Parental Resp Conc KSS

24CA1601 Parental Resp Conc KSS 09-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1601
Adams County District Court No. 11DR2710
Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge
Honorable Phelicia Kossie, Magistrate

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning K.S.S., a Child,

and Concerning Suzanne S. Galan,

Appellant,

and

Christopher A. Smith,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Lum and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 11, 2025

Suzanne S. Galan, Pro Se

Everson & Memic Law, LLP, Jasmina Memic, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Christopher Smith (father) filed a motion against Suzanne

Galan (mother) concerning disputes over parenting time for K.S.S.

(the child). After a magistrate granted the motion, mother

petitioned the district court for review of the order, which it denied.

Mother appeals the district court’s order, and we affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 In 2012, the court granted mother sole parenting time and

decision-making for the child. Because of father’s criminal history

and an active protection order between father and mother, the court

imposed conditions that father had to meet before he could ask for

parenting time with the child. Father moved to modify the

parenting time order in 2021.

¶3 In 2023, after finding that father had complied with the initial

conditions, a magistrate granted father’s request for unsupervised

parenting time in three phases (the 2023 order). As relevant here,

the third phase allowed father and the child to have unsupervised

parenting time every other weekend, from after school on Friday

until the beginning of school on Monday. The magistrate ordered

mother to give father the name, address, and telephone number for

1
“the child’s present and future school” so he could pick the child up

from school and drop her off at school once phase three began.

¶4 Mother did not ask the district court to review the 2023 order.

However, when phase three began, she refused to disclose any

information about the child’s school. After a contested hearing,

mother entered a stipulation, adopted as a court order, modifying

father’s parenting time and requiring mother to give father

information about the child’s school by February 2024.

¶5 When mother failed to comply with the stipulation, father filed

a verified motion concerning parenting time disputes. After two

evidentiary hearings, the magistrate found that “there has been a

substantial and continued noncompliance with Court Orders” by

mother. The magistrate entered sanctions in July 2024, granting

father makeup parenting time and fining mother for her failure to

disclose information about the child’s school (the July 2024 order).

Mother petitioned the district court for review of the July 2024

order, which was denied.

II. Mother’s Noncompliance with the Appellate Rules

¶6 Mother represents herself on appeal. Doing so can be difficult,

which is why we liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se parties.

2
See Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. Nonetheless, “pro se

parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as

parties represented by attorneys.” Id.

¶7 These rules include Colorado Appellate Rule 28. This rule

requires, among other things, that an appellant’s opening brief

specifically identify the errors they believe were committed by the

district court and make arguments with citations to the record and

supporting legal authority. C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B).

¶8 Mother’s opening brief is largely noncompliant with C.A.R. 28.

It is not our burden to locate and synthesize the relevant facts,

arguments, and legal authority. Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148

P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (the reviewing court may decline to

review issues where the opening brief fails to identify specific errors

or provide legal authority). Recognizing that mother is representing

herself, we will exercise our discretion to construe mother’s brief

broadly and address the issues we can identify. See O’Quinn v.

Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2010) (the reviewing court may

exercise its discretion to review issues when appellate rules are not

followed). However, we will not consider factual allegations made in

mother’s opening brief that we cannot locate in the appellate record.

3
See McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004)

(reviewing court is bound by the record presented and may consider

only arguments and assertions supported by the evidence in the

record).

III. Mother’s Motion to Modify Parenting Time

¶9 As best we understand it, mother first contends that the

magistrate did not comply with the address confidentiality program

when it ordered her to give father information about the child’s

school. We disagree.

¶ 10 Section 24-30-2101 to -2115, C.R.S. 2025 (the address

confidentiality program) governs the procedure courts must follow

when victims of domestic violence and certain other crimes request

their address be kept confidential. When father asked for parenting

time in 2021, mother notified the court of her participation in the

address confidentially program and objected to giving father

information about the child’s school. The magistrate addressed

mother’s concern when it granted father’s motion for parenting time

in the 2023 order. At that time, the magistrate found that

disclosure of the child’s school information was “required in the

interests of justice and that the potential harm to the program

4
participant is substantially outweighed by the public interest in the

disclosure and that no other alternative would satisfy that

necessity.” The magistrate’s finding used the language required by

the address confidentiality program. See § 24-30-2111, C.R.S.

2025 (explaining when a person can be compelled to disclose

information related to a program participant’s residence, work, or

school).

¶ 11 Judgments not appealed become final and binding on the

parties. See Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910, 912 (Colo. 2002).

Mother did not ask the district court to review the 2023 order. See

C.R.M. 7(a) (a party has fourteen days to appeal an order or

judgment entered by a magistrate).

¶ 12 So after the 2023 order, even though mother is a participant

in the address confidentiality program, she nevertheless is required

to give father information about the child’s school so that he could

exercise parenting time with the child. The magistrate’s July 2024

order that mother must comply with the terms of the 2023 order

does not give mother a second chance to appeal those underlying

terms. See In re Marriage of Tognoni, 313 P.3d 655, 658 (Colo. App.

5
2011) (timely appeal from later orders does not bring up the court’s

previous final orders for review).

IV. Mother’s Motion Concerning Parenting Time Disputes and
Mother’s Motion for Reconsideration

¶ 13 As we understand it, mother next contends that the

magistrate did not resolve safety concerns before ordering parenting

time for father. Although mother doesn’t directly refer to the

makeup parenting time ordered in the July 2024 order, she cites

the transcript from that hearing. For that reason, we construe her

argument as a claim that the magistrate erred when she ordered

makeup parenting time for father as a sanction for her refusal to

follow the 2023 order.

¶ 14 We discern no error.

A. Appellate Standard of Review

¶ 15 Our review of a district court’s order reviewing a magistrate’s

order is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we must

accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25; see

C.R.M. 7(a)(9). A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only

if there is no record support for them. Thorburn, ¶ 25. We review

6
the magistrate’s legal conclusions de novo. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.

B. Governing Law

¶ 16 Section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, allows a parent to file a

motion with the court when the other parent is not complying with

a parenting time order or schedule. If, after a hearing, the court

finds that a party has not complied with a parenting time order, it

may, in the best interests of the child, impose remedial orders.

§ 14-10-129.5(1), (2)(b). As relevant here, one remedial order that

the court can enter is for makeup parenting time for the aggrieved

parent and child. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d). Makeup parenting time

must be “of the same type and duration of parenting time as that

which was denied” and must be completed within six months after

the noncompliance happened. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d)(I), (II).

C. Analysis

¶ 17 In her petition for review of the magistrate’s order, mother

referred the district court to the legislative declaration for House Bill

21-1228, which, among other things, directs domestic relations

courts to consider domestic violence and “resolve safety risks . . .

first as a fundamental consideration in determining the best

7
interests of the child before assessing other best interest factors.”

Ch. 292, sec. 1, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 1728.

¶ 18 It is clear from the July 2024 order that the magistrate

considered the child’s safety when ordering makeup parenting time

for the child and father. In response to mother’s concerns, the

magistrate found that “the child is not endangered by contact with

[father] and [father] is not a threat to the child’s physical safety or

her emotional well[-]being.” We presume that the magistrate

considered all the evidence presented during the hearing when

making this finding. See In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 503-

04 (Colo. 1989) (appellate court may presume that the district court

considered evidence presented, even if order does not expressly say

that it did so).

¶ 19 We also presume that the record supports the magistrate’s

findings that the child was safe with father. This is because mother

did not submit a transcript of the hearing to the district court when

she asked for a review of the magistrate’s order. See C.R.M. 7(a)(9)

(“The failure of the petitioner to file a transcript of the proceedings

before the magistrate is not grounds to deny a petition for review

but, under those circumstances, the reviewing judge shall presume

8
that the record would support the magistrate’s order”). Even

though mother provided a transcript on appeal, we may not

consider it. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 14 (our

review of the district court’s order is limited to the record that was

before the district court).

¶ 20 We therefore discern no error in the magistrate’s finding that

the child’s safety and well-being were not at risk during parenting

time with father.

¶ 21 The magistrate found that mother violated the 2023 order by

failing to disclose information about the child’s school and

withholding the child from parenting time with father. Mother does

not challenge these findings. The makeup time ordered was for

unsupervised weekends (the same type and length of the parenting

time that mother withheld) and was ordered to take place on

specific dates (within six months after the noncompliance occurred).

The order therefore complied with the requirements of section 14-

10-129.5.

¶ 22 We therefore discern no error in the magistrate’s order for

makeup parenting time between the child and father.

9
V. Mother’s Other Claims

¶ 23 Mother also asks this court to (1) consider father’s

psychological report, (2) unseal the parental risk assessment, and

(3) order supervised visitation between the child and father.

¶ 24 We may not address these issues. These requests were not

made to — or ruled on by — either the magistrate or the district

court in the July 2024 order that mother is appealing. “The

purpose of an appellate court is to [r]eview judgments, not to make

them for the trial court.” In re Org. of N. Chaffee Cnty. Fire Prot.

Dist., 544 P.2d 637, 638 (Colo. 1975). Instead, our appellate

jurisdiction is limited to review of final judgments or orders made by

the district court. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 11; see

also § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2025 (generally granting jurisdiction to

the court of appeals to hear appeals from “final judgments” made by

district courts); C.A.R. 1(a)(1) (same). As there are no final

judgments or orders addressing these issues, we may not review

them.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

10