People in Interest of H.L.B.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
November 6, 2025

2025COA86

No. 24CA1786, People in Interest of H.L.B. — Juvenile Court —
Dependency and Neglect — Termination of the Parent-Child
Legal Relationship — Criteria for Termination — Less Dramatic
Alternatives — Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

In this dependency and neglect case, a department of human

services appeals a juvenile court’s order denying its motion to

terminate the parent-child legal relationship, arguing that the

juvenile court erred because the court was precluded from finding

that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) was an available

less drastic alternative to termination and in the child’s best

interests when the child’s placement provider at the time of the

termination hearing was not willing to be a party to an APR.

Applying People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 37,

the division observes that whether a less drastic alternative is

available and in the best interests of the child is a fact-intensive,
case-specific inquiry to which an appellate court must accord

deference.

Applying this standard, the division concludes that, based on

the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court’s finding that

there was a less drastic alternative to termination in the form of an

APR is supported by the record. In reaching this conclusion, the

division rejects the proposition that the current availability of a

specific less drastic alternative (i.e., an APR to specific individuals)

is a necessary prerequisite for a court to conclude that a less

drastic alternative is available; instead, the division concludes that

current availability is among the multitude of factors that a juvenile

court may consider in assessing whether the less drastic alternative

is in the child’s best interests.

The division further concludes that the record supports the

court’s finding that an APR was in the child’s best interests —

meaning it was the best option for this child. Accordingly, the

division affirms the juvenile court’s order denying the motion to

terminate parental rights.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA86

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1786
Mesa County District Court No. 23JV8
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellant,

In the Interest of H.L.B., Child-Appellant,

and Concerning A.S.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Grove, J., concurs
Welling, J., specially concurs

Announced November 6, 2025

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant The People of the State of Colorado

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, the Mesa County

Department of Human Services (the Department) appeals the

juvenile court’s order denying its motion to terminate the parent-

child legal relationship between A.S. (mother) and H.L.B. (the child).

¶2 The Department contends that the juvenile court erred by

denying its motion because the court was precluded from finding

that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) was an available

less drastic alternative to termination and in the child’s best

interests when the child’s placement provider at the time of the

termination hearing was not willing to be a party to an APR. In

other words, the Department asserts that, because there was not a

less drastic alternative to termination currently available, the

juvenile court erred as a matter of law by denying its request to

terminate mother’s parental rights.

¶3 In People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 37, the

supreme court held that a juvenile court should deny a

department’s motion to terminate the parent-child relationship if,

“in connection with its overall consideration of the statutory criteria

for termination, [the court] finds that a less drastic alternative is

available and is in the child’s best interests.” Whether a less drastic

1
alternative is available and in the best interests of the child is a

fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry to which we must accord

deference.

¶4 Based on the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the

juvenile court’s finding that there was a less drastic alternative to

termination in the form of an APR is supported by the record. In

reaching this conclusion, we reject the proposition that the current

availability of a specific less drastic alternative (i.e., an APR to

specific individuals) is a necessary prerequisite for a court to

conclude that a less drastic alternative is available; instead, current

availability is among the multitude of factors that a juvenile court

may consider in assessing whether the less drastic alternative is in

the child’s best interests.

¶5 We further conclude that the record supports the court’s

determination that an APR was in the child’s best interests —

meaning it was the best option for this child. Therefore, the

juvenile court did not err by rejecting the Department’s motion

seeking termination, and we affirm the court’s order requiring the

dependency and neglect action to remain open.

2
I. Background

¶6 The Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect

raising concerns about mother’s substance dependence. The

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and

adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to address her

mental health and substance dependence and maintain a

relationship with the child by participating in family time. One year

after the treatment plan was adopted, the Department moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights.

¶7 After a contested hearing, the juvenile court found that mother

had not fully complied with her treatment plan and that the

Department had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

statutory criteria for termination had been satisfied. But the court

nonetheless denied the Department’s motion for termination

because it found that an APR was a less drastic alternative to

termination and that an APR — not a termination of parental

rights — was in the best interests of the child.1

1 The juvenile court found that father had abandoned the child and

terminated his parental rights; father is not part of this appeal.

3
¶8 The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) appeal the

juvenile court’s denial of the termination motion.

II. Standard of Review

¶9 We review a juvenile court’s application of the termination

statute to evidentiary questions as a mixed question of law and fact.

See A.M., ¶ 15. “Thus, a trial court’s factual findings and

conclusions will be set aside only where they are ‘so clearly

erroneous as to find no support in the record.’” Id. (quoting People

in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010)).

¶ 10 As part of our review of a juvenile court’s decision to deny a

motion to terminate the parent-child relationship, we review a

juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings, including whether

the less drastic alternative is in the child’s best interests, for clear

error. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 44, 49; see also People in Interest of M.B., 70

P.3d 618, 627 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that if the record supports

the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions regarding whether a

less drastic alternative is in the child’s best interests, we may not

disturb the court’s determination).

¶ 11 It is for the juvenile court as the trier of fact to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

4
assess witness credibility. A.M., ¶ 15; People in Interest of C.A.K.,

652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982). When the evidence conflicts, a

reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its

judgment for that of the juvenile court merely because there might

be evidence supporting a different result. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at

256.

III. Applicable Law on Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 12 A court may terminate parental rights only if it finds, by clear

and convincing evidence, that “(1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan, or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.” A.M., ¶ 19.

We will refer to these as the “statutory criteria.”

¶ 13 A juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less drastic

alternatives to termination before entering an order terminating the

parent-child legal relationship under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S.

2025. The supreme court has characterized the consideration of a

less drastic alternative as an “implicit” criterion under the statutory

5
scheme. A.M., ¶ 19; see People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,

531 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 14 In determining whether to terminate the parent-child

relationship, the court must give primary consideration to the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-

3-604(3); People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 29.

¶ 15 The parties disagree as to whether a juvenile court must grant

a motion to terminate once it determines that all of the statutory

and implicit criteria have been established by the requisite burden

of proof. The Department and the GAL contend that the granting of

the motion is mandatory under such circumstances, while mother

contends that the court retains discretion to deny the motion even if

the court finds that all of the statutory and implicit criteria have

been established.

¶ 16 It appears that A.M. resolves this dispute in favor of the

Department and GAL. In A.M., the supreme court held that if the

juvenile court determines that the statutory criteria are satisfied

and that termination is in the best interests of the child, then it

“must” grant the motion to terminate. A.M., ¶¶ 32, 37. The court’s

direction in this regard begins by telling us that “if a trial court

6
considers a less drastic alternative in connection with its overall

evaluation of the statutory criteria for termination and finds that it

is in the child’s best interests, it should deny the termination

request.” Id. at ¶¶ 32, 37. The court goes on to hold that “if a trial

court considers a less drastic alternative in connection with its

overall consideration of the statutory criteria for termination and

finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject

the alternative and order termination.” Id. at ¶ 32 (emphasis added).

Thus, because the juvenile court here found that the statutory

criteria were satisfied — and those findings are not challenged on

appeal — the propriety of the juvenile court’s denial of the motion

turns on whether its determination that the less drastic alternative

was in the child’s best interests is supported by the record.

Accordingly, that is where we focus our analysis.

IV. Analysis

¶ 17 As noted above, the juvenile court determined that a less

drastic alternative was in the child’s best interests and that “the

best interests of [the child] would not be termination of parental

rights.” The juvenile court found that an APR was a less drastic

alternative to termination because it met the child’s primary need of

7
maintaining a relationship with mother. The court further found

that this primary need outweighed other factors, including mother’s

failure to demonstrate sobriety and the placement provider’s

concerns about becoming a permanent placement under an APR.

Based on this finding, the court concluded that an APR was an

available less drastic alternative that was in the child’s best

interests, and, therefore, it denied the termination motion. We

conclude that the juvenile court’s ruling is consistent with A.M. and

enjoys record support.

8
A. The Availability of a Less Drastic Alternative Finding

¶ 18 The Department contends that “an APR was not available

because the placement would not accept one.”2 Specifically, the

placement provider testified that she was not open to an APR

because “dealing with [mother] is difficult . . . and we don’t want to

have to deal with it anymore.” Based on this testimony, the

Department contends that, because the less drastic alternative was

not currently available, the juvenile court necessarily erred in its

assessment of the less drastic alternative criterion for termination.

We disagree.

2 Mischaracterizing the juvenile court’s order denying the motion to

terminate as one also ordering an APR to the current placement,
the Department initially asserted a claim that the juvenile court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order being appealed.
But once it was clarified at oral argument that the juvenile court did
not enter an APR order but instead solely denied the termination
motion because it found that an APR was in the child’s best
interests, the Department abandoned its subject matter jurisdiction
challenge. And because we are convinced that the juvenile court
had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order being appealed,
we do not address this issue further. See People in Interest of J.W.
v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶ 24 (where a “court has already obtained
subject matter jurisdiction, a later failure to follow statutory
requirements does not divest the court of subject matter
jurisdiction” (quoting People in Interest of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381,
1387 (Colo. 1988))).

9
¶ 19 A less drastic alternative analysis requires a juvenile court to

determine which permanency outcome for a child serves the child’s

best interests. In the termination context, if a return to home is not

possible, the comparison is often between termination and

adoption, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an alternate

path to permanency that leaves a respondent’s parental rights

intact, such as a permanent placement through legal guardianship

or an APR, or other planned permanent living arrangements. § 19-

3-702(4)(a)(I)-(V), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 20 The Department seems to suggest that when assessing

whether an APR is an available less drastic alternative, the court

must constrain its consideration of an APR to specific, identified

individuals. But the Department does not cite, nor are we aware of,

any authority that so constrains the framing of the issue of less

drastic alternatives. Indeed, when a court concludes that

termination is in a child’s best interests because that child’s needs

are best met by the permanency that only termination and adoption

can provide, for that finding to survive appellate scrutiny, the child

does not need to be in a potentially adoptive home, nor do we

require that a specific adoptive placement be identified or known to

10
the court at the time of termination. See People in Interest of T.E.M.,

124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005) (declining to disturb a

juvenile court’s rejection of placement with a relative as a less

drastic alternative and its finding that termination and adoption

were in the children’s best interests “whether or not they were

ultimately adopted” and notwithstanding that the children were not

placed in a potentially adoptive home at the time of the termination

hearing).

¶ 21 We are not persuaded that the requirement is any different

when it comes to assessing whether an APR is in a child’s best

interests. In other words, in assessing the less drastic alternative

criterion, a juvenile court may consider whether the alternative legal

disposition — e.g., an APR — is available and in a child’s best

interests, even when a specific person has not been identified or the

specific terms of a proposed APR are not before the court.

¶ 22 Even though a less drastic alternative to termination is not

dependent on a particular out-of-home placement provider,

divisions of this court have viewed approvingly a juvenile court’s

consideration of factors related to the child’s current or potential

placement provider, including (1) attempts already made by the

11
court or a department to cultivate alternative dispositions to

termination, C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 640-41

(Colo. 2004); (2) the identification of persons who could be

permanent placement providers under an APR or guardianship,

D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532; (3) a proposed placement provider’s

understanding of the child’s needs and conditions, id.; (4) a

proposed placement provider’s preference for a certain permanency

disposition, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo.

App. 2011); and (5) the parent’s fitness to care for the child, People

in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38.

¶ 23 In other words, whether a less drastic alternative is available

is a distinct consideration from a court’s later finding of whether

that alternative is in the child’s best interests. And here, the only

barrier to an APR identified by the Department and GAL is the

child’s current placement provider’s expressed hesitation or

unwillingness to be a party to an APR. But as mother correctly

points out, the current placement provider’s expressed preference

for adoption does not make an APR unavailable. Instead, a

particular placement provider’s willingness to enter into an APR is

only one consideration for the juvenile court to weigh to determine

12
whether an APR would be in the best interests of the child. See id.

Likewise, the present availability of a specific APR proposal is yet

another consideration; indeed, even when a placement provider is

willing to enter into an APR with a parent, the court may properly

determine that such an arrangement is not the best option for the

child and, therefore, not in the child’s best interests. See D.B-J., 89

P.3d at 532 (upholding a juvenile court’s determination that a

proposed placement was not a less drastic alternative to

termination based on a finding that the placement provider lacked

appreciation of the child’s needs and conditions).

¶ 24 Based on the record that was before the juvenile court, we

conclude that it was not error for the court to determine in this case

that an APR was an available less drastic alternative to termination.

See People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1124 (Colo. 1986)

(determining that the juvenile court’s crediting of testimony that a

child’s need to maintain contact with his parent was secondary to

his primary needs of consistent and reliable parenting supported its

no less drastic alternative finding); see also In re Marriage of Kann,

2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).

13
B. The Child’s Best Interests Finding

¶ 25 We now turn to whether the record supports that an APR was

in the child’s best interests. We conclude it does.

¶ 26 In A.M., the supreme court stated that, for a less drastic

alternative to be viable, “it must not only be adequate, it must be in

the child’s best interests.” A.M., ¶ 27. In other words, whether a

less drastic alternative is available is likely easy to ascertain, but

whether it is in the child’s best interests involves a complex

analysis, often requiring the court to weigh and resolve conflicting

evidence and make credibility determinations. See A.R., ¶ 38.

¶ 27 To highlight the complexity and range of what a juvenile court

considers when determining whether a less drastic alternative is in

the child’s best interests, we note that divisions of this court have

looked favorably upon juvenile courts resting their best interest

determinations on the following findings: (1) it was important for

the child to maintain an ongoing relationship with a parent, see id.;

(2) the child was bonded to the parent or interested in maintaining

a relationship, see People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 36,

aff’d sub nom., R.W. v. People In Interest of E.W., 2022 CO 51;

(3) the child needed permanency, see People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

14
COA 3M, ¶ 30; (4) it was important for the child to maintain

relationships with siblings and other biological family members, see

People in Interest of J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006);

and (5) the child’s developmental needs might preclude a long-term

placement with siblings, see People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,

215 (Colo. App. 2007). With this in mind, we turn to the facts of

this case as found by the juvenile court.

¶ 28 At the time of the termination hearing, the child in this case

was ten years old.

¶ 29 The child’s placement provider testified that mother and the

child had maintained a strong relationship throughout the

dependency case. The placement provider testified that the child

and mother “need to have a relationship with each other” and that

her “ultimate goal” would be for mother to take care of the child

again one day, even if the case ended in a termination.

¶ 30 The family time facilitator described a robust relationship

between the child and mother. The facilitator testified that mother

was appropriate in her engagement and redirection of the child

when necessary. The facilitator also described mother’s unique

insight into the child’s feelings and experiences. The facilitator

15
further testified that mother was able to engage the child to express

his feelings and put “her own needs last and direct[] her efforts

towards comforting [the child],” particularly when he was upset

after overhearing comments about the case direction and about

mother. The family time facilitator advocated for an expansion of

family time and the addition of family therapy.

¶ 31 The caseworker testified that the child advocated for more and

less restrictive time with mother, a request approved by the

Department. The caseworker testified that the child was asking to

return to mother’s care at least part-time and had consistently

reported feeling safe with mother.

¶ 32 Mother’s expert in the mental and emotional impact of

permanency outcomes, childhood trauma, and child development

testified that a termination outcome for a ten-year-old child bonded

to their mother would be “catastrophic.” The expert opined that the

child’s age was a significant factor in the potential harm caused by

a termination because he “has the knowledge, experience, and

opinions and feelings and memories associated with” mother. The

expert opined that a child may have dysregulated or extreme

behaviors after being told that adoption is a possible outcome, in

16
part because a child’s “psychological wellbeing hinges on his

opportunity to maintain that . . . connected bond with his mother.”

Finally, the expert explained that there was “no reasonable

certainty” that such a connected bond would be maintained

through termination and adoption, but “there is that guarantee

through a well-constructed and appropriate APR.”

¶ 33 The Department responds by pointing to evidence presented at

the hearing supporting a conclusion that the child needs

permanency. Specifically, the Department notes the caseworker’s

opinion that the child felt “in limbo and [wa]s confused about where

he is going to be.” As we have said, the need for permanency is but

one consideration of many for the court to weigh when determining

whether a less drastic alternative is available and is in the child’s

best interests. It is for the juvenile court, however, to weigh the

evidence, and we cannot substitute our judgment for the juvenile

court’s determination. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 256; People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29; M.B., 70 P.3d at 627.

¶ 34 We acknowledge that this record could support a contrary

outcome, but we must defer to the juvenile court’s weighing of the

conflicting evidence, as we would if the court had found that the

17
less drastic alternative, while available, was not in the child’s best

interests and, thus, had granted the Department’s motion to

terminate. Indeed, even a similar record with the passage of time or

subsequent motions for termination may compel the same fact

finder to reach a different outcome.

¶ 35 But when, as was the case here, the juvenile court finds that a

less drastic alternative “is in the child’s best interests, it should

deny the termination request.” A.M., ¶¶ 32, 37. And because there

is record evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that an

APR was a less drastic alternative to termination and was in the

child’s best interests, we won’t disturb the juvenile court’s

judgment.

V. Conclusion

¶ 36 The juvenile court’s order denying the Department’s motion to

terminate and requiring the dependency and neglect action to

remain open is therefore affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE concurs.

JUDGE WELLING specially concurs.

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JUDGE WELLING, specially concurring.

¶ 37 I am fully on board with the majority opinion in its rationale

and conclusion. I write separately to raise a concern regarding the

proper standard of review that appellate courts should apply when

reviewing a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative findings,

particularly the question of whether the less drastic alternative is in

the child’s best interests. As we noted in Part II of the majority

opinion, People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶¶ 15, 44,

provides that we review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative

findings, including whether the less drastic alternative is in the

child’s best interests, for clear error. Supra ¶¶ 9-10.

¶ 38 We are of course bound by supreme court precedent, see In re

Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 40, and, therefore, we must

review the juvenile court’s less drastic alternative finding for clear

error as A.M., ¶¶ 15, 44, requires. While the supreme court

reaffirmed the clear error standard for a juvenile court’s less drastic

alternative ruling in People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80, it

also summed up its ruling in that case by stating, “we see no abuse

of discretion by the district court when it concluded that there were

no less drastic alternatives to termination,” id. at ¶ 4 (emphasis

19
added), leaving some room for questioning whether the court

applied a clear error or abuse of discretion standard in that case.

¶ 39 I think there is a strong case to be made that an abuse of

discretion standard should apply to a juvenile court’s less drastic

alternative finding. After all, the clear error standard is so

deferential that appellate courts will only reverse ‘“if there is no

evidence in the record’ to support the . . . court’s factual findings.”

Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 22 (quoting Byerly v.

Bank of Colo., 2013 COA 35, ¶ 32). I am concerned that this

standard may render a juvenile court’s less drastic alternative

findings virtually unreviewable, particularly when a court may

reject some or all of a witness’s testimony, see In re Marriage of

Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 50 (a court can believe all, part, or none

of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).

¶ 40 At the very least, I wonder whether the availability of the less

drastic alternative should be treated as a factual finding reviewed

for clear error, while the less drastic alternative being in the child’s

best interests should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. While

A.M., ¶¶ 15, 44, treated best interests of the child as a factual

finding reviewed for clear error, the supreme court and divisions of

20
this court have routinely reviewed best interests of the child

findings in the domestic relations context for an abuse of discretion.

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo. 2005)

(reviewing “[a] best interests determination under subsection 14–

10–129(2)(c),” C.R.S. 2004, “for an abuse of discretion”); In re

Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 52 (Where the trial court

ruled that the child could move with the father out of state, the

appellate court reviewing the order stated, “[W]e perceive no abuse

of discretion in the court’s consideration and resolution of the best

interests factors.”).

¶ 41 All of this said, although in the majority we reviewed the

juvenile court’s order for clear error, I would also conclude that the

court’s finding that there was a less drastic alternative to

termination available that was in the child’s best interests was not

an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies or misconstrues the law. See People in Interest of E.B.,

2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The juvenile court here provided a well-reasoned

analysis that, despite the current placement provider not being

amenable to an APR, an APR was in the child’s best interests. It

21
based this conclusion on appropriate best interest factors, including

placing great weight on this child’s need to maintain a relationship

with mother and the benefits to him of doing so. Thus, I don’t

discern an abuse of discretion, much less clear error, by the

juvenile court.

22