Marriage of Kelly

24CA2169 Marriage of Kelly 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2169
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22DR31018
Honorable Kimberly Karn, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Uriah Michael Kelly,

Appellee,

and

Cassandra Anne Kelly,

Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD*
Román, C.J., and Berger*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Law Office of Leonard R. Higdon, PLLC, Leonard R. Higdon, Jacqueline M.
Schneider, Greenwood Village, Colorado for Appellee

Paul A. Frederiksen, Parker, Colorado for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 This is a dissolution of marriage proceeding between a wife,

Cassandra Anne Kelly, and a husband, Uriah Michael Kelly. Wife

appeals the district court’s permanent orders. She submits the

court did not have jurisdiction over the parties, and she challenges

the court’s determinations on maintenance and dividing up the

marital property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part,

and we remand the case to the court for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, husband asked the court to dissolve the parties’

fourteen-year marriage. Wife filed a motion to dismiss the petition,

asserting the court lacked jurisdiction because the parties had

moved to Florida. After a hearing, the court determined wife was

domiciled in Florida, but husband continued to be domiciled in

Colorado.

¶3 The court later entered permanent orders. As is pertinent to

our analysis, the court found the value of husband’s 401(k) was

$69,353.94 and it had a loan against it of $27,494.64. So the court

allocated husband his 401(k) in the amount of $41,859.30. The

court allocated to wife the parties’ debt to wife’s parents in the

amount of $23,363.89.

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¶4 With respect to the marital home in Florida, the court

• valued it at $295,800, noting it was encumbered by a

mortgage with a balance of $238,558.21;

• allocated the marital equity in the home of $57,241.79 to

wife;

• ordered her to assume the mortgage or to refinance it in

her name within ninety days; if she could not do so, she

was to sell the home within sixty-one days of the order;

and

• decided, if wife sold the home and garnered more than

$57,241.79 in profit, she must split the proceeds above

this amount equally with husband.

¶5 With respect to maintenance, the court found husband should

pay wife the guideline amount, which it calculated at $385.05 per

month for a period of eight years and four months. But the court

found husband had paid the entire mortgage on the Florida home in

the time the parties owned it, even though husband never lived in

the home. These payments totaled $52,977.08. The court

considered these payments to be a form of maintenance and

credited them to husband, resulting in an overpayment of

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$14,472.58 in the amount of maintenance due. As a result, the

court found husband did not owe wife any maintenance, but it did

not require wife to refund the overpayment to husband.

II. Jurisdiction

¶6 Wife contends the court did not have jurisdiction to preside

over the dissolution proceeding because both parties were domiciled

in Florida. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶7 To dissolve a marriage, a court must find, among other things,

that “one of the parties has been domiciled in this state for ninety-

one days” before the proceedings began. § 14-10-106(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2025. If this domiciliary requirement is not met, the court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. See In re

Marriage of Barnes, 907 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Colo. App. 1995).

¶8 The determination of a spouse’s domicile is a question of fact.

In re Marriage of Akins, 932 P.2d 863, 868 (Colo. App. 1997).

Accordingly, we review the court’s finding that husband was

domiciled in Colorado for the requisite time before filing the petition

for clear error, meaning we will not disturb the finding if it is

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supported by the record. See Martinez v. Mintz Law Firm, LLC, 2016

CO 43, ¶ 17.

¶9 Domicile “is the place of one’s actual residence with the

intention to remain permanently, or for an indefinite time, and

without any certain purpose to return to a former place of abode.”

Akins, 932 P.2d at 868; see also Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 43

(domicile is a “person’s permanent home to which he or she intends

to return to and remain”). “Domicile” is not synonymous with

“residence,” however, because a person can have more than one

residence at a time, but only one domicile. Old Republic Nat’l Title

Ins. Co. v. Kornegay, 2012 COA 140, ¶ 18; see Brandt, ¶ 43. Both

residence and intent to remain permanently must coexist to create

a person’s domicile. Akins, 932 P.2d at 868. Once established, a

person’s domicile continues until another one is established,

without regard to any “changes in temporary sojourn.” Id.

B. Discussion

¶ 10 The court found, although wife moved to Florida in July 2021,

husband never moved to join her. It also found, although it may

have been husband’s intent to reside in Florida at some point, he

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was never domiciled there and remained domiciled in Colorado.

The record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 11 Both parties testified wife moved to Florida in July 2021, but

husband was unable to move because he could not ask for a

transfer of employment until at least April 2022. Husband

continued to live in Colorado at his father’s home. He testified that,

after wife moved, he visited Florida only twice for a total of ten days

and returned to Colorado after each trip. He also testified and

provided exhibits supporting his testimony that he had a

commercial driver’s license issued out of Colorado; he was

registered to vote in Colorado; he titled, registered, and insured his

car in Colorado; and he was not aware of receiving any mail at an

address outside of Colorado.

¶ 12 We acknowledge wife asserts husband intended to move to

Florida once he was able to request a transfer from his employer, he

signed a mortgage agreement which appears to state his intent to

live in the Florida home, and he alone paid the mortgage for the

Florida house. But it is the court’s role, and not ours, to resolve the

conflicting evidence regarding where and when husband established

a domicile, and its resolution of that factual issue is binding on

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review. See M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1383-84

(Colo. 1994); see also In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 270

(Colo. App. 2010)(it is the province of the district court to determine

the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve conflicting evidence).

¶ 13 We are not persuaded by wife’s reliance on People v. Fox, 862

P.2d 1000, 1004 (Colo. App. 1993), to conclude husband changed

his domicile by virtue of wife alone moving to Florida. Fox

considered when a “marital domicile” enjoyed the protections of the

Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and

hinged on the undisputed fact the defendant and his wife would

have remained together in the marital domicile — wherever that

might have been located — had the defendant not been

incarcerated. Id.

¶ 14 In this case, wife submits, by analogy, the “only reason

husband did not stay in Florida . . . was that he could not transfer

his . . . employment to Florida until April of the next year.” This is

another attack on the court’s finding that, although husband might

have intended to move to Florida at some point, he was never

domiciled anywhere but Colorado. Because the record supports the

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court’s finding that husband remained domiciled in Colorado, we

will not disturb it.

¶ 15 Last, to the extent wife asserts the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under section 13-1-124(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025, we disagree.

She contends section 13-1-124(1)(e) “requires that the marital

domicile has been maintained in Colorado without interruption.”

But she misreads the statute. Rather, section 13-1-124 confers

jurisdiction on Colorado courts for actions related to “the

maintenance of a matrimonial domicile . . . if one of the parties of

the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within

the state.” The court found that husband continued to be domiciled

in Colorado and, as we have discussed, we defer to this finding of

fact.

III. Property Division

¶ 16 Wife contends the court erred when it divided the marital

property. Specifically, she asserts (1) the court inappropriately

calculated the amount of husband’s 401(k) and the debt owed to

wife’s parents; (2) its order relating to allocation of profit if the

marital home were to be sold was contrary to Colorado law; and (3)

it did not make any finding about the total assets and debts

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allocated to each party. Although we agree the court’s order

relating to the profit made on the marital home was erroneous, we

affirm the remaining property division orders.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 Before dividing the marital estate, a court must first determine

whether each asset or debt is marital property, which is subject to

division, or separate property, which is not. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.

2025. Assets acquired and debts incurred during the marriage are

presumed marital, but this presumption can be rebutted with

evidence proving an exception listed in section 14-10-113(2). § 14-

10-113(3); see In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1171-72

(Colo. App. 2006)(“Marital liabilities include all debts that are

acquired and incurred by [the spouses] during their marriage.”).

¶ 18 Next, a court must value each asset or debt. In re Marriage of

Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4; Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at 1172. It may

adopt either spouse’s valuation or arrive at its own, so long as the

valuation is reasonable considering the evidence as a whole. In re

Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 41. Property is valued as of

the date of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on the

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disposition of property if this hearing precedes the date of the

decree. § 14-10-113(2), (5).

¶ 19 Finally, a court must equitably divide the marital estate,

considering all relevant factors. § 14-10-113(1); see In re Marriage

of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 50; Wright, ¶ 3; see also Jorgenson, 143

P.3d at 1172 (distribution of marital debts is like property division).

The division must be equitable, but it need not be equal. Wright,

¶ 3.

¶ 20 A court has broad discretion to divide the marital estate

equitably based on the particular facts and circumstances of each

case, and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that

discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,

¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1); In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95,

¶ 67 (weighing the statutory factors is within the court’s sound

discretion). A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law

or its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

Medeiros, ¶ 28. Specific findings on every statutory factor are not

required, provided a court’s overall findings allow us to determine

whether its decision was supported by competent evidence. Collins,

¶ 19.

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B. Discussion

¶ 21 When valuing husband’s 401(k), the court found it was marital

property and the amount in the account was $69,353.94, with a

loan against the account of $27,494.64. The court therefore found

the account had a marital value of $41,859.00 and allocated it to

husband.

¶ 22 Wife asserts the court erred because the court’s valuation

merely subtracted the loan amount from the balance and, as a

result, ignored “that the loan is an asset that is owed to the account

that is not considered elsewhere” in husband’s financials or

property division. So, she continues, the court “hid” the debt of

$27,494.64 from consideration in the property division.

Accordingly, she asks us to remand the case to the court to award

husband the 401(k) in the amount of $69,353.94.

¶ 23 We decline wife’s request because, even if the court erred by

subtracting the amount of the loan from the 401(k) and awarding

the balance to husband, she does not explain how this harmed her.

If we were to remand with instructions to value the 401(k) at

$69,353.94, the court would also have to allocate the $27,494.64

loan against the 401(k), leaving husband with the same allocation

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of property and the same debts as set forth in the permanent

orders. See C.R.C.P. 61; see also In re Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36

(Colo. 2001)(“Errors by the trial court in determining the property

division in a dissolution case are reversible when the aggregate

effect of such errors affects the substantial rights of the parties.”).

¶ 24 Wife next disputes the amount of the debt to her parents. The

court found that the balance on the debt the parties borrowed from

wife’s parents amounted to $23,363.89 and allocated it to wife.

Wife first submits the court’s determination that wife’s parents were

not collecting interest on the loan was error. The court noted that,

“[a]lthough there is an interest rate in the written document, the

evidence established that the parties have borrowed several times

from [w]ife’s parents, have never paid interest, and there is no

communication from the parents to husband or wife regarding how

much interest is due and owing.”

¶ 25 Wife asserts this finding was erroneous because evidence

showed wife’s parents had communicated about the debt on several

occasions. We agree evidence showed wife’s parents communicated

with the parties about the debt in general, but the court’s finding

was there had been no communication about the interest accrued

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on the debt. The evidence wife cites does not address interest on

the debt. And, to the extent wife contends other evidence

established her parents intended to, or did, collect interest on the

debt, husband testified there had been no interest charged on the

loan to his knowledge. We are not free to reweigh the court’s

factual findings. Farr, 228 P.3d at 270.

¶ 26 Next, wife contends the amount the court found owing on the

debt to her parents is not supported by the record. We agree the

court incorrectly calculated the amount owed. It found the evidence

established the parties had borrowed a total of $60,300.00 and had

paid $37,136.11. This leaves a balance owed of $23,163.89 rather

than the court’s stated amount of $23,363.89. But we do not see,

and wife does not explain, how she was harmed by this calculation

error amounting to only $200.00. See C.R.C.P. 61; Balanson, 25

P.3d at 32.

¶ 27 Wife next takes issue with the court’s order that, if she must

sell the marital home because she cannot refinance it, she must

split any profits over $57,241.79 (the marital value awarded to her)

with husband. She asserts this order is “contrary to established

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Colorado law” because husband is not entitled to any future

appreciation.

¶ 28 We agree with wife that, because the court awarded the

marital home to her in the permanent orders, any later appreciation

is hers. See In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814 (Colo.

App. 1985)(noting husband was not entitled to share in the future

appreciation of the marital residence awarded to wife because

property is valued at the time of the dissolution hearing or as of the

hearing on property division, whichever occurs first); see also In re

Marriage of Campbell, 599 P.2d 275, 275-76 (Colo. App.

1979)(district court committed reversible error when it awarded the

wife the increase in value of the marital residence when sold after

the dissolution); § 14-10-113(3). We therefore vacate that portion of

the order requiring wife to split any proceeds over $57,241.79 with

husband if she must sell the marital home.

¶ 29 Last, wife submits the court erred because it did not make any

finding about the total assets and debts allocated to each party.

She provides no authority stating a final accounting is required,

and the court’s order is sufficient for us to understand the total

marital assets and debts and how they were allocated. See In re

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Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must

make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court

a clear understanding of the basis of its order.”).

IV. Maintenance Obligation

¶ 30 Wife challenges the court’s decision that husband fulfilled his

maintenance obligation. She asserts, among other reasons, the

court erred when it reduced husband’s income by $900.00 to

account for child support paid to his newborn son. Because we

cannot ascertain how the court landed on the amount of $900.00,

we agree. But, on remand, the court may consider the mortgage

payments husband made during the pendency of the proceeding

when determining the amount and the length of the term of

maintenance.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 31 Section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2025, specifies the process a

court must follow when considering a maintenance request. Wright,

¶ 13. The court must first make findings concerning (1) the amount

of each party’s gross income; (2) the marital property apportioned to

each party; (3) the financial resources of each party; (4) the

reasonable financial need as established during the marriage; and

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(5) whether the maintenance awarded would be deductible for

federal income tax purposes by the payor and taxable income to the

recipient. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see also Wright, ¶ 14.

¶ 32 After making these initial findings, the court must determine

the amount and term of maintenance, if any, that is fair and

equitable to the parties after considering, among other things, the

guideline amount and term set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(b).

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); Wright, ¶ 15.

¶ 33 The advisory guidelines are a “starting point” for the

determination of fair and equitable maintenance awards. § 14-10-

114(1)(b)(II). The advisory guideline amounts are based on the

parties’ “adjusted gross income,” which means gross income less

pre-existing court-ordered child support obligations actually paid by

a party and the adjustment to a party’s income as determined by

application of the child support guidelines in section 14-10-

115(6)(b), C.R.S. 2025, for any children who are not children of the

marriage for whom the party has a legal responsibility to support.

§ 14-10-114(8)(a)(I).

¶ 34 We review a court’s maintenance award for an abuse of

discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 58; In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530,

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533 (Colo. App. 2011). A court abuses its discretion when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies the law. Medeiros, ¶ 28. A court must “make

sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear

understanding of the basis of its order.” Wright, ¶ 20

(quoting Gibbs, ¶ 9).

B. Child Support Deduction

¶ 35 The court determined husband’s monthly income was

$8,379.10. After considering the statutory factors set forth in

section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I), it determined wife had a need for

support. It then determined under the maintenance guidelines

husband must pay wife the monthly amount of $385.05 for eight

years. The court arrived at that number by taking husband’s

monthly income and adjusting it by $900.00 per month for support

paid to his son born to another woman. Wife submits this was

error because the court did not explain the foundation for the

$900.00 deduction. We agree.

¶ 36 When discussing support for his newborn child, husband

testified, “[I]t’s looking between [$]800 to $1,000 a month.” In

response to questioning from the court, husband clarified he was

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currently supporting the child and there was no court order or case

filed for child support. But he had a “written agreement” with the

child’s mother about child support. The record does not establish

how much child support husband paid to the mother of his child or

document any such payments. In sum, we cannot discern how the

court decided $900.00 should be deducted from husband’s income

for child support and we must therefore remand the maintenance

determination to the court.

¶ 37 On remand, the court must take evidence about the parties’

then existing financial circumstances and, as such, we do not

address wife’s several additional contentions related to the court’s

determinations concerning income and other things. Id. at ¶ 24

(declining, after maintenance award was reversed and remanded, to

consider argument that court improperly calculated a party’s

income).

C. Credit for Mortgage Payments

¶ 38 Because it may arise on remand, we will consider whether the

court erred when it found husband’s maintenance obligation could

be offset by the amount he paid on the Florida mortgage.

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¶ 39 The court found husband had paid the mortgage on the

Florida home since it was purchased for a total of $52,977.08. It

considered this “as a payment of maintenance” and found husband

had fulfilled his entire obligation to wife, plus an overpayment of

more than fourteen thousand dollars. The court did not abuse its

discretion by crediting husband for the amount paid on the

mortgage.

¶ 40 Wife asserts the court erred because (1) there was no order for

husband to pay temporary maintenance, and the mortgage

payments could not be considered “maintenance” under section 14-

10-114(2); and (2) husband’s mortgage payments were not “from

one spouse to the other.”

¶ 41 First, the court’s order does not run afoul of section 14-10-

114(2). That statute provides the court may order the payment of

maintenance at the time of permanent orders — not whether the

court may consider mortgage payments made during the pendency

of a proceeding when deciding whether a permanent order of

maintenance would be fair and equitable. § 14-10-114(2).

¶ 42 Next, we agree the court never ordered husband to continue

making mortgage payments and the parties never requested

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temporary maintenance. But, to the extent wife submits such

orders were required before the court could consider the mortgage

payments as a factor when determining the maintenance amount

and term, we are not persuaded.

¶ 43 The statute provides a nonexclusive list of factors a court shall

consider when determining the amount and term of maintenance.

§ 14-10-114(4)(c)(I)-(XIII). As part of its maintenance determination,

the court in this case was permitted to consider “any other factor” it

“deem[ed] relevant.” § 14-10-114(4)(c)(XIII).

¶ 44 Wife does not contend the mortgage payments were irrelevant.

We therefore do not agree the court erred when it offset wife’s

maintenance award with the amount of mortgage payments made.

See Smith, ¶ 67 (weighing the statutory factors is within a court’s

sound discretion).

¶ 45 Last, wife contends the court’s order that husband had met

his maintenance obligation was erroneous because it created an

“unmodifiable” award without “the necessary findings,” especially

considering wife’s medical conditions. But she does not develop

this argument further, and we therefore decline to address it. See

Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA

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34, ¶ 44 (declining to consider undeveloped and conclusory

contentions of error made without supporting argument or

authority).

V. Attorney Fees

¶ 46 Husband requests an award of attorney fees and costs related

to this appeal. But we will only award attorney fees and costs if the

party seeking them states a legal and factual basis for the award.

C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 53; see also

Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984)(“A

request to impose sanctions has been denied where the appellee

failed to . . . clearly state the basis for the request.”). Husband does

not cite a statute or rule or explain what facts support his request.

Accordingly, we deny his request.

VI. Disposition

¶ 47 The portion of the court’s permanent orders requiring wife to

split the proceeds of the sale of the marital home is vacated. The

court’s maintenance determination is reversed and remanded for

further proceedings. All other portions of the permanent orders are

affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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