Peo v. Piel

23CA0716 Peo v Piel 09-25-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0716
Weld County District Court No. 21CR1749
Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Clinton William Piel,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 25, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Clinton William Piel, of assault

with a deadly weapon, which he committed against his stepfather,

Mark Nelson. Piel appeals, contending that the trial court

improperly limited his attorney’s cross-examination of a police

officer and erroneously declined to provide the jury his tendered

instruction defining “deadly weapon.” We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Piel lived with his mother and Nelson. One morning, Nelson

asked Piel not to touch the house’s sprinkler system; that evening,

Piel’s mother made the same request. Piel became angry, lashing

out verbally at both his mother and Nelson. After several minutes,

the situation seemed to be de-escalating, and Nelson thought he

saw Piel move to get a cup of coffee. Instead, Piel stabbed Nelson in

his right upper arm with a steak knife.1

¶3 By all accounts, Piel did not attempt to stab his mother or

attempt to stab Nelson again. Piel’s mother and Nelson went to the

hospital to treat the injury. Nelson’s wound required four staples.

1 The steak knife had plastic grips riveted to metal and a metal

blade exceeding four inches in length.

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Piel was arrested and charged with attempted murder, a class 3

felony, and second degree assault, a class 4 felony.

¶4 At trial, the prosecution called Officer David Driscoll, who

responded to the incident and interviewed both Nelson and medical

personnel at the hospital. During cross-examination of Driscoll,

Piel’s attorney read aloud the legal definition of serious bodily injury

while framing a question. The prosecutor objected on relevancy

grounds because Piel was not charged with inflicting serious bodily

injury and because the question called for Driscoll to provide an

improper legal opinion based on hearsay. The court sustained the

objection and did not permit Driscoll to provide any opinion

testimony about the legal definition of serious bodily injury or

whether the medical personnel who treated Nelson found evidence

thereof.

¶5 Before the court finalized the jury instructions, Piel’s counsel

requested a theory of defense instruction that contained the

following explanation of how and when a knife could be considered

a deadly weapon:

Knives are not automatically deadly weapons,
and are only considered deadly weapons if the
specific way they are used or intended to be

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used in a particular incident is capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury.

(Emphasis added.); see § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (defining

deadly weapon, as relevant here, to include “[a] knife, bludgeon, or

any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance,

whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or

intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily

injury”); COLJI-Crim. F:88 (2024) (tracking this statutory language).

¶6 When the court declined to provide this language, Piel’s

counsel requested the court modify the deadly weapon instruction

to include the “in a particular incident” language. Piel’s counsel

argued that this phrase was necessary to avoid any jury confusion

and possible misinterpretation regarding whether the definition’s

“use or intended use” language referred specially to Piel’s charged

conduct or to the knife’s general intended use. The court declined

to include the language Piel’s counsel requested, concluding that

the following instruction was sufficiently clear:

“DEADLY WEAPON” means any of the following
in which the manner it is used or intended to
be used is capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury.

a. A knife;

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b. A bludgeon; or

c. Any other weapon device, instrument,
material, or substance, whether animate or
inanimate.

¶7 After deliberations, the jury acquitted Piel of the attempted

murder charge and convicted him of second degree assault with a

deadly weapon. The court sentenced him to eight years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Analysis

¶8 Piel raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial

court erred by not permitting his attorney to cross-examine Officer

Driscoll regarding whether Nelson’s injury amounted to serious

bodily injury. Second, Piel contends the trial court should have

instructed the jury that a deadly weapon is defined by “the manner

in which it is used or intended to be used in a particular incident,”

rather than the statutory definition of a deadly weapon that

contains a more general use clause. See § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II).

¶9 We address each contention in turn.

A. Cross-Examination of Officer Driscoll

¶ 10 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Meils, 2019 COA 180, ¶ 11. A trial court

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abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misapprehension or

misapplication of the law. Id.

¶ 11 During counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Driscoll, the

following exchange occurred:

Q: And as the officer at the hospital, one of
your duties was to investigate whether there
was serious bodily injury?

A: Correct.

Q: And in investigating that, you were
referencing the legal definition in Colorado of
serious bodily injury, correct?

A: Correct. And as . . . to what the doctors see
and observed . . . and would testify to, yes.

Q: Right. So what the doctors thought about
whether it met that legal definition for serious
bodily injury, right?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. An injury counts as serious bodily
injury if it involves a substantial risk of death,
a substantial risk of serious permanent
disfigurement?

¶ 12 At that point, the prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s

asking Driscoll either questions pertaining to whether Nelson’s

wound was a serious bodily injury or questions that required

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Driscoll to opine on or apply the legal definition of serious bodily

injury because that would call for Driscoll to give a legal conclusion.

In response, Piel’s counsel noted that Piel was charged with assault

with a deadly weapon, and whether serious bodily injury occurred

was “relevant to many issues.” On appeal, Piel clarifies this

argument thusly: To qualify as a “deadly weapon,” a weapon must

be “capable of producing death or serious bodily injury” in the way

the defendant used it. § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II). Therefore, to

demonstrate that the prosecution could not meet its burden in

proving the knife was a deadly weapon, Piel sought to show that

Nelson’s wound was not a serious bodily injury through Driscoll’s

testimony of what he saw and was told, or not told, by treating

medical staff at the hospital.

¶ 13 At the end of the bench conference, the following exchange

occurred:

COURT: I’m not going to allow [Driscoll] to
give an answer about whether or not [the] legal
definition [of serious bodily injury] has been
met.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Then I would just ask
[Driscoll] whether he obtained any evidence
that there was serious bodily injury in the
course of his investigation.

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PROSECUTION: And Your Honor, I would
continue to object.

COURT: I’m going to sustain the objection if
you’re using that [phrase], and particularly
how you’ve started to ask it. Again, using it
and calling it a legal definition. You can ask
[Driscoll] questions about whether [Nelson]
had to be admitted to the hospital . . . and
what type of treatment [he received] . . . .

¶ 14 Piel’s argument requires us to consider two aspects of the trial

court’s ruling: whether the trial court erred by precluding questions

about whether Nelson’s wound met the legal definition of serious

bodily injury, and whether any inquiry about serious bodily injury

was irrelevant because Piel was not charged with inflicting serious

bodily injury. We address both in turn.

¶ 15 A lay witness cannot testify as to “whether a particular legal

standard has or has not been met.” People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82,

¶ 32. Therefore, a “question that elicits . . . opinion testimony must

be phrased to ask for a factual, rather than a legal opinion.” Id.

(quoting People v. Beilke, 232 P.3d 146, 152 (Colo. App. 2009)). The

question posed by Piel’s counsel clearly sought to elicit Driscoll’s

opinion on whether the legal definition of serious bodily injury was

established in this case because counsel quoted the definition of

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that term in his question. For this reason, we perceive no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s decision to prohibit the questions that

sought Driscoll’s opinion on whether or not Nelson’s injury met the

legal definition of serious bodily injury.

¶ 16 We now turn to Piel’s argument that the trial court abused its

discretion in determining that any question about serious bodily

injury was irrelevant. Piel argues that determining whether

Nelson’s wound was a serious bodily injury ties directly to whether

the knife was a deadly weapon.

¶ 17 When assessing whether an object is a deadly weapon, we

“evaluat[e] the manner in which the object[] [was] used.” People v.

Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo. 2002); see People v. Buell, 2017

COA 148, ¶ 33 (“[D]etermining whether a knife is a deadly weapon

involves a two-step inquiry: (1) did the defendant intend to use the

knife as a weapon; and if so, (2) was the knife capable of producing

serious bodily injury?”), aff’d, 2019 CO 27. Piel specifically argues

that we should decline to follow Buell, which held that “a reasonable

jury could not have concluded that [a four- to five-inch] knife was

anything other than a deadly weapon.” Buell, ¶ 36. Instead, he

argues that the extent of Nelson’s injuries — and particularly the

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absence of a serious bodily injury finding — suggests that the steak

knife was not used as a deadly weapon.

¶ 18 However, Piel’s logic is flawed: While the presence of a serious

bodily injury could indicate that a deadly weapon was used, it does

not necessarily follow that the lack of serious bodily injury indicates

that a deadly weapon was not used. See id. at ¶ 35 (“[W]hether an

object is a deadly weapon does not depend upon the ultimate result

of an object’s use.” (quoting Saleh, 45 P.3d at 1275)). So we need

not decide whether a knife of this size is always a deadly weapon

because Piel’s intent in using the knife coupled with the size of the

blade made it clear that the knife was capable of producing serious

bodily injury. Therefore, we perceive no error in the trial court’s

determination that the presence or absence of serious bodily injury

was irrelevant.

B. Deadly Weapon Jury Instruction

1. Standard of Review

¶ 19 “A trial court must accurately instruct the jury concerning the

controlling law.” People v. Melara, 2025 COA 48, ¶ 16. “We review

jury instructions de novo to determine whether they accurately

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inform the jury of the governing law.” McDonald v. People, 2021 CO

64, ¶ 54 (quoting Hoggard v. People, 2020 CO 54, ¶ 12).

¶ 20 “Jury instructions framed in the language of a statute are

generally considered adequate and proper.” People v. Manyik, 2016

COA 42, ¶ 77. Some model jury instructions, however, require

specific tailoring to each case when the instructions, taken as a

whole, do not adequately apprise the jury of the law from the

defendant’s standpoint — for example, self-defense. See Idrogo v.

People, 818 P.2d 752, 754 (Colo. 1991). We review a trial court’s

“decision whether to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse

of discretion.” Melara, ¶ 16.

2. Analysis

¶ 21 Piel argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury

that a deadly weapon is defined by “the manner in which it is used

or intended to be used in a particular incident.” Piel argues that the

exclusion of his requested “in a particular incident” language could

have confused the jury. Specifically, he contends that the jury may

have interpreted the statutory phrase to refer to the “use or

intended use” of a steak knife in a general sense, rather than to

Piel’s use or intended use of the knife.

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¶ 22 Piel’s argument relies on the proposition that both the

prosecution and a division of this court in People v. Montez, 280

P.3d 9 (Colo. App. 2010), rev’d, 2012 CO 6, concluded that the

definition of deadly weapon could be interpreted to apply to more

instances than just the charged conduct. Therefore, his argument

continues, if both the People and a division of this court could

interpret the definition so broadly, a reasonable juror could do the

same. However, Piel’s argument fails for multiple reasons.

¶ 23 First, the division in Montez did not expressly address or

conclude that the definition of a deadly weapon could be interpreted

to apply to the manufacturer’s intended use of a weapon, as

opposed to the defendant’s intended use; rather, the division held

there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the

defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. Montez, 280 P.3d at

12-13. True, the supreme court reversed the defendant’s conviction

because the prosecution had argued to the jury that the definition

of deadly weapon could be satisfied if the weapon was used as

intended by the manufacturer rather than the defendant. Montez,

¶ 3 (“We hold that the term ‘intended to be used’ in the deadly

weapon definition of section 18–1–901(3)(e) refers to the

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defendant’s, not the manufacturer’s intent.”). But this was an issue

that the division had not expressly addressed.

¶ 24 In addition to these legal distinctions, Montez is clearly

distinguishable factually. Piel’s crime did not involve a gun.

Rather, it was committed with a steak knife. The manufacturer’s

intended use of a steak knife is to cut food. Thus, even if we

assume that the instruction could create ambiguity in some

contexts, we perceive no likelihood that the jury would have been

misled into thinking that it should focus on the manufacturer’s

intended use of the steak knife rather than Piel’s intended use when

stabbing Nelson.

¶ 25 Moreover, the instructions must be read as a whole, rather

than in isolation. Riley v. People, 266 P.3d 1089, 1092-93 (Colo.

2011) (“We consider all of the instructions given by the trial court

together to determine whether they properly informed the jury.”).

Read together, and in context, it is clear that the jury was

instructed to focus on Piel’s conduct and intent, on the night in

question, when he stabbed Nelson. We perceive no reasonable

basis by which the jury could have been misled into thinking that it

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should analyze the use or intended use of the steak knife from

anyone’s perspective other than Piel’s.

¶ 26 Finally, the jury instruction provided by the court was

consistent with both the model jury instruction and the relevant

statute. See COLJI-Crim. F:88 (2024); § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II). And

there is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury was confused

by the instructions or sought clarification. Thus, we perceive no

error.

C. Cumulative Error

¶ 27 “[C]umulative error is based on the concept that multiple

errors, in isolation, may be viewed as harmless, but the synergistic

effect of the multiple errors may be greater than [their] sum” and

are therefore “so prejudicial that they deprive a defendant of a fair

trial.” People v. Grudznske, 2023 COA 36, ¶ 80. Because we

perceive no error with either of the trial court’s determinations

raised on appeal, we do not find any cumulative error. See id. at

¶ 81.

III. Disposition

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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