Parental Resp Conc CDG

25CA0407 Parental Resp Conc CDG 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0407
Summit County District Court No. 22DR29
Honorable Reed W. Owens, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.D.G., a Child,

and Concerning Shannon McDonough Wehner,

Appellee,

and

Stephen Gladstone,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 9, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Stephen Gladstone, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-decree proceeding involving Shannon McDonough

Wehner (mother) and Stephen Gladstone (father), father appeals the

district court’s order restricting his parenting time with C.D.G. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, mother petitioned for an allocation of parental

responsibilities. In 2023, the district court entered permanent

orders granting mother sole decision-making responsibilities and

establishing a step-up parenting plan for father. The step-up plan

required him to, among other things, participate in individual

therapy and engage in family therapy with the child.

¶3 In 2024, the district court entered an order placing any

overnight parenting time “on . . . hold until the therapeutic

components can be resumed or replaced appropriately” (the 2024

order). Father appealed.

¶4 While the 2024 appeal was pending, the child’s legal

representative moved to further restrict father’s parenting time

pursuant to section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025. After a

contested hearing, the district court granted the motion in part (the

2025 order).

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¶5 Because the 2025 order rendered any issues relating to the

2024 order moot, a division of this court dismissed the 2024

appeal. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning C.D.G., (Colo.

App. No. 24CA1792, April 21, 2025) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)); see People in Interest of Yeager, 93 P.3d 589, 592

(Colo. App. 2004) (an appellate court will decline to render an

opinion on the merits of an appeal when the judgment on appeal

becomes moot because of subsequent events or orders).

¶6 Father now appeals the 2025 order.

II. The Scope of this Appeal

¶7 Father represents himself on appeal. Doing so can be difficult,

which is why “we liberally construe his filings while applying the

same law and procedural rules applicable to a party represented by

counsel.” Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we

seek to effectuate the substance, rather than the form, of his

briefing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. However, we will not

rewrite his arguments or act as an advocate on his behalf. Johnson

v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.

¶8 Therefore at the outset we address what is — and what is not

— properly before us.

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¶9 The only order properly before us is the 2025 order restricting

father’s parenting time. That order prevents father from having

“contact or communication” with the child outside of a therapeutic

setting and requires him to participate in family therapy separately

from the child as recommended by the family therapist until certain

conditions are met. We will address father’s contentions related to

the 2025 hearing regarding (1) the standard of proof used by the

district court; (2) record support for the restriction of his parenting

time; and (3) evidentiary issues.

¶ 10 However, any other orders that father seeks to challenge are

not properly before us. See In re Marriage of Roosa, 89 P.3d 524,

529 (Colo. App. 2004) (We will not engage in a “[p]iecemeal review of

orders and judgments that do not fully resolve an issue or claim.”);

see also C.A.R. 1(a) (explaining that our jurisdiction is limited to a

review of final, appealable judgments or orders). Old judgments

that were not timely appealed have become final and binding on the

parties and can no longer be addressed. See Karr v. Williams, 50

P.3d 910, 912 (Colo. 2002). Therefore, we will not address father’s

claims regarding (1) a “motion to dismiss for malicious prosecution”

that the district court denied in 2022; (2) the appointment of the

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child’s legal representative, which he reports is pending in separate

litigation; or (3) the “over forty motions” filed by father during the

course of the case.

¶ 11 Nor can we consider father’s broad assertions and conclusory

arguments that lack legal or factual support. See In re Marriage of

Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to

consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any

meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see also Vallagio at

Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO

69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court will “decline to assume the mantle”

when parties offer no supporting arguments for their claims).

Therefore, we cannot address father’s general and undeveloped

claims of “collusive conduct,” “coordinated efforts,” “fraud on the

court,” due process violations, retaliation, and surveillance.

¶ 12 Finally, we may not address father’s requests to appoint his

preferred reunification therapist, reinstate his parenting time, and

address his concerns with the child’s legal representative. “The

purpose of an appellate court is to review judgments, not to make

them for the trial court.” In re Org. of N. Chaffee Cnty. Fire Prot.

Dist., 544 P.2d 637, 638 (Colo. 1975).

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¶ 13 We turn now to father’s challenges to the 2025 order

restricting his parenting time.

III. Restriction of Father’s Parenting Time

A. Standard of Proof

¶ 14 Citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), father contends that the district court

erred by employing a preponderance of the evidence standard

instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. However,

father’s reliance on Troxel and Santosky is misplaced. In Troxel, the

Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard when a

nonparent is seeking visitation over a fit parent’s objection. Troxel,

530 U.S. at 69-70. In Santosky, the Court considered the correct

standard when a state actor seeks to terminate parental rights.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70. But here, there was no outside party

seeking visitation with the child, and father’s parental rights were

not terminated.

¶ 15 Instead, the order restricting father’s parenting time was a

custody determination between two parents. With such a

determination, preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate

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standard of proof. People in Interest of A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632, 635-36

(Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 16 Therefore, the court did not err in this regard.

B. Evidentiary Matters

¶ 17 Father next contends that the district court erred by relying on

hearsay, excluding evidence, and ignoring recommendations from

his therapist. We discern no error.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 18 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Leaf

v. Beihoffer, 2014 COA 117, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion when

its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 19 To be properly admitted, evidence presented to the district

court must be relevant and reliable. Evidence is relevant if it has

“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401. A

threshold issue for reliability is identification and authentication.

Authentication is “a condition precedent to admissibility [and] is

satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter

in question is what its proponent claims.” CRE 901(a).

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2. Analysis

¶ 20 Father first claims that the district court erroneously “relied

heavily on unverified statements” from the child’s therapist. But

the child’s therapist did not testify at the 2025 hearing and was not

mentioned in the 2025 order restricting father’s parenting time. We

therefore reject this claim.

¶ 21 Next, father claims that the district court “excluded critical

evidence, including direct media that refuted claims by the mother

and therapists.” As best as we can tell, father’s claim relates to a

folder with documents that he handed to the court and a recording

that he attempted to play during the hearing. As the court

explained then, “just because you handed this to [the judge] does

not mean that these are admitted exhibits.” Before a court can

consider exhibits, the person offering the exhibit must follow the

rules of evidence, including requirements that each exhibit be

disclosed to the other parties, identified and authenticated, and

shown to be relevant to the issue before the court. CRE 401; CRE

901; C.R.C.P. 16.2(h). Pro se parties are subject “to the same rules,

procedures, and substantive law applicable to a licensed attorney.”

People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Colo. 1985). Thus, it was

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not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny father’s request to

admit exhibits that he brought to the hearing but did not properly

identify or authenticate or that the court deemed irrelevant.

¶ 22 However, the district court did admit the exhibits that father

laid a proper foundation for, including a report from the child’s

school, photos of the child during father’s parenting time, and a

film of father and the child together. Father described the film,

which was played in open court, as “the most important thing” he

brought.

¶ 23 Finally, father claims that the district court ignored

statements made by his individual therapist. Father did not call

this therapist as a witness at the hearing. However, the court

accepted into evidence a written report by the therapist dated before

the motion to restrict father’s parenting time was filed. Absent any

evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court considered and

weighed this evidence along with the other evidence properly

admitted during the hearing. See In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d

499, 503-04 (Colo. 1989) (appellate court may presume that the

district court considered evidence presented, even if the district

court’s order does not expressly say that it did so). However, when

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considering evidence, a court is not required to adopt or credit that

evidence. In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App.

2007) (The court “can believe all, part, or none of a witness's

testimony, even if uncontroverted, and [the court]’s resolution of

conflicting evidence is binding on review.”).

¶ 24 We therefore discern no error.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 25 Father also contends that there was no compelling evidence to

justify the restriction of his parenting time because there was no

finding that he was an unfit parent. We note that a court is not

required to make a finding of unfitness before restricting parenting

time. § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) (requiring a finding that parenting time

“would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair

the child’s emotional development”). Nevertheless, we will construe

his claims broadly as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 26 A court may generally modify an order granting or denying

parenting time whenever a modification would serve the child’s best

interests under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. However,

the court may not restrict parenting time unless it finds that the

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parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or

significantly impair their emotional development. § 14-10-

129(1)(b)(I).

¶ 27 As explained above, the court’s findings must be supported by

a preponderance of the evidence. A.R.D., 43 P.3d at 635-36. The

preponderance of the evidence standard allows for some uncertainty

in the determination of dispositive facts. See People in Interest of

A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 634 (Colo. 1982). The preponderance of the

evidence standard requires a fact finder to determine whether the

existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

People in Interest of D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 8. In other words,

preponderance of the evidence means more likely than not.

¶ 28 A district court has “broad discretion when modifying an

existing parenting time order,” and we review the court’s

modification decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of

Barker, 251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010).

2. Analysis

¶ 29 The district court found that father’s actions during family

therapy — including his dysregulation, failure to honor boundaries,

and inability to accept advice from the therapeutic providers —

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created “an emotionally harmful situation” for the child.

Specifically, the court found that there was “significant

dysregulation” for the child “surrounding his parenting time with

father,” which resulted in a significant impairment to the child’s

emotional development.

¶ 30 And, contrary to father’s claims on appeal, the district court

did not enter a “no contact order.” Instead, the court restricted

father’s parenting time to only family therapy conducted in separate

sessions from the child. The court ruled that the restriction on

parenting time would be lifted once father addressed his actions

that were endangering the child through individual work with both

the family therapist and his individual therapist. The court noted

that its order resulted in a significant restriction on parenting time

but found that “these steps are necessary under the specific

circumstances of this case” because family therapy together had

been “completely unproductive” and they had been trying to

support the child’s relationship with father “for years now [with a]

lack of progress.”

¶ 31 The record supports these findings. The school counselor and

school administrative assistant described the child acting fearful,

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anxious, and “severely withdrawn” on days that father’s parenting

time was scheduled. The school counselor testified that she had

safety concerns for the child based on his behavior on those days.

¶ 32 The family therapist described the last family therapy session,

where the child arrived “very dysregulated” and verbalized

repeatedly that he was scared, did not want to be there, and did not

want to see his father. The therapist testified that it took thirty

minutes and “quite a bit of therapeutic intervention” to get the child

to agree to participate in family therapy with father.

¶ 33 Although the session went well for some period after father

joined, things devolved after the therapist attempted a therapeutic

intervention. Father became frustrated and dysregulated, and he

disregarded the boundaries he and the therapist had set before the

session started. The therapist testified that father’s actions

adversely affected the child.

¶ 34 The therapist, an expert in family counseling and general

psychology, explained that a child’s dysregulation or trauma

response is not always marked by “screaming and crying.” The

therapist recommended they separate family therapy until father

could demonstrate the ability to be appropriate in session with the

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child. The therapist opined that the child’s emotional development

would be significantly endangered if parenting time continued in

the way that it had, and that it was not in the child’s best interests

to continue family therapy with father in the room.

¶ 35 In light of this evidence, we discern no abuse of the court’s

discretion in restricting father’s parenting time. Although father’s

testimony contradicted the accounts given by the other witnesses,

we cannot reweigh the evidence. See In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to determine witness

credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the

evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

therefrom).

IV. Disposition

¶ 36 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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