Peo in Interest of AB

25CA0875 Peo in Interest of AB 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0875
Weld County District Court No. 23JV129
Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.B., a Child,

and Concerning T.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Welling and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for A.B.

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.B. (father)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for A.B. (the youth) to her maternal grandparents.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2023, the then-thirteen-year-old youth and her

older half-sister (sister) were living with their mother. Mother’s

mental health began deteriorating, so the youth and her sister

snuck out of mother’s home and went to their maternal

grandparents’ home.

¶3 Shortly thereafter, the Weld County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect alleging

concerns about mother’s mental health and substance use. The

petition noted that father and the youth had a positive relationship,

but they had limited contact because father lived in Missouri. The

juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to the Department,

and the youth and her sister remained with their maternal

grandparents.

¶4 Approximately four months after the Department filed the

petition, father entered a no-fault admission, and the juvenile court

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adjudicated the youth dependent or neglected. On the same day,

the court adopted a treatment plan for father.

¶5 Mother passed away in April 2024. Three months later, father

moved the juvenile court to return the youth home to him. The

court denied father’s motion, finding that it was in the youth’s best

interests to remain with maternal grandparents.

¶6 Father then moved for an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) for the youth to him. Thereafter, the youth filed a competing

motion requesting an APR to maternal grandparents. The court

held a contested hearing on the motions. After considering the

evidence and taking the matter under advisement, the court

granted an APR for the youth to maternal grandparents. The court

ordered joint decision-making responsibility between maternal

grandparents and father. The court also granted father telephone

and video contact with the youth. It then ordered a step-up

visitation plan in which father would exercise two weekend visits in

Colorado and one week-long visit in Missouri during the first year of

the plan, followed by two week-long visits in Missouri during the

following years until the youth turned eighteen.

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II. Determination of the APR

¶7 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

and “infringed upon [his] fundamental, constitutional right to

parent” by granting an APR to maternal grandparents. Specifically,

he argues that the court abused its discretion by granting the APR

because (1) he was a fit parent; (2) no evidence showed that the

youth’s health, safety, or development would be at risk if she lived

with him; and (3) considerable evidence showed that the youth’s

health, safety, and development would be in danger if she lived with

maternal grandparents. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 The Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to enter an

order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting

time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a youth who

is dependent and neglected. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025; People

in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10. When allocating parental

responsibilities in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the court

must consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code under

section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA

47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to

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protect a youth’s welfare and safety by providing procedures

through which the youth’s best interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19.

Consequently, the court must allocate parental responsibilities in

accordance with the youth’s best interests. Id.

¶9 Even so, parents maintain a fundamental liberty interest in

the care, custody, and control of their children. See Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). In Troxel, the Supreme Court

recognized that a parent who is adequately caring for their child or

youth — a fit parent — is presumed to act in their child’s best

interests. Id. at 68-69. Thus, in a dependency and neglect

proceeding, if the court determines that a parent has become fit,

then it must apply the Troxel presumption before awarding an APR

to a nonparent. See J.G., ¶¶ 21, 27; People in Interest of N.G.G.,

2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 18-19. Applying the Troxel presumption requires

the court to accord “at least some special weight to the parent’s own

determination” regarding the youth’s best interests. J.G., ¶ 21

(quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70).

¶ 10 Nonetheless, the Troxel presumption may be rebutted if the

nonparent shows by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s

determination isn’t in the youth’s best interests and that the

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nonparent’s request is in the youth’s best interests. See N.G.G.,

¶ 16; In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128,

1132 (Colo. 2010). The court must also identify special factors that

support entering an order contrary to the parent’s wishes. J.G.,

¶ 22; see also In Interest of C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 226 (Colo. App.

2007) (overturning a visitation order based on Troxel when the

nonparent failed to present evidence of special circumstances to

justify an order contrary to the parents’ wishes).

¶ 11 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the

juvenile court’s sound discretion. In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies the law.” People in Interest of M.H-K.,

2018 COA 178, ¶ 60. Further, we won’t disturb a court’s factual

findings unless they are unsupported by the record. See J.G., ¶ 17.

Whether a court applied the correct legal standard in making its

findings, however, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

B. The Record Supported the APR Determination

¶ 12 In its oral ruling, the juvenile court first found that father was

a fit parent because he had successfully completed his treatment

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plan and no safety concerns existed with his home. Based on that

finding, the court noted that it was required to “start with a

presumption that what [father] want[ed] for [the youth was] in her

best interest[s]” and that the youth should be with father. But the

court concluded that father’s presumption had been rebutted by

clear and convincing evidence showing that the youth living with

father wasn’t in her best interests.

¶ 13 To support its conclusion, the juvenile court made extensive

and thorough factual findings. It found that the youth’s “lack of a

relationship with father for years” and the youth’s “extremely close

bond” with her grandparents and sister were compelling reasons to

conclude that moving to Missouri with father wouldn’t be in the

youth’s best interests. The court also considered several “special

factors” in determining that an APR to father wasn’t in the youth’s

best interests while an APR to maternal grandparents was.

Specifically, the court said that the following findings constituted

the “special factors” it relied on in making its determination:

• The youth was sufficiently mature to express her opinion,

and she was “very clear” that she wanted to remain in the

home with her grandparents. The youth’s wishes were

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based on the fact that maternal grandparents’ home was

the home she had “known for her whole life” and that she

had an “extremely close relationship” with her

grandparents and sister.

• The youth’s connection to her sister was strong, and her

sister was “one of the most stable individuals in [the

youth’s] life.”

• Maternal grandparents had been involved in the youth’s

care since at least 2018. But father left when the youth

was very young and didn’t have contact with her for a

significant period of time, which diminished the bond

between them.

• At the time of the hearing, the youth hadn’t seen father

in person for almost a year; she said that she would run

away if forced to move to Missouri to live with him.

• The youth was well-adjusted to her Colorado school and

had recently improved her grades and attendance. A

move to Missouri would require the youth to “completely

start[] over” at a new school.

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• The youth was also well-situated in her Colorado

community. She had future plans in Colorado, including

a summer job and the desire to attend college in Denver.

• If the youth moved to Missouri to live with father, it

would be a “drastic” change for her because she would be

“going from her home state that she ha[d] been living in

her entire life to an entirely new location where she ha[d]

never lived before.” The move would also prevent the

youth from frequent contact with her grandparents and

sister, who she relied on for support.

• The youth was particularly vulnerable because of the

recent loss of her mother. It “would be devastating to her

emotional and mental health” if the court “ripped her

away” from her community, sister, and maternal

grandparents only a year after her mother passed away.

¶ 14 The record supports these findings. The youth was fourteen

years old by the time of the APR hearing and testified that she

wanted to continue living with maternal grandparents and her

sister. More specifically, the youth testified that she had a very

good relationship with her grandparents and that she would be

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“devastated” if she was separated from them. She also testified that

she was very close with her sister, had lived with her sister for her

whole life, and would “feel lost and probably alone” without her

sister.

¶ 15 Similarly, the caseworker testified that the youth was very

bonded to maternal grandparents and that they had maintained a

“parental role” throughout the case. The caseworker stated that

maternal grandparents were very supportive of the youth and that

the youth relied on them when she was struggling. The caseworker

described the youth’s sister as her “protector” and testified that the

youth relied on her sister for support in difficult times.

¶ 16 The youth, the caseworker, and maternal grandfather all

testified that the youth and her sister had lived with maternal

grandparents off and on since 2018. Father testified that he moved

to Missouri when the youth was approximately three years old. The

youth testified that she didn’t have any contact with father for

approximately nine years after he moved to Missouri. Father

disagreed but acknowledged that he didn’t have any in-person

contact with the youth from the time the youth was four years old

until she was ten years old.

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¶ 17 Further, the youth testified that when she was three years old,

she had one visit with her father in Missouri, but she didn’t

remember that visit. After that visit, she didn’t visit father again

until she was twelve years old. After this case opened, she visited

father in Missouri two more times. The caseworker noted that after

the second visit, the youth’s relationship with father was “fractured”

and became unstable because the youth felt betrayed when father

asked the juvenile court to grant him an APR. Indeed, the youth

testified that she had blocked father on her phone and wasn’t open

to communication with him because she felt like he didn’t consider

how she felt before he asked the court for an APR.

¶ 18 Moreover, the youth testified that she had attended school in

the same district since second grade. She said that she had known

many of her friends since then, had established good relationships

with her teachers, and felt as though she belonged to a community

through her Colorado school and neighborhood. The youth also

testified that she had summer plans to work at the Colorado

International Speedway and wanted to attend college in Denver

when she graduated from high school. The youth believed that her

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plans would “go down the drain” if she was forced to move to

Missouri.

¶ 19 The caseworker agreed that the youth was connected to her

school, noting that some of her school counselors had provided

support when the youth’s mother died. The caseworker further

testified that the youth felt comfortable and “very secure” in her

Colorado community because she had lived there for her entire life

and had many friends in the area.

¶ 20 Finally, the caseworker, who testified as an expert in child

protection casework, opined that it wouldn’t be in the youth’s best

interests to move to Missouri to live with father. The caseworker

based her opinion, in part, on the fact that moving to Missouri

would separate the youth from the people who provide her support.

The caseworker went on to opine that forcing the youth to

communicate with father before she was ready would be

“emotionally traumatizing” for the youth. The caseworker noted

that the youth had threatened to run away if she had to move to

Missouri. And the caseworker didn’t believe that father would be

able to meet the youth’s emotional needs, particularly because she

lacked a relationship with father and wouldn’t feel comfortable

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asking him for support. The caseworker concluded that a move to

Missouri would be “detrimental” to the youth because she was still

dealing with the loss of her mother and wouldn’t have anyone to

talk to if she was forced to leave maternal grandparents, her sister,

and her community.

¶ 21 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

applied the correct legal standard for allocating parental

responsibilities to a nonparent in a dependency and neglect case

and that the record supports its determination that an APR to

father wasn’t in the youth’s best interests, while an APR to maternal

grandparents was.

C. The Juvenile Court Wasn’t Required to Grant an APR to Father
Simply Because He Was Fit

¶ 22 To the extent that father argues that the APR to maternal

grandparents was improper because he was a fit parent, we

disagree. True, the juvenile court specifically found that father had

become fit by the time of the APR hearing. But the fact that a

parent is fit isn’t, on its own, dispositive of whether a court must

grant an APR to that parent. Rather, “parental deficiencies less

serious than unfitness may give rise to a compelling reason not to

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return the child home when considered in light of the [youth’s]

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.” People in

Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 23 Here, the juvenile court presumed that father’s request for an

APR was in the youth’s best interests but nonetheless found that

the presumption had been rebutted and that several “special

factors” justified entering an order contrary to father’s wishes. See

J.G., ¶¶ 21, 27; C.T.G., 179 P.3d at 226. In other words, the court

properly analyzed whether father’s request for an APR was in the

youth’s best interests and determined it wasn’t.

¶ 24 Accordingly, we reject father’s argument that the juvenile

court should have granted him an APR simply because he was a fit

parent.

D. The UMDA’s Endangerment Standard Doesn’t Apply

¶ 25 Next, citing section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, father

asserts that “in the domestic relations context, a court may not

restrict a parent’s time with his or her children unless parenting

time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly

impair the child’s emotional development.” From that premise,

father argues that because no party presented evidence showing

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that parenting time with him would endanger the youth, the APR to

maternal grandparents constituted an improper restriction of his

parenting time and a violation of his constitutional right to parent.

¶ 26 But section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) is part of the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act (UMDA). When a custody issue arises

in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the court is guided by the

Colorado Children’s Code, not the UMDA. See J.G., ¶ 18; People in

Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).

Consequently, unlike a restriction of parenting time in the domestic

relations context, a court need not find endangerment before

allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and neglect

case. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.

¶ 27 Accordingly, the fact that the youth wouldn’t be endangered if

she lived with father wasn’t dispositive of the juvenile court’s APR

determination.

E. Father’s Concerns with Maternal Grandparents Didn’t Render
the APR Determination an Abuse of Discretion

¶ 28 Last, father argues that the juvenile court’s judgment granting

an APR to maternal grandparents rose to an abuse of discretion

because “considerable evidence” showed that the youth’s health,

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safety, and development were at risk if she remained in maternal

grandparents’ care. True, father testified that he had numerous

concerns about maternal grandparents’ parenting abilities and their

home. Specifically, father expressed concern that the youth’s

grades and school attendance were poor; that maternal

grandparents allowed the youth to attend parties with alcohol,

drugs, and inappropriate sexual activities; that the youth was

entangled in contentious and emotionally difficult family conflicts;

and that maternal grandparents had been unable to prevent the

youth from being exposed to the details of mother’s death.

¶ 29 But the juvenile court heard and considered the evidence

father presented. In fact, it acknowledged father’s concerns in its

oral ruling. Even so, the court found, with record support and by

clear and convincing evidence, that an APR to maternal

grandparents was in the youth’s best interests. As an appellate

court, we don’t reweigh the evidence presented to the juvenile court.

See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

III. Disposition

¶ 30 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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