Parental Resp Conc EMK

24CA2107 Parental Resp Conc EMK 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2107
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21DR2587
Honorable Marie Avery Moses, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning E.M.K., a Child,

and Concerning Jason Matthew Kidd,

Appellee,

and

Holly Joy Schlotterback,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Williams Weese Pepple & Ferguson PC, John Bernetich, Rena E. Meisler,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Holly Joy Schlotterback (mother) appeals the district court’s

order modifying decision-making authority and parenting time. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and Jason Matthew Kidd (father) share one child —

E.M.K. — who was born in 2021. After mediation, the parties

reached a simplified parenting plan agreement in May 2022, which

the district court adopted in its permanent orders. The parenting

plan provided for joint decision-making and allocated all overnights

to mother but specified that father would have liberal parenting

time, as agreed upon by the parties.

¶3 At mother’s request, the district court modified the parenting

plan in July 2023 and made, in relevant part, the following findings

of fact:

• The parties had been in a state of almost constant conflict

since the permanent orders were entered.

• The parties had been unable to agree upon a parenting time

schedule for E.M.K.

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• The relationship between the parties was marked by intense

conflict and emotionality. The parents were dishonest with

each other.

• On two occasions mother had sought and obtained

temporary civil protection orders against father, but neither

protection order was made permanent.

• Parenting time exchanges were periods of intense conflict

between the parents and had to be minimized to protect

E.M.K. from parental conflict.

• The parents’ failure to provide the court with any

information about E.M.K. demonstrated that neither parent

was able to focus on E.M.K.’s needs, and the parents were

only able to focus on their own wants and desires.

• For E.M.K. to develop strong bonds with father, E.M.K.

needed increased parenting time with father.

The court allocated parenting time to father from Sunday at noon to

Tuesday morning in week one and from Friday night to Tuesday

morning in week two, with the schedule to repeat every two weeks.

Mother was awarded all parenting time not allocated to father. The

parties retained joint decision-making authority.

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¶4 In October 2023, father filed a verified motion concerning

parenting time disputes under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025,

alleging that mother had taken parenting time away from him and

lied to him about E.M.K.’s schooling. Father also filed a contempt

motion, alleging, among other things, that mother refused to give

him the child and was late for exchanges.

¶5 The district court scheduled a hearing and appointed a Child

and Family Investigator (CFI). The order appointing the CFI noted

that there was “currently a protection order in [a] Denver County

Case . . . wherein [father] is the restrained party and [mother] is the

protected party.”

¶6 The CFI completed a twenty-five-page report detailing the

following:

• Father’s record included an arrest in June 2023 for

violating a protection order in which mother was the

protected party. The arrest involved domestic violence

charges of disturbance via phone and making threats to

injure a person or property. He went to trial on the

domestic violence charges and was found guilty of

disturbance via phone but not guilty of making threats in

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violation of a protection order because he was not served

with the protection order before the incident.

• Father was arrested again in September 2023, in part, for

violating a protection order.

• The parties had been conducting parenting time exchanges

at the Denver Police Department (DPD) District 2 station

because a mandatory protection order was issued between

the parties shortly after the parenting plan was

implemented.

• In September 2023, mother moved from Denver to Castle

Rock because she had been on a waitlist for subsidized

housing since 2017.

¶7 The district court held a hearing on father’s motion in

September 2024. At the request of mother’s counsel, the court took

judicial notice of the two criminal cases involving father. The court

also advised father as follows:

Now, one of the other factors that I have to
consider is any reports related to domestic
violence. Now, I understand that you have
perhaps some criminal charges pending
related to domestic violence, and it sounds like
you might be appealing some of those. So you
are welcome to tell me anything you want me

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to know about . . . domestic violence. On the
other hand, you do have a Fifth Amendment
right not to speak about any instances if it
might incriminate you. I will — if you do
invoke your Fifth Amendment right not to
testify about any issues that might subject you
to criminal penalties, I can . . . draw an
adverse inference about your refusal to testify
about those issues.

Father discussed his domestic violence conviction for “disturbance

via phone,” explaining that the charge stemmed from texts he sent

to mother asking why she had checked E.M.K. out of day care when

it was his “day” with E.M.K.

¶8 Father, mother, and the CFI testified at the hearing. Mother

asked the court to keep the current parenting time schedule, and

the CFI recommended a parenting schedule “similar to the one that

is in place now.” Mother also asked for sole decision-making

authority; father asked the court to maintain joint decision-making.

As part of her testimony, the CFI recommended that mother be

responsible for decision-making.

¶9 After considering the CFI’s report; the testimony of father,

mother, and the CFI; and “all factors regarding the best interests of

the minor child pursuant to [section] 14-10-124,” C.R.S. 2025, the

court modified the existing allocation of parenting time and

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decision-making authority. The court ordered an equal parenting

time schedule with only one exchange per week, to occur at the

DPD District 2 station. The court awarded mother sole decision-

making authority over religious activities; medical, dental, and

mental health; and any extracurricular or recreational activities

that occur during mother’s parenting time. Father was given sole

decision-making authority over school and education and any

extracurricular or recreational activities that occur during his

parenting time. Mother appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Mother contends that the district court failed to consider

evidence of domestic violence by father against her before awarding

father equal parenting time and giving him sole decision-making

authority over certain matters in violation of section 14-10-

124(4)(a), (1.5)(a), and (1.5)(b). We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 We review a court’s modification of parenting time and

parental responsibilities for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage

of Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010); Spahmer v. Gullette,

113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo. 2005). The district court abuses its

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discretion when it acts in a manner that is manifestly arbitrary,

unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies or misconstrues the

law. In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16.

¶ 12 When there is support in the record for the findings, the

district court’s “resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on

review.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA

63, ¶ 15. We review de novo whether the district court applied the

correct legal standard. In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 21.

¶ 13 The district court may modify an order regarding parenting

time whenever the modification would serve the best interests of the

child. § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The district court “has

broad discretion” to modify parenting time, “taking into

consideration the child’s best interests and the policy of

encouraging parent-child relationships.” Barker, 251 P.3d at 592.

What serves the bests interests of the child is determined by

considering the factors in section 14-10-124(1.5). In re Marriage of

Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 741–42 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 14 Likewise, a court may modify an order of decision-making

responsibility if it finds that “a change has occurred in the

circumstances of the child” or the parent with decision-making

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authority, and “the modification is necessary to serve the best

interests of the child.” § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. The court

must retain the existing allocation of decision-making responsibility

unless doing so “would endanger the child’s physical health or

significantly impairs the child’s emotional development and the

harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed

by the advantage” to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c). In determining

the best interests of the child for decision-making authority, the

court gives “paramount consideration to the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the children, after considering

numerous statutory factors.” In re Marriage of Bertsch, 97 P.3d

219, 222 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 15 When a claim of domestic violence is made to the court, “prior

to allocating parental responsibilities . . . and prior to considering

the factors set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1.5) . . .

the court shall consider” whether a party has committed domestic

violence, including a party’s pattern or history of domestic violence.

§ 14-10-124(4)(a)(II). While the court must consider the factors set

forth in the statute as it applies to the best interests of the child,

the court does not need to make specific findings on every factor if

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the record reflects that the court considered the “pertinent factors.”

People in the Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565–66 (Colo. App.

2003). The district court’s “[f]indings must be sufficiently explicit,

however, to give the reviewing court a clear understanding of the

basis of the order.” In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 44.

B. The District Court Considered Evidence of Domestic Violence
as Required by Section 14-10-124(4)(a)

¶ 16 Mother alleges that the district court failed to comply with the

requirements of section 14-10-124(4)(a), by not determining

whether father committed domestic violence. We disagree.

¶ 17 Mother argues that the record fails to show the court

considered the allegations of domestic violence. Our review of the

record indicates otherwise. During the hearing, the court took

judicial notice of father’s criminal cases, including the case in

which he was convicted of disturbance via phone. The court also

asked father about the domestic violence allegations, his pending

charges related to domestic violence, and how he intended to

address his low frustration tolerance.

¶ 18 The court’s order similarly reflects its consideration of

domestic violence by acknowledging father’s “low frustration

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tolerance,” his “inability to manage his negative feelings towards

mother,” and the CFI’s findings that father “engaged in coercive

control in his dealings with mother.” The order also addressed

father’s treatment of mother and specified the findings in the CFI’s

report outlining the same history. Accordingly, there is ample

evidence in the record that the district court considered the

allegations of domestic violence in its analysis.

¶ 19 Mother contends that the court erred by not determining, as a

threshold matter, whether father committed domestic violence. The

statute, however, does not require the court to make such a finding.

Rather, the district court must only consider whether one of the

parties has committed domestic violence. § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II). The

court therefore did not misconstrue or misapply the law; it properly

considered the allegations and evidence of domestic violence during

the hearing and in its order.

C. The District Court Did Not Err in Allocating Parenting Time

¶ 20 Mother alleges that the district court did not comply with the

provisions of section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and failed to consider

evidence of domestic violence when it allocated parenting time.

Specifically, she argues that the district court ignored the evidence

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of domestic violence mentioned in the CFI’s report, which included

information on father’s prior arrests and displays of coercive

behavior. She claims that the court erred by departing from the

CFI’s recommendation to maintain a parenting time schedule like

the one currently in place. We disagree.

¶ 21 Under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), the court may make

“provisions for parenting time that the court finds are in the best

interests of the child, with the child’s safety always paramount.”

This standard requires the court to consider factors including, but

not limited to, interactions between the child and their parents and

siblings, the child’s adjustment to the home, the ability of the

parties to encourage the sharing of love and affection between the

child and the other party, and the ability of the parties to place the

child’s needs ahead of their own. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (IV), (VI),

(XI).

¶ 22 In addition, section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5) provides that when

determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider

CFI reports related to domestic violence. While the statute requires

the court to consider the CFI’s report, the court is not required to

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follow the CFI’s recommendations. See In re Marriage of McNamara,

962 P.2d 330, 334 (Colo. App. 1998).

¶ 23 The court’s order reflects its consideration of the CFI’s report

and the CFI’s testimony as well as the other statutory factors it

must consider when allocating parenting time between mother and

father.

¶ 24 The court agreed with the CFI’s assessment that the parenting

exchange times between mother and father led to increased conflict,

encouraged inappropriate behavior between the parties, and should

be modified to protect E.M.K. from parental conflict. The CFI report

noted that father used the exchanges as an opportunity to address

“adult issues” with mother in front of E.M.K. Additionally, the

report indicated that the parenting time exchanges resulted in

father expressing anger towards mother, with father being arrested

at one exchange.

¶ 25 The report further acknowledged that the 6:30 a.m. exchanges

were too early for E.M.K., as she often sleeps later than the

exchange time. To address the issue, the court’s order implements

parenting exchanges in the afternoon rather than in the mornings.

Similarly, the court’s order minimized the exchanges to once a

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week, in response to the CFI’s assessment that these exchanges are

times of intense conflict.

¶ 26 In addition to considering the CFI’s report, the court’s order

reflects a consideration of the pertinent factors, including the ability

of the parties to encourage the sharing of love and affection between

the child and the other party. The court found that father

encourages the relationship between E.M.K. and mother, while the

court disagreed that mother was willing to foster E.M.K.’s

relationship with father. Additionally, the order indicates the court

looked at the ability of the parties to place the child’s needs above

their own. The court noted that mother’s decision to move to Castle

Rock, her interactions with father, and her decision to exclude

father from participating in communications with E.M.K.’s day care

were not based on E.M.K.’s needs.

¶ 27 As to father’s increased time with E.M.K., the court

determined that there’s no reason to believe E.M.K. is not ready to

transition to equal parenting time “particularly if it results in fewer

parenting time transitions between the parties.” The CFI’s report

supports this finding, stating that, during her visit, E.M.K. was

playful, happy, and comfortable in father’s home. The CFI’s report

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further provides that father was attentive to E.M.K. during the visit

and the two share a strong bond.

¶ 28 The court’s parenting time order, while different from the CFI’s

recommendations, ultimately reflects the court’s consideration of

what the CFI indicated as the source of conflict between the parties,

which was the parenting time exchanges. Because the court’s order

considers the factors required by section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),

including reports of domestic violence, the court did not abuse its

discretion in allocating parenting time.

¶ 29 Finally, mother argues that the court erred by failing to make

an oral or written finding explaining why unsupervised parenting

time with father was in the best interests of the child when there

are allegations of domestic violence as required by section 14-10-

124(9).

¶ 30 Even if mother were correct, however, the lack of written or

oral findings specific to unsupervised parenting time for father is

harmless because it does not affect the fairness of the proceedings

for several reasons. See Pawelec, ¶ 56. Since the permanent

orders were entered, father has never had supervised parenting

time, mother never requested that father’s time be supervised, and

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mother told the CFI she wanted to continue the parenting schedule

in effect, which provided for unsupervised parenting time with

father. Further, the CFI never mentioned father’s parenting time

should be supervised, and there is ample evidence in the record,

including the CFI’s report and CFI’s testimony, that father and

E.M.K. have a loving relationship.

D. The District Court Did Not Err in Allocating Decision-Making
Responsibility

¶ 31 Mother contends that the district court did not comply with

the statutory requirements of section 14-10-124(1.5)(b) in allocating

decision-making responsibilities. Specifically, mother argues that

the court erred by not considering evidence of domestic violence

and did not consider as the primary concern the safety and well-

being of E.M.K. and mother. We disagree.

¶ 32 The best interests of the child analysis for allocation of

parental responsibilities requires the court to consider the factors in

subsection (1.5)(a) as well as (I) evidence of the ability of the parties

to cooperate and make joint decisions; (II) the involvement of the

parties with the child in a manner that “reflects a system of values,

time commitment, and mutual support that would indicate” the

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ability for the parties as mutual decision-makers to provide a

nourishing and positive relationship with the child; (III) and

whether mutual decision-making will promote continuing contact

between the parties and the child. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b).

¶ 33 As pertinent here, the court’s order regarding decision-making

authority states that “[t]he parties are unable to share joint

decision-making authority because of their intense conflict.” This

intense conflict has been present throughout the case. As it

pertains to the relationship between the parties, the court stated:

The parents are dishonest with each other.
Both parents are extremely rigid in their
dealings with each other. In their efforts to
communicate, both parents are only able to
see their own perspective and consider their
own needs. The parents are unable to
consider the perspective of the other parent
and are unable to be flexible to accommodate
the child’s needs.

¶ 34 Additionally, father testified that he and mother were unable

to cooperatively make decisions. When the court asked father if he

could point to any instances where the parties effectively made a

decision together, father stated that nothing came to mind. The

CFI’s statements reiterate father’s testimony. When asked why the

CFI was recommending sole decision-making for mother, the CFI

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testified that she did not “come across a lot of evidence that these

parties would be able to consistently work together, communicate

appropriately, and be able to make decisions.”

¶ 35 Based on the parties’ past, the district court determined that

allocating sole decision-making to mother in all contexts would not

be in E.M.K.’s best interests. The court was “gravely concerned that

mother would use an award of sole decision-making responsibility

to attempt to exclude father from the child’s life.” With respect to

E.M.K.’s school and education, the court was concerned that

mother would use her decision-making authority “to enroll the child

in a school that would make it impossible for father to exercise

significant parenting time because of his work schedule.” The court

determined that this would not be in the child’s best interest.

Father noted such concerns in his testimony. He testified that he

was not involved in the process of selecting E.M.K.’s day care and

that mother had unilaterally completed the admissions paperwork.

Father also testified that he tried to participate in parent-teacher

conferences but was told that parents had to meet together. Father

subsequently learned that mother met privately with one of E.M.K.’s

teachers. When the court asked mother if she considered staying

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home and allowing father to attend a parent-teacher conference,

mother indicated she could have but that she did not.

¶ 36 Given the record of intense and constant conflict between the

parties and their inability to cooperatively make decisions, the

court’s allocation of decision-making authority was not an abuse of

discretion.

¶ 37 Finally, mother argues that section 14-10-124(4)(d) required

the court to consider, as the primary concern, the safety and well-

being of the child and mother. While the court did not make a

finding of domestic violence, the record indicates the court did

consider and implement mechanisms to ensure the safety and well-

being of mother and E.M.K. The court’s order limits the amount

and method of contact between the parties to two messages per day

on TalkingParents, it requires parenting time exchanges to occur at

the DPD District 2 station, and it requires father to enroll in six

months of anger management treatment. These provisions address

the difficulties in communication and exchanges between the

parties by limiting interactions, ensuring interactions are in

monitored locations, and addressing father’s low frustration

tolerance and anger towards mother. The court therefore

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considered the best interests of E.M.K. while implementing

measures to ensure the safety of mother and E.M.K.

III. Disposition

¶ 38 We affirm the district court’s order.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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