Peo in Interest of CC

25CA0250 Peo in Interest of CC 09-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0250
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30734
Honorable Elizabeth J. McCarthy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.C., a Child,

and Concerning C.F.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 11, 2025

Michiko Ando Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, C.F.C. (father) appeals

the judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with

C.C. (the child). We reverse.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2023, after receiving a report that the child was

born drug-exposed, the Denver County Department of Human

Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the child to

the Department and the child was placed with his maternal cousin,

where he remained throughout the case.

¶3 When the child was born, father was living and working in

Florida. Aside from noting that he lived out of state, none of the

petition’s allegations related to father.

¶4 Father was notified of the proceedings and, in December 2023,

genetic testing confirmed his paternity. The juvenile court

adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted a

treatment plan for father. The treatment plan required father to (1)

consistently spend time with the child to build a relationship and

learn the child’s needs; (2) obtain and maintain a verifiable source

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of income and a suitable home; and (3) cooperate with the

Department.

¶5 Father returned to Colorado in May 2024. Less than four

months later, the Department asked the court to set a termination

hearing1 and later filed a motion to terminate father’s parental

rights. The court granted the motion after a hearing.

II. Statutory Criteria

¶6 The goal of a dependency and neglect case is to preserve the

parent-child relationship whenever possible. People in Interest of

C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 610 (Colo. 1982). And given that the

termination of a parent-child legal relationship affects a parent’s

fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of the child,

1 The Department’s request to set a termination hearing occurred at

a status hearing in August 2024. In a report prepared for that
August hearing, the caseworker stated that
[father] has been attending in person visits
with [the child] consistently and has been fully
engaged. He brings diapers and food as well
as toys. [Father] and [the child] seem to enjoy
a good relationship and are comfortable with
each other. . . . [Father] currently has visits
twice a week for 2 hours and he has
consistently attended these visits. The family
time supervisor reports he does very well
during visits.

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the state must exercise extreme caution in terminating parental

rights. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). For this

reason, a juvenile court must strictly comply with the statutory

termination criteria. Id.; People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M,

¶ 18.

¶7 A juvenile court may terminate a parent-child legal

relationship if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the

child was adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has

not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan, or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent

is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to

change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

“The burden of proof lies with the party seeking termination.”

People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 8.

III. Analysis

¶8 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding him

unfit. We agree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care. § 19-

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3-604(2); People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App.

2007). Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the

parent provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo.

App. 2006). A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan

generally “demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the

child’s needs” and may be considered in determining unfitness.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. L.M.,

¶ 17. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we

review its legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. S.R.N.J-

S., ¶ 10. Whether the evidence establishes that a parent is unfit is

ultimately a legal conclusion because its resolution requires

application of the evidentiary facts to the termination statute. Id. at

¶ 11.

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B. Fitness

¶ 11 The Department did not allege that father had substance

abuse or mental health issues. He generally cooperated with the

Department, though his relationship with the primary caseworker

deteriorated after father accused the caseworker of making racially

discriminatory comments concerning his status as a Black single

father.2

¶ 12 The juvenile court’s finding of unfitness focused on two main

areas of concern: father’s stability and his ability to parent the child

full-time. We therefore look at each issue in turn to determine if

clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s finding of

unfitness.

2 The court found that the caseworker was not “acting with racial

animus.” We have no reason to question that finding, though we
disagree with the court’s basis for it. The court appeared to rely, at
least in part, on the caseworker’s testimony that she identified as
“half [B]lack.” However, we note that color discrimination can occur
between people of the same race or color. See, e.g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (“[I]t would be unwise to presume
as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will
not discriminate against other members of their group.”).
Well-known studies have confirmed this concept. See, e.g., Simon
Howard & Kalen Kennedy, The “Doll Studies,” Kenneth B. Clark and
Mamie P. Clark, 1947, in Essays in Developmental Psychology 54
(Charles Golden ed., 2025), https://perma.cc/FPZ6-QJB3.

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1. Stability

¶ 13 The juvenile court found that, at the time of the termination

hearing, father had appropriate and stable housing with a dedicated

space for the child. This finding was supported by the evidence.

¶ 14 Both the caseworker and the family time supervisor testified

that they did not have concerns regarding father’s home. And the

court admitted photographs of father’s home into evidence, which

reflected that he had a dedicated space for the child including a

toddler bed and age-appropriate toys.

¶ 15 Despite this evidence, the court expressed concern that it took

father the length of the case to obtain his own housing, stating

“[o]nly now, in the last month, does [father] have stable housing.”

In so finding, the court noted that father (1) was working in Florida

when the case began; (2) did not return to Colorado until eight

months after the petition was filed; and (3) upon his return to

Colorado, lived with roommates and refused to provide their

identifying information to the caseworker. The Department and

GAL argue that the evidence supports these findings and that the

findings prove that father was unfit.

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¶ 16 True, when the case began, father was working as a plumber

in Florida and did not return to Colorado until eight months after

the petition was filed. But, for approximately the first three

months, father was awaiting genetic testing to confirm paternity.

Once paternity was established, he completed his work

commitments in Florida, sold some property to obtain necessary

funds to relocate, and returned to Colorado. According to the

caseworker’s reports, while father was in Florida, he had regular

contact with the Department, the child, and the child’s placement

provider. Father returned to Colorado within two months of the

adoption of the treatment plan. The court did not explain why this

chronology proved that father was unfit — i.e., that father was

unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care for the child.

¶ 17 Once in Colorado, father promptly began renting a room in a

home with several roommates. A temporary caseworker visited the

residence and “felt it was appropriate safety-wise,” but father

acknowledged that his roommates would not pass background

checks, so he chose to exercise his visits in the community while he

worked to find a suitable residence for the child. Father remained

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there until he obtained his own residence, with a year-long lease,

two months before the hearing.

¶ 18 The record shows that father had housing since moving to

Colorado. At the time of the hearing, father had a stable and

appropriate residence for the child. He also had social security

income and continued to work as a plumber. There was no

evidence presented that father could not meet the child’s financial

or housing needs. Thus, we cannot conclude that, simply because

it took father several months to establish appropriate housing for

the child, this proved by clear and convincing evidence that father

was unfit. See id. at ¶ 46 (holding that the juvenile court erred by

discounting evidence of a parent’s safe and stable residence based

on evidence of past housing struggles).

2. Ability to Parent the Child

¶ 19 The juvenile court also found that father had “not shown any

ability . . . to be a full-time parent to [the child].” As noted, when

the case began father resided out-of-state and had virtual visits

with the child. The court found, with record support, that father

generally ended the visits early. However, at that time, the child

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was an infant, and the juvenile court acknowledged that the child

was unlikely to engage via video for a full hour.3

¶ 20 Once father relocated to Colorado in May 2024, he actively and

consistently engaged in in-person family time. See id. at ¶ 25

(finding that the father’s lack of visits with the children during the

first year the case was open because he lived in Mexico did not

render him unfit, as he consistently attended visits upon relocation

to Colorado). Indeed, the caseworker testified that during the eight-

month period between his return to Colorado and the termination

hearing, father missed a total of four of his twice-weekly visits —

3 In her May 2024 report to the court, the caseworker stated that

father
has attended virtual visits with [the child]
regularly; however, given [the child’s] age it has
been very hard to engage and interact with
him through a screen. [Father] has been
reported to communicate with [the child] and
ask his caregiver about how he has been
doing. [Father] has been very proactive about
getting visits set up and has reached out to
[multiple] different people when he had an
interruption in visits to get those rescheduled.

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two due to medical procedures and two due to illness.4 (The

caseworker nonetheless characterized father’s visitation as “[v]ery

spotty” and “intermittent.” She faulted him for not scheduling his

medical procedures around his visitation schedule and for not

coming to visits when he was sick.) Thus, the evidence established

that father attended approximately ninety percent of his family

time. See id. at ¶ 24 (holding that a “few missed visits” were not

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the

parent failed to provide reasonable parental care).

¶ 21 The Department had no concerns about father’s visits with the

child. The evidence was undisputed that father was attentive and

engaged at visits, that he did not need correction from the family

time supervisor, and that he and the child were bonded. The court

4 This testimony was consistent with the caseworker’s additional

testimony that “a handful of times,” father either canceled a visit or
ended the visit early, although during that part of her testimony,
the caseworker said that father had, in addition to canceling visits
for medical appointments, also canceled or ended a visit early due
to work obligations. The family time supervisor testified that she
had no concerns about the number of visits that father missed and
nothing in the record otherwise shows that the few missed visits for
medical or work reasons affected father’s ability to meet the child’s
needs.

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noted that the family time supervisor “was impressed by [father’s]

parenting skills.”

¶ 22 Despite this evidence, the juvenile court found father to be

unfit because he (1) previously expressed interest in terminating his

rights; (2) was still only exercising supervised family time, and

(3) had not shown an ability to parent full-time.

¶ 23 During his testimony, father acknowledged that about six

months before the termination hearing, he had expressed concern

about his ability to care for the child because he was undergoing

testing for a serious medical condition that had also afflicted his

mother. But the test result was negative, and father testified that

he did not have health problems that would impact his ability to

care for the child. And father expressed his desire to parent the

child.

¶ 24 As for family time, the record shows that the Department

either disregarded, or delayed implementation of, the family time

supervisor’s recommendations.

¶ 25 The caseworker initially testified that there was “no

recommendation for [father] to have monitored or unsupervised

time.” That turned out to be false. The family time supervisor’s

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reports showed that beginning in September 2024 — and in every

monthly report thereafter — the supervisor recommended

decreasing the level of supervision. When confronted with the

reports at the termination hearing, the caseworker admitted that

she did not recall the recommendations but then insisted she had

discussed the recommendations with others, just not with father or

his lawyer or during any regularly scheduled team meeting. The

caseworker agreed that the family time supervisor was “the person

in this whole case who’s had the most contact with” father and the

child, and that she relied on the supervisor’s recommendations

about visitation. Still, the caseworker did not explain why the

Department did not follow the supervisor’s repeated

recommendation to decrease the supervision level at visits.

¶ 26 The caseworker also testified that “there was an opportunity

for [father] to expand his visits” and that “he chose not to.” That

also turned out to be wrong. When father began in-person

visitation in May 2024, the Department allowed two-hour visits

twice a week. Almost immediately, the family time supervisor

recommended increasing family time. Father (through his lawyer)

followed up with his own request for additional time. The

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Department did not approve expanded visits until October 2024, a

few months before the termination hearing. Visitation was

increased from four hours a week to six hours a week.

¶ 27 The court’s conclusion that father was unfit was based in large

part on its finding that father “is still having supervised parenting

time” and that the child needed a “full-time parent, not a parent for

six hours a week.” But the record demonstrates that any lack of

progress on that front was attributable to the Department. And,

maybe more importantly, there was no evidence that father could

not safely parent the child for more than six hours per week.

¶ 28 The primary caseworker who testified at the hearing had never

attended a visit between father and the child. The temporary

caseworker attended only one. The family time supervisor was

present at all of father’s visits from June 2024 through December —

approximately fifty, according to the evidence.

¶ 29 In her September 2024 report to the Department, the family

time supervisor reported that

[father] continues to be prepared with supplies
for his son and engages with baby the entire
parenting time. Continued follow through for
parenting expectations and care of a young
child. [Father] is always prepared with food

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and drink for baby. [Father] sends home
books to placement for [the child] and his big
sister. [Father] consistently interacts and
engages with son during scheduled visits.

¶ 30 The family time supervisor’s December “record of contact”

detailed father’s engagement with the child during the visit and

stated that “[father] continues to be prepared and ready for [family

time].” The only challenges listed were “[c]ommunicating with

[p]lacement and scheduling make up time.”

¶ 31 At the termination hearing, the family time supervisor

confirmed that “there [had] [n]ever been a time . . . where [she was]

concerned about the interaction with [the child] and [father]” or a

time “where [father] d[id] not attend to [the child’s] needs.” She

explained that the child “knows when he’s with [father] that [father]

will meet his needs and care for him and provide what [the child]

needs.”

¶ 32 The family time supervisor’s observations were not disputed.

The caseworker generically opined that father was not “able to have

[the child] full-time, unsupervised,” but she testified that her

opinion was based entirely on her (mistaken) belief that there was

never a “recommendation for [father] to have monitored or

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unsupervised [family] time.” In that way, the caseworker conceded

that she was basing her opinion on the family time supervisor’s

assessment of father’s parenting abilities — she was just mistaken

about the supervisor’s assessment.

¶ 33 The uncontested evidence showed that father could provide

appropriate care for the child during all of the parenting time

allotted to him. The juvenile court, though, appeared to expect

father to prove his ability to care for the child full-time, rather than

requiring the Department to prove that, notwithstanding his

success at family time, father was unable or unwilling to provide

appropriate care on a full-time basis. In other words, the court

improperly shifted the burden to father to show fitness, rather than

requiring the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he was unfit. See id. at ¶ 8; see also People in Interest of S.N-

V., 300 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App. 2011) (“The constitutional and

statutory due process requirements for a termination hearing place

no duty on a respondent parent.”). True, as the Department and

GAL assert, a parent is required to use the services provided by the

Department to comply with his or her treatment plan. People in

Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). But, as

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discussed above, father engaged in the family time provided to build

a relationship with the child and learn his needs — the key

component of father’s treatment plan.

¶ 34 At the hearing, the Department and GAL argued that father

should have demanded expanded family time with lower

supervision, presumably so that he could have demonstrated his

ability to parent the child for longer periods. To the extent the

juvenile court adopted that view, it erred. It is not the parent’s

responsibility to demand appropriate family time. The Department,

not the parent, has the obligation to review the family time

supervisor’s reports and implement the recommendations if

appropriate in order to ensure the parent’s progress toward

reunification with the child. See § 19-3-208(2), C.R.S. 2025

(detailing the services the Department must provide as determined

by individual case planning, including family time, with the goal of

“speedy reunification of parents with . . . their children” in mind).

¶ 35 That leaves the Department and GAL’s argument that the

court’s unfitness determination is supported by evidence that father

failed to take an eight-hour parenting class or to prove that he had

a support system to help him care for the child.

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¶ 36 Father did not complete the class as required by his treatment

plan. However, the caseworker acknowledged that the family time

supervisor never raised any concerns about father’s parenting

ability or his need for a parenting class. Additionally, father has a

grown daughter who, at the time of the termination hearing, was

preparing to take the bar exam to become a licensed attorney.

Thus, father did not feel the class was needed, but he testified that

he would be willing to complete the class if necessary for the safety

of the child. While the juvenile court initially found that the lack of

completion of this one-hour, six-to-eight-week class was not

“conclusive” or “essential,” the court later focused on this as an

example of father’s failure to comply with his treatment plan. Due

to the limited scope of the class, the other evidence of father’s

parenting abilities, and the inconsistent nature of the juvenile

court’s findings, we cannot agree that father’s failure to complete

the class proves by clear and convincing evidence that he was unfit.

¶ 37 The Department and GAL also assert that father lacked a

support system because he was estranged from his older daughter

(she was angry upon learning that father had a second child), did

not provide the Department information about his fiancée, was

17
initially reluctant to involve other family members in the case, and

did not know the name of the neighbor whom he planned to hire as

a babysitter. But the record demonstrates that, at the time of the

hearing, father and his older daughter had reconciled, two of his

nephews testified and expressed their support for him and

willingness to assist with childcare, and he was able to provide the

name of his proposed babysitter (a neighbor who had cared for her

grandchild) during his testimony.

¶ 38 At the termination hearing, the Department’s counsel

encouraged the court to terminate father’s parental rights because

“he doesn’t really have a solid plan for taking care of [the child] for

the next 17 years.” We wonder what sort of seventeen-year plan

counsel thought father should have presented to the court to prove

his fitness. And we are troubled by the Department and the court’s

focus on the fact that father’s job might sometimes require him to

leave the child with family members or a babysitter. As another

division has aptly pointed out, “[M]ost (perhaps all) working parents

face [work-related] scheduling conflicts at one time or another.

Grappling with such conflicts doesn’t, on its own, make them legally

unfit.” S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 28.

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¶ 39 At any rate, the Department and GAL do not point us to any

authority requiring a parent to establish an outside support system

before they can be found fit, and we are not aware of any.

C. Harmless Error

¶ 40 While the Department and GAL encourage us to find any error

to be harmless, they develop no such argument. We therefore

decline to address this issue further. See People in Interest of D.B-

J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an

appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific

argument, or supporting authorities).

D. Conclusion

¶ 41 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the juvenile court

erred by (1) determining that the Department proved by clear and

convincing evidence that father was unfit; and (2) shifting the

burden to father to prove his fitness. (We do not hold that father

was or was not a fit parent, only that the court erred by concluding

that the Department met its burden to prove father’s unfitness.)

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IV. Disposition

¶ 42 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

juvenile court.5

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

5 Because we have concluded that the juvenile court erred with

respect to its determination of unfitness, we need not address
father’s other contention that the juvenile court erred by finding
that he could not become fit within a reasonable time.

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