Garcia v. Jefferson County

24CA1386 Garcia v Jefferson County 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1386
Jefferson County District Court No. 24CV30089
Honorable Andrew C. Poland, Judge
Honorable Meegan A. Miloud, Judge

Joanne Garcia,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Jefferson County R-1 School District,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Scot C. Kreider, Corey A. Holton, Denver, Colorado,
for Plaintiff-Appellant

Caplan and Earnest LLC, Justin H. Miller, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee
¶1 Plaintiff, Joanne Garcia, appeals the district court’s judgment

dismissing her negligence action against defendant, Jefferson

County R-1 School District (the District). She also appeals the

court’s post-dismissal order granting the District’s request for

attorney fees. We affirm the judgment and the order.

I. Background

¶2 The following facts are taken from Garcia’s complaint.

¶3 Garcia fell and injured herself when she tripped over a

two-inch protruding steel stanchion embedded in the floor of a

middle school gym’s doorway in the District. The purpose of a

stanchion is to secure a door mullion. A mullion is a vertical steel

bar in the middle of a double doorway, which allows the double

doors to be locked or secured. It is designed to be removable,

however, which permits use of the entire width of the doorway.

¶4 The mullion had been removed from the doorway of the gym to

allow students to move large instruments into the gym in

preparation for a band concert that day. The District failed to

replace the mullion before arrival of guests for the band

performance. Garcia tripped on the stanchion and was injured.

1
¶5 Garcia sued the District under the Colorado Premises Liability

Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2025, and in the alternative brought a

negligence claim. The District moved to dismiss the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1),

contending that it was immune from liability under the Colorado

Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S.

2025. Garcia sought discovery on the jurisdictional issue. The

district court denied Garcia’s request for discovery and granted the

District’s motion to dismiss.

¶6 The District moved for an award of $23,023.25 in attorney fees

under section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2025, which the court awarded.

II. Motion to Dismiss

¶7 Garcia contends that the district court erred by dismissing her

complaint. We discern no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 The applicability of immunity under the CGIA is an issue of

subject matter jurisdiction to be determined by the district court in

accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271,

276 (Colo. 1995); Young v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff, 2012 COA 185,

¶ 7. “When the alleged jurisdictional facts are in dispute, the trial

2
court should conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the

jurisdictional issue.” Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176, 1180

(Colo. 2001). But where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed,

the issue of governmental immunity is one of law, and the district

court may rule on the jurisdictional issue without an evidentiary

hearing.1 Id. In such a case, we review the district court’s

jurisdictional ruling de novo. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83

P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003).

¶9 A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists,

so, in the context of the CGIA, it must demonstrate that immunity

has been waived. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs,

1 Although Garcia requested discovery on factual issues such as

whether doors were locked, when guests and students arrived, and
when the mullion was removed, she did not request discovery on
the design of the mullion-stanchion mechanism. In fact, she
concedes that the mullion was designed to be removable. See
Herrera v. City & County of Denver, 221 P.3d 423, 428 (Colo. App.
2009) (concluding that the trial court was not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the city and county was
immune under the CGIA from suit arising from a collision between
a motorist’s vehicle and a snowplow, inasmuch as the city and
county did not contend on appeal that a factual question existed as
to whether the snowplow met the statutory definition of “motor
vehicle,” and the issue of whether the snowplow could be a “motor
vehicle” was one of law). Thus, no evidentiary hearing was required
regarding the design of the door.

3
2018 CO 10, ¶ 21. Because the CGIA “derogates Colorado’s

common law,” we strictly construe its immunity provisions, but we

broadly construe its waiver provisions “in the interest of

compensating victims of governmental negligence.” Id. at ¶ 22.

¶ 10 Further, to the extent our review depends on an interpretation

of the CGIA, we review such questions de novo. See Springer v. City

& County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798-99 (Colo. 2000). Our primary

purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to

the General Assembly’s intent. Id. at 799. We look first to the

statute’s language, giving words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meanings. Id. If the statute is unambiguous, we need not

conduct any further statutory analysis. Id.

¶ 11 Under the CGIA, public entities are generally immune from

liability in “all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”

§ 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2025. However, sovereign immunity is

waived in actions for injuries that resulted from “[a] dangerous

condition of any public building.” § 24-10-106(1)(c). A dangerous

condition is

either a physical condition of a facility or the
use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable
risk to the health or safety of the public, which

4
is known to exist or which in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been known to
exist and which condition is proximately
caused by the negligent act or omission of the
public entity or public employee in
constructing or maintaining such facility.

§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2025. The supreme court has interpreted

this definition as creating a four-part test. St. Vrain Valley Sch.

Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 16 (citing Springer, 13 P.3d

at 799). A dangerous condition exists when a plaintiff establishes

that their injuries occurred because of (1) the physical condition of

the public facility or use thereof, (2) which constituted an

unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, (3) which

was known to exist or should have been known to exist in the

exercise of reasonable care, and (4) which was proximately caused

by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing

or maintaining such facility. Id.

¶ 12 A dangerous condition “shall not exist solely because the

design of any facility is inadequate.” § 24-10-103(1.3). Thus, as a

threshold jurisdictional matter, a plaintiff must show that the

dangerous condition arose due to governmental conduct, or lack

thereof, in constructing or maintaining the condition, and not due

5
to the design alone. Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d

1380, 1384 (Colo. 1997).

¶ 13 Maintenance is defined as “the act or omission of a public

entity or public employee in keeping a facility in the same general

state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in preserving a

facility from decline or failure.” § 24-10-103(2.5). Further,

maintenance does not include any duty to “modernize, modify, or

improve the design or construction of [the] facility.” Id. By

contrast, to design is “to conceive or plan out in the mind.”

Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1386 (citing Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 611 (1986)).

¶ 14 Based on these definitions, an injury is the result of negligent

maintenance when a dangerous condition “is allowed to develop

subsequent to the initial design and construction,” whereas an

injury is the result of negligent design when the dangerous

condition is “inherent in the design itself and is allowed to persist to

the time of the injury.” Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 456 (Colo.

2001). The scope of the public entity’s duty, and the associated

waiver, must therefore be measured by comparing the original

condition of the facility to the condition of the facility when the

6
injury occurred. Id. at 448-49. “Only after making this

determination can [we] ascertain whether the dangerous condition

. . . developed through a lack of maintenance subsequent to the

initial design and construction of the [facility], and thus, whether

immunity has been waived.” Id. at 449.

B. Analysis

¶ 15 Garcia concedes “that the facts are undisputed with respect to

the nature of the door system and its intended uses.” She alleged

in her complaint that the mullion was removeable and, when it was

removed, the two-inch stanchion protruded up from the floor into

the doorway. The district court concluded that, if removal of the

mullion created a dangerous condition by exposing the two-inch

stanchion, the condition arose solely from inadequate design and

not from the District’s failure to maintain the door. Based on

Garcia’s complaint, we agree with this conclusion and reject

Garcia’s arguments to the contrary.

¶ 16 As an initial matter, we agree with the District that Garcia did

not preserve her argument that it had a “ministerial” obligation to

eliminate the trip hazard posed by the exposed stanchion because

she never made this argument in the district court. Thus, we do

7
not address it. See Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019

COA 11, ¶ 21 (“It is axiomatic that in civil cases, issues not raised

in or decided by the trial court generally will not be addressed for

the first time on appeal.”). Instead, we turn to her preserved

arguments.

¶ 17 Garcia contends that the mullion-stanchion mechanism exists

in two states of efficiency. In one state, the mullion is in place and

the double doors latch and lock. In the second state, the mullion is

removed and the stanchion protrudes.2 She contends that by

leaving the mullion-stanchion mechanism in the latter state of

efficiency, the District failed to “maintain” the door in “the same

general state of . . . efficiency as initially constructed.” We disagree.

¶ 18 But nothing in the record suggests whether the “original” state

of efficiency was with the mullion in place or removed.3 Moreover,

we do not read “the same general state of . . . efficiency as initially

constructed” as imposing a “maintenance” obligation on the District

2 Notably, Garcia does not allege that when the mullion is removed,

the stanchion is supposed to be removed or altered in some other
manner so that it does not protrude in a dangerous way.
3 It does not appear that Garcia’s outstanding discovery requests

would have answered this question.

8
to default to one use of the design over the other. § 24-10-103(2.5).

Rather, as noted, the District is only liable for failing to “maintain”

with respect to a condition if that condition arose subsequent to the

initial design of the door. See Medina, 35 P.3d at 456.

¶ 19 Garcia argues that removal of the mullion created a condition

of the facility (or, perhaps more accurately, was a use thereof),

which was such a subsequently occurring condition. But her

argument proves too much because it essentially means any use of

a design that involves two possible states of efficiency constitutes

maintenance. This would essentially swallow the design exception

altogether.

¶ 20 Garcia also contends that the district court broadly construed

the word “design” to encompass not only the “conception” of the

door, but also all conduct of the District that arguably falls within

the scope of the design’s function. She further argues that by so

concluding, the district court read “solely” out of the part of the

CGIA that provides that a dangerous condition “shall not exist

solely because the design of any facility is inadequate.”

§ 24-10-103(1.3) (emphasis added). In essence Garcia’s argument

is that, even though the design allowed for removal of the mullion,

9
the District was negligent for allowing the public to use the door

with the mullion removed and the stanchion exposed.4

¶ 21 But the District used this function of the door specifically as it

was designed. The mullion was removed — as it was designed to

be — so large instruments could be moved into the gym; it was not

removed for the purpose of cleaning, repairing, or otherwise

performing any maintenance on the mullion, the stanchion, or the

door. Thus, contrary to Garcia’s contention, the condition (and use)

of the mullion-stanchion mechanism at the time of her injury

existed solely because of the door’s design.

¶ 22 Alternatively, Garcia contends that the district court’s order

can be read as requiring some degradation from the “as designed”

state in order to trigger the District’s maintenance obligation. We

do not read the district court’s order to say that. The district court

correctly recited the definition of maintenance in its order, and its

subsequent analysis of whether the dangerous condition developed

because of the District’s lack of maintenance did not concern

4 It is difficult to distinguish Garcia’s argument from a contention

that the stanchion is a dangerous condition because it protrudes
two inches above the floor when the mullion is removed — which is
clearly a condition that is solely related to the design of the door.

10
whether the door had degraded or not. Rather, the court correctly

found that the “exposed stanchion did not arise from a condition of

the doorway that arose subsequent to the initial design but, rather

was a design choice that persisted to the time of injury.”

¶ 23 In short, human intervention caused the mullion to be

removed. This intervention can be seen as either part of the

mullion-stanchion design or not. If it is, then the situation was

“solely” a result of the design and immunity applies. If it is not,

then Garcia needed to show that the removal was a function of

either negligent construction or maintenance, which she did not.5

¶ 24 Thus, the district court did not err by granting the motion to

dismiss.

5 We reject Garcia’s argument that, in light of the district court’s

restriction on discovery, it is premature to resolve the issue of
whether the removal of the mullion fell within the definition of
maintenance. None of the requested discovery for, as Garcia
describes it in her opening brief, the “design specifications of the
doorway system” or the “policies and procedures related to removal”
of the mullion would have further illuminated that issue. Moreover,
the record sufficiently demonstrates that the mullion removal was
not a maintenance function.

11
III. Attorney Fees

¶ 25 Garcia contends that the district court erred by awarding the

full amount of the District’s attorney fees. We discern no error.

A. Additional Background

¶ 26 After the district court dismissed the complaint, the District

moved for an award of $23,023.25 in attorney fees under section

13-17-201. After both parties briefed the issue, the district court

held an evidentiary hearing and awarded the District its requested

attorney fees.

¶ 27 The court found that the hourly rates for defendants’ attorneys

were reasonable based on their expertise and experience, and that

the hours they expended were reasonable. The court multiplied the

rates by the hours expended to calculate $23,023.25 in attorney

fees. The court then made findings as to why it was not making

any adjustments to that amount, including that the amount of time

spent was reasonable, this is a specialty area of law, this case

precluded other work, the rates were customary in the locality, and

the amount of purported damages was high and the results

obtained were significant.

12
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 An award of attorney fees under section 13-17-201 is

mandatory when a district court dismisses an action under

C.R.C.P. 12(b). Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.

2010); US Fax L. Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512, 517

(Colo. App. 2009). But the award of attorney fees under the statute

must be reasonable. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys.,

262 P.3d 991, 998 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 29 We review the reasonableness of an attorney fees award for an

abuse of discretion. Planning Partners Int’l, LLC v. QED, Inc., 2013

CO 43, ¶ 12. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, and we will not

overturn a district court’s determination of a reasonable attorney

fees award unless it is patently erroneous and unsupported by the

evidence. Id.

¶ 30 A district court makes an initial estimate of reasonable

attorney fees by calculating the lodestar amount, which represents

the number of hours reasonably expended on the case, multiplied

by a reasonable hourly rate. Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012 COA

135M, ¶ 18. The court’s calculation of the lodestar amount carries

13
with it a strong presumption of reasonableness. Id. The district

court then has discretion to make upward or downward

adjustments to the lodestar amount based on factors including the

amount in controversy, the length of time required to represent the

client effectively, the complexity of the case, the value of the legal

services to the client, and awards in similar cases. Tallitsch v. Child

Support Servs., Inc., 926 P.2d 143, 147 (Colo. App. 1996); Colo. RPC

1.5.

C. Analysis

¶ 31 Garcia contends that the district court failed to make factual

findings related to the number of hours expended by the District’s

lawyers on its motion to dismiss. We disagree.

¶ 32 The district court’s calculation of the lodestar amount carries

with it a presumption of reasonableness, and its findings as to why

it was not adjusting that amount upward or downward followed the

required criteria: the time and labor required, the complexity of the

action, that the work precluded other employment, the customary

practice in the legal community regarding fees in similar cases, the

amount in controversy involved and the results obtained, the

14
experience of the lawyers, and the value of the legal services to the

client. See Colo. RPC 1.5(a)(1).

¶ 33 Moreover, in conjunction with discussing these factors, the

court specifically found at the hearing that the time spent by the

District’s lawyers was appropriate given the type of motion, which

involved a specialty area of law that required a significant amount

of research, evidence review, and site visits to properly brief.

¶ 34 Accordingly, we find no merit in Garcia’s argument that the

district court failed to make factual findings related to the number

of hours expended by the District’s lawyers on its motion to

dismiss. Thus, the district court did not err by awarding the

District $23,023.25 in attorney fees.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 35 The District requests its appellate attorney fees under section

13-17-201.

¶ 36 A party that successfully defends an appeal of an action that

was dismissed on a pretrial motion to dismiss under the CGIA is

entitled to recover its reasonable appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-201. Wark v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 P.3d 711, 717

(Colo. App. 2002). The District has prevailed on appeal, so we grant

15
its request. Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145,

¶ 54. Because the district court is better suited to conduct any

factfinding necessary to determine the reasonableness and

necessity of the fees, we exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1

and remand the case to the district court to determine the amount

of the District’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

V. Disposition

¶ 37 The judgment and order are affirmed, and the case is

remanded to the district court to determine the amount of the

District’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

16