Peo v. Delafuente

23CA1696 Peo v Delafuente 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1696
Weld County District Court No. 18CR402
Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Catalina Delafuente,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 4, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John P. Finnegan, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Catalina Delafuente, appeals the district court’s

order revoking and reinstating her probation. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2018, Delafuente pleaded guilty to driving under the

influence (fourth or subsequent), a class 4 felony. She was

sentenced to nine months in jail, plus an additional one year in jail

suspended on the successful completion of a three-year probation

term.

¶3 Delafuente had completed her nine-month jail sentence but

was still serving her probation when, in February 2020, her

probation officer filed a probation revocation complaint. The

probation officer alleged that Delafuente had failed to comply with

the following four conditions of her probation:

• Condition No. 6: “I will not use alcohol (to excess) or use

or possess any illegal, dangerous, or abusable drugs or

controlled substances without a prescription . . . .”

• Condition No. 7: “I will submit to drug and alcohol testing

as directed by Probation. . . .”

• Condition No. 8: “I will actively participate in, cooperate

with, and successfully complete any referral, evaluation,

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assessment or recommended program. These programs

may include, but are not limited to: . . . counseling or

treatment for drugs or alcohol . . . .”

• Condition No. 9: “I will report to my probation officer for

appointments, as directed by the Court or the Probation

office. . . .”

¶4 Following a hearing, the district court found that Delafuente

had violated these four conditions of her probation. The court

therefore revoked and reinstated her probation for a two-year term.

The court also ordered ninety days of electronic home monitoring,

allowing Delafuente to leave her home during that time only for her

own treatment or her mother’s medical needs. The court made

clear that its decision to revoke Delafuente’s probation was based

largely on her violation of Condition No. 8, stating that, if only the

violations of Condition Nos. 6, 7, and 9 were at issue, it would have

been unlikely to revoke Delafuente’s probation.

¶5 On appeal, Delafuente contends that her due process rights

were violated because the prosecution didn’t establish that any

failure to comply with Condition No. 8 resulted from her own

willfulness or lack of adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the

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resources needed to comply with that condition, as opposed to

merely resulting from her indigency. And, more broadly, she

contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence

to establish that she violated Condition No. 8 by not “actively

participat[ing] in, cooperat[ing] with, and successfully complet[ing]”

treatment. We reject both contentions.

II. Discussion

¶6 We first set out the relevant legal standards and then turn to

Delafuente’s arguments.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 “Probation is a privilege, not a right.” People v. Howell, 64

P.3d 894, 896 (Colo. App. 2002). Probation may be revoked if a

probationer violates any condition of probation. Id. Where, as here,

probation violations don’t involve the commission of criminal

offenses, the prosecution must establish the violations by a

preponderance of the evidence. See § 16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 2025;

Sharrow v. People, 2019 CO 25, ¶¶ 47-48.

¶8 Whether a probation condition has been violated is a question

of fact for the district court. People v. Fair, 2013 COA 41, ¶ 12.

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Once the court finds a violation, it has discretion to decide whether

to revoke the probationer’s probation. Id.

¶9 Delafuente challenges only the district court’s finding that she

violated the conditions of her probation — not the court’s decision,

after finding the violations, to revoke her probation.

¶ 10 We apply de novo review in assessing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the district court’s finding of a violation of the

conditions of probation. See McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 34.

We consider whether the evidence is sufficient in quality and

quantity to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of establishing a

probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See People

v. Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 908 (Colo. App. 2002); People in Interest of

C.J.W., 727 P.2d 870, 872 (Colo. App. 1986); see also People v.

Ortiz, 2016 COA 58, ¶ 26 (applying this standard to a sufficiency

challenge to a restitution award). In doing so, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See People v. Donald,

2020 CO 24, ¶ 18. If the evidence sufficiently supports a finding of

a violation, “we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court.” Moses, 64 P.3d at 908; accord People v. Trujillo, 539 P.2d

1234, 1236 (Colo. 1975) (declining to disturb a finding of a

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probation violation because the district court that had “heard the

testimony of all the witnesses [wa]s in a far better position to weigh

the evidence than this court on review”). Nor will we disturb a

finding of a violation “merely because there is a conflict in the

evidence.” Howell, 64 P.3d at 897.

¶ 11 Delafuente’s related due process argument presents a question

of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Calderon, 2014 COA

144, ¶ 23.

B. Due Process

¶ 12 First, we reject Delafuente’s argument that the revocation of

her probation violated her due process rights.

¶ 13 Delafuente contends that, because she presented evidence

that she was unable to comply with the conditions of her probation

due to financial difficulties, the prosecution was required to show

that she willfully failed to comply with her probation conditions or

that she failed to make adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the

resources she needed to be able to comply with those conditions.

Her argument is premised on the rule articulated by our supreme

court in Sharrow, ¶ 42:

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[W]hen a probationer defends against an
alleged violation of a nonpayment condition of
probation based on [their] lack of financial
means, the trial court cannot revoke probation
and impose imprisonment without first
determining whether [they] failed to comply
with probation willfully or failed to make
sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources
to comply with probation. If the trial court
finds that the defendant willfully refused to
comply with probation or failed to make
sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources
to do so, it may revoke probation and impose
imprisonment. On the other hand, if the trial
court finds that the defendant could not
comply with probation despite sufficient bona
fide efforts to acquire resources to do so, it
must consider alternatives to imprisonment.
Only if alternate measures are not adequate to
fulfill the State’s sentencing interests,
including in punishment, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and community safety, may the
court imprison an indigent defendant who,
notwithstanding sufficient bona fide efforts to
comply with probation, nevertheless failed to
do so.

(Emphases added) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). Sharrow,

in turn, relied on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in

Bearden v. Georgia, which established a similar rule for the

revocation of probation and imposition of a prison sentence for

failure to pay a fine or restitution. 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).

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¶ 14 But the requirements set forth in Bearden and Sharrow apply

only when a court imposes imprisonment upon revoking probation.

See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672; Sharrow, ¶¶ 6, 42; see also State v.

Bell, 331 P.3d 1062, 1063 (Ore. Ct. App. 2014) (“Bearden

unequivocally does not apply to situations in which a probationer’s

failure to pay fines or restitution results in some sanction less

onerous than imprisonment.”); State v. Pickett, 2015-Ohio-972, ¶ 19

(distinguishing Bearden on the basis that the probationer at issue

wasn’t imprisoned for failing to make required payments).

¶ 15 Here, the district court didn’t impose imprisonment upon

revoking Delafuente’s probation. Rather, it imposed home

detention with ankle monitoring. See People v. Chavez, 122 P.3d

1036, 1038 (Colo. App. 2005) (distinguishing home detention with

electronic monitoring from confinement in a correctional facility,

particularly with regard to the differing restrictions on liberty and

privacy, in the context of presentence confinement credit). Thus,

the prosecution wasn’t required to show that Delafuente willfully

failed to comply with her probation conditions or failed to make

adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the resources she needed to be

able to comply with those conditions.

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C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 16 Having determined that the heightened requirements of

Bearden and Sharrow don’t apply, we also reject Delafuente’s

argument that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to

establish a violation of her probation conditions.

¶ 17 Because the district court based its revocation on its finding

that Delafuente had violated Condition No. 8, our review is limited

to the sufficiency of evidence as to that particular violation. See

People v. Lientz, 2012 COA 118, ¶ 9 (“[W]e cannot affirm the

revocation based on the fact that the record shows that [the]

defendant violated other probation conditions . . . . Rather, we can

only affirm on that basis if ‘the record clearly shows the [district]

court would have reached the same result’ even without considering

the challenged conditions.” (quoting People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408,

416 (Colo. 2010))).

¶ 18 As indicated above, Condition No. 8 required Delafuente to

“actively participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete”

recommended treatment.

¶ 19 The probation revocation complaint, filed in February 2020,

alleged that Delafuente had violated this condition in that she

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hadn’t followed through with the requirements for her alcohol

treatment and had last attended that treatment in September 2019.

¶ 20 At the revocation hearing, the probation officer testified that in

September 2018, Delafuente was recommended to complete Level II

Four Plus alcohol treatment. According to the probation officer,

Delafuente initially complied with the recommended treatment by

completing her intake appointment and attending her classes.

However, the treatment agency notified the probation officer that,

although Delafuente hadn’t been formally discharged, as of the time

the revocation complaint was filed, she hadn’t complied with or

completed the treatment.

¶ 21 On cross-examination, the probation officer acknowledged that

Delafuente had reported having financial difficulties that led to

transportation challenges. Delafuente had indicated that she relied

on her sister for transportation to and from the treatment center,

which, at the time, was in Greeley, about eighteen miles from her

home in Platteville. Delafuente also had indicated that at times her

sister wouldn’t take her to treatment. And Delafuente had said in

September 2019 that she’d obtained a learner’s permit but that her

car wasn’t drivable and she didn’t have the money to fix it.

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¶ 22 The probation officer testified that she had attempted to assist

Delafuente in overcoming these transportation challenges. Initially,

the probation officer provided Delafuente with bus passes that

worked within Greeley to assist her in attending her treatment

there. Later, at Delafuente’s request, the probation officer switched

her from a treatment center in Greeley to one in Fort Lupton, where

she’d indicated she could access a working car.

¶ 23 Ultimately, the district court found that Delafuente had ceased

actively participating in her treatment and hadn’t successfully

completed that treatment. It also found that Delafuente’s failure to

complete her treatment wasn’t the result of her financial issues and

related transportation challenges.

¶ 24 While the record is thin, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to support these findings by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Moses, 64 P.3d at 908; C.J.W., 727 P.2d at 872.

¶ 25 The prosecution presented evidence that, as of the time the

revocation complaint was filed, Delafuente hadn’t complied with or

completed the recommended treatment program. Delafuente didn’t

contest that allegation. Rather, she asserted that she lacked

reliable transportation to the treatment center due to her financial

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difficulties. The prosecution, in turn, offered evidence that the

probation officer had provided Delafuente with accommodations in

an effort to ease her burdens relating to transportation. Even so,

there was no evidence that Delafuente took advantage of these

accommodations and was actively participating in her treatment,

particularly after the treatment was moved to a location where

Delafuente had indicated she had access to a car.

¶ 26 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as we must, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient

to support the district court’s finding that Delafuente violated

Condition No. 8 of her probation. See Donald, ¶ 18; see also Moses,

64 P.3d at 908; Trujillo, 539 P.2d at 1236. Accordingly, we do not

disturb the court’s order revoking and reinstating her probation.

III. Disposition

¶ 27 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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