Peo in Interest of SIR

25CA0659 Peo in Interest of SIR 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0659
Logan County District Court No. 24JV30000
Honorable Carl S. McGuire III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.I.R. and J.L., Children,

and Concerning A.L. and B.R.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Alan W. Samber, County Attorney, Jeffrey C. Koy, Special County Attorney,
Catherine Kleindl, Special County Attorney, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant A.L.

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant B.R.
¶1 A.L. (mother) and B.R. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with

S.I.R. and J.L. (the children). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The Logan County Department of Human Services received a

referral that S.I.R. had been born “affected by substance exposure.”

It opened a voluntary case with father and created a safety plan for

the children. The record shows that, at the time the Department

created the safety plan, (1) father lived with the paternal

grandfather, maintained contact with the Department, and

participated in services; (2) the paternal grandfather agreed to notify

the Department about any changes in father’s sobriety or behavior;

and (3) the Department supervised mother’s contact with the

children.

¶3 Four months later, the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect in which it alleged that the safety plan “had

been broken and [the paternal grandfather] had no longer been able

to keep the children safe.” The court granted the Department

temporary custody of the children.

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¶4 The court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected and

adopted treatment plans for the parents. The children’s guardian

ad litem later moved to terminate the parents’ parental rights.

¶5 Eighteen months after the Department became involved with

the children and fourteen months after it filed the petition, the

court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights following a

contested evidentiary hearing.

II. Denial of Continuance

¶6 Father first contends that the court erred by denying his

motion to continue the termination hearing because the

Department allegedly failed to comply with its disclosure and

discovery obligations. We discern no error.

¶7 Adjudication of a motion for continuance is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the requested

continuance will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that

discretion. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1150 (Colo.

App. 2006). In ruling on the motion, the court “should balance the

need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against

the facts underlying the motion, while considering the child’s need

for permanency.” Id.

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¶8 When the expedited permanency planning requirements bind

the juvenile court, as in this case, the court “shall not grant a delay

unless good cause is shown and unless the court finds that the best

interests of the child will be served by granting a delay.”

§ 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025; see also § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2025

(hearing must not be delayed in case involving a child under six

years of age unless good cause is shown).

¶9 In denying father’s request for a continuance, the court found

that the delay resulting from a continuance would not be in the

children’s best interests. Father does not challenge this finding on

appeal. Even assuming that father had good cause for a

continuance, the court still properly denied his request in light of

its finding that a continuance was not in the children’s best

interests. See People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 49, 454

P.3d 375, 383 (affirming the court’s denial of a continuance where

the parent “provided no basis to find that a delay would serve the

child’s best interests”).

¶ 10 In addition, father includes in the continuance section of his

opening brief a two-sentence argument, lacking supporting legal

citations, that “to the extent . . . either counsel or substitute

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counsel failed to properly request discovery, that constituted

deficient performance.” Because father does not develop this

argument, we do not consider it on the merits. See Barnett v. Elite

Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010).

III. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 11 Next, father contends that the court erred by finding that his

treatment plan was appropriate. Father asserts that he preserved

this argument in his counsel’s closing statement at the hearing.

But the citation to the record he provides directs us to an argument

regarding the Department’s alleged failure to make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate father. We do not see any place in the record

where father argued that his treatment plan was not appropriate.

We therefore decline to address this argument on the merits. See

People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 30, 305 P.3d 414, 419

(holding that issues not raised in the juvenile court will not be

considered on appeal).

IV. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 12 Father next contends that the court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him. We

discern no error.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the department of human

services must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and

reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208,

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the

“exercise of diligence and care” for a child who is in out-of-home

placement, and the reasonable efforts standard is satisfied when

services are provided in accordance with section 19-3-208.

§ 19-1-103(114).

¶ 14 The juvenile court must consider whether the department of

human services provided appropriate services to support the

parent’s treatment plan. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911,

915 (Colo. App. 2011). However, a department of human services

has “discretion to prioritize certain services or resources to address

a family’s most pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s

overall completion of the treatment plan.” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33, 512 P.3d 132, 143. “When

reviewing whether active efforts have been made,” the court must be

open to “recognizing that certain services address overlapping

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objectives or serve as a necessary stepping stone to achieving

another objective. . . . [The department’s] efforts must be measured

holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific

treatment plan objectives.” Id. at ¶ 35, 512 P.3d at 143. The

parent is ultimately responsible for using those services to obtain

the assistance the parent needs to comply with the treatment plan.

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 15 “We review the juvenile court’s findings of evidentiary fact —

the raw, historical data underlying the controversy — for clear error

and accept them if they have record support.” People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204. “But we

review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those

facts.” Id. at ¶ 10, 486 P.3d at 1205. The ultimate determination of

whether the Department provided reasonable efforts is a legal

conclusion that we review de novo. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.

¶ 16 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

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B. Analysis

¶ 17 The court found that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate father and to reunify the family. Specifically, the

court found that the Department attempted to assist father in

accessing and using identified services but that father “frustrated

those efforts.” The court further found that father “refused to show

up for [f]amily [e]ngagement [m]eetings, visits, or otherwise

participate” in the case and, “[t]herefore, the [D]epartment ha[d]

exercised reasonable efforts.”

¶ 18 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that, after the Department filed the dependency or neglect petition,

father only communicated with her about or during family time.

Father engaged with the caseworker when she located him in jail,

but he stopped contacting her a few weeks after his release. The

caseworker testified that father did not complete any of his

treatment plan objectives and did not participate in the services for

which she had made referrals; however, at times, he joined in family

time. The caseworker testified that she “would have to be able to be

engaged with [father] in order to continue to help and assist him.

And he was not willing to come in and meet [her], or see [her], or

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answer a phone call or a text message, or attend a [f]amily

[e]ngagement [m]eeting.”

¶ 19 While father now contends that the caseworker should have

done more to engage him and assist him with housing, we are not

persuaded. Father suggests that the caseworker should have

“employed the . . . assistance from law enforcement during the

case” to look for him at the trailer where mother resided. But

nothing in the record suggests that such an effort would have been

reasonable. In any event, it is the parents’ responsibility to engage

in their court-ordered treatment plan. J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

¶ 20 The court therefore properly considered the uncontested

evidence of father’s lack of engagement when it determined that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him. See People

in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 1019, 1022

(holding that a court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment when determining whether a department of

human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent).

¶ 21 Moreover, the Department satisfied the reasonable efforts

standard. It devised a treatment plan for father; provided referrals

for substance abuse treatment, a fatherhood program, sobriety

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monitoring, and parenting education; made bus passes available;

supervised family time; and facilitated placement services for the

children.

¶ 22 Given this evidence, we will not disturb the court’s findings

and legal conclusions on reasonable efforts.

V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 23 Mother and father contend that the court erred by finding

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 24 When considering less drastic alternatives, the court bases its

decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). A juvenile court may

consider and weigh various factors in determining the viability of a

less drastic alternative, including whether (1) a less drastic

alternative is available, People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 356

(Colo. App. 2007), and (2) an alternative option provides the child

with adequate permanency or meets the child’s needs, People in

Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005).

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¶ 25 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be the child’s

best option. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27,

480 P.3d 682, 688. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interest, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32, 480 P.3d at 689.

¶ 26 When the juvenile court considers the availability of a less

drastic alternative and still determines that termination of the

parent’s rights would be in the child’s best interests, we must affirm

the court’s decision if the record supports its findings. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80, 488 P.3d 1026, 1042.

B. Analysis

¶ 27 The court found “[t]here is no less drastic alternative to

termination of the parent-child legal relationships which would

meet the physical, emotional, and mental health needs of the

children.” Further, the court found that termination was in the

children’s best interests.

¶ 28 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that, when mother and father attended family time, there was not

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much interaction between S.I.R. and mother or between J.L. and

father. Mother and father stopped coming to family time nine

months before the termination hearing. Father briefly reengaged in

family time without mother; he last saw the children five months

before the hearing. Further, the caseworker testified that neither

parent understood the children’s developmental needs.

¶ 29 Because the dependency or neglect case opened when S.I.R.

was just four months old, the court was required to facilitate

permanency for the children “as expeditiously as possible.”

§ 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025

(explaining that expedited permanency planning provisions apply

when at least one of the children was less than six years old when

the petition was filed).

¶ 30 Mother and father separately contend that the Department did

not do enough, frequently enough, to identify all relatives who

might have been willing to accept an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) for the children. A “department must

evaluate a reasonable number of persons suggested to it as possible

placements.” People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo.

App. 2004). But we are not aware of, and neither parent directs us

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to, any requirement that a department of human services explore

“all” family options, as mother and father contend. In any event,

even if the Department identified a family member willing to accept

an APR, the court could properly determine that such an

arrangement would not adequately meet the needs of the children.

See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910 (holding that a child’s permanent

placement with a relative may not be a viable alternative if it does

not provide adequate permanence or otherwise meet the child’s

needs); D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532 (concluding that a proposed

placement is not a less drastic alternative to termination if the

placement provider lacks appreciation of a child’s needs and

conditions); see also A.M., ¶ 31, 480 P.3d at 689 (“Primary

consideration of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs requires more than a mere assessment of

adequacy in order to satisfy the overall intent of the Children’s

Code.”).

¶ 31 Because the court found, with record support, that no

alternative short of termination would meet the children’s needs,

whether someone might have been able to serve as the children’s

placement provider was immaterial. We therefore discern no error

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in the court’s finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to

termination.

VI. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 32 Mother also contends that the court erred by determining that

she could not become fit within a reasonable time. Specifically,

mother argues that, “had the case remained open, [she] could have

continued to build a relationship with her children and made efforts

to address her sobriety, thereby becoming a fit parent.” We are not

convinced.

¶ 33 “In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the court may consider

whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24, 524 P.3d 1209, 1216.

¶ 34 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and must

be determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of each child. Id. at ¶ 25, 524 P.3d at 1216.

A “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And because the

expedited permanency planning provisions applied, the court

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needed to place the children in a permanent home. See

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 35 The court found that mother was unfit and unlikely to change

within a reasonable time and that she had neglected and “wholly

abandoned” the children. Moreover, the court found that mother

failed to attend family time without good cause and exhibited the

same problems with substance dependence that led the Department

to file the case. And the court took judicial notice of a prior case in

which a court adjudicated another one of mother’s children

dependent or neglected.

¶ 36 The record supports these findings. The uncontested evidence

established that mother did not make progress on any of her

treatment plan’s objectives. The caseworker testified that, for the

first six months of the case, mother only had contact with the

Department during family time. Mother subsequently did not

maintain contact with the Department, complete an alcohol or drug

evaluation, or participate in any of the services the Department

offered. The caseworker testified that, despite her efforts to engage

with mother, at the time of the termination hearing, mother had not

seen the children for nine months. Moreover, mother did not

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appear at the hearing and had not been in contact with the

Department for at least three months.

¶ 37 Nothing in the record supports mother’s contention that she

would have reengaged if the Department had given her more time to

become a fit parent. We therefore discern no error in the court’s

finding that mother could not become fit within a reasonable time.

VII. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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