Marriage of Alnouri

24CA1758 Marriage of Alnouri 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1758
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR1001
Honorable Frank A. Moschetti, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Toka Y. Elgharably,

Appellant,

and

Mohamad Alnouri,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Graham*, and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 4, 2025

The Larson Law Firm, LLC, Olivia J. Larson, Castle Rock, Colorado for
Appellant

Gendelman Klimas Edwards, Ltd., Laurence I. Gendelman, William Erwin,
Denver, Colorado for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 In this divorce proceeding involving Toka Y. Elgharably (wife)

and Mohamad Alnouri (husband), wife appeals the parenting time,

decision-making, child support, and property division portions of

the permanent orders. We reverse the judgment and remand the

case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2021. They have one child, who was

almost one year old when wife filed for divorce in 2023. In an oral

ruling following the permanent orders hearing, the magistrate

adopted husband’s proposed separation agreement and parenting

plan — including a child support determination — into the divorce

decree. Eleven days after the oral ruling, the court adopted

husband’s proposed support order, which contained a new child

support calculation, and proposed written decree, verbatim.

II. Adequacy of the Magistrate’s Permanent Orders

¶3 Wife argues that the permanent orders were inadequate

because, in adopting husband’s proposed orders, the magistrate did

not make findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable the

reviewing court to discern the district court’s rationale. We agree.

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A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶4 “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court

shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of

law thereon . . . .” C.R.C.P. 52. Nevertheless, adoption of one

party’s proposed findings and conclusions is not necessarily

improper and does not warrant reversal unless the findings are

inadequate. Uptime Corp. v. Colo. Research Corp., 420 P.2d 232,

235 (Colo. 1966); see also In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952,

954 (Colo. App. 2009). In People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 90, a

division of this court opined that “the adequacy of a trial court’s

findings, as contrasted with the sufficiency of the evidence to

support them, is tested by whether an appellate court can discern

the lower court’s rationale.”

¶5 We review de novo the adequacy of a court’s ruling. Id. When

the district court adopts proposed findings of fact and conclusions

of law verbatim, the appellate court scrutinizes them more critically

than if they were written by the district court itself. Ficor, Inc. v.

McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982). And we consider the

district court’s bench findings and rulings as a supplement to its

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written order. See Friends of Denver Parks, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of

Denver, 2013 COA 177, ¶¶ 34-37.

B. No Presumption that Magistrate Agreed with Proposed Orders

¶6 In Uptime, the supreme court reasoned that a reviewing court

may assume that a district court judge who adopts a proposed

order verbatim has examined the proposed findings and agreed that

they correctly state the facts. See Uptime, 420 P.2d at 235.

Husband argues that this rationale should apply here. But we

agree with wife that the circumstances of this case do not permit

this assumption.

¶7 At the oral ruling, the magistrate indicated that personal

issues prevented him from being able to “resolve what [was]

outstanding” in the case. The magistrate admitted that he was “not

prepared to enter a final ruling” because he could not “recall the

case specifically” and would not be able to locate his notes.

Nevertheless, the day of the hearing, the magistrate incorporated

husband’s proposed orders regarding property division, parenting

time, decision-making responsibility, and child support into the

decree. And, eleven days later, the court adopted husband’s new

child support order and proposed decree, verbatim.

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¶8 Given the magistrate’s admitted lack of knowledge, we cannot

presume, as the court in Uptime did, that the magistrate’s adoption

of proposed orders indicated his agreement that they correctly

stated the facts and the law.

C. The Magistrate’s Order is Inadequate

1. Parenting Time

¶9 During the permanent orders hearing, the magistrate awarded

equal parenting time to both parties with several conditions. Both

parties were to surrender their passports and file with the court

names of “suitable caretakers” for the child. Until the parties

complied, husband would continue to have parenting time only

twice per week. By the date of the oral ruling, only husband had

fully complied. Without explanation, and without wife’s full

compliance with the previously imposed conditions, the magistrate

adopted husband’s parenting plan, which called for equal parenting

time.

¶ 10 A district court allocates parenting time in accordance with

the child’s best interests by applying the factors in section

14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025, including any report related to

domestic violence or other testimony regarding domestic violence

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from the parties. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5); see also In re Custody of

C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 11 Husband’s proposed order does not address — and indeed

could not have anticipated — the magistrate’s apparent change of

heart regarding the necessity of wife’s full compliance with the

conditions before ordering equal parenting time. And the proposed

order lists no factors, pursuant to section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), that

the magistrate relied on when he determined parenting time. The

order is therefore inadequate.

¶ 12 On remand, the district court should review the parenting time

order, at the very least taking new evidence, or, if the magistrate’s

notes cannot be located, holding a new hearing, and provide

complete findings with regard to both parties’ parenting time and

whether any conditions should be imposed before parenting time is

exercised. See In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App.

1989) (on remand, a court may exercise discretion in determining

whether additional evidence is necessary or whether it may rely on

evidence from the prior hearing).

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2. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 13 Without making any findings, let alone addressing wife’s

testimony that husband refused to communicate with her, the

magistrate ordered shared decision-making between the parties,

consistent with husband’s wishes. A district court must allocate

decision-making responsibility in accordance with the child’s best

interests applying the factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(b), including

credible evidence of the parties’ ability to cooperate and make

decisions jointly. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(I); see also C.J.S., 37 P.3d at

482. Because no record evidence shows that the court considered

these factors, we cannot discern the basis of the magistrate’s

determination regarding decision-making responsibility.

¶ 14 On remand, the court should review its parental

responsibilities determination and, after either taking additional

evidence or, in the event it cannot locate its notes, after a new

hearing, make findings that demonstrate that it considered the

relevant statutorily required factors. Lee, 781 P.2d at 104; see also

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(b).

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3. Child Support

¶ 15 Again without findings of any kind, the magistrate ordered

wife to pay husband $138.43 in monthly child support, with no

retroactive child support owed, as part of husband’s proposed

parenting plan. He did this even though, during the permanent

orders hearing, husband asked the magistrate to deviate from that

amount and relieve wife of any child support obligation. Then,

eleven days after adopting the parenting plan, the court adopted

husband’s proposed support order, which included a new child

support calculation. That proposal included four months of child

support at $276.86 per month — to account for $553.72 in

retroactive support — before monthly payments begin at $138.43.

¶ 16 The record showing the magistrate’s adoption of these various,

inconsistent child support orders does not provide this court with

an adequate basis to determine his rationale. On remand, and after

either taking new evidence or after holding a new hearing if the

magistrate’s notes cannot be located, the district court should

review the child support order, and provide complete findings with

regard to the calculation of child support as well as the existence, if

any, of a retroactive child support amount. Lee, 781 P.2d at 104.

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4. Property Division

¶ 17 At the conclusion of the permanent orders hearing, the

magistrate stated that he had “heard a lot of testimony about [three]

real properties that would fit as marital property. [He] heard no

evaluation of how much they were paid for, how much they were

worth, especially in this market of increasing property values.” The

magistrate allowed the parties time to agree on the division of this

property, but they were unable to do so.

¶ 18 During the oral ruling, the magistrate made no findings

related to the distribution of assets or debts before adopting

husband’s proposed property division. Inexplicably, husband’s

proposed property division did not mention any of the three real

properties.

¶ 19 Moreover, the record — including husband’s proposed orders

— contains no reference to section 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025,

which requires the district court to divide marital property “as [it]

deems just,” and considering all relevant factors. See In re Marriage

of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2009). These factors

include the contributions of each spouse to acquiring the property,

the spouses’ economic circumstances, and any increases or

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decreases in a spouse’s separate property during the marriage or

depletions of separate property for marital purposes.

§ 14-10-113(1)(a), (c), (d).

¶ 20 Given this record — which does not value or allocate the real

properties discussed during the hearing and does not otherwise

refer to, let alone rely on the relevant factors required by statute —

we conclude that the magistrate’s order is woefully inadequate.

¶ 21 On remand, the district court should revisit the property

division to achieve an equitable result, considering all relevant

factors, including those listed in section 14-10-113(1). And while

the court may rely on the evidence presented at the hearing, it

should allow the parties to present new evidence about their

current economic circumstances. See § 14-10-113(1)(c) (a district

court considers the spouses’ economic circumstances at the time

the property division “is to become effective”); In re Marriage of

Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 695 (Colo. 1993) (“[Section] 14-10-113(1)(c)

requires a [district] court to consider the economic circumstances of

the respective spouses at the time any hearing relating to the

division of marital property is held, including a hearing following a

remand for the purpose of dividing the property . . . .”); see also

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Corak, ¶ 21 (district court on remand may take additional evidence

concerning the spouses’ economic circumstances).

¶ 22 A reconsideration of a property determination would usually

necessitate a reconsideration of spousal maintenance. See In re

Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 (maintenance and property

division are interdependent). Here, however, both parties explicitly

waived maintenance, and the court accepted their waivers.

III. Wife’s Additional Claims

¶ 23 Because the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for new findings and orders, we do not reach wife’s claim that her

due process rights were violated when the court proceeded to an

oral ruling without her appearance.

¶ 24 To the extent wife claims that the magistrate committed

judicial misconduct when he made final orders without mother

present and after admitting he was unprepared to do so, we do not

have jurisdiction to review this contention. In re People, 2024 CO

12, ¶ 15 (the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline has

exclusive jurisdiction over investigations of, and decision-making

authority to impose discipline against, judicial officers).

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IV. Disposition

¶ 25 Because the magistrate’s findings and orders are inadequate,

we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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