Peo v. Ramirez

22CA1936 Peo v Ramirez 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1936
City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CR7143
Honorable Ericka F. H. Englert, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Saul Ramirez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Yaried A. Hailu, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sean James Lacefield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Saul Ramirez, appeals his convictions on two

counts of sexual assault on a child (position of trust) and two

counts of sexual assault on a child (pattern of abuse). He contends

that the district court erred by (1) admitting expert testimony that

improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility and (2) allowing

prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 When she was in seventh grade, the victim reported to her

school principal that Ramirez — her godfather — had raped her

during a weekend visit to his home when she was ten years old. An

investigation followed, and though Ramirez denied the allegations,

the prosecution charged him with two counts of sexual assault on a

child (position of trust), two counts of sexual assault on a child

(pattern of abuse), and two sentence enhancers.

¶3 According to the victim’s trial testimony, Ramirez sexually

assaulted her twice over the course of one weekend. The first

assault occurred when she was lying on a living room couch and

Ramirez touched her “private part” underneath her underwear. The

second assault happened the next night in Ramirez’s room. The

victim reported that Ramirez took off her pants and underwear,

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spread her legs, licked her vagina, and put his penis in her vagina.

The victim recalled that “it didn’t feel good,” and, after Ramirez left,

she went to a bathroom to clean “white stuff” off her vagina.

¶4 The victim didn’t tell anyone about the assaults at the time

because Ramirez “threatened” that “bad things w[ould] happen to

[her]” if she did. She also explained that, although she used to

spend almost every weekend at her godfather’s house, she “would

never go back” after the assaults. The victim’s mother confirmed

that when the victim was in fifth grade, she “stopped asking” to go

to her godfather’s house.

¶5 Ramirez didn’t testify at trial. His counsel defended on the

theory that Ramirez was falsely accused and that the victim had

“create[d] this story” after watching a television show about a girl

who disclosed to her mother that she had been sexually abused.

¶6 The jury convicted Ramirez as charged, and the district court

sentenced him to eight years to life in prison.

II. Expert Testimony

¶7 Ramirez contends that the district court plainly erred by

permitting an expert witness to testify — in direct response to a

juror question — that “a very small percentage of children” will

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knowingly make a “false accusation” about sexual abuse. Because

we agree with the People that Ramirez invited this alleged error, we

will not review it.

A. Additional Background

¶8 The prosecution presented a generalized expert in child sexual

assault and trauma dynamics. The expert explained that she had

not met the victim or Ramirez and that her role was to provide

general information about child sexual assault and trauma

responses. She testified about, among other things, why a child

might delay disclosing sexual abuse.

¶9 During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the expert if

she did “any work” on false accusations and whether she had

training to determine whether an accusation could be false. He

then asked whether she had ever followed up in the cases in which

she had testified to determine whether the accuser “had made a

false accusation” and “eventually recanted.” The expert said she

“do[es] not track that type of information.”

¶ 10 At the end of cross-examination, jurors submitted a few

questions for the expert, including, “How often do children lie about

abuse to please another trusted adult like a godmother, someone

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who is trying to separate from their spouse?”1 The prosecutor and

defense counsel each stated that they had “no objection” to the

proposed question, and the court asked it.

¶ 11 In response to the question, the expert testified:

So without speaking specifically to statistics,
that there’s certainly research around children
and false allegations and whether or not
children lie about something like sexual abuse.

My experience and understanding of sexual
abuse, even if it’s related to the dynamics
within a family, is that there are a very small
percentage of children that will make an
intentional accusation of another individual.
Sometimes there is mitigating factors where
another adult in the family misunderstands
something, but the idea a child intentionally
makes a false accusation and knowingly does
so, the numbers are very, very small.

¶ 12 Defense counsel did not object to this response or ask that it

be stricken. Instead, defense counsel questioned the expert further

about the referenced false allegation research and revisited the

expert’s earlier statement that she did not review whether victims in

cases in which she had testified had recanted.

1 At trial, the jury heard Ramirez’s recorded police interview, in

which he explained that his wife — the victim’s godmother — was
divorcing him.

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¶ 13 In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Ramirez had

been falsely accused and pointed to the expert’s testimony that false

accusations occur and that the expert never investigated what

happened in cases in which she testified.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 14 While we generally review unpreserved issues for plain error,

the doctrine of invited error precludes appellate review of alleged

errors that a party injected into the case “deliberately and as a

matter of trial strategy,” as opposed to through oversight. People v.

Smith, 2018 CO 33, ¶ 14; People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34; see

also People v. Garcia, 2018 COA 180, ¶ 7 (noting that invited error

“is limited to situations where an error was caused by a party’s

affirmative, strategic conduct and not by a party’s inaction or

inadvertence”).

¶ 15 “[T]he doctrine is not limited to cases in which a party

requests that the court take a particular action and then later

complains of that same action.” Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611,

619 (Colo. 2002). Rather, it also applies where one party expressly

acquiesces to a proposed ruling or procedure. See Rediger, ¶¶ 34,

37; see also Boothe v. People, 814 P.2d 372, 377-78 (Colo. 1991)

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(Lohr, J., concurring) (concluding that the invited error doctrine

applied where the defense counsel acquiesced to the court’s

response to a jury question).

¶ 16 We review de novo whether invited error applies. People v.

Becker, 2014 COA 36, ¶ 20.

C. Ramirez Invited the Response to the Juror’s Question

¶ 17 Despite not objecting to either the juror’s question or the

expert’s response, Ramirez now asks us to reverse his convictions

because he contends that the response was improper bolstering

testimony.

¶ 18 While we generally agree that witnesses may not testify about

the percentage of children who make false sexual abuse allegations,

see, e.g., People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 17, by acquiescing to the

question, defense counsel invited the testimony about which

Ramirez now complains. Indeed, the juror’s question directly asked

the expert to testify about “[h]ow often” children lie about sexual

assault. Defense counsel had the time and opportunity to review

and object to that question. But instead, he agreed to the question

by confirming that he had “no objection” to it. By doing so, he

invited the expert’s foreseeable response about the percentage of

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children who make false sexual abuse allegations. See People v.

Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009) (noting that error may

be invited where an expert witness’s “responses were a foreseeable

result of the form of questioning”); see also People v. Shackelford,

511 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. 1973) (any error in admitting a witness’s

testimony was invited by defense counsel’s “wide-open question” to

the witness).2

¶ 19 We disagree with Ramirez that this case is like Marx. There, a

division of this court concluded that the district court plainly erred

by allowing the prosecutor to elicit expert testimony that children

generally do not lie about sexual abuse. Marx, ¶ 23. Unlike in

Marx, the prosecutor in this case did not elicit improper expert

testimony. Rather, defense counsel first introduced the topic of

false accusations during his cross-examination of the expert and

then expressly acquiesced to the juror’s question seeking testimony

about the frequency of false sexual abuse allegations.

2 Because acquiescence is enough, we necessarily reject Ramirez’s

contention that invited error “is inapplicable” because defense
counsel himself did not “inject” the error by asking the question.

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¶ 20 To the extent that Ramirez contends defense counsel’s

acquiescence was not strategic, we disagree. After all, defense

counsel defended on the theory that the victim had falsely accused

Ramirez and pressed this theory throughout trial, from opening

statement through closing argument. Thus, we can hardly

conclude that the decision to cross-examine the expert witness

about false accusations and then acquiesce to the juror’s question

seeking information about the frequency of false sexual abuse

accusations was anything but strategic.

¶ 21 Because defense counsel invited the expert’s response, the

error is unreviewable.3

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 22 Ramirez contends that the district court plainly erred when it

allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct during rebuttal

closing argument by “distorting [the] burden of proof.” We aren’t

convinced.

3 Having concluded that defense counsel invited the expert’s

response to the juror’s question, we do not reach the People’s
related arguments that defense counsel opened the door to the
expert’s response or waived any objection to that response.

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A. Additional Background

¶ 23 In his closing argument, defense counsel maintained that

Ramirez “has been subjected to a false accusation.” Counsel

argued that the victim was lonely and attention-seeking, her version

of events didn’t “make any sense,” she couldn’t remember critical

details, no evidence corroborated the outcry, and Ramirez

consistently denied the allegations because “he didn’t do it.”

¶ 24 The prosecutor then argued in rebuttal closing:

To find [Ramirez] not guilty, you would have to
believe that [the victim] was sophisticated
enough to make this all up and remember the
details four years later. You would have to
believe that she is sophisticated enough to
carry this story through. The little girl who,
when asked in the forensic interview, [w]here
does your godfather live, doesn’t think, oh,
we’re talking about addresses. She says, [i]n a
house, the same house that they’ve been
talking about for ten minutes prior. That little
girl is not sophisticated enough to invent this.

....

You would have to believe that [the victim], for
whatever reason, chose a day to become
emotional to an extent she had never become
emotional before and just invent this story for
no reason whatsoever.

You would have to believe that [the school
principal] was making up the emotion that she

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saw, the fact that [the victim] went from
appearing to be a normal, quiet, thoughtful,
smiley girl until [the date of the outcry] when
all of a sudden, her whole body was trembling
and she burst out in tears when she said . . . I
was raped by my godfather at his house in fifth
grade.

....

To find [Ramirez] not guilty, you would have to
believe that [the victim’s] mom invented a story
about [the victim] distancing herself from
[Ramirez]. You would have to believe that [the
victim] and her mom conspired to both
remember that they stopped going over to
[Ramirez’s] house and that that fact would be a
good fact to collaborate on.

....

To find [Ramirez] not guilty, you would have to
believe, again, that [the victim] came up with
the detail, having to clean up something white
from her vaginal area, that only someone who’s
experienced that phenomenon after sex would
know about.

....

And you would have to believe that [the victim]
made this up for no reason at all.

¶ 25 Defense counsel did not object to any of these statements.

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B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 26 We apply a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial

misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).

We first determine “whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If it

was improper, we then determine whether the misconduct warrants

reversal. Id.

¶ 27 Because Ramirez didn’t object to the prosecutor’s statements,

we review for plain error. People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27,

¶ 88. An error is plain if it is both obvious, meaning that it

“contravene[s] a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal

principle, or Colorado case law,” and substantial, meaning that it

“so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to

cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”

People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 43. Only misconduct that is

“flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper” warrants reversal

under the plain error standard. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d

1043, 1053 (Colo. 2005) (citation omitted); see also People v.

Smalley, 2015 COA 140, ¶ 37 (“Prosecutorial misconduct in closing

argument rarely constitutes plain error.”).

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C. The District Court Did Not Commit Plain Error

¶ 28 Ramirez now says that the district court plainly erred by

allowing the prosecutor to summarize what the jury would “have to

believe” to find Ramirez not guilty.

¶ 29 In support of his argument, Ramirez says the prosecutor told

the jury that to “acquit Ramirez,” it must believe that several

witnesses “repeatedly lied.” To be sure, it’s improper for a

prosecutor to opine that a witness lied. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d

at 1050. But contrary to Ramirez’s assertion, the prosecutor never

used the word “lie” (or a prohibited equivalent) in rebuttal closing or

when referring to a witness. And because prosecutors may fairly

comment on witness demeanor and credibility, People v. Constant,

645 P.2d 843, 846 (Colo. 1982), as well as respond to defense

counsel’s arguments, People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, ¶ 140, without

the benefit of some specific objection, we cannot fault the district

court for allowing the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument.

¶ 30 Ramirez also says that the prosecutor improperly distorted the

burden of proof by arguing what the jury “would have to believe” to

find Ramirez not guilty. But a division of this court has rejected

that argument, holding that rebuttal comments summarizing what

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the jury “would have to believe” to find the defendant “not guilty” do

not shift the burden of proof and are not improper. People v.

Robles, 302 P.3d 269, 280 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2013 CO 24.

The district court therefore did not err by allowing the argument.

See People v. Scott, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 17 (“[T]he trial judge is bound to

follow the decisions of the appellate courts and cannot generally be

faulted for not departing from that authority sua sponte.”),

abrogated on other grounds by, Whiteaker v. People, 2024 CO 25,

¶ 25.

¶ 31 We recognize that, after Ramirez’s trial, a division of this court

concluded that prosecutors may not argue that the jury “must

disbelieve the prosecution’s witness before it could acquit the

defendant.” People v. Cuellar, 2023 COA 20, ¶ 69. The Cuellar

division concluded that this argument “misstated the law” and “had

the potential to lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.” Id. at

¶¶ 67-68.

¶ 32 But to be plain, an error must be obvious at the time of trial.

People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶¶ 41-43. Even setting aside the

division split on the propriety of the prosecutor’s rebuttal

comments, because Cuellar was decided after Ramirez’s trial, any

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error was not obvious at the time of trial. See id. at ¶ 45; see also

Ray, ¶ 146 (concluding that any error in the prosecutor’s comments

was not plain because “the first appellate opinion to explicitly

disapprove” of similar comments was announced after the

defendant’s trial).

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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