Regalado v. ICAO

25CA1302 Regalado v ICAO 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1302
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 3012-2025

Jessie Regalado,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Jessie Regalado, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent
¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, claimant, Jessie

Regalado, seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (Panel). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s

decision disqualifying Regalado from receiving benefits based on his

job separation from Ash Group, LLC (Ash Group). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Regalado worked as a marketing analyst at Ash Group from

March 2023 until September 2024. During that time, Ash Group

contracted Regalado to work for one of its clients, Xcel Energy

(Xcel). Regalado’s initial contract with Xcel was for seven months.

Approximately a week before the contract’s expiration, Xcel notified

Ash Group that it would renew Regalado’s contract for another year,

making the new expiration date September 24, 2024.

¶3 Approximately two months before the new expiration date,

Regalado asked his Xcel supervisor if his contract would be renewed

again. The supervisor told Regalado that she had requested a

contract renewal but did not know if the request would be

approved. Around the same time, Regalado started looking for

other jobs.

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¶4 On September 3 or 4, 2024, Regalado accepted a new job and

submitted his resignation notice to Ash Group. About a week later,

Xcel renewed Regalado’s contract. Although Regalado learned that

his Xcel contract had been renewed, he still chose to leave Ash

Group.

¶5 Regalado then applied for unemployment benefits, but a

deputy for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division)

denied his application. Regalado appealed the deputy’s decision,

and a Division hearing officer held an evidentiary hearing to

determine why Regalado had been discharged and whether that

reason disqualified him from receiving benefits under the Colorado

Employment Security Act.

¶6 After considering the evidence, the hearing officer found that

Regalado voluntarily quit his job at Ash Group after accepting a

new job. Consequently, the hearing officer concluded that Regalado

was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 8-73-

108(5)(e)(V), C.R.S. 2025 (quitting to seek other work or accept

other employment). The Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s factual

findings and legal conclusions.

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II. Discussion

¶7 Regalado contends that he did not quit his job at Ash Group to

seek or accept other employment. Instead, he claims that he quit

because he reasonably believed that his termination from Ash

Group was imminent — a circumstance that he claims “align[ed]

more closely with [section] 8-73-108(4), C.R.S. than with a

disqualifying voluntary job switch under [section] 8-73-

108(5)(e)(V).”1 Accordingly, he asserts that the hearing officer and

the Panel erroneously assessed the evidence and applied the law.

We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel

acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was

procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support the

decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-

107(6), C.R.S. 2025.

1 Regalado cites section 8-73-108(4), C.R.S. 2025, in his brief, but

he fails to identify any specific subsection that would support his
claim to benefits, and we perceive none. We therefore focus our
analysis on the Panel’s application of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V),
C.R.S. 2025.

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¶9 As trier of fact, it is the hearing officer’s responsibility to weigh

the evidence, assess credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence,

and determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom. Hoskins v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2014 COA 47, ¶ 10. Like the Panel, we

may not reweigh the evidence presented or disturb the credibility

determinations made by the hearing officer. Id. We are bound by

the hearing officer’s findings of fact if they are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. § 8-74-107(4); Mesa Cnty. Pub.

Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17. However,

we review de novo ultimate conclusions of fact and ultimate legal

conclusions. Simon v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2023 COA 74, ¶

19.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 A claimant’s entitlement to benefits is determined by the

reason for his separation from employment. Id. at ¶ 20. To

ascertain the reason for separation, “the trier of fact must evaluate

the totality of the evidence and determine the motivating factors in

the employee’s separation and then determine whether, based upon

those factors, [the] claimant is entitled to, or disqualified from, the

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receipt of benefits.” Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d

97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989).

¶ 11 A worker can receive benefits only if he is unemployed through

no fault of his own. § 8-73-108(1)(a); see Bara v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 2023 COA 19, ¶ 11. For purposes of the

unemployment statutes, fault does not require culpability; rather, it

requires “some volitional act” by the employee or that he “exercised

some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from

employment.” Cath. Health Initiatives Colo. v. Indus. Claim Appeals

Off., 2021 COA 48, ¶ 13 (quoting Gonzales v. Indus. Comm’n, 740

P.2d 999, 1003 (Colo. 1987)). Whether a claimant is at fault for a

separation from employment must be determined “on a case-by-

case basis, with due consideration given to the totality of the

circumstances in each particular situation.” Morris v. City &

County of Denver, 843 P.2d 76, 79 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 12 As relevant here, an individual is at fault for a separation from

employment, and thus disqualified from receiving unemployment

benefits, if the separation occurred based on “[q]uitting to seek

other work[] or quitting to accept other employment.” § 8-73-

108(5)(e)(V). However, an employee is not at fault for a separation if

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he quit based on a reasonable belief that termination was

imminent. Goddard v. E G & G Rocky Flats, Inc., 888 P.2d 369, 371

(Colo. App. 1994). In such instances, the employee’s choice is not

considered voluntary, and the employee is entitled to

unemployment benefits. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 13 The hearing officer found that, in early September 2024,

Regalado submitted his resignation to Ash Group after accepting a

new job that offered double the pay and better benefits than his job

at Ash Group. The officer found that even after Regalado learned

that his contract at Ash Group had been renewed for another year,

he still took the new job because of “the lack of stability with the

[Ash Group] job and the increase in pay and benefits.”

¶ 14 Moreover, the hearing officer found that at the time Regalado

resigned, he did not have any information indicating that his

contract would not be renewed. The officer noted that Regalado’s

Xcel supervisor had requested a second renewal, that the contract

had been renewed once before, and that the prior renewal happened

shortly before the contract’s expiration, which was similar to the

timing of the second renewal. Based on those findings, the officer

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concluded that Regalado did not have an objectively reasonable

belief that his termination was imminent. Accordingly, the officer

concluded that Regalado’s resignation was voluntary and that he

was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 8-73-

108(5)(e)(V).

¶ 15 The record contains substantial evidence supporting the

hearing officer’s findings. Regalado testified that he started looking

for another job because he was uncertain if his contract with Xcel

would be renewed. He said he then accepted a new job before his

contract’s expiration date. He testified that after he gave his

resignation notice to Ash Group, he found out that his contract had

been renewed. At that point, he “weigh[ed]” the two jobs but chose

to leave Ash Group because he would be make more money at the

new job and “wanted to ensure stable income.” When asked about

the specific reason he left Ash Group, Regalado said, “Due to the

lack of renewal notice, I quit from accepting another job offer.”

¶ 16 Ash Group’s director of operations testified that the contract

renewal process with Xcel is complicated and “can take a while.”

She said that Xcel had not approved Ash Group’s prior request to

renew Regalado’s contract until the week the contract was set to

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expire. She also testified that when Regalado gave his resignation

notice, the second contract renewal request was pending with Xcel,

and Ash Group did not know if it was going to be approved. And

she said that when Regalado resigned, he told her it was because he

found another job.

¶ 17 Regalado argues that the hearing officer erred by focusing on

the fact that he accepted a new job instead of focusing on the

reason he felt forced to look for a new job in the first place. He

asserts that he only started looking for a new job because he had no

assurance that his contract would be renewed in the month leading

up to the contract’s expiration date, and thus, he reasonably

believed that his termination was imminent. Based on that

assertion, he argues that he was entitled to unemployment benefits

because he was not at fault for the separation.

¶ 18 However, whether an employee reasonably believed that

termination was imminent is a factual question that involves

weighing the evidence, which is within the hearing officer’s

discretion. See, e.g., Goddard, 888 P.2d at 371-72 (analyzing

whether the facts of the case showed that the claimant had a

reasonable belief that termination was imminent); see also Hoskins,

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¶ 10 (it is the hearing officer’s responsibility to weigh the evidence

and determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom). To that end,

the hearing officer expressly “considered that the claimant was

concerned that his contract had not been renewed.” Nonetheless,

as noted above, the hearing officer found that Regalado’s belief that

termination was imminent was not objectively reasonable because

the evidence showed that nobody told Regalado that his contract

would not be renewed and that Regalado’s prior contract renewal

occurred only a week before it was set to expire. Because the

hearing officer’s finding was based on a reasonable inference drawn

from the evidence, we are bound by it. See Hoskins, ¶ 10 (we

cannot reweigh the evidence); see also Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim

Appeals Off., 2013 COA 124, ¶ 10 (“We do not disturb findings of a

hearing officer that are supported by substantial evidence or

reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.”).

¶ 19 Based on the foregoing, we discern no basis to set aside the

determination that Regalado was at fault for his job termination

and disqualified from benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(V). See

§ 8-74-107(6).

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III. Disposition

¶ 20 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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