Peo v. Dobler

24CA0330 Peo v Dobler 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0330
Jefferson County District Court No. 11CR2082
Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Zachariah Clark Dobler,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, James S. Hardy, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Zachariah Clark Dobler, appeals the

postconviction court’s order denying his motion to reconsider the

denial of his motion to enforce his plea agreement. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After Dobler sped through an accident scene, killed a tow

truck driver, and then fled the scene, the prosecution charged him

with multiple crimes. In 2012, Dobler pleaded guilty to vehicular

homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. In

exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges.

¶3 Dobler stipulated in his plea agreement, in relevant part, as

follows:

• He “fully underst[oo]d” that he “shall be sentenced to a

term of at least 24 years but not more than 48 years” in

prison.

• The court could determine the presence of any

aggravating circumstances.

• “[T]he [c]ourt c[ould] order the sentence on each count to

run concurrent with or consecutive to the other count.”

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• There was a factual basis for the guilty plea, and he

“waive[d] the requirement of showing a factual basis for

the plea.”

¶4 At the plea hearing, defense counsel and the prosecution

stipulated “that a factual basis exist[ed].” The court confirmed that

Dobler had read and understood the plea agreement. And Dobler

specifically confirmed his understanding that “the prison sentence

[wa]s going to be for a definite term of 24 to 48 years.” He also

confirmed that he had no questions about “the possible penalties.”

The court then accepted Dobler’s guilty pleas.

¶5 The court later sentenced Dobler to twenty-four years in

prison on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total prison

sentence of forty-eight years.

¶6 Dobler directly appealed his sentence. A division of this court

affirmed, concluding that Dobler could not challenge the propriety

of his sentence because it was within the agreed upon range.

People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶¶ 5, 28.

¶7 Over the next several years, Dobler filed multiple unsuccessful

motions under Crim. P. 35(a) and Crim. P. 35(c), challenging,

among other things, the legality of his sentence.

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¶8 Then, in 2023, Dobler filed his motion to enforce the plea

agreement and asked the postconviction court to “correct the illegal

sentence imposed.” He asserted that (1) the sentencing court

breached the plea agreement when it imposed an aggravated

sentence; and (2) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the

convictions were based on identical evidence, requiring the court to

impose concurrent sentences under section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S.

2025. The postconviction court denied the motion.

¶9 Not long after, Dobler filed the motion to reconsider the

postconviction court’s denial of his motion to enforce the plea

agreement — the motion currently at issue. In the motion to

reconsider, Dobler again argued that the sentencing court

improperly aggravated his sentence in breach of the plea agreement

and erred by imposing illegal consecutive sentences.

¶ 10 In a detailed written order, the postconviction court denied the

motion to reconsider. The court concluded that the sentencing

court adhered to the plea agreement when it sentenced Dobler in

the stipulated range and that his consecutive sentences were not

illegal because his convictions weren’t based on identical evidence.

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II. Analysis

¶ 11 Dobler contends that the postconviction court erred by

denying his motion to reconsider. As we understand it, Dobler

maintains that the sentencing court (1) improperly sentenced him

to an aggravated sentence in breach of the plea agreement and (2)

imposed illegal consecutive sentences. Because different

procedural rules apply to these contentions, we consider them

separately.

A. Breach of the Plea Agreement

¶ 12 We first consider Dobler’s claim that the court improperly

sentenced him to an aggravated sentence in breach of his plea

agreement. We conclude that Rule 35(c) bars this claim.

¶ 13 A postconviction claim alleging the breach of a plea agreement

is cognizable under Rule 35(c).1 See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I) (providing

for postconviction review of a defendant’s claim that his sentence

was imposed in violation of the United States or Colorado

1 Because the substance — not the caption — of a postconviction

motion controls how the court resolves it, People v. Collier, 151 P.3d
668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006), we disagree with Dobler’s claim that his
motion asserting breach of the plea agreement falls outside Crim. P.
35(c).

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Constitutions or laws); St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1030-32

(Colo. 1997) (addressing the defendant’s claim for breach of a plea

agreement under Rule 35(c)); see also People v. Wilbur, 890 P.2d

113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995) (addressing a motion to enforce a plea

agreement under Rule 35(c)).

¶ 14 Absent certain exceptions not applicable here, a court shall

deny any claim that either was raised or could have been raised in a

previous appeal or postconviction proceeding. See Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VI), (VII). This procedural bar is “mandatory.” People v.

Taylor, 2018 COA 175, ¶ 17.

¶ 15 Because a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35(c)

motion, like Dobler’s motion to reconsider, is “essentially a

successive motion for postconviction relief,” People v. Thomas, 195

P.3d 1162, 1165 (Colo. App. 2008), we conclude, albeit on different

grounds, that the postconviction court properly denied the motion

to reconsider Dobler’s claim that the court aggravated his sentence

in breach of the plea agreement, see People v. Cooper, 2023 COA

113, ¶ 7 (“We may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any

ground supported by the record, whether or not the postconviction

court relied on or considered that ground.”).

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B. Illegal Consecutive Sentences

¶ 16 We next consider Dobler’s argument that the court imposed

illegal consecutive sentences in violation of section 18-1-408(3). We

construe this claim under Rule 35(a), which allows a court to

correct a sentence not authorized by law or imposed without

jurisdiction at any time, but allows a court to correct a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner only within 126 days after sentencing.

¶ 17 Because Dobler maintains that his consecutive sentences are

not authorized under section 18-1-408(3), we disagree with the

People that Dobler’s claim is a time-barred illegal manner claim.

See People v. Green, 36 P.3d 125, 126 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[A]n illegal

sentence is one that is inconsistent with the terms specified by

statutes.”); see also Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 19 (listing

sentences that “should have been imposed to run concurrently” but

“were imposed to run consecutively” as an example of an illegal

sentence claim). And because successive illegal sentence claims are

analyzed under the law of the case doctrine (which the People do

not argue), we likewise disagree with the People that this claim is

successive under Rule 35(c). See People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5-6

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(Colo. App. 2007) (noting that Rule 35(c)’s procedural bars do not

apply to Rule 35(a) claims).

¶ 18 We review de novo the legality of a defendant’s sentence. Veith

v. People, 2017 CO 19, ¶ 12.

¶ 19 When a defendant is convicted of multiple counts committed

against a single victim, section 18-1-408(3) requires concurrent

sentencing only if (1) the counts are based on the same act or series

of acts arising from the same criminal episode, and (2) the evidence

supporting the counts is identical. Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896,

901 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 20 Though not addressed by the parties, we question whether

Dobler waived this claim. That’s because, in his plea agreement,

Dobler waived the factual basis for his guilty plea and agreed that

the court could order his sentences to run consecutively, rather

than concurrently. See People v. Maestas, 224 P.3d 405, 408-09

(Colo. App. 2009) (noting that, when a defendant pleads guilty and

waives the establishment of a factual basis, he waives the right to

rely on section 18-1-408(3)).

¶ 21 But even if Dobler did not waive the right to rely on section 18-

1-408(3), we conclude that the postconviction court properly

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determined that his convictions were based on separate and distinct

acts. See Juhl, 172 P.3d at 902 (noting that convictions are not

based on identical evidence when the charges result “from two or

more acts fairly considered to be separate acts”). Evidence that

Dobler drove his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and

then hit and killed the victim supported the vehicular homicide

charge. See § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (outlining the elements

of vehicular homicide while under the influence). After Dobler killed

the victim, he fled the accident scene and did not return. That

separate act supported his conviction for leaving the scene of an

accident resulting in death. See § 42-4-1601(1), C.R.S. 2011

(outlining the elements for leaving the scene of an accident resulting

in death).2 Though Dobler never stopped driving, “[t]he mere fact

that the offenses took place during one continuous criminal episode

does not establish that they were supported by identical evidence.”

People v. Jurado, 30 P.3d 769, 773 (Colo. App. 2001).

2 Since the statute for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in

death has since been amended, see Ch. 261, sec. 1, § 42-4-1601(1),
2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 1354, we cite the statute in effect at the time
of the charged crime.

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¶ 22 Because the evidence required to prove the two convictions

was not identical, the sentencing court did not impose an illegal

consecutive sentence, and the postconviction court properly denied

the motion to reconsider.

III. Disposition

¶ 23 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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