Peo v. Robledo-Valdez

24CA0090 Peo v Robledo-Valdez 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0090
Jefferson County District Court No. 16CR535
Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Craig Sebastian Robledo-Valdez,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Craig Sebastian Robledo-Valdez, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Craig Sebastian Robledo-Valdez, appeals the

postconviction court’s order denying zhis Crim. P. 35(c) motion for

postconviction relief.1 We affirm, albeit on different grounds.

I. Background

¶2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Robledo-Valdez pleaded guilty

to two counts of stalking, see § 18-3-602(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, and

received stipulated, consecutive four-year sentences in the custody

of the Department of Corrections (DOC) on each count. Before

sentencing, zhe moved to withdraw zhis guilty plea pursuant to

Crim. P. 32(d), based in part on alleged discovery violations. The

trial court denied the motion and imposed the stipulated, aggregate

eight-year DOC sentence. A division of this court affirmed the order

denying Robledo-Valdez’s motion to withdraw zhis guilty plea. See

People v. Robledo-Valdez, (Colo. App. No. 17CA1828, Apr. 30, 2020)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶3 In December 2020, Robledo-Valdez filed a motion that was

designated as a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” under

Crim. P. 35(a) but that asserted constitutional challenges to zhis

1 Robledo-Valdez uses the pronouns zhe/zhim.

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sentence under Crim. P. 35(c), which the postconviction court

summarily denied. In March 2021, zhe filed a motion to

supplement zhis Crim. P. 35 claims, which the court denied. And

in May 2021, Robledo-Valdez filed a “Petition for Rehearing” of zhis

Crim. P. 35 claims, which the court denied. Robledo-Valdez

appealed this last order, and a division of this court affirmed it. See

People v. Robledo-Valdez, slip op. at ¶ 17 (Colo. App. No. 21CA1218,

Oct. 13, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). In doing

so, the division concluded that the arguments in the Petition for

Rehearing were cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) and that the court

was required to deny them as successive because they could have

been asserted in Robledo-Valdez’s December 2020 or March 2021

motions. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11, 13-15; see also People v. Knoeppchen,

2019 COA 34, ¶ 6 (“[T]he substantive issues raised in a motion,

rather than the label placed on such motion, . . . determine how the

matter should be characterized.”), overruled on other grounds by,

People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 47 n.16.

¶4 In October 2023, Robledo-Valdez filed another Crim. P. 35(c)

motion, in which zhe asserted numerous challenges to zhis

conviction. Among other things, zhe argued zhe was entitled to the

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retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). In

Counterman, the Supreme Court held that, in a criminal

prosecution premised on communications of true threats of

violence, “[t]he State must show that the defendant consciously

disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be

viewed as threatening violence.” Id. at 69, 72-73.

¶5 In a lengthy order, the postconviction court denied the motion

without a hearing. The court denied most of the claims as

successive because they either had been previously raised and

resolved or they could have been raised in prior appellate or

postconviction proceedings. As to Robledo-Valdez’s Counterman

claim, the court determined that zhe was not entitled to retroactive

application of Counterman because zhis conviction was final before

the Supreme Court decided Counterman.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 We review de novo a court’s denial without a hearing of a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief. People v. Cali,

2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

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¶7 To be entitled to a hearing, a defendant must assert facts that,

if true, would provide a basis for relief. White v. Denv. Dist. Ct.,

766 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo. 1988). A Crim. P. 35(c) motion may be

denied without an evidentiary hearing only where the motion, files,

and record clearly establish that the defendant’s allegations are

without merit and do not warrant relief. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d

73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

III. Constitutional Challenge

¶8 Robledo-Valdez reasserts that zhe was entitled to retroactive

application of the new rule of constitutional law announced in

Counterman and that zhis stalking conviction is consequently

unconstitutional. We decline to address this contention, however,

because Robledo-Valdez waived it when zhe pleaded guilty.

¶9 A statute can be unconstitutional either on its face or as it is

applied. People v. Perez-Rodriguez, 2017 COA 77, ¶ 9.

¶ 10 A statute that restricts speech may be struck down as facially

overbroad if it substantially infringes, or has a chilling effect, on

speech protected by the First Amendment. People v. Moreno, 2022

CO 15, ¶¶ 11, 13; People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 12. “Outside the

First Amendment context, a facial challenge alleges that there are

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no circumstances to which a statute can be applied

constitutionally.” People v. Ford, 232 P.3d 260, 263 (Colo. App.

2009).

¶ 11 “By contrast, an as-applied constitutional challenge contends

that a provision is unconstitutional under the specific

circumstances in which a party has acted or is planning to act.”

People v. Hernandez, 2025 CO 13, ¶ 14.

¶ 12 When a defendant enters a guilty plea, they waive important

constitutional rights. Medina v. People, 2023 CO 46, ¶ 17.

Specifically, “[a] valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all

nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that

constitutional rights have been violated.” People v. Butler, 251 P.3d

519, 520 (Colo. App. 2010). But there are exceptions to this waiver.

Ford, 232 P.3d at 261-62.

¶ 13 The entry of a guilty plea waives a defendant’s ability to assert

an “as-applied” challenge to the constitutionality of the statute

defining the offense to which they pleaded guilty. People v. Gardner,

250 P.3d 1262, 1268 (Colo. App. 2010); Ford, 232 P.3d at 262-63.

However, the entry of a guilty plea does not waive a “facial”

challenge to such statute. Ford, 232 P.3d at 262.

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¶ 14 Robledo-Valdez maintains that Counterman struck down the

provision of the Colorado stalking statute pursuant to which zhe

pleaded guilty as facially unconstitutional and that all stalking

convictions pursuant to that provision are consequently infirm. We

are not convinced.

¶ 15 We read nothing in Counterman as striking down any

provision of the Colorado stalking statute. See People v. Crawford,

2025 CO 22, ¶ 1 (In Counterman, “the U.S. Supreme Court

interpreted a provision of Colorado’s stalking statute.”). Instead,

the Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision of the

statute as it was applied to the defendant in a true-threats case.

See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 72 (“The first dispute here is about

whether the First Amendment nonetheless demands that the State

in a true-threats case prove that the defendant was aware in some

way of the threatening nature of his communications.”); id. at 72

n.2 (“The question in this case arises when the

defendant . . . understands the content of the words, but may not

grasp that others would find them threatening. Must he do so,

under the First Amendment, for a true-threats prosecution to

succeed?”); id. at 82 (the defendant’s stalking conviction violated

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the First Amendment because, in its prosecution, the State “did not

have to show any awareness on his part that [his] statements could

be understood” as threats); see also Hernandez, ¶ 14 (“[I]n as-

applied constitutional challenges, the issue is whether certain

actions are unconstitutional applications of the law, not whether a

statute should be ‘declared unconstitutional’ in all of its possible

applications.”).

¶ 16 Thus, Counterman involved an as-applied constitutional

challenge to the Colorado stalking statute. See People v.

Counterman, 2021 COA 97, ¶¶ 1-2, 15, 23, 34, 53, 59 (the

defendant’s claim was an “as-applied” constitutional challenge),

vacated, 600 U.S. at 83; State v. Labbe, 2024 ME 15, ¶ 48,

314 A.3d 162, 178 (rejecting the defendant’s facial challenge to

Maine’s stalking statute because “Counterman did not hold that . . .

the Colorado stalking statute was facially unconstitutional; it was

an as-applied challenge based on the specific facts in, and posture

of, that case”); cf. Hernandez, ¶¶ 1, 3, 6 (concluding that the

supreme court lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order

dismissing a criminal complaint in partial reliance on Counterman

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because the dismissal was based on as-applied constitutional

grounds, which must first be filed with the court of appeals).

¶ 17 Accordingly, by pleading guilty, Robledo-Valdez waived zhis

ability to assert any as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of

the statute defining the stalking offense to which zhe pleaded guilty.

¶ 18 To the extent Robledo-Valdez is asserting a facial challenge to

the stalking statute that is independent of Counterman, we decline

to address that argument because it was not sufficiently developed,

see People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24, and it could have been

raised in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding, see

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII).

IV. Remaining Claims

¶ 19 Robledo-Valdez additionally argues that, in executing a search

warrant, the police violated zhis constitutional right against

unreasonable searches and seizures. We decline to address this

issue because it could have been raised in zhis direct appeal or a

prior postconviction proceeding, see Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII), and

because zhe waived the issue when zhe pleaded guilty. See Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal

defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that [they are] in

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fact guilty of the offense with which [they are] charged, [they] may

not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation

of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.”); Butler, 251 P.3d at 520 (“A guilty plea waives a defendant’s

right to challenge [their] plea on the basis of an illegal search and

seizure.”).

¶ 20 Robledo-Valdez further asserts that the prosecution committed

discovery violations that affected the validity of zhis guilty plea. We

also decline to consider this issue because it was raised in zhis

Crim. P. 32(d) motion and was resolved in zhis direct appeal. See

People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 758 (Colo. 1999) (“The [law of the

case] doctrine provides that prior relevant rulings made in the same

case are to be followed unless such application would result in error

or unless the ruling is no longer sound due to changed

conditions.”); People v. Robbins, 87 P.3d 120, 122 (Colo. App. 2003)

(“The pronouncement of an appellate court on an issue becomes the

law of the case and is binding in subsequent appeals involving the

same case.”), aff’d, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005); see also

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) (a claim generally must be denied if it was

raised and resolved in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding).

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To the extent the underlying discovery violation claim differs from

the one raised in zhis Crim. P. 32(d) motion, the claim was

nevertheless required to be denied because it could have been

asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII).

¶ 21 Lastly, we decline to address any claim mentioned in Robledo-

Valdez’s opening brief that was not sufficiently argued or developed.

See Houser, ¶ 24. And any claim raised in Robledo-Valdez’s motion

that was not reasserted on appeal is abandoned. See People v.

Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo. App. 2010); see also C.A.R. 57

(“Incorporation by reference of briefs previously filed in the lower

court is prohibited.”); People v. Gutierrez-Vite, 2014 COA 159, ¶ 28

(declining to address incorporated arguments).

V. Disposition

¶ 22 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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