Peo v. Sanchez

24CA0922 Peo v Sanchez 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0922
Jefferson County District Court No. 17CR688
Honorable Philip J. McNulty, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Frank Junior Sanchez,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 9, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Frank Junior Sanchez, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Frank Junior Sanchez, appeals the district court’s

order summarily denying his postconviction motion and his request

for appointment of postconviction counsel. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2017, Sanchez and a friend went to Calvin

Huner’s house to buy three pounds of marijuana from him. After

Sanchez arrived at the house, Huner borrowed Sanchez’s car to

pick up the marijuana. When Huner came back, he parked

Sanchez’s car in front of the house. Huner was followed home by

Branden Sanchez1 and four or five other people. Branden parked

his car on the side of Huner’s house, which was on a corner lot.

¶3 Huner, Branden, and Sanchez went inside the house to

complete the transaction. Instead of paying Huner, however,

Sanchez threatened him with a gun, grabbed the marijuana, and

left the house through the garage. After Sanchez left, Huner and

Branden ran out the front door and jumped off the side of the patio

to go to Branden’s car. As Huner was running toward the car, he

was shot in the back.

1 We refer to Branden Sanchez by his first name to avoid confusion,

and we mean no disrespect by doing so.

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¶4 At trial, Sanchez’s theory of defense was that the police

investigation was incomplete, and it was unclear who fired the gun

that shot Huner. The jury found Sanchez guilty of attempted

second degree murder, first degree assault, three counts of

aggravated robbery, and two counts of felony menacing. The

district court imposed a controlling sentence of twenty-eight years

in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶5 On direct appeal, a division of this court affirmed Sanchez’s

convictions. People v. Sanchez, (Colo. App. No. 19CA0920, Aug. 12,

2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The mandate

issued on January 10, 2022.

¶6 In 2023, Sanchez timely filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Sanchez claimed that Huner

testified at trial that he had been shot in the back while pursuing

Sanchez with the intent to rob Sanchez. Sanchez argued that

because counsel failed to adequately investigate the “logistical

improbability” of Sanchez shooting Huner in the back while Huner

was chasing him, he was deprived of “a defense more likely to

prevail.” Sanchez also asserted that counsel failed to cross-examine

Huner about how Huner could have been shot in the back by

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Sanchez while pursuing Sanchez. Sanchez also requested the

appointment of postconviction counsel.

¶7 The district court denied the motion without a hearing,

reasoning that (1) Sanchez’s arguments were contradicted by the

record; and (2) he failed to allege, with specificity, what further

investigation or cross-examination would have revealed or how it

would have undermined his convictions. Sanchez appeals.

II. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶8 We review de novo a postconviction court’s denial of a Crim. P.

35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

¶9 A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Crim. P.

35(c) motion when it alleges facts that, if true, would entitle the

defendant to relief. People v. Simpson, 69 P.3d 79, 81 (Colo. 2003).

A postconviction court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a

hearing when the defendant’s allegations are bare and conclusory;

the allegations do not warrant postconviction relief, even if true; the

claims raise only an issue of law; or the record directly refutes the

defendant’s allegations. People v. Venzor, 121 P.3d 260, 262 (Colo.

App. 2005).

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¶ 10 When a pro se defendant files a Crim. P. 35(c) motion that

includes a request for counsel, the trial court has two options:

First, it may conclude, based on its review of
the motion, the record, and the file, that none
of the claims has arguable merit, in which case
it must deny the motion in its entirety without
further action by entering written findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Second, it may
conclude, based on its review of the motion,
the record, and the file, that at least one claim
has arguable merit, in which case it must
grant the request for postconviction counsel
and forward a complete copy of the motion to
the prosecution and the [Office of the Public
Defender].

People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶ 7.

¶ 11 We broadly construe pleadings filed by unrepresented litigants

“to ensure that they are not denied review of important issues

because of their inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer.”

Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But we will not rewrite an

unrepresented litigant’s pleadings or act as their advocate. Cali,

¶ 34. And we will not consider issues that were not raised before

the postconviction court in a motion for postconviction relief. Id.;

see DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not

raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief

will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”).

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III. The District Court Did Not Err by Summarily Denying
Sanchez’s Postconviction Motion

¶ 12 Sanchez contends that the district court erred by denying his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without conducting a

hearing. We disagree.

¶ 13 Both the United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.

U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. To succeed

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell

below the minimum standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment;

and (2) the defendant was prejudiced, in that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984); Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054,

1063 (Colo. 2007). “Only where both the performance prong and

the prejudice prong have been proven will a defendant be entitled to

postconviction relief because of the ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1063.

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¶ 14 Sanchez’s arguments are premised on his assertion that

Huner admitted he was chasing after Sanchez to rob him when

Huner was shot in the back. But as the district court concluded,

the record contradicts this assertion.

¶ 15 Instead, Huner testified that, after Sanchez fled through the

garage, Huner ran out the front door, “jumped over the patio,” and

ran across the grass to Branden’s car, which was parked on the

street on the side of Huner’s house, to “figure out the next move.”

Huner also said that the last place he saw Sanchez’s car was where

he had parked it in front of the house. Although Huner was not

sure if the car had moved, the police later found a bullet casing in

that area, and Huner said the sound of the gunshot came from

behind him, where Sanchez’s car had been parked. Huner also

testified that although “[t]here was, like, an idea out there that

[Sanchez] should have got robbed,” Huner “didn’t want that to

happen” and never attempted to rob Sanchez.

¶ 16 True, Huner did not dispute defense counsel’s phrasing on

cross-examination that he “chased after [Sanchez],” but Huner

never said that he ran toward Sanchez. Some of the individuals

who had been waiting outside during the transaction also testified

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that Huner was running away from the house toward Branden’s car

when he was shot. And the only person who was seen with a gun

was Sanchez.

¶ 17 We conclude, as did the district court, that the record

contradicts Sanchez’s assertion that Huner’s testimony created a

“logistical improbability” that Sanchez shot Huner in the back.

Consequently, Sanchez failed to set forth facts that, if true,

demonstrated that counsel performed deficiently by not pursuing

that defense. See Simpson, 69 P.3d at 81; Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262.

¶ 18 Sanchez’s postconviction motion also failed to allege what

additional investigation counsel should have undertaken — namely,

what “facts” that investigation would have revealed or how further

cross-examination of Huner would have altered the outcome of the

case. Sanchez’s vague and conclusory assertion that counsel

should have investigated the “facts,” without more, did not justify a

hearing on his motion. See Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262 (“[I]f the claims

are bare and conclusory in nature, and lack supporting factual

allegations, the motion may also be denied without a hearing.”).

¶ 19 On appeal, Sanchez raises several arguments for the first time,

including that counsel were ineffective because they (1) had a

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conflict of interest; (2) presented a defense that admitted guilt on at

least one charge; (3) failed to investigate Huner’s medical records,

which Sanchez asserts would have shown that Huner had been

shot in the front and that he had opiates and THC in his system;

(4) failed to cross-examine the emergency room doctor who treated

Huner about whether Huner was shot in the front or back; and

(5) failed to meet with a witness who had exculpatory evidence.

Because Sanchez did not raise these claims in his Crim. P. 35(c)

motion, we decline to address them. See Cali, ¶ 34; DePineda, 915

P.2d at 1280.

¶ 20 We also reject Sanchez’s contention that the district court

should have given him an opportunity to amend his postconviction

motion before denying it. Sanchez cites Reynoldson v. Schillinger,

907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990), and Murray v. Archambo, 132

F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998), but these cases do not apply

because they are civil cases analyzing the right to amend a

complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The People argue that the

only instance in which a court should allow an amendment to a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion is to give a defendant the opportunity to

substantially comply with “Form 4,” which is a standard form for

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postconviction relief included in the appendix to the Colorado Rules

of Criminal Procedure. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(II); Crim. P. Form 4;

see also People v. Stanley, 169 P.3d 258, 260 (Colo. App. 2007)

(explaining that a trial court should return the defendant’s Crim. P.

35(c) motion with a blank Form 4 if the motion fails to substantially

comply). Those circumstances are not present here either.

Sanchez does not cite, and we are not aware of, any other authority

that entitles him to cure deficiencies in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion.

¶ 21 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by

denying Sanchez’s postconviction motion without conducting a

hearing. See Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262.

IV. The District Court Did Not Err by Denying Sanchez’s Request
for Postconviction Counsel

¶ 22 Sanchez contends that the district court erred by denying his

request for postconviction counsel.2 Because the district court

correctly concluded that Sanchez was not entitled to relief on his

Crim. P. 35(c) motion, however, it was not required to appoint

2 We reject Sanchez’s contention that the district court violated

Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.7 by “ignoring” his
request for postconviction counsel because the court necessarily
denied the request for counsel when it summarily denied the Crim.
P. 35(c) motion.

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postconviction counsel. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV); Segura, ¶ 7.

Thus, we perceive no error.

¶ 23 To the extent Sanchez argues that the court should have

appointed him counsel due to his limited cognitive abilities, we do

not address this argument because it was raised for the first time

on appeal. See Cali, ¶ 34; DePineda, 915 P.2d at 1280.

V. Disposition

¶ 24 We affirm the district court’s order denying Sanchez’s

postconviction motion and his request for postconviction counsel.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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