Hooks v. Myers

24CA2120 Hooks v Myers 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2120
Bent County District Court No. 23CV30012
Honorable Samuel Scott Vigil, Judge

Anthony Hooks III and Leigh Ann Hooks,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Everett M. Myers,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*
Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Randa Davis-Tice, Lamar, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Everett M. Myers, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Everett M. Myers, appeals the district court’s

judgment partially in his favor and partially in favor of plaintiffs,

Anthony Hooks III and Leigh Ann Hooks (the Hookses). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2017, Myers and the Hookses entered into a “Contract for

the Sale of Real and Personal Property.” The real and personal

property consisted of a furnished house and approximately 165

acres of land in Bent County, Colorado. Under the contract, the

Hookses agreed to pay a down payment of $5,000 and $1,000 a

month for a total of $200,000. The Hookses were also responsible

for the annual cost of insurance, irrigation water, and taxes. The

contract specified that Myers would “maintain insurance coverage

on the house” but the Hookses “may use an insurance company of

[their] own choosing as long as the coverage remains the same (full

replacement costs) and said policy is in the name of [Myers].” The

contract stated that the home “was fully furnished and [the

Hookses] may have full use of any and all personal items,” but “[i]f

[the Hookses] do not wish to use these items they need to inform

[Myers] so that he (Seller) may dispose of these items.” The contract

also contained a clause stating that, “[i]n case of destruction of over

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[fifty percent] of the house, insurance proceeds will go to [Myers] for

liquidation of amount owed on this contract for sale” (the

destruction clause).

¶3 The contract provided that, if the Hookses performed all the

covenants and made all payments, Myers would convey the

property to them, in fee simple, by warranty deed.

¶4 In 2022, a fire damaged the property, and the Hookses

submitted an insurance claim. It is undisputed that the Hookses

had obtained an insurance policy listing themselves as the policy

holders and Myers as the first mortgagee. In February 2023, the

insurance company agreed to pay a cash value settlement of

$136,901.74 to the Hookses, but Myers asserted that he was

entitled to the full amount of the insurance proceeds. Because of

the dispute, the insurance proceeds were not released to either

party.

¶5 In December 2023, the Hookses filed a complaint requesting a

declaratory judgment as to the rights and duties under the contract

and regarding the insurance proceeds. The Hookses asked the

district court to determine that Myers was only entitled to a portion

of the insurance proceeds to cover the remaining amount owed on

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the contract, approximately $103,000 at the time the suit was filed.

The Hookses also asked that the court order Myers to convey the

property to them once full payment was made.1

¶6 Myers counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and bad

faith, and requested liquidated and exemplary damages. He

asserted that the Hookses breached the contract by failing to (1) list

him as the insured on the insurance policy and (2) notify him

regarding his personal property. Myers also argued that the parties

should be released from the contract, that he was entitled to all of

the insurance proceeds under the destruction clause, and that he

was entitled to $50,000 in damages based on the breach related to

his personal property.

¶7 After a bench trial and written closing arguments, the court

determined that (1) the destruction clause unambiguously entitled

Myers to the remaining amount owed on the contract, not the full

amount of insurance proceeds; (2) the clause was triggered because

over fifty percent of the house was destroyed and the Hookses were

1 It was undisputed that the Hookses had made all required

monthly payments and were continuing to make monthly payments
while the suit was ongoing.

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required to pay Myers the “amount currently remaining due on the

installment land contract”; (3) the Hookses breached the contract

by failing to designate Myers as the insured on the policy, but he

was only entitled to nominal damages; and (4) the Hookses

breached the contract by failing to notify Myers that they did not

want some of his personal property, but Myers was only entitled to

nominal damages.2 Lastly, the court ordered that any other claims

or counterclaims that were not addressed were considered

abandoned.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 The interpretation of a contract, and whether there is a

breach, is a legal question that we review de novo. French v.

Centura Health Corp., 2022 CO 20, ¶ 24.

¶9 We construe pro se appellate briefs broadly, focusing on their

substance rather than their form. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO

2 The district court also concluded that (1) the Hookses were not

entitled to interest on the insurance proceeds; (2) Myers was not
entitled to exemplary damages; and (3) there was no prevailing
party. It ordered each party to bear their own attorney fees and
costs. Because neither party raises an argument on appeal
regarding these rulings, we consider them abandoned. See Armed
Forces Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA 74, ¶ 38 (arguments raised in
the trial court and not pursued on appeal are deemed abandoned).

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61, ¶ 5. But it is not our role to rewrite a pro se appellant’s briefs

or to act as their advocate. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.

III. Analysis

¶ 10 As best we can discern, Myers contends that the district court

erred by (1) concluding that the destruction clause was

unambiguous or, alternatively, by interpreting an unambiguous

contract contrary to the parties’ mutual understanding and creating

ambiguity; (2) concluding that the Hookses did not materially

breach the contract; (3) labelling the contract as a “land installment

contract”; (4) treating his unjust enrichment claim as abandoned;

(5) allowing the Hookses to raise a new argument after trial; and

(6) treating him unequally from the Hookses. We perceive no error.

A. Ambiguity

¶ 11 Myers contends that the district court erred by concluding

that the contract’s destruction clause was unambiguous or,

alternatively, that the court’s interpretation conflicted with the

parties’ mutual understanding and created ambiguity. We are not

persuaded.

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1. The Contract Is Not Ambiguous

¶ 12 Myers contends that the contract is ambiguous (1) based

on the district court’s order denying his motion for summary

judgment and (2) because the destruction clause language is

subject to multiple interpretations. We disagree.

a. Denial of Summary Judgment

¶ 13 The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not

reviewable on appeal as it is not a final order. CadleRock Joint

Venture LP v. Esperanza Architecture & Consulting, Inc., 2021 COA

119, ¶ 28. To preserve an issue raised in a denied motion for

summary judgment, a party must raise the issue in a motion

addressed to the verdict, such as a motion for directed verdict or

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Feiger, Collison &

Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 14 Because Myers failed to provide the trial transcript on appeal,

we are unable to discern whether he re-raised any of the arguments

he asserted in his denied motion for summary judgment. See

C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (Appellants “must include in the record transcripts

of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues

on appeal.”). So we decline to address his challenge to the court’s

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order denying his summary judgment motion. Castillo v.

Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291-92 (Colo. App. 2006) (declining

to review trial court’s order due to appellant’s failure to comply with

appellate rules).

b. Ambiguity

¶ 15 Myers next contends that the district court erroneously

concluded that the destruction clause was unambiguous because

(1) the term “liquidated” has multiple definitions and (2) the clause

does not contain limiting language. He argues that, because the

clause is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence should be considered. We

are not persuaded.

¶ 16 Our primary goal in interpreting a contract is to give effect to

the parties’ intent, which is discerned primarily from the contract’s

language. French, ¶ 25. We first determine if the contract terms

are ambiguous by examining the contract’s language and affording

the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. The language’s

plain meaning is “examined and construed in harmony” with

reference to all parts of the contract. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist.

No. 12 v. Thompson, 861 P.2d 711, 715 (Colo. 1993). If the written

contract is unambiguous, we enforce it as written. French, ¶ 25. If

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the contract is ambiguous — that is, if the words are susceptible of

more than one reasonable interpretation — extrinsic evidence is

admissible to establish the parties’ intent. Id. However, extrinsic

expressions of intent cannot contradict the plain language or justify

a different interpretation. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. High Plains A & M,

LLC, 167 P.3d 726, 729 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 17 The destruction clause states, “In case of destruction of over

[fifty percent] of the house, insurance proceeds will go to [Myers] for

liquidation of amount owed on this contract for sale.” The court

examined the plain and ordinary meanings of the word “liquidation”

and concluded that it referred to “liquidation of the debt on the

contract,” which was limited to the remaining amount owed on the

contract. The court also determined that the clause did not state

“all insurance proceeds are to go to the seller,” and it found that

“[l]iquidation of the debt necessarily means payment of the

remaining amount owed, not payment of the entirety of the

insurance proceeds.” The court concluded that the contract was

not ambiguous and, upon full payment, Myers was required to

convey title to the Hookses.

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¶ 18 Although we are not bound by the court’s interpretation, see

Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo.

2000), we agree with its conclusion. “Liquidation” is defined as

“[t]he act of determining by agreement or by litigation the exact

amount of something (as a debt or damages) that before was

uncertain”; “[t]he act of settling a debt by payment or other

satisfaction”; or “[t]he act or process of converting assets into cash,

esp. to settle debts.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1114 (12th ed. 2024).

And the destruction clause explicitly states that the insurance

proceeds “go to” the “amount owed on this contract for sale.” Thus,

we agree with the district court and conclude that the contract’s

plain language states that Myers is only entitled to the portion of

the insurance proceeds required to pay any remaining balance owed

on the contract.

¶ 19 But Myers asserts that “liquidated” has multiple dictionary

definitions, so it must be ambiguous. True, “liquidated” has more

than one definition, but merely having multiple dictionary

definitions does not make a word ambiguous. Ybarra v. Greenberg

& Sada, P.C., 2016 COA 116, ¶ 16 (“The fact that an undefined

word in a statute has more than one dictionary definition does not

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necessarily render either the word or the statute ambiguous.”),

aff’d, 2018 CO 81. In the context of the contract, see id. at ¶ 22,

the only reasonable interpretation of the destruction clause is that

“liquidation” refers to the act of settling the debt, which consists of

the amount owed on the contract.

¶ 20 We are not persuaded otherwise by Myers’ argument that the

parties’ intent cannot be discerned from the written contract absent

specific language stating the clause was for “debt reduction only.”

Myers cites Union Rural Electric Ass’n v. Public Utilities Commission,

661 P.2d 247, 252 (Colo. 1983), and McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,

¶¶ 43-49, to support his argument. Neither case is applicable. In

Union Rural Electric Ass’n, 661 P.2d at 251, the court did not

address the absence of limiting language and instead discerned the

parties’ intent from the contract’s language. And in McCoy, ¶ 44,

the court examined an ambiguous criminal statute and legislative

intent. Because Myers failed to develop his argument, we decline to

address it further. See S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. &

Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 35 (declining

to address conclusory argument presented without authority);

Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010)

10
(Appellate courts “will not consider a bald legal proposition

presented without argument or development.”).

¶ 21 Because the destruction clause is not ambiguous, we

necessarily reject Myers’ argument that we should look to extrinsic

evidence to interpret the contract. See Cheyenne, 861 P.2d at 715

(“Only after a contract is deemed ambiguous may the trial court use

extrinsic evidence to assist it in ascertaining the intent of the

parties.”).

2. District Court Did Not Create Ambiguity

¶ 22 Myers contends that the contract language is unambiguous

and the parties understood the destruction clause as a liquated

damages clause entitling him to all of the insurance proceeds. He

argues that the district court’s interpretation conflicted with that

mutual understanding and created ambiguity. We are not

persuaded for two reasons.

¶ 23 First, Myers does not explain how the destruction clause

constitutes a liquidated damages provision. A liquidated damages

provision identifies a stipulated amount of damages to be paid in

the event of a breach. See Black’s Law Dictionary 490 (12th ed.

2024) (defining “liquidated damages” as “[a]n amount contractually

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stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be

recovered by one party if the other party breaches”); Ravenstar, LLC

v. One Ski Hill Place, LLC, 2017 CO 83, ¶ 10 (explaining that a

liquidated damages provision has three elements: (1) the parties’

intention to liquidate damages; (2) the amount of liquidated

damages is a reasonable estimate of actual damages resulting from

a breach; and (3) actual damages resulting from a breach were

difficult to determine as of the date of the contract). The

destruction clause does not mention a breach, nor does it identify a

stipulated amount to estimate reasonable damages in the event of a

breach. The destruction clause is not a liquidated damages

provision. See Ravenstar, ¶ 10. So, to the extent that Myers

contends that he is entitled to “liquidated damages,” we reject that

argument.3

¶ 24 Second, as discussed, the contract plainly entitles Myers to

the remaining amount owed on the contract — not to all the

3 Myers also asserts that the district court erroneously awarded him

“actual damages” by ordering payment of the remaining amount
owed on the contract. However, the court’s order does not award
him damages; it orders that the Hookses pay the amount owed
under the destruction clause.

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insurance proceeds. To the extent that the parties’ past treatment

of the clause suggests otherwise, we do not consider extrinsic

expressions of intent. See Fort Lyon Canal, 167 P.3d at 729

(“[E]xtrinsic evidence of intent can never contradict or change the

language of a contract or justify an interpretation not reasonably

derivable from the contract itself.”). So we perceive no error with

the court’s interpretation. See French, ¶ 24.

B. The Hookses’ Breaches

¶ 25 Myers contends that the district court’s conclusion that the

Hookses’ breaches were not material is unsupported by the record.4

We disagree.

¶ 26 “Whether there has been a material breach of contract turns

upon the importance or seriousness of the breach and the

likelihood that the injured party nonetheless received, or will

receive, substantial performance under the contract.” Interbank

4 To the extent that Myers attempts to raise a claim for conversion,

he does not develop that argument so we decline to address it. See
S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v.
Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 35 (declining to address conclusory
argument presented without authority); Barnett v. Elite Props. of
Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (Appellate courts “will
not consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or
development.”).

13
Invs., L.L.C. v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224, 1228

(Colo. App. 2000). A material breach renders substantial

performance impossible. Id. at 1229. Whether a party materially

breached a contract is a factual question that we will only disturb if

it is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record. Id.

¶ 27 The district court determined that the Hookses had breached

the contract by failing to designate Myers as the named insured on

the insurance policy. But the court found that the insurance

payout was more than what was owed on the contract. Because

Myers was only entitled to the amount owed on the contract, his

inability to participate in the insurance payout negotiations was

irrelevant and the breach did not cause him any damages. The

court similarly concluded that the Hookses breached the contract

by failing to notify Myers that they did not want his personal

property before destroying it, but Myers was only entitled to the

value of the property that was destroyed, and he failed to prove

actual damages at trial. Thus, the court awarded nominal damages

of one dollar for each breach. The court also rejected Myers’

assertion that the parties should be released from the contract

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because “the breaches [were] not substantial [and] the injury

caused [was] not irreparable.”

¶ 28 By concluding that the Hookses’ breaches did not result in any

damages to Myers, the court impliedly concluded that Myers was

still able to receive the benefit of the contract and substantial

performance was not rendered impossible. See id. at 1229.

Because the breaches were not material and Myers failed to

establish any damages, we perceive no error in the court’s

conclusion. See id. (concluding the trial court properly found a

developer’s breach was nonmaterial when the water districts could

not show they were damaged).

¶ 29 We are not otherwise persuaded by Myers’ contention that

“actual damages are evident because the Hookses received over

$365,900 in insurance proceeds.” As discussed, Myers is only

entitled to the amount of insurance proceeds necessary to pay the

remaining balance owed on the contract. And as to Myers’ personal

property damages claim, he did not provide a trial transcript or

specific record cites to support his contention. So we assume that

the record supports the court’s finding that he failed to prove those

damages. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where

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the appellant fails to provide . . . a transcript, the [appellate] court

must presume that the record supports the judgment.”); Clements

v. Davies, 217 P.3d 912, 916 (Colo. App. 2009) (absent an adequate

record to demonstrate their claims of error, we presume the

evidence fully supports the court’s ruling); C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B)

(Arguments “must contain . . . a clear and concise discussion of the

grounds upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal or

modification of the . . . rulings of the lower court or tribunal, with

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the

appellant relies.”).

¶ 30 Myers also contends that the Hookses’ breaches amount to

unsatisfied conditions precedent or noncompliance with the

contract’s covenants that preclude conveyance of title to the real

property. Because Myers fails to cite where in the record he raised

this argument before the district court, we decline to address his

contention. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5) (an appellant’s brief must include

the relevant facts and procedural history with appropriate

references to the record); Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2023 COA

107, ¶ 25 (“In civil cases, arguments never presented to, considered

by, or ruled upon by a district court may not be raised for the first

16
time on appeal.”); Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica Premier

Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[I]t is not the duty of

the reviewing court to search the record for evidence to support

bald assertions.”), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997).

¶ 31 We perceive no error in the court’s ruling that the Hookses did

not materially breach the contract or that Myers must convey title

to the real property to the Hookses on full payment of the remaining

amount owed on the contract. See Interbank, 12 P.3d at 1228;

French, ¶ 24.

C. Land Installment Contract

¶ 32 Myers contends that the district court erroneously labelled the

“rent to own” contract as a “land installment” contract. He argues

that a land installment contract has “certain statutory rights” but

acknowledges that those rights “were never raised or pleaded here,”

nor were they asserted as an affirmative defense. He also argues

that “[t]he court’s erroneous label as a ‘installment land contract’

fundamentally altered the legal framework of the contract,” but he

does not explain how the court’s label did so. Because Myers’

argument is undeveloped and conclusory, we decline to address it.

See Weinstein, ¶ 35; Barnett, 252 P.3d at 19.

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D. Unjust Enrichment Claim

¶ 33 Myers contends that the district court erred by concluding

that his unjust enrichment claim was abandoned. We reject this

contention because an unjust enrichment claim cannot stand when

a legally enforceable contract exists. See Bd. of Governors of Colo.

State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 44 (“[A] party cannot properly

state a claim for unjust enrichment when a legally enforceable

contract exists that covers the same subject matter and that

contract has not been abrogated or rescinded.”).

E. “New Argument”

¶ 34 Myers contends that the district court erroneously allowed the

Hookses to introduce the new argument post-trial that the

destruction clause only entitled Myers to the remaining amount

owed on the contract. We are unable to discern whether the

Hookses raised that argument during trial, or if Myers objected to it

during trial, because Myers did not provide the trial transcripts on

appeal. Without those transcripts, we assume that the record

supports the court’s order. Dean, ¶ 13.

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F. Unequal Treatment

¶ 35 Myers contends that the district court required him to prove

his claimed damages for his personal property while not requiring

the Hookses to prove their damages. He argues that this unequal

treatment resulted in the Hookses benefiting from receiving the

insurance proceeds. We are not persuaded.

¶ 36 Notably, it does not appear that the Hookses ever requested

damages — their complaint only requests a declaratory judgment.

And the court did not award them damages — indeed, it ordered the

Hookses to pay, from the insurance proceeds, the remaining

amount owed on the contract to Myers. Moreover, Myers has failed

to show any other instance of the court treating the parties

unequally or with any prejudice beyond taking issue with the

court’s ruling. See People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 30 (The

party asserting a trial judge was biased must allege more than

“[b]are assertions and speculative statements” to show “the judge

had a substantial bent of mind against him or her.” (citations

omitted)). To the extent that Myers asserts that the court’s ruling

should be reversed, we reject his request because we have

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concluded above that the court interpreted the contract correctly.

See supra Part III.A.

IV. Disposition

¶ 37 We affirm the district court’s judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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