Peo v. McCall

22CA1268 Peo v McCall 10-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1268
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR5454
Honorable Christopher J. Baumann, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jacob L. McCall,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jacob L. McCall, appeals his judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of felony second

degree assault (strangulation) and misdemeanor third degree

assault. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

¶2 According to testimony at trial, McCall and K.S. were in an

intimate relationship and lived together in McCall’s apartment. One

night, after an argument, McCall accused K.S. of cheating and

slapped her twice across the face. He pushed her down to the floor

by the back of her head. After K.S. got up, he put both arms

around her neck and restricted her breathing. He then lifted her up

by her neck and slammed her against the ground multiple times.

After McCall stopped, K.S. ran out of the apartment and went to a

friend’s home, where she and her friend called the police. McCall

was charged with second degree assault (strangulation), a felony,

and third degree assault, a misdemeanor.

¶3 McCall represented himself at trial, and a jury found him

guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced him to eight years

in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

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¶4 McCall now appeals his judgment of conviction, arguing that

the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by (1) finding

that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and

(2) denying his motion for a continuance of the trial date that would

have allowed his newly retained counsel to represent him at trial.

Because we conclude that the court erroneously found that McCall

waived his right to counsel, we reverse the judgment without

reaching McCall’s arguments concerning the denial of the motion

for a continuance.

II. Waiver of the Right to Counsel

¶5 McCall contends that the trial court incorrectly found that he

waived his right to counsel because its advisements under People v.

Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989), were deficient, thus preventing

him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Sixth Amendment

rights. We agree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the

right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40

(1963); People v. Schupper, 2014 COA 80M, ¶ 40. A defendant also

has an alternative constitutional right to self-representation. People

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v. Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 15. The fundamental right to counsel,

along with the correlative right to self-representation, is considered

essential to a fair trial. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92.

¶7 Due to the importance of the right to be assisted by an

attorney at trial, before a defendant is allowed to proceed without

an attorney, he must first make a valid waiver of that right. Id.

Waiver may occur expressly or implicitly based on the defendant’s

conduct. People v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006). Under

either circumstance, we must ascertain whether, under the totality

of circumstances, a defendant’s conduct evinces a voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Id.

¶8 A waiver is knowing and intelligent when the defendant

“understands ‘the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses

included within them, the range of allowable punishments

thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in

mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad

understanding of the whole matter.’” Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94

(quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (plurality

opinion)). We must consider not only the “on-the-record

advisement” but also “the whole record” in ascertaining the validity

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of the asserted waiver. Id. at 96. The unconstitutional denial of the

right to counsel is a structural error requiring reversal. People v.

Waller, 2016 COA 115, ¶ 23, 872; see Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63,

¶ 10.

¶9 “Whether a defendant effectively waived the right to counsel,

and therefore can exercise the right to self-representation, is a

mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Lavadie, 2021 CO 42,

¶ 22. “On appeal, we ‘accept the trial court’s findings of historic

fact if those findings are supported by competent evidence, but we

assess the legal significance of the facts de novo.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

B. Procedural History

¶ 10 At his first appearance, McCall said that the public defender’s

office had notified him that an attorney would be appointed to

represent him, but a public defender who appeared “as a courtesy”

informed the court that McCall had not completed the requisite

paperwork. At his second appearance, which took place the next

week, McCall reported that he did not qualify for a public defender

but was attempting to hire an attorney. The court pushed the

arraignment back two more weeks but told McCall that if he failed

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to retain counsel by that time he be given “what’s known as an

Arguello advisement,” after which the court would “accept [his] plea,

set some dates, and . . . advance [the] case.”

¶ 11 At McCall’s third appearance two weeks later, he again

informed the court that he had not been able to retain counsel.

Observing that the case had “been pending a long time,” the court

told McCall, “I’m going to provide you with an Arguello advisement

and . . . go ahead and set some dates, take your plea, and move this

case along.” This procedure, the court said, would give McCall

some additional time “to hopefully retain counsel or speak with the

district attorney about a potential disposition.”

¶ 12 The court then advised McCall as follows:

You have the right to be represented by an
attorney throughout these proceedings. If you
can’t afford an attorney and you qualify as
indigent . . . an attorney will be provided to
you and it doesn’t sound like that’s the case.
Again, you can continue to speak with them or
[if] your financial position changes, I’ll consider
appointing counsel for you. They can provide
you with a list of counsel who charge less than
most in the community.

¶ 13 Without inquiring whether McCall understood the statement it

had just read, the court asked McCall whether he had any legal

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training and also inquired if he was currently under the influence of

any drugs, alcohol, or medication. In response to the court’s

inquiry whether he had any legal training, McCall responded, “No,

very little.” McCall also denied being under the influence of any

substances. The court continued,

I’m advising you that criminal law is a
complicated area, that an attorney trained in
this field could be of great help to you, that
you understand.

You have the right to . . . remain silent and
anything you say can be used against you in
court.

You have the right to represent yourself but in
doing so, you take a great risk and that’s not
something I recommend.

You have the right to confront witnesses
against you and cross-examine them.

You have a right to have witnesses that you
choose compelled to appear and testify on your
behalf.

You must exercise diligence in pursuing your
right to counsel by either making application
to the public defender or other counsel —
private counsel, and your failure to exercise
this right can result in a constructive waiver.

With that, do — how do you plead, sir, to the
charges . . . [?]

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¶ 14 McCall then pleaded not guilty to both charges. At no point

did the court ask him whether he understood the rights and

responsibilities associated with self-representation that it had just

described.

¶ 15 Several months later, McCall told the court he was working

with the public defender’s office due to a change in his financial

situation. He then appeared with Public Defender Betsy Atkinson.

His initial not guilty plea was withdrawn, and the case was reset for

arraignment with counsel. McCall entered a new not guilty plea in

May 2021, and trial was scheduled for October of the same year.

¶ 16 Three weeks before the trial date, Jeffery A. Wolf, a private

attorney, filed a “conditional entry of appearance” on McCall’s

behalf. The entry of appearance was conditioned on the district

court’s disposition of a motion to continue the trial, which Wolf filed

the same day. The motion for a continuance — which the

prosecution did not oppose despite an objection from the victim —

said that Wolf was unavailable on the scheduled trial dates and that

he would, in any event, need more time to prepare for trial. Wolf

represented that McCall was “willing to waive his speedy trial in

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order to effectuate [the proposed] change of counsel.” The court

summarily denied the requested continuance.

¶ 17 After the court denied the motion to continue, Wolf filed a

motion to withdraw, representing that his relationship with McCall

had “become adversarial,” and that he would “not be able to

ethically and adequately represent [McCall] given the current nature

of the relationship and due to the Court’s order denying the motion

to continue.”1 Once Atkinson learned of private counsel’s

withdrawal, she filed her own motion to withdraw due to a conflict

of interest, explaining that there had been a breakdown in

communication between herself and McCall that prevented her from

representing him effectively.

¶ 18 A short time later, McCall appeared before a different judge for

resolution of Atkinson’s motion to withdraw. See People v.

Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 694-95 (Colo. 2010) (holding that a court

must conduct a hearing, at which both attorney and client testify,

1 It appears that the trial court never ruled on the motion to

withdraw. But Wolf’s entry of appearance was expressly
conditioned on the court granting the motion to continue. Thus,
while it was likely prudent for Wolf to create a clear record by
formally filing a motion to withdraw once the continuance was
denied, it is unclear whether formal withdrawal was necessary.

8
to adjudicate a defendant’s assertion that his appointed attorney

cannot or will not completely represent him). At the hearing,

McCall asserted that he wanted to represent himself because of a

disagreement over trial strategy. The Bergerud judge granted

Atkinson’s motion to withdraw without deciding whether a

breakdown in communication prevented her from providing

adequate representation. The Bergerud judge told McCall that the

trial judge would provide an Arguello advisement to ensure that

McCall was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving his

right to counsel.

¶ 19 The following day, McCall appeared pro se at the pretrial

conference, but the court did not give him an Arguello advisement.

¶ 20 On the first day of the trial, McCall appeared pro se with his

wife acting as his “assistant.”2 Before voir dire, McCall notified the

2 Before beginning the trial, the court barred McCall’s wife from

assisting him because she was not a licensed attorney. However,
she should not have been permitted to speak on his behalf at all.
See Watt, Tieder, Killian & Hoffar v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 847 P.2d
170, 173 (Colo. App. 1992) (In determining “whether a particular
activity amounts to the unauthorized practice of law,” the “basic
and initial question must always be whether the individual’s
appearance is in a representative capacity to protect, enforce, or
defend the rights or duties of someone else.”).

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court that, among other issues, he had not received an Arguello

advisement. The court disagreed, explaining that it had provided

the advisement in January. The court also — mistakenly — told

McCall that the Bergerud court had provided an Arguello

advisement at the time that it allowed Atkinson’s withdrawal.

McCall continued to argue the point. Although many of his

statements on the issue appeared to conflict with one another, he

consistently maintained that neither the trial court nor the

Bergerud court had gone through “what he was potentially giving up

by self-representation.”

¶ 21 The trial court reiterated that McCall received an Arguello

advisement at the January 28, 2021, arraignment hearing and that

McCall had “elected to proceed pro se at that point in time.” McCall

again asserted that he “never got a copy of the Arguello statement”

when he “became [his] own attorney” and that the Bergerud court

stated that the trial court was “supposed to read it.” McCall

persisted, asserting he “really ha[d] to have the Arguello statement

in writing from this Court” and that he needed it before proceeding

because “[he] d[id]n’t know what [wa]s going on really.”

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¶ 22 The court acquiesced, explaining that it was “redundant at

this point” and “stale in that [McCall] had months and months and

months.” The trial judge then summarized his prior Arguello

advisement, telling McCall,

[I] read to you on the record that you have the
right to be represented by counsel throughout
these proceedings. If you can’t afford an
attorney and you qualify as indigent under the
supreme court lines [sic], counsel will be
provided to you free of charge.

I reviewed the charges with you. I asked you
whether you are under the influence of drugs,
medication, or alcohol. You advised me no. I
accepted your plea.

I advised you that understanding criminal law
is a complicated area and that an attorney
trained in the field could be of great help. I
advised you that you have the right to remain
silent, and anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have a right to
represent yourself, but in doing so, you take
great risk of not properly presenting your case.

You have the right to confront witnesses
against you and cross-examine them. You
have the right to have witnesses you choose
compel to appear and testify on your behalf.

I further advised you that you must exercise
diligence in pursuing your right to counsel
whether making application to the public
defender’s office or contacting private counsel
to represent you.

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Finally I advised you failure to exercise
diligence in seeking counsel can at some point
constitute constructive waiver of your right to
counsel. You have counsel. Your Bergerud
motion was denied. You have very competent
counsel.

You fired her shortly before trial and elected to
proceed, and I find that you have
constructively waived your right to counsel, as
I so advised you when I first accepted you not
guilty plea in this case. We are proceeding.

C. Analysis

¶ 23 The record does not establish that McCall knowingly and

intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, either

expressly or implicitly.

¶ 24 At the outset, the trial court’s January 28 Arguello advisement

failed to inform McCall that he would be representing himself going

forward. To the contrary, even though McCall said he was trying to

find an attorney at the time, the trial court explained it was

providing an Arguello advisement because it “need[ed] to move”

McCall’s case along. The court failed to confirm that McCall

understood its Arguello advisement as apprising him of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and the potential pitfalls of proceeding

pro se. Instead, the record reflects — outside of two yes or no

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questions relating to McCall’s legal training and current mental

acuity — that the court’s Arguello advisement was more of a

monologue rather than a verification that McCall was making a

“knowing and informed decision” to forgo counsel. Arguello, 772

P.2d at 95. Indeed, the court never asked McCall whether he

understood the list of rights that it had just read, nor confirmed

that McCall wished to represent himself.

¶ 25 The trial court’s advisement also omitted key portions of the

recommended “Colorado Trial Judges’ Benchbook” inquiry. See

Arguello, 772 P.2d at 98 (endorsing the practice of asking a series of

questions appearing in the Colorado Trial Judge’s Benchbook to

ensure a defendant validly waives his right to counsel). Specifically,

the court did not inform McCall about the range of penalties he

faced, of his right to consult with a public defender about his

decision to forgo counsel, or of his right to court-appointed advisory

counsel. Aside from a brief question about his legal experience, the

court failed to inquire into McCall’s education level and did not

explore whether McCall understood the “possible defenses to [his]

charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof.” Id. at 94 (quoting

Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724).

13
¶ 26 The record reflects that McCall did not understand many of

the issues that the trial court omitted from the abbreviated Arguello

advisement it provided at McCall’s third appearance. For example,

nothing in the record indicates that the court ever advised McCall of

the potential penalties he was facing, much less that he could be

subject to an aggravated sentence of between five and sixteen years.

Likewise, McCall’s attempt to rely on his wife as an “assistant” at

trial — which the court forbade once it realized she was not a

licensed attorney — suggests that McCall might well have requested

advisory counsel had he been informed of the possibility. And

McCall’s conduct at trial betrayed a fundamental lack of knowledge

about procedural requirements, the rules of evidence, and the legal

system in general.

¶ 27 These shortcomings were not remedied by the trial court’s

recap of the faulty Arguello advisement on the first day of trial.

Despite McCall’s insistence that he “d[id]n’t know what is going on,”

the court did not engage in a colloquy with McCall to assess the

situation. To the contrary, it simply paraphrased the incomplete

statement that it had provided at McCall’s third appearance,

deemed McCall’s conduct a constructive waiver of the right to

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counsel, and declared that it would be moving forward with the trial

as scheduled. Moreover, the court’s ruling was premised on its

erroneous assumption that McCall had received a separate Arguello

advisement at the Bergerud hearing.

¶ 28 “A court’s failure to comply substantially with [the Colorado

Trial Judges’ Benchbook’s recommended inquiry] does not

automatically render the waiver invalid[] but is an exception which

should rarely be invoked.” Arguello, 772 P.2d at 96. Under the

circumstances here — where McCall’s actions throughout the

proceedings indicated he did not fully understand that he was

entitled to the aforementioned information and rights, let alone that

he waived them — we conclude that we cannot overlook the

advisement’s shortcomings. See People v. Stanley, 56 P.3d 1241,

1245 (Colo. App. 2002) (explaining that the record as a whole must

establish the defendant knowingly and voluntarily undertook a

course of conduct showing an unequivocal intent to abandon legal

representation for an implied waiver to be valid).

¶ 29 Moreover, given the inadequate Arguello advisements, we

cannot conclude that McCall’s actions amounted to a constructive

Sixth Amendment waiver. See Stanley, 56 P.3d at 1245 (“Where the

15
advisement has been found deficient, courts rarely recognize an

implied waiver.”). True, at the Bergerud hearing, McCall stated he

“[knew] the law very well,” that he “want[ed] to go defend [himself],”

and that he was “requesting to defend [himself] today.” He also

insisted that he wanted to discharge his public defender. But

McCall made those statements and took that position without the

benefit of a full Arguello colloquy. A thorough advisement from

either the Bergerud court or the trial court might well have given

McCall pause about his relationship with appointed counsel, led to

second thoughts about taking on the task of self-representation, or

caused him to accept advisory counsel. See Arguello, 772 P.2d at

97 (A defendant’s “conduct, though far from exemplary, cannot be

considered a valid waiver of his right to counsel in the absence of

proof that he was adequately informed so as to understand the

consequences of his actions.”).

¶ 30 Because McCall was never provided an adequate Arguello

advisement, and because the record does not support a conclusion

that he “understood the nature of the charges, the statutory

offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments,

the possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in their

16
mitigation, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of

the whole matter,” Lavadie, ¶ 48, we conclude that he did not

knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to the

assistance of trial counsel. Because the error is structural, see

Arguello, 772 P.2d at 97, we must reverse.

III. Disposition

¶ 31 McCall’s judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is

remanded for a new trial.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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