and resolve ambiguity in the

defendant’s favor. Roddy, ¶ 24. While we may resolve ambiguity in

the defendant’s favor, we may not read into an “agreement a term

that lacks evidentiary support in the record.” Craig, 986 P.2d at

962.

¶ 17 In interpreting a plea agreement, courts may consider written

documents, oral statements, and the “circumstances of the

7
government’s dealings with the defendant.” People v. Romero, 745

P.2d 1003, 1010 (Colo. 1987). Unlike with civil contracts, courts

can consider extrinsic evidence even where ambiguity is not

present, but considering extrinsic evidence “takes on special

significance only where the plea agreement is itself ambiguous.”

Craig, 986 P.2d at 961. Where conflict exists between terms of a

contract, the specific provisions will prevail over the general

provisions. In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo. App.

2003). Oral statements made on the record after sentencing do not

modify a plea agreement’s terms. Keller, 29 P.3d at 298. “Allowing

statements made after the entry of the guilty plea to enter into our

determination of a plea agreement’s meaning runs counter to”

Criminal Procedure Rule 11. Id. A court’s advisement does not

generally alter obligations in an unambiguous plea agreement, but

if a court’s statements add a term that is inconsistent with the plea

agreement, the agreement is altered if the parties acquiesce. Craig,

986 P.2d at 961.

8
B. The District Court Improperly Ordered Restitution in Case No.
22CR275

¶ 18 Claypoole contends that the operative plea agreement did not

provide for restitution in Case No. 22CR725 and that absent such

agreement, the district court could not order restitution for the

dismissed case. We agree.

¶ 19 Paragraphs 7(b) and 29 of the plea agreement discuss

restitution. Paragraph 7(b) provides that Claypool “agrees to pay

restitution as ordered.” Paragraph 29 of the signed plea agreement,

in relevant part, provides as follows:

I agree to pay restitution for all counts and
cases governed by this plea agreement,
including counts and/or cases dismissed as
part of this plea agreement. I further stipulate
to causation for restitution purposes in this
case and in any case(s) dismissed as part of
this agreement.

....

a. As part of my plea agreement with the
People, I am agreeing to pay restitution in the
other cases and counts that the People have
agreed to dismiss. I understand that I engaged
in misconduct in the other cases which caused
a loss to victims in those cases and that it
would be helpful to me in my rehabilitation to
be required to make those victims whole. In
order to obtain the benefit of the plea offer
presented to me by the People I am agreeing to

9
pay restitution in case(s): none and the
remaining counts in the current case.

....

b. I understand that the restitution ordered will
become a condition of the sentence the court
imposes on the case to which I am entering a
plea of guilty and my failure to pay that
restitution could lead to revocation proceedings
instituted against me in the future. [The
investigation number for those other counts is
______.] [The victim in those other counts is
__________________.]

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 20 The pertinent provision of paragraph 29(a) indicates that

Claypoole agreed to pay restitution in cases “none and the

remaining counts in the current case.” The plain meaning of the

term “none” is “not any,” “not any such thing or person,” or “no

part: nothing.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/58EG-NFBR. Use of the term “none” in the plea

agreement indicates that no other cases beyond the specified

“current case” were subject to the restitution provisions. Likewise,

the empty lines in paragraph 29(b), which the prosecutor could

have filled in with case numbers and the names of the victims, were

left blank.

10
¶ 21 Accordingly, Claypoole’s interpretation that the People did not

seek restitution for any case except the current case is reasonable.

This language reflects the parties’ agreement that Claypoole would

pay restitution only for the remaining counts in Case No.

22CR1033.

¶ 22 The People argue that the agreement’s language is ambiguous

when paragraph 7 is read together with paragraph 29. Even if the

plea agreement’s restitution provisions were ambiguous, our

interpretation would remain the same based on two principles that

guide our reading of the agreement. First, the more specific term in

the plea agreement prevails over the general terms. See In re

Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d at 861. The more specific term in the

agreement indicates Claypoole agrees to pay restitution in “none” of

the dismissed cases. This term therefore prevails over the general

terms in paragraph 29 and in paragraph 7, which provides that

Claypoole agrees to pay restitution as ordered. Second, we are

obligated to “look to the plain language of the agreement and

resolve any ambiguity in favor of the defendant.” Roddy, ¶ 24. Any

ambiguity must be resolved in Claypoole’s favor. Therefore, at the

11
time the plea was entered, Claypoole agreed to pay restitution “in

the remaining counts in the current case” only.

¶ 23 The People argue that we should consider as extrinsic evidence

statements made at the providency hearing and two restitution

hearings, the restitution request, and Claypoole’s objection to that

request. We disagree for the reasons explained below.

¶ 24 The providency hearing occurred on March 2 — the same day

Claypoole signed the plea agreement. Although the parties broadly

addressed restitution at the providency hearing, neither party

addressed restitution as it applied to specific cases, and the

prosecution never asked to amend the plea agreement to include

restitution for the dismissed cases.

¶ 25 The People indicated that “there will be [restitution]” and

asked for forty-two days in which to file a restitution request.

Defense counsel then made a record that she had “advised Mr.

Claypoole of restitution” and that he was “willing to waive his right

to be present for a hearing.” The court then ordered and reserved

restitution for forty-two days.

¶ 26 While the prosecutor indicated that he would seek restitution

and defense counsel acknowledged that she “advised” Claypoole of

12
restitution, the parties never discussed restitution in the dismissed

cases or any intent to amend the plea agreement. The parties’

statements made at the providency hearing do not provide

additional information concerning restitution or change our

interpretation of the plea agreement.

¶ 27 The People further contend that even if, at the time he entered

into the plea agreement, Claypoole did not agree to pay restitution

in the dismissed cases, he later acquiesced to pay restitution in

Case No. 22CR725. In support, the People argue that Claypoole

participated in determining the amount of restitution in Case No.

22CR725 and, while defense counsel objected to the amount of

restitution in Case No. 22CR1033, she failed to object to restitution

in Case No. 22CR725.

¶ 28 The People’s argument runs counter to the rule announced in

Roddy — and later codified in section 18-1.3-603(11) — that the

defendant must agree to pay restitution for a dismissed case at the

time the plea was entered on the record, and we are unable to

consider it. See § 18-1.3-603(11); Roddy, ¶ 32.

¶ 29 Claypoole did not agree to pay restitution for the dismissed

cases at the time the plea was entered on the record, and the

13
district court’s award of restitution for Case No. 22CR725 is

improper.

III. Disposition

¶ 30 We vacate the portion of the order awarding restitution in Case

No. 22CR725.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

14