People v. Fields

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
October 23, 2025

2025COA84

No. 20CA1708, People v. Fields — Criminal Law — Sentencing
— Punishment for Habitual Criminals

A division of the court of appeals applies, for the first time

since its announcement, People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, in which the

supreme court applied Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821

(2024), and held that habitual criminal adjudications under section

18-1.3-803, C.R.S. 2025, must be determined by a jury. After

determining that the trial court erred — because a jury must

determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were separately

brought and tried and whether they arose out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes — the division, reviewing for

constitutional harmlessness, further concludes that the error in

this case does not warrant reversal.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA84

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1708
City and County of Denver District Court No. 17CR1872
Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Troy L. Fields,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre and Schock, JJ., concur

Prior Opinion Announced August 3, 2023, Vacated in 24-5460

Announced October 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sean James Lacefield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Troy L. Fields, of kidnapping and

sexual assault against the victim, J.C., as well as five habitual

criminal charges.1 Based on the habitual criminal charges, and the

fact that Fields had already been adjudicated a habitual criminal in

a prior case, the court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of

ninety-six years in prison for kidnapping and life in prison with the

possibility of parole after forty years for sexual assault.

¶2 Fields appealed, arguing the trial court violated the Uniform

Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), improperly

instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping, and admitted

irrelevant victim impact evidence. He also challenged his

adjudication as a habitual criminal and argued that his life

sentence was illegal. We affirmed Fields’ convictions and sentences.

People v. Fields, (Colo. App. No. 20CA1708, Aug. 3, 2023) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Fields I).

1 The kidnapping and sexual assault charges stem from events that

occurred in 1994, when J.C. arrived home, unlocked the front door
of her house, and was pulled in by a man waiting inside. The man
held a knife to her throat, repeatedly threatened to kill her, moved
her around the house, restrained her, and sexually assaulted her.
The case had been cold for twenty-two years when detectives
reprocessed DNA taken from J.C.’s vaginal swab and identified a
match with a DNA sample taken from Fields.

1
¶3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated

our judgment in Fields I, and remanded the case for further

consideration in light of Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821

(2024). See Fields v. Colorado, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 1136 (2025)

(mem.). Erlinger held that, under the Sixth Amendment, whether a

criminal defendant’s prior convictions were committed on different

occasions from one another for purposes of the Armed Career

Criminal Act is the sort of fact-laden inquiry that a jury must

decide. 602 U.S. at 834. Fields argues that for purposes of

Colorado’s habitual criminal statute, now codified at section 18-1.3-

803, C.R.S. 2025, Erlinger also requires a jury to find whether a

defendant’s prior convictions were separately brought and tried,

and whether they arose out of separate and distinct criminal

episodes.

¶4 Since this case returned to us, the Colorado Supreme Court

issued its opinion in People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57. It held that

Erlinger applies to Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing statute

and “the question of separate and distinct criminal episodes

demands a jury finding.” People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, ¶ 24.

Applying Gregg, we conclude the trial court erred when it, rather

2
than a jury, decided the habitual criminal counts. But we conclude

that the error does not warrant reversal of Fields’ convictions on

those counts. The result of our analysis with respect to all other

issues decided in Fields I remains unchanged. We thus affirm

Fields’ convictions and sentences.

I. Jury Trial on Habitual Criminal Adjudication

¶5 Fields asserts that the trial court erred when it adjudicated the

habitual criminal counts. He argues that the court’s failure to have

a jury decide whether the prosecution proved that his prior

convictions were separately brought and tried and that they arose

out of distinct criminal episodes violated his statutory and

constitutional rights. We see no basis for reversal.

A. No Statutory Right

¶6 As to Fields’ statutory arguments, we discern no error. In

1994, when Fields committed the underlying offenses, “a defendant

was entitled to a jury trial on habitual criminal charges.” People v.

King, 121 P.3d 234, 243 (Colo. App. 2005); see also § 16-13-103,

C.R.S. 1994. But that right was limited to the right to have a jury

decide the issue of identity. People v. Jones, 967 P.2d 166, 169

(Colo. App. 1997) (the defendant “was not entitled to have any other

3
issues determined by the jury”). And in 1995, the legislature

amended the statute to allow a court to determine habitual criminal

charges as a matter of law for “all informations filed on or after July

1, 1995.”2 King, 121 P.3d at 243.

¶7 Although Fields committed the underlying offenses in 1994,

the prosecution filed its complaint and information in 2017.

Therefore, no jury trial was required. See id. Nevertheless, Fields

received a jury trial on the issue of identity — a greater protection

than he was entitled to by statute. We are not persuaded by his

arguments that King and Jones are inapposite. Instead, we follow

their holdings and conclude that his statutory rights were not

violated.

B. Sixth Amendment Violation Was Harmless

¶8 We reach a different conclusion with respect to Fields’

constitutional arguments. We agree with Fields that Erlinger

instructs that the jury should have determined whether Fields’ prior

convictions were separately brought and tried and whether they

2 The legislature has since amended the habitual criminal statute to

once again require a jury trial on habitual criminal charges. See
Ch. 344, sec. 1, § 18-1.3-803(1), (4), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1866-67
(effective June 2, 2025).

4
arose out of distinct criminal episodes. See Gregg, ¶ 24 (there are

no material differences between the separate-offenses inquiry at

issue in Erlinger and Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing

statute). Because both questions “require[] more than a mere

determination of ‘what crime, with what elements, the defendant

was convicted of,’” a jury determination was required. See id.

(quoting Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 838). Nevertheless, we conclude that

the error was harmless.3

1. No Structural Error

¶9 “Structural errors are constitutional ‘defects affecting the

framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and they require

automatic reversal because they defy analysis by harmless error

standards.” People v. Washington, 2022 COA 62, ¶ 25. Fields

argues that his habitual criminal convictions must be reversed

3 In People v. Gregg, the supreme court was not required to address

the appropriate remedy when a judge, not jury, makes the habitual
offense determination. 2025 CO 57. Unlike Fields, the defendant
in Gregg was never adjudicated a habitual criminal. Id. at ¶ 39.
Because sentencing had not yet occurred, the supreme court only
addressed whether double jeopardy precluded a second jury from
deciding the habitual criminal counts. Because we conclude that
Fields was adjudicated and sentenced in error, we review the error
for constitutional harmlessness. C.A.R. 35(c).

5
because the court’s error was structural. We disagree. Erlinger

applied Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Alleyne v. United States, 570

U.S. 99 (2013) — all of which addressed a sentencing judge’s

determination to increase the mandatory minimum sentence for a

crime or to impose a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum

sentence, based on facts not submitted to the jury and proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Error under each of these cases is

reviewed for constitutional harmlessness. See Erlinger, 602 U.S. at

835 (describing Erlinger as “on all fours” with Apprendi and

Alleyne); see also People v. Mountjoy, 2016 COA 86, ¶¶ 14-15

(collecting cases and noting that both “a majority of the federal

circuits” and “[m]any state appellate courts” have consistently

applied harmless error review to Apprendi/Blakely errors), aff’d,

2018 CO 92M; Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Colo.

2008) (reviewing Blakely error for constitutional harmlessness).

¶ 10 Despite this longstanding precedent, Fields argues that

structural error applies because the Erlinger Court quoted a

structural error discussion from Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578

(1986). We are not persuaded that this citation supports a

6
structural error analysis. The Supreme Court quoted Rose in the

context of emphasizing the requirement that a jury must decide

whether prior convictions were committed on separate occasions,

even if, in many cases, that inquiry may be straightforward.4 See

Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 842 (“There is no efficiency exception to the

Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”). Despite quoting this discussion,

the Court has consistently held that “most constitutional errors,”

including Sixth Amendment errors, “can be harmless.” Washington

v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

¶ 11 Fields also argues that, unlike the determination of a single

element in an offense, the jury’s determination of whether prior

convictions were separately brought and tried and arose out of

separate and distinct criminal episodes is too multifaceted and

unpredictable to be reviewed for harmlessness. We disagree.

Instead, these questions “can be definitively established based on

the judicial records introduced at the habitual criminal trial.”

4 In fact, the dissent in Erlinger observed that because this inquiry

is so straightforward, “[i]n most (if not all) cases,” Erlinger error “will
be harmless.” Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 859 (2024)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

7
People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222, 227 (Colo. App. 2006). Accordingly,

structural error does not apply.

2. Assuming Preservation, Any Error Was Harmless

¶ 12 Because we conclude that Erlinger error is not subject to

automatic reversal for structural error, we must next decide

whether reversal is appropriate under the applicable standard. The

parties disagree about whether Fields preserved his constitutional

arguments. But even if we assume preservation, reversal is not

warranted.

¶ 13 We review preserved claims of constitutional error for

constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11.

These errors require reversal unless we can declare that the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “In other words, we

reverse if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might

have contributed to the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

¶ 14 For a defendant to be adjudged a habitual criminal under

section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I), the prosecution must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant, having been convicted of a

felony, “has been three times previously convicted, upon charges

8
separately brought and tried, and arising out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes.” People v. Williams, 2019 COA 32, ¶ 37.

“Charges are separately brought where they are ‘in separate

informations, with separate docket numbers, arising out of separate

criminal incidents.’” Id. at ¶ 38 (quoting Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d

262, 267 (Colo. 1982)). “[A] predicate conviction can result from

either a conviction following trial or a guilty plea.” Id. Convictions

arising from guilty pleas satisfy the requirement of “separately

brought and tried” when the underlying charges “would have been

tried separately” if not for the guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted).

Prior crimes arise from distinct criminal episodes where they are

separated by enough time and have different victims and locations,

such that “proof of neither could have formed a substantial portion

of the proof of the other.” Marquez v. People, 2013 CO 58, ¶ 20.

¶ 15 At the close of trial and while the jury was still empaneled, the

prosecution presented evidence of the following:

• On September 12, 1988, Fields pled guilty to burglary

and theft against a business for an offense occurring in

Sedgwick County, Kansas, on January 30, 1987.

9
• On April 8, 1988, Fields pled no contest to burglary and

theft against a residence for an offense occurring in

Shawnee County, Kansas, on May 11, 1987.

• On November 6, 1989, Fields pled no contest to forgery

for an offense that took place in Shawnee County on

November 30, 1987.5

¶ 16 The record contains charging documents for each of these

offenses; they show different dates (separated by a span of months),

different locations, different victims, and different case numbers.

Given this record, we cannot imagine a scenario in which a jury

could have found that Fields’ prior offenses occurred as part of the

same criminal episode or that the prosecution might have brought

and tried them together. Instead, based on this overwhelming

5 The prosecution also presented evidence that Fields pled guilty to

attempted drug possession for an offense occurring on December
18, 1987, and to attempted drug possession for another offense
occurring on September 20, 1989. Depending on the underlying
facts, these convictions might or might not have been considered
felonies if they had been committed in Colorado. See § 18-1.3-
801(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (if a conviction occurred in another state, it
must be for a crime that would be a felony in Colorado to be eligible
to enhance a defendant’s sentence as a habitual criminal). But
even without them, we conclude that there is overwhelming
evidence to support Fields’ habitual criminal adjudication and
sentence.

10
evidence, we conclude that any rational jury would have found,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Fields’ convictions were separately

brought and tried and arose out of distinct criminal episodes. See

Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 842 (“Often, a defendant’s past offenses will be

different enough and separated by enough time and space that

there is little question he committed them on separate occasions.”);

see also United States v. Butler, 122 F.4th 584, 590 (5th Cir. 2024)

(Erlinger error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the

record clearly showed that the prior offenses spanned a range of

months to years and involved different parties).

¶ 17 Because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s

error in failing to try the “separately brought and tried” and

“separate and distinct criminal episode” elements to a jury might

have contributed to Fields’ habitual criminal convictions, reversal is

not warranted.

II. Other Issues

A. UMDDA

1. Applicable Law

¶ 18 The UMDDA provides that a prisoner “may request final

disposition of any untried indictment, information, or criminal

11
complaint pending against him in this state.” § 16-14-102(1),

C.R.S. 2025. Once the trial court and prosecution receive a

UMDDA request, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 182

days. § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. 2025. A defendant invokes his rights

under the UMDDA if (1) his request substantially complies with the

statute’s requirements; and (2) the prosecution receives “actual

notice,” which means “actual knowledge,” of his request. People v.

McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶¶ 20-21. If a defendant invokes his rights

but the trial court fails to comply with the 182-day deadline, the

court loses jurisdiction, and the charges must be dismissed with

prejudice. § 16-14-104(1).

¶ 19 In reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the

UMDDA, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings provided they

are supported by competent evidence, but we review the court’s

legal conclusions de novo. McKimmy, ¶ 19.

2. Procedural History

¶ 20 The prosecution filed the underlying charges against Fields on

March 24, 2017. On May 7, 2017, while Fields was represented by

a public defender, Fields’ wife, Lisa Fields, sent a fax to the

prosecutor and county court requesting final disposition of the

12
charges under the UMDDA and seeking removal of the public

defender. On May 19, 2017, the county court issued a minute

order noting that it had received these motions, but “[u]nless Lisa

Fields is a licensed attorney said motions are null.” Fields himself

filed a second UMDDA request, which was received on August 2,

2017.

¶ 21 The case was moved to the district court, and a motions

hearing was held on November 3, 2017. Representing himself,

Fields argued that the county court misapplied the law by nullifying

the May 7th UMDDA request and that his right to a speedy trial

would be violated unless trial was held by the following day. The

prosecutor argued that Fields did not file an effective notice of his

rights because the prosecutor’s office never received the motion and

she was not familiar with the telephone number to which the

motion had been faxed.

¶ 22 The trial court deferred ruling on the motion and ordered the

prosecutor to investigate whether the May 7th request was received

and whether service by fax was sufficient.

¶ 23 At a subsequent hearing, the prosecutor argued that the

county court properly exercised its discretion to nullify Fields’

13
UMDDA request. The trial court noted that while the record did not

indicate why the county court rejected the May 7th filing “but

accepted an almost identical filing . . . on August 2nd,” it was “not

in a position to countermand what [the county court] did.” Because

the May 7th request was nullified, the court denied the motion to

dismiss.

3. Discussion

¶ 24 Fields argues that the trial court improperly relied on the law

of the case doctrine because the county court abused its discretion

by nullifying the May 7th UMDDA request.6 We disagree. A

criminal defendant is not entitled to hybrid representation — self-

representation and representation by counsel — and a court is

entitled to ignore pro se filings submitted by a represented

defendant. See People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734, 737 (Colo. App.

2010). Moreover, Fields’ wife, a nonattorney, filed the request,

which she is not authorized to do. People v. Adams, 243 P.3d 256,

266 (Colo. 2010) (nonattorneys may not engage in the unauthorized

practice of law, including by preparing court pleadings). Because

6 Fields does not appeal the timeliness of his trial as related to his

August 2nd UMDDA request.

14
the county court properly nullified the UMMDA request filed by

Fields’ wife, the trial court properly concluded that this request was

void. See People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809, 813 (Colo. App. 2002)

(“Under the law of the case doctrine, prior relevant rulings made in

the same case generally are to be followed.”); People v. Dyer, 2019

COA 161, ¶ 39 (we may affirm on any ground supported by the

record). Accordingly, we discern no error.

B. Kidnapping Instruction

¶ 25 Fields next argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of second degree

kidnapping. The prosecution agrees that the instruction was

incorrect but argues that reversal is not required.

¶ 26 Second degree kidnapping requires that the defendant

knowingly “seizes and carries” a person “from one place to another”

without lawful justification or the person’s consent. § 18-3-302(1),

C.R.S. 2025. Though the elemental instruction correctly listed the

elements, a separate definitional instruction said that “‘[s]eized and

carried’ means any movement, however short in distance.” Between

the time of trial and this appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held

that such an instruction is error. Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6,

15
¶¶ 20-21 (this instruction eliminates the seizure element and

improperly changes the asportation element from carrying a person

from one place to another to “any movement, however short in

distance,” effectively lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof).

¶ 27 Because the error was unpreserved in this case, we reverse

only if it was plain. See Hagos, ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is

both obvious and substantial. Id. An error is substantial if it so

undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious

doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id.

¶ 28 Since our decision in Fields I, the supreme court has made

clear that the obviousness of an error for purposes of plain error

review must be judged at the time the error was made, not at the

time of appellate review. People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 4. At

the time of trial, the law was settled that the definitional instruction

given here was correct. See People v. Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶¶

94-97, overruled by, Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6; People v. Rogers,

220 P.3d 931, 936 (Colo. App. 2008), overruled by, Garcia v. People,

16
2022 CO 6. Accordingly, because the error was not obvious, it was

not plain error.7

C. Victim Impact Evidence

¶ 29 Fields also argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on

the improper admission of victim impact evidence. Specifically, he

challenges J.C.’s testimony that she “never [again] lived” in the

home where she was assaulted and J.C.’s mother’s testimony that

J.C. “would never let [the mother] turn the lights off day or night”

and “would never sleep by herself,” choosing to sleep with her

mother “because she was so scared with the lights on day and

night.”

¶ 30 Fields’ counsel did not object to this testimony at trial, so

again, reversal is not required in the absence of plain error. Hagos,

¶ 14. We are not convinced that the testimony was irrelevant, as it

7 We recognize that we analyzed this issue differently — albeit

reaching the same conclusion — in People v. Fields, slip op. at
¶¶ 13-21 (Colo. App. No. 20CA1708, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Fields I). In that now-vacated opinion, we
concluded that even if the instructional error was obvious, it was
not substantial based on overwhelming evidence, a conclusion to
which we continue to adhere. Id. at ¶¶ 17-21. But People v.
Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, is also now dispositive, and so we apply it
as well.

17
had some tendency to lend credibility to J.C.’s testimony that the

crime happened as she said it did. People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d

110, 113-14 (Colo. 1986) (though state-of-mind evidence is to be

viewed with skepticism, the evidence was not improper because it

“substantiated the credibility of the victim” and was not so

inflammatory or repetitive as to violate CRE 403). But even

assuming that this testimony was improper, reversal is not

required. Both J.C.’s and her mother’s testimony was brief, was not

referenced in closing argument, and “conveyed relatively mundane

information when compared with the graphic evidence otherwise

admitted at trial.” People v. Dean, 2012 COA 106, ¶ 46, aff’d, 2016

CO 14.

D. Applicability of Section 16-13-101(2.5), C.R.S. 1994

¶ 31 Finally, we are not persuaded by Fields’ argument that his life

sentence for sexual assault is illegal. As it did in 1994, the habitual

criminal statute requires life imprisonment for any person who was

convicted and sentenced as a habitual criminal and “who [was]

thereafter convicted of a felony which is a crime of violence.” § 18-

1.3-801(2.5), C.R.S. 2025; § 16-13-101(2.5), C.R.S. 1994. Five days

after the 1994 sexual assault, Fields committed a burglary. He was

18
convicted of burglary and adjudicated a habitual criminal in 1995.

He was convicted of the charges in this case in 2019.

¶ 32 Fields argues that his life sentence is illegal because he

committed the crime of violence (the sexual assault) before he

committed burglary. Put another way, he argues that the burglary

cannot serve as the predicate offense under the habitual criminal

statute because it occurred after the sexual assault.

¶ 33 Despite Fields’ arguments, the statute’s plain language

unambiguously provides that the sequence of convictions — not

commission of the offenses — controls. See McCoy v. People, 2019

CO 44, ¶ 38 (“If the statute is unambiguous, then we need look no

further.”); see also People v. Woodside, 2023 CO 25, ¶ 17 (a

conviction is “prior” even if it is for conduct occurring after a second

offense where the plain language of the applicable statute does not

“contemplate the timing of the underlying conduct”). We therefore

conclude that Fields was properly sentenced.

III. Disposition

¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

19