Peo v. Klingensmith

23CA0571 Peo v Klingensmith 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0571
El Paso County District Court No. 20CR1269
Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Eric J. Klingensmith,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katherine Gillespie, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Eric J. Klingensmith, was convicted of aggravated

sexual assault on a child, sexual assault on a child - position of

trust - pattern of abuse, aggravated incest, and attempt to commit

sexual assault on a child. Klingensmith appeals, contending that

the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial and should have

permitted him to cross-examine K.S.’s credibility on the basis that

she had previously falsely reported a sexual assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 K.S. reported that her father, Klingensmith, began sexually

assaulting her when she was seven years old. The assaults

continued for several years. K.S. described that Klingensmith gave

her Ambien to forget the encounters.

¶3 K.S. reported that Klingensmith also sexually assaulted a

friend of hers, L.C. L.C. was interviewed and disclosed that when

she was nine or ten years old, she slept over at K.S.’s house.

During the sleepover, she was sent to the basement to sleep

because she and K.S. were being too loud. Klingensmith came

downstairs while L.C. was sleeping and removed her blanket. L.C.

stated that after the blanket was removed, she felt something

touching her upper thigh and she saw it was Klingensmith’s

1
genitals. L.C. stated that Klingensmith told her and K.S. that if

they said anything to the authorities, he would kill them.

¶4 Klingensmith was charged with sexual assault on a child by

one in a position of trust, two counts of sexual assault on a child,

sexual assault on a child - position of trust - victim less than fifteen

and as part of a pattern of abuse, and aggravated incest.

¶5 On the day Klingensmith’s trial was set to begin, the trial

court declared a mistrial under Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because the

COVID-19 pandemic prevented the court from safely empaneling a

jury. The trial was continued several more times.

¶6 The court severed the charges relating to K.S. from those

relating to L.C. The charges relating to K.S. were tried to a jury in

November 2022. The jury found Klingensmith guilty of sexual

assault on a child, sexual assault on a child - position of trust -

victim less than fifteen and as part of a pattern of abuse, and

aggravated incest.

¶7 The parties subsequently reached a plea agreement regarding

the counts relating to L.C. In November 2022, Klingensmith

pleaded guilty to an added count of attempted sexual assault on a

2
child in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts involving

L.C.

¶8 The trial court sentenced Klingensmith to the custody of the

Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term of fourteen

years to life for sexual assault on a child and sexual assault on a

child - position of trust - pattern of abuse; an indeterminate term of

twelve years to life for aggravated incest; and a determinate term of

three years for attempted sexual assault on a child. The court

ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

II. Discussion

¶9 Klingensmith contends that the trial court erred (1) by

declaring a mistrial and refusing to dismiss the case on speedy trial

grounds because Crim. P. 24(c)(4) violates the separation of powers

doctrine and (2) by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-

examining K.S. concerning her prior allegations of sexual abuse

against her mother under section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2022. We

disagree with both contentions.

3
A. Crim. P. 24(c)(4) Does Not Violate the Separation of Powers
Doctrine

¶ 10 Klingensmith argues that the trial court lacked authority to

declare a mistrial under Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because that rule violates

the separation of powers doctrine. Crim. P. 24(c)(4) provides, “At

any time before trial, upon motion by a party or on its own motion,

the court may declare a mistrial in a case on the ground that a fair

jury pool cannot be safely assembled . . . due to a public health

crisis or limitations brought about by such crisis.” Klingensmith

argues that a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial is a

substantive right and that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) unconstitutionally

allows trial courts to extend the speedy trial timeline. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 “Whether a rule adopted by the supreme court is

constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo.” People

v. Eason, 2022 COA 54, ¶ 16; see People v. Pennington, 2021 COA

9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers challenge de novo).

¶ 12 The Colorado Constitution vests the legislative, executive, and

judicial branches of government with distinct powers. Colo. Const.

art. III. The separation of powers doctrine limits each branch to the

4
exercise of only its powers. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436

(Colo. 1993). While the state’s legislative power is vested in the

General Assembly, the state’s judicial power is vested in the courts.

Colo. Const. art. V, § 1; Colo. Const. art. VI, § 1. This judicial

power includes the Colorado Supreme Court’s authority to

“promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and

criminal cases.” Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. However, “legislative

policy and judicial rulemaking powers may overlap to some extent

so long as there is no substantial conflict between statute and rule.”

People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1978). “No such

conflict exists in the absence of a procedure conflicting with that set

forth in the statute.” People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA 50, ¶ 24. If a

substantial conflict exists, the statute prevails when it governs

traditional areas of legislative concern. § 13-2-108, C.R.S. 2025.

2. Analysis

¶ 13 Klingensmith argues that section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025,

which requires a defendant to be tried within six months from

entering a not-guilty plea, conflicts with and must prevail over

Crim. P. 24(c)(4) because the right to a speedy trial is substantive

and statutory. Klingensmith claims that Crim. P. 24(c)(4)

5
impermissibly broadens the meaning of a “mistrial,” but he fails to

point to any conflict between the statute and the rule that would

require us to conclude that the statute prevails over the rule.

¶ 14 Section 18-1-405(6) sets forth the exceptions to the six-month

speedy trial requirement. The mistrial exception doesn’t define or

limit what constitutes a mistrial; it merely provides that “[t]he

period of delay caused by any mistrial . . . [is] not to exceed three

months for each mistrial.” § 18-1-405(6)(e). Crim. P. 24(c)(4), on

the other hand, specifically provides that a trial court may declare a

mistrial if a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled due to a

public health crisis. This is consistent with the principle that

courts also traditionally determine what constitutes a mistrial. See,

e.g., People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1213 (Colo. 1987) (“In the

absence of a constitutional violation, it is well-established that the

decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is directed to the

sound discretion of the trial court.”).

¶ 15 Further, another division of our court addressed the issue

Klingensmith raises and held that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) was a

procedural rule that did not run afoul of the separation of powers

doctrine. Eason, ¶ 21. The division concluded that Crim. P.

6
24(c)(4) was designed to regulate procedural matters, including

docket management, jury pool assembly, and trial practice. Id. at

¶ 23. And, to the extent that there was some aspect of public policy

underlying Crim. P. 24(c), it didn’t conflict with any legislative or

executive expression of public policy. Id. at ¶ 21.

¶ 16 Although we are not obligated to follow another division, we

are persuaded by Eason’s rationale and see no reason to depart

from the division’s holding. We therefore disagree with

Klingensmith’s contention that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) is unconstitutional.

Consequently, the court did not violate Klingensmith’s speedy trial

rights or err by denying his motion to dismiss.

B. The Rape Shield Statute

¶ 17 Klingensmith argues that (1) People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180

(Colo. 2006), which held that a victim must have made multiple

false accusations of sexual assault before the rape shield statute

may be pierced, was wrongfully decided; (2) we are not bound by

Weiss because the 2024 amendments to section 18-3-407(2) apply

to his case; and (3) the trial court erred by prohibiting defense

counsel from cross-examining K.S. about her prior false allegation

7
of sexual abuse against her mother. We disagree with every

contention.

1. Additional Applicable Facts

¶ 18 Based on two pages of a 2014 report written by the

Department of Human Services (DHS), Klingensmith filed a pretrial

motion to pierce the rape shield statute as it applied to K.S. As part

of a prior dependency and neglect case involving her mother, K.S.

alleged her mother sexually abused her, but DHS determined the

allegation was unfounded. Klingensmith sought to admit K.S.’s

prior accusation as evidence of her untruthfulness under CRE

608(b).

¶ 19 At a July 2021 hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that

K.S. made only one false report but claimed that the evidence

should still be admitted despite the supreme court’s holding in

Weiss, which defense counsel argued was incorrectly decided. The

trial court denied the motion, stating, “The case law is what it is, so,

obviously, I am going to follow the case law.”

¶ 20 The case proceeded to trial in November 2022. K.S. testified

that she had been attending therapy and meeting with her school

counselor during middle and high school to deal with anxiety and

8
mental health concerns. On recross-examination, K.S. attributed

her need for therapy to “flashbacks to the sexual stuff, or even just

my panic attacks and with my dad. I would talk to the counselor or

the middle school . . . therapist and try to find ways to help . . .

lessen the effect of those and help mitigate it on my own.”

¶ 21 Defense counsel immediately filed a motion asking the court to

reconsider its prior ruling under section 18-3-407, C.R.S. 2022,

arguing that K.S. attributed her need to see a therapist to the acts

that Klingensmith allegedly committed but that she was already in

therapy because of the alleged sexual abuse her mother inflicted.

The defense argued that because it was prohibited from confronting

K.S. about the falsehood, the court was allowing K.S. to mislead the

jury, which violated Klingensmith’s Sixth Amendment confrontation

rights. Defense counsel claimed that K.S.’s testimony “opened the

door” and that she should be subject to cross-examination to

challenge her credibility.

¶ 22 The trial court held a hearing on the motion and ultimately

denied it for the following reasons:

[F]irst, the defense has not satisfied the
elements of the Rape Shield statute that under
the statute would allow them to put on

9
evidence that [K.S.] has a history of false
reporting of sexual assault. First, there is only
an allegation of one false report and under
[People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 50,1] the
statute requires at least two false reports.

Second, at this hearing that we’re holding now,
the . . . case law also establishes that the
burden is on the defense to . . . prove the false
reports by a preponderance of the evidence.
So I find that the defense has not proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that [K.S.] made
even one prior false report.

¶ 23 The trial court explained:

[T]here was an admission by [K.S.’s] mother
that the touching was reported, that she had
touched her daughter in the ways that [K.S.]
had reported, but she denied it being sexual in
nature, whereas [K.S.] alleged it being sexual
in nature. So what we have is a difference in
characterization of certain touching that was
factually admitted. So to the extent it’s
relevant, which it may not be because it’s . . .
only one incident rather than two, I find that
based on that evidence, . . . I can’t find that
the defense has proved by a preponderance
that [K.S.] made a false report of sexual abuse.

1 People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 50, reiterated the supreme

court’s holding in People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180 (Colo. 2006), that
more than one single false report was necessary to evidence a
history of false reporting under the exception to the rape shield
statute.

10
2. Weiss Requires More than One “Prior False Allegation”

¶ 24 Klingensmith first argues that Weiss was improperly decided

when it held there must be more than one prior false accusation of

sexual abuse or assault to constitute a “history of false reporting.”

We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 25 We review a trial court’s determination of the admissibility of

evidence under the rape shield statute for an abuse of discretion,

but we review its interpretation of the rape shield statute de novo.

People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 63. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or is based on an erroneous view of the law. People v.

Osorio-Bahena, 2013 COA 55, ¶ 21.

¶ 26 Because sexual assault is a hostile crime of violence and

domination calculated to humiliate, injure, and degrade, the

General Assembly enacted section 18-3-407. People in Interest of

K.N., 977 P.2d 868, 874 (Colo. 1999). The rape shield statute seeks

to protect sexual assault victims from “humiliating and

embarrassing public fishing expeditions into their past sexual

conduct.” Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1185 (quoting McKenna, 585 P.2d at

11
277-78). The rape shield statute deems the prior or subsequent

sexual conduct of any alleged victim to be presumptively irrelevant

to the criminal trial. Id.

¶ 27 But the rape shield statute includes several exceptions to the

presumption that evidence of a victim’s sexual activities is

inadmissible. People v. Lancaster, 2015 COA 93, ¶ 36. One of

those exceptions deals with false reporting. Under the version of

that exception in effect at the time of Klingensmith’s trial, evidence

that the victim had a “history of false reporting of sexual assaults”

was admissible if the evidence was relevant and material and the

defendant followed the procedure for admitting such evidence. Id.

(quoting § 18-3-407(2), C.R.S. 2014). To use this exception, the

defendant must articulate facts that would show that “the alleged

victim made multiple prior or subsequent reports of sexual assault”

that were false. Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1182. And “[a] single false

report is not a ‘history of false reporting of sexual assaults.’” Marx,

¶ 50 (quoting Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1187).

b. Discussion

¶ 28 Klingensmith acknowledges that he alleged only one instance

of false reporting but argues Weiss was wrongly decided. We are

12
bound by the rules expressed by the supreme court, however, and

we are not free to depart from its precedent. People v. Melendez,

2024 COA 21M, ¶ 19. Accordingly, until the supreme court states

otherwise, Weiss controls.

¶ 29 Because the trial court was required to follow Weiss and Marx,

it did not abuse its discretion by requiring evidence of more than

one prior instance of falsely reported sexual assault. People v.

Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 45 (recognizing that trial judges are

bound to follow appellate court decisions).

3. The 2024 Amendments to Section 18-3-407 Do Not Apply

¶ 30 Klingensmith argues that the 2024 amendments to section 18-

3-407, which require only one instance of false reporting, apply to

his case because his conviction is not final and this appeal is a

“proceeding” as used in the “effective date” language of House Bill

24-1072. We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 31 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de

novo. Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 12. In interpreting a

statute, “our focus is on legislative intent, and we construe the

statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible

13
effect to all of its parts.” City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018

CO 37, ¶ 12.

¶ 32 Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the

General Assembly’s intent. Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218, 220 (Colo.

2004). We first look to a statute’s plain language. Bostelman v.

People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo. 2007). “If the statutory language

is clear and unambiguous, we do not engage in further statutory

analysis.” Id. Only if the statutory language is ambiguous may we

employ other tools of statutory construction, including statutory or

legislative history or the rule of lenity. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2025;

People v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76, ¶ 14.

¶ 33 Absent express legislative intent to the contrary, we presume a

statute only operates prospectively, meaning it solely applies to

events occurring after its effective date. § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025;

People v. Di Asio, 2022 COA 140, ¶ 15. To overcome this

presumption, a statute must reveal a clear legislative intent that it

be applied retroactively. Di Asio, ¶ 15.

¶ 34 Until 2024, the legislature included an exception to the rape

shield statute when the alleged victim has a “history of false

reporting of sexual assaults.” § 18-3-407(2), C.R.S. 2023. In 2024,

14
the legislature changed the relevant language in subsection (2) to

include an exception to the rape shield statute when the alleged

victim has “at least one incident of false reporting of unlawful

sexual behavior.” Ch. 123, sec. 2, § 18-3-407(2)(a)(I), 2024 Colo.

Sess. Laws 409. The 2024 amendment also requires the moving

party to articulate facts that would demonstrate that the victim

made a “report of unlawful sexual behavior that was demonstrably

false or false in fact.” § 18-3-407(2)(a)(II), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws at

409.

b. Analysis

¶ 35 Klingensmith relies on People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, ¶ 36,

to argue that ameliorative amendatory legislation applies to non-

final convictions unless the amendment contains language

indicating it applies only prospectively. This reliance is misplaced

for two reasons.

¶ 36 First, in Stellabotte, the supreme court clarified that a

defendant is entitled to the benefit of ameliorative amendatory

legislation that has mitigated the penalties for the crime at issue if

the defendant requested such relief before their conviction was

final. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 21.

15
¶ 37 Here, the legislative amendment was not ameliorative because

it did not decrease the severity of a previously defined crime or

reduce the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the

commission of that crime. See People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M,

¶ 29. Rather, the legislature simply changed the language in

subsection (2) from “a history of false reporting” to requiring that

there be “at least one incident of false reporting.” 2024 Colo. Sess.

Laws at 409. The amendment addressed an evidentiary

requirement; it did not reduce any criminal penalties.

¶ 38 Second, the amendment does not apply retroactively. House

Bill 24-1072, which revised section 18-3-407, provided that “[t]his

act takes effect July 1, 2024, and applies to proceedings occurring

on or after said date.” Sec. 3, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws at 410. The

legislature expressly provided that the amendment applies

prospectively. Because the 2022 statute was in effect at the time of

the events in this case and the trial, the 2022 version applies to

Klingensmith’s conviction. See People v. Gallegos, 2025 CO 41M,

¶ 6 n.2.

16
4. Klingensmith’s Offer of Proof Was Insufficient

¶ 39 Klingensmith contends that his offer of proof was legally

sufficient because he provided two pages of a DHS report

demonstrating that K.S. alleged sexual abuse against her mother

but that DHS determined it was unfounded. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 40 The defendant seeking to avail himself of the false-reporting

exception to the rape shield statute must file a motion offering proof

of the specific instances of the victim’s false reports of sexual

assaults. § 18-3-407(2)(a), C.R.S. 2022. The motion must be

accompanied by an affidavit in which the facts contained in the

offer of proof are sufficiently stated. § 18-3-407(2)(b). The purpose

of the offer of proof is to inform the court of the legal theory under

which the evidence is admissible, advise the trial judge of the

“specific nature of the evidence so that the court can review its

admissibility,” and to create “a record for appellate review.” Marx,

¶ 46 (quoting State v. Martinez, 991 A.2d 1086, 1094 (Conn. 2010)).

¶ 41 An “offer of proof” typically states (1) what the anticipated

testimony of the witness would be if the witness were permitted to

testify concerning the matter at issue; (2) the purpose and relevance

of the testimony sought to be introduced; and (3) all the facts

17
necessary to establish the testimony’s admissibility. Weiss, 133

P.3d at 1186–87. The defendant is required, in their offer of proof

affidavit, to articulate facts that would show that “the alleged victim

made multiple prior or subsequent reports of sexual assault” that

were false. Id. at 1182.

¶ 42 Klingensmith’s pretrial offer of proof was insufficient as a

matter of law because it failed to articulate why the evidence was

relevant or how it would show by a preponderance of the evidence

that K.S.’s prior allegation was false. Klingensmith failed to list

witnesses that defense counsel intended to call to establish that the

prior allegation of sexual abuse was false, and the defense never

mentioned whether it had interviewed anyone at DHS or how the

facts would be developed at trial. Although the defense filed an

affidavit from its investigator, the affidavit merely indicated that the

investigator read the DHS report but provided nothing more.

Klingensmith did not explain what DHS’s “unfounded” designation

meant or how DHS arrived at such a designation.

¶ 43 Simply put, there was nothing alleged in the offer of proof that

would have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a

hearing that K.S.’s prior accusation was false. And, as case law

18
clarifies, an unfounded designation, standing alone, is insufficient

to constitute a finding that an allegation was false. See, e.g.,

Lancaster, ¶ 40 (where the charges were dismissed, such an

allegation was insufficient in and of itself to establish that the

report was false); Weiss, 133 P.3d at 1188-89 (motion requesting

evidentiary hearing rested solely on allegations that no charges had

been brought as a result of the victim’s prior reports of sexual

assault and was insufficient to pierce the rape shield); cf. Marx, ¶ 55

(“The [a]ffidavit referenced other witnesses besides [the person

accused of sexual assault] who were prepared to testify to the falsity

of the accuser’s accusations and the school’s findings that the

accuser had made false allegations of sexual assault.”).

¶ 44 Klingensmith’s offer of proof was legally insufficient, and

therefore the trial court did not err by denying his motion to pierce

the rape shield or his motion for reconsideration. Legal

insufficiency notwithstanding, at the hearing the trial court

concluded that defense counsel failed to prove “by a preponderance

that [K.S.] made a false report of sexual abuse” based on how

mother characterized the touching (as nonsexual) versus how K.S.

19
characterized it (as sexual). Accordingly, the trial court did not err

by denying Klingensmith’s rape shield motion.

5. The Trial Court did Not Err by Denying Klingensmith’s
Request to Admit Evidence

¶ 45 Klingensmith argues that K.S.’s testimony in response to a

jury question opened the door to evidence regarding her prior false

allegation of sexual assault against her mother. Again, we are

unpersuaded.

¶ 46 When a party opens the door to otherwise inadmissible

evidence, the opposing party may then inquire into the previously

barred matter. Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008).

A juror asked K.S. if she experienced any mental or physical health

concerns in middle school or high school. Defense counsel

indicated that it was a “fair question” and did not object. In

response, K.S. testified that she didn’t recall if she was ever

diagnosed with depression or anxiety but that she talked to

“therapists throughout middle school . . . [and] regularly visited the

school counselor . . . almost on a weekly basis” because she had

“pretty bad anxiety attacks throughout high school.”

20
¶ 47 K.S.’s testimony concerning the counseling she received in

middle school and high school did not open the door to permit

Klingensmith to inquire about her allegation of sexual assault

against her mother for two reasons. First, K.S.’s response to the

juror’s question only mentioned her panic attacks and did not

mention her mother or her father. During defense counsel’s

recross-examination, K.S. testified that she did not disclose the

sexual abuse to her therapist but simply used therapy to help

manage her anxiety and panic attacks. Although K.S. referenced

“[her] dad” in her response, that reference was made directly in

answer to defense counsel’s question concerning her decision not to

disclose prior abuse to her therapists. K.S.’s testimony, which

omitted any mention of her mother and referenced her father only

in the context of subjects not discussed during therapy, did not

establish a sufficient factual basis for defense counsel to inquire

about K.S.’s allegedly false prior allegation.

¶ 48 Second, although the trial court concluded that the evidence

was inadmissible to prove a history of false reporting, it

acknowledged that K.S. had “created a misleading impression that

she was in therapy because of what her father had done to her.” To

21
remedy any misunderstanding, the court asked the parties to

discuss a stipulation or jury instruction that could remedy the

issue. After some debate, the court instructed the jury as follows:

“You are advised that, in addition to her testimony, one of the

reasons [K.S.] was in therapy was due to abuse allegedly committed

by her mother.” Defense counsel did not object to the instruction.

¶ 49 We find Klingensmith’s claim that this instruction failed to

correct any error unpersuasive. First, defense counsel, through

multiple drafts discussed with the court, provided the language that

was later used in the clarifying instruction. Finally, defense

counsel agreed to the final version and did not object when the

court gave the clarifying instruction to the jury. Collectively,

defense counsel’s failure to object to the clarifying instruction and

active participation in its phrasing undermines Klingensmith’s

claim that the instruction was inadequately curative. People v.

Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 817 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Failure to object to a

clarifying instruction, combined with active participation in the

response, waives any right to assert error on appeal unless the

response is so ‘patently wrong’ as to constitute a ‘misstatement of

the law.’” (quoting Boothe v. People, 814 P.2d 372, 378 (Colo. 1991)

22
(Lohr, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in

the judgment))). Thus, the trial court cured any misleading

impression the jury may have had as to why K.S. was in therapy by

instructing the jury that “in addition to her testimony, one of the

reasons [K.S.] was in therapy was due to abuse allegedly committed

by her mother.” See People v. Kembel, 2023 CO 5, ¶ 50 (There is a

“presumption of law” that jurors are generally able to “understand

and follow a trial court’s limiting instructions.” (quoting Qwest

Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1089 (Colo. 2011))).

III. Disposition

¶ 50 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.

23